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IntroductIon: corruptIon, polItIcs and afrIca
World is crazier and more of it than we think, Incorrigibly plural1
1. ‘Corruption ruins lives: take action!’ 2
In the past two decades a general consensus has emerged condemning 
corruption as one of the most damaging factors for development. corrup-
tion is seen to undermine the cohesion and strength of whole societies, 
to threaten precarious economic and social progress made in developing 
countries, and to increase the vulnerability of lives and livelihoods of the 
poor. What is new is not only the wave of concern, but that the condem-
nation of corruption transcends all boundaries and sectors. the battle cry 
to ‘combat corruption’ is sounded by allies as well as formerly bitterly 
opposed combatants, from nGo activists and grassroots movements, to 
cEos of multinational enterprises and heads of government, from power-
ful high-income oEcd countries to conflict and poverty-ridden southern 
countries.
this is all the more surprising as for the greater part of the post-war 
period corruption was generally seen to be an a priori neutral symptom 
of changing societies, a kind of ‘growing pain’ of Westernising bureau-
cracies and industrialising economies. although there was the odd moral 
tremor denouncing the vicious and retarding effects of corruption,3 until 
the late eighties most forms of corruption in the developing world were 
generally accepted as inevitable if not in all cases desirable side-effects 
of modernisation. corruption, “a welcome lubricant easing the path 
1  Excerpt from the poem “Snow” by louis Macneice. for the full poem see the 
conclusions. 
2 this is one of transparency International’s captions, to be seen on their website 
(www.transparency.org). 
3 the most widely cited book of this era is Wraith/simpkins 1963, which famously 
stated: “throughout the fabric of public life in newly independent states [sic] runs the 
scarlet thread of bribery and corruption [. . .] which flourishes as luxuriantly as the weeds 
it so much resembles, taking the goodness from the soil and suffocating the growth of 
plants which have been carefully, and expensively, bred and tended” (Wraith/simpkins 
1963: 12–13).
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to  modernisation” (Huntington 1969: 69),4 was seen to serve specific func-
tions, both economically and socially.
conceptualising corruption as a lubricant smoothing political transi-
tion, supportive of economic growth and as a facilitator in overcoming 
obstructive bureaucracies in third world countries fitted very neatly into 
the export-driven agenda of international trade and industry. for decades 
corruption was understood to be not only necessary to do business in 
southern countries, but even mutually beneficial. “corruption reduces 
uncertainty and increases investment” (leff 1964: 8), as an influential 
Harvard scholar posited in 1964.5 a particularly telling example is the 
bribing of foreign public officials by international business companies: 
until the late nineties, it was not only perfectly acceptable for northern 
enterprises to give bribes, it was also perfectly normal to expect foreign 
(southern) officials to take bribes. In other words, corruption was a gen-
erally accepted, legal and even tax-deductable standard practice in many 
oEcd countries—business as usual.
In the meantime, however, attitudes towards corruption have changed 
dramatically. since the end of the cold War, we have been witnessing 
a radical change of tide: whereas before the prevailing understanding of 
corruption was to view it as a relatively harmless phenomenon, since the 
late eighties and early nineties it is viewed as the exact opposite: a seri-
ous threat undermining democracy, growth and equity. one indicator 
of this renewed interest in corruption is the wave of academic literature 
discussing corruption in relation to economic growth, political develop-
ment and social cohesion.6 Given the “eerie silence” (theobald 1999: 497) 
that prevailed before, a “corruption eruption” (naim 1995) took place in 
the nineties. With new theories and empirical case-studies on corruption 
flourishing and cross-fertilising each other, the past three decades have 
greatly increased our understanding of different forms, causes and effects 
of corruption. typologies of corruption have been refined, transcended 
4 to do him justice, Huntington undertook a more discerning analysis than this decon-
textualised quote indicates. for a more detailed discussion of Huntington’s approach to 
corruption and political change see chapter 1, below. 
5 for a more detailed discussion of early theories on corruption and political change 
see chapter 3, below.
6 the four volumes comprising seminal articles on corruption edited by robert Wil-
liams and fellow scholars epitomise the surge of interest over the last two decade (see 
Williams (ed.) 2000 (Vol. 1); Williams/doig (eds.) 2000 (Vol. 2); Williams et al. (eds.) 2001 
(Vol. 3); and Williams/theobald (eds.) 2001 (Vol. 4)).
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and regrouped;7 new theories on the political economy of corruption have 
been coined;8 and previously un- or underexplored fields, such as cor-
ruption in the private sector (‘private-to-private corruption’)9 or popular 
perspectives on corruption,10 have been mapped out.
Even more spectacularly, however, the spring tide of concern has 
swelled and washed ashore a dazzling multitude of initiatives, declara-
tions and conventions in all four corners of the earth. since 1997, at least 
nine conventions on corruption have been adopted, spanning global, 
regional and topical issues of corruption (see below, figure 1). In all con-
ventions, its serious repercussions on development, growth and stability 
are emphasised. consider for instance the african union, whose members 
are: “Concerned about the negative effects of corruption and impunity on 
the political, economic, social and cultural stability of african states and 
its devastating effects on the economic and social development of the 
african peoples”.11 or, indeed, the opening paragraph of the preamble of 
the oEcd convention on the combating Bribery of foreign public offi-
cials in International Business transactions: “considering that bribery is a 
widespread phenomenon in international business transactions, including 
trade and investment, which raises serious moral and political concerns, 
undermines good governance and economic development, and distorts 
international competitive conditions”,12 and subsequently proceeds to 
criminalise the bribery of foreign public officials.
 7 for a sociological discussion of types of corruption see alatas 1990; for an excellent 
elaboration of fundamental problems of typologising corruption see Heidenheimer et al. 
1993 or Johnston 1996; for a brief and clear-cut differentiation between petty, institutional 
and endemic corruption see robinson 1998; for a discussion of ‘grand’ corruption see rose-
ackermann 1996 or Moody-stuart 1997; for an early analysis of rent-seeking and corruption 
see Hutchcroft 1997; for an analysis of systemic corruption see Johnston 1998; for an early 
analysis of rent-seeking and corruption see Hutchcroft 1997. 
 8 Groundbreaking here rose-ackerman 1978, Heidenheimer et al. (eds.) 1993 and 
Khan/Jomo K.s. 2000; for a more recent state-of-the-art compilation see rose-ackerman 
(ed.) 2006.
 9 a watershed was demarcated by the oEcd edition on corruption in the private sec-
tor, with contributions by renowned scholars and experts (see oEcd (ed.) 2000).
10 Here, olivier de sardan and Blundo have paved the way (olivier de sardan 1999, 
Blundo/olivier de sardan 2000, 2001), but see also smith 2007 for an excellent case-study 
on popular perceptions of corruption in nigeria.
11  see the preamble of the “african union convention on preventing and combating 
corruption”, adopted by the 2nd ordinary session of the assembly of the union, Maputo, 
11 July 2003: 2, emphasis in original.
12 see the preamble of the “convention on combating Bribery of foreign public 
officials in International Business transactions”, adopted by the negotiating parties on 
27 november 1997. 
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(source: the author, based on data from transparency International)13
figure 1: a timeline of anti-corruption conventions
Both examples, two of many, demonstrate a new worldwide approach 
to the issue of corruption. they indicate a transformed understanding of 
north/south relations by placing the responsibility for corruption firmly 
within global economic and political relations. up to the early nineties, 
northern countries generally understood corruption to be a problem of 
greedy, poor and ineffective southern administrations. southern coun-
tries, on the other hand, denounced it as a problem of the corrupting 
influence of big (northern) business. However, today the consensus across 
13 see tIs website under http://www.transparency.org/global_priorities/international_
conventions/conventions_instruments (last accessed 30 april 2010). 
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continents and sectors is that “[p]oor governance and corruption under-
mine efforts in the south to fight poverty, to improve access to basic ser-
vices, to establish responsible government and to improve the quality of 
life for all.”14 In other words, it is generally acknowledged that corruption 
is a global problem that affects all dimensions of political, economic and 
social development. anyone concerned with development and political 
change should therefore also be concerned with corruption.
However, in spite of this general consensus on the negative correlation 
between corruption and development, it is not self-evident how the anti-
corruption discourse impacts democratic politics. as will be explained in 
the following sections, my key interest is not the measurable impact or 
even coherence of anti-corruption policies. conversely, neither is it the 
impact of corruption on democratic policies. the line of thought which 
will be explored in the following chapters will be framed in far more polit-
ical terms, for on centre stage is the question of corruption and political 
change: under what conditions can the discourse of corruption actually 
catalyse political change that leads to greater individual and social free-
dom? In other words, the key interest of this book is to explore how the 
discourse of corruption can act as an imaginary and catalyst of political 
change. to undertake this study, I bring together three complementary 
and intertwined themes: a critical study of scholarly thought on corrup-
tion and political order in africa; an outline of a political theory of cor-
ruption, putting the conditions of political agency and emancipation on 
centre stage; and a case-study of governance, corruption and political 
agency in the construction industry of dar Es salaam, tanzania.
In the following sections of this Introduction I shall sketch out some 
background ideas and concepts, in particular with regard to the devel-
opment discourse that has profiled corruption and governance so 
prominently.
2. Development Discourse: Good Governance and the  
‘Anti-Corruption Machine’
the swell of concern with corruption and development has been con-
solidated in a development paradigm crystallised around the notion of 
14 see the declaration of the 12th International anti-corruption conference, “towards 
a fairer World: Why is corruption still Blocking the Way?” Guatemala city, Guatemala, 
18 november 2006.
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‘good governance’. Indeed, it can be stated without exaggeration that cor-
ruption and governance have been the most influential notions informing 
the development discourse since the late eighties. Interestingly, the con-
cept of governance was initially developed with direct reference to Afri-
can development. In a much-noted publication on “sustainable Growth in 
subsaharan africa” in 1989, the World Bank undertook a major transforma-
tion of its development strategy, shifting from market-centred, neo-liberal 
policies to state-led development framed by more effective institutions 
and better governance (World Bank 1989). the World Bank outlined its 
new position by stating that
african governments [. . .] need to go beyond the issues of public finance, 
monetary policy, prices and markets to address fundamental questions 
relating to human capacities, institutions, governance, the environment, 
population growth and distribution, and technology (World Bank 1989: 1).15
Hence, corruption was increasingly recognised as the major obstacle to 
good governance, to the point where (good) governance and (anti-)-
corruption became almost synonymous with development: “pervasive 
corruption [. . .] undermines the credibility of democratic institutions and 
works against good governance. corruption, whether in the public or pri-
vate sector, also results in the misuse of scarce resources with far-reaching 
effects throughout the economy” (dac/oEcd 1995: 19). this consensus 
culminated in 1996, when the then president of the World Bank, James 
Wolfensohn, famously declared the core commitment of the World Bank 
to fight the ‘cancer of corruption’.16
15 Equally, the World Bank’s landmark publication on the state in a changing World 
(1997), arguing for more effective and efficient state institutions as a precondition for eco-
nomic growth, draws heavily on examples drawn from the rapaciousness and greed of 
african regimes and public officials. In many cases, the dysfunctional african state char-
acterised by corruption epitomises the ‘bad’ governance which ‘good’ governance seeks 
to eradicate, with clientelism, patronage and more specific types of corruption serving as 
prime features of bad governance. although the concept of governance has since gained 
worldwide traction, it still draws particular salience from references to africa. 
16 see World Bank 2000a: 1, where the reference to this ‘cancer’ is used to underscore 
the need for ‘new approaches’ and ‘a truly global response’ to fighting corruption. the 
World Bank justifies its engagement by referring to its important contributions to interna-
tional anti-corruption efforts as well as its fiduciary duty to member countries. the World 
Bank’s approach is summed up in the following excerpt: “the Bank views corruption as 
a symptom of underlying institutional dysfunction, and thus employs a proactive and 
holistic approach that attempts to help clients strengthen governance and public sector 
management, to improve economic policies and legal/judicial systems, and to develop and 
implement specific anticorruption measures” (World Bank 2000a: 4).
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In the nineties and 2000s, all major bilateral and multilateral devel-
opment agencies put anti-corruption policies on centre stage of their 
programmes, as a means to achieve their overarching goal of poverty 
reduction. leading the field were no doubt the multinational develop-
ment agencies, who elaborated a whole set of paradigms and develop-
ment strategies based on the notion of ‘good’ governance. the lynchpin 
of good governance was the ‘fight against corruption’, implying more 
effective, efficient and accountable state institutions as a prerequisite 
for poverty reduction (seminally World Bank 1990, 1992).17 In this period, 
all major multi- as well as bilateral development agencies undertook 
notable organisational reforms to accommodate governance as a new 
development priority, by producing a plethora of strategies, white papers, 
programmes, clusters, and indicators in the quest to operationalise gover-
nance and anti- corruption.18 not surprisingly, this policy priority was also 
reflected in the highly influential paris declaration on aid Effectiveness 
(2005), seeking to harmonise foreign aid in a consolidated effort to render 
it more effective. Its statement of resolve highlights that
17 certainly in the 2000s, the World Bank still occupied a privileged position in con-
structing the field of governance; indeed, some would argue the World Bank is not only 
the “key actor in the construction of governance states in africa” (Harrison 2004: 7) but 
even “the paramount force behind governance no less” (Harrison 2004: 7). the introduc-
tory remarks of Governance and anti-corruption strategy (World Bank 2007) epitomise 
the consensus within development policy:
“at the center of the Gac strategy is the emergence of a shared vision in which coun-
tries recognize the links between governance, corruption, growth, and poverty reduction, 
and where governments are taking active steps to address the governance barriers to faster 
and more inclusive growth and improved service delivery, and thus to poverty reduction” 
(World Bank 2007: 1).
18 suffice to illustrate with some pertinent examples: In this period, the undp estab-
lished a focus area on democratic Governance (see there website under http://www 
.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourwork/democraticgovernance/focus_areas.html (last 
accessed 18 March 2012)), the oEcd/dac established an anti-corruption task team as 
well as Governance network (GoVnEt), whose member states have drawn up the prin-
ciples of donor action in anti-corruption (for more information see http://www.oecd 
.org/dac/governanceanddevelopment/principlesfordonoractiononanti-corruption.htm); 
the World Bank an anticorruption and Governance thematic Group (http://go.worldbank 
.org/9YHufW46I0 (last accessed 18 March 2012)), and introduced a governance cluster 
in its country policy and Institutional assessment (cpIa). furthermore, the nineties saw 
the launch of the much noted Worldwide Governance Indicators through the World Bank 
Institute. also, a group of European donor countries established u4, an anti-corruption 
resource centre (www.u4.no), operated by the christian Mickelsen center on behalf of the 
so-called u4, a group of European donor countries. on the level of bilateral agencies, the 
department for International development’s White paper on Governance (dfId 2006), or 
the netherlands’ “strategic Governance and corruption analysis” (sGaca) (unsworth and 
cru 2007) have met with great interest.
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corruption and lack of transparency, which erode public support, impede 
effective resource mobilisation and allocation and divert resources away 
from activities that are vital for poverty reduction and sustainable economic 
development. Where corruption exists, it inhibits donors from relying on 
partner country systems.19
Just how pervasive this new thinking and operationalisation of anti-
 corruption was can also be seen from growth in scientific indicators seek-
ing to quantify and capture corruption. this process began in the nineties 
with the ranking of countries, most influentially through the World Bank 
Governance Indicators and transparency International corruption per-
ceptions Index. further indices soon followed, entrenching a particular 
epistemic authority with regard to ‘dysfunctions’ of development, quite 
literally measuring the degree of ‘corrupted’ political and economic order. 
Increasingly, such indicators were also used to evaluate countries with 
regard to further disbursements, illustrating just how central the measure-
ment of governance and corruption had become in foreign aid.
However, this ubiquitous concern with corruption as an obstacle to 
development begs more questions than it answers. Whence the change 
of tide that necessitates this ‘fight against corruption’? a series of critical 
scholars have engaged with this question, and their analysis provides some 
insights into the background and emergence of the governance agenda. 
Most significantly, their insights include, firstly, the geo-political transfor-
mations that took place after the cold War ended, and which unlodged 
geo-strategic underpinnings of development interventions based on 
a East/West-divide. second, the stark failure of the neoliberal develop-
ment paradigm imposed in the eighties, especially on african countries, 
necessitated the search for and construction of a revised development 
 paradigm.20 the concept of governance was mid-way between state-led 
and market-led development, emphasising the importance of market-
based macro-economic policies within a framework provided by an effec-
tive and efficient state. and lastly, it could and has been argued that the 
discourse of governance, but even more so the crisper, more evocative 
19  paris declaration on aid Effectiveness 2005: section 1. 
20 for a discussion of the mostly disastrous impact of structural adjustment programmes 
see for instance Bienefeld 1995 or Haggard/Kaufman 1995; see also Jenkins 2001. It is no 
coincidence that one year after the historic end of the cold War, the united nations pub-
lished the first annual Human development report (1990), explicitly conceptualised as 
a rights-based counter-agenda to the neo-liberal, technocratic policy framework of the 
World Bank.
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discourse of corruption, serves to reframe the development discourse in a 
way to justify further technocratic interventions in state and society.21
this latter reading adopts a deeply critical approach to the develop-
ment apparatus as a whole, and seeks to deconstruct the underlying 
relations that constitute ‘development’. drawing heavily on the writing 
of Michel foucault, ‘development’ is understood as a discourse, as “a 
domain of thought and action” (Escobar 1995: 10) that privileges certain 
forms of knowledge and gives rise to certain techniques of power, which 
in turn frame specific forms of subjectivities.22 In the case of the devel-
opment discourse, the results are “concrete practices of thinking and 
acting through which the third World is produced” (Escobar 1995: 11). 
perhaps most poignantly of all critical scholars of development, Escobar 
termed the key feature of foreign aid and the development discourse as 
“the bureaucratization of social action” (Escobar 1995: 53), indicating the 
depoliticisation effect that the technocratic engineering of and interven-
tion in society effects.23
precisely this depoliticisation effect has been critically noted with 
regard to governance and anti-corruption policies. although it aims at 
transforming political culture and practice, the system (or discourse) of 
21  for critical deconstructions of the the governance and anti-corruption discourse see 
Marquette 2003 or Harrison 2004.
22 Michel foucault speaks of a ‘strategic apparatus’, a “system of relations” or “forma-
tion” which “has a dominant strategic function” (foucault 1980: 194).
23 for influential contributions see ferguson 1990, Escobar 1995, and the edited vol-
umes of sachs (ed.) 1995 and rahema/Bawtree (eds.) 1997. 
(source: compiled by the author)
figure 2: a timeline of Governance and corruption Indices
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foreign aid has the opposite effect. note for instance the trenchant cri-
tique of good governance policies by Morris szeftel:
firstly, the governance agenda tackles corruption as if it were the cause of 
democratic and development problems rather than a symptom or conse-
quence of them. thus it fails to address the deeper political and class forces 
which drive the politics of clientelism and corruption. and secondly, in their 
demonization of the state and determination to substitute themselves for 
the state to force adjustment through, the donors and international agencies 
undermine the institutional development needed to sustain a more demo-
cratic, transparent and accountable system. the result is that the important 
institutional structures and principles they seek to mobilize against corrup-
tion are unlikely to take root (szeftel 1998: 238).
In the same vein, adrian leftwich exposes the vacuity of the good gov-
ernance agenda below their “impeccably Weberian” (leftwich 1993: 167) 
surface of public sector reform.24
crucially, then, it has not been regime type but the kind and character of 
the state and its associated politics that have been decisive in influencing 
developmental performance. this in turn highlights the primacy of politics, 
not simply governance, as a central determinant of development (leftwich 
1993: 169; emphasis in original).25
Hence, the key critique of governance policies and the anti-corruption 
discourse is that, through their emphasis on ‘getting institutions right’ and 
through the bureaucratisation and engineering of political change they 
effect the opposite to what they intend to do: instead of nurturing and 
catalysing democratic change, they crowd out the ‘deeper political force’, 
the social forces and the politics which historically have initiated and 
carried political change.26 Much like the ‘anti-politics machine’, as fer-
guson (1990) convincingly terms the development apparatus, what can be 
observed here is an ‘anti-corruption machine’: an interrelated set of highly 
normative social imaginaries and resource-rich technocratic interventions 
aimed at fundamentally restructuring state-society relations.
24 for a non-exhaustive list of further contributions feeding into this loosely connected 
critical contributions see riley 1993, 1998; Khan 1996; Harriss-White/White 1996; doig/riley 
1998; szeftel 1998; doig/theobald (eds.) 2000; Morris 2000; or Kotkin/sajo 2001. 
25 on a theoretical level, Joël Migdal frames the problem in the following way: “policies 
intended to bring about radical redistributions in wealth or political and social power in 
the end frequently have the opposite effect [. . .]. states in fragmented societies are more 
likely to remain arenas for accommodation than to become sources for major changes in 
peoples’ social behavior” (Migdal 2001: 94).
26 for a seminal study see rueschemeyer et al. 1992. 
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Interestingly, however, in the past decade influential development 
agencies such as the World Bank or dfid have sought to address this 
critique by integrating ‘power’ and ‘politics’ into their governance and 
anti-corruption strategies (see World Bank 2007, dfid 2007, 2009, csr 
and unsworth 2007). note for instance the netherlands’ “strategic Gover-
nance and corruption analysis” (sGaca), which is designed as a toolbox 
to incorporate political processes as an integral part of governance poli-
cies and programmes. for, in its own words,
despite best efforts, direct interventions of donors to strengthen formal insti-
tutions of governance have often had limited impact, and ‘political will’—to 
promote growth and poverty reduction, fight corruption and protect human 
rights—is often lacking. the sGaca [. . .] highlights the importance of social 
and political processes in achieving better governance.27
However, the jury is still out whether the mainstreaming of ‘power’ and 
‘politics’ into the operational and by necessity essentially bureaucratic 
implementation mechanisms of aid agencies will actually effect a funda-
mental change in power relations that seem to be prerequisite for political 
change. the effects of these modified interventions do not obey a linear, 
mechanistic logic, which would make outcomes and results perfectly pre-
dictable. rather, they are embedded in dynamic and contingent processes 
of social and political relations, which mould and appropriate such inter-
ventions in often unexpected ways—with corruption itself being some-
times one of the more original ways of ‘practicing’ development.28
and yet, even if one adopts a critical stance towards the development 
discourse, the fact remains that foreign aid constitutes a highly significant 
material, financial and technical reality in developing countries, with the 
resources flowing into governance policies on the rise (see oEcd 2010). 
Given these substantial levels of aid tied to governance, one must assume 
that these policies have very real impacts on social realities. But these 
impacts may not always converge with the stated objectives of the devel-
opment policies, programmes or projects; a critical conclusion which 
many evaluations of governance and anti-corruption policies have also 
come to.29
27 see unsworth and cru 2007: 1.
28 a very graphic and practical example of ‘how aid works’ to enable corruption is dis-
cussed by Jansen 2009, critically scrutinising both actors and mechanisms of aid. 
29 for many, see tangri/Mwenda 2006 or doig 2006.
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In a very foucauldian sense, however, this unplanned or reverse out-
come of development interventions should not be seen as ‘failures’. on 
the contrary, they are part and parcel of the discursive (re)production of 
‘development’.30 ferguson observes this phenomenon by remarking:
plans constructed within a conceptual apparatus do have effects but in the 
process of having these effects they generally ‘fail’ to transform the world in 
their own image. But ‘failure’ here does not mean doing nothing; it means 
doing something else, and that something always has its own logic. systems 
of discourse and systems of thought are thus bound up in a complex causal 
relationship with the stream of planned and unplanned events that consti-
tutes the social world (ferguson 1990: 277).
In other words, intentions and plans may be very powerful in the way 
they isolate and elevate certain types of knowledge and practices, the way 
in which a ‘masterplan’ is constructed. But the ways that this masterplan 
‘makes’ reality are far more unpredictable and complex, operating as they 
do in a world of unacknowledged structures and processes. this is not 
a normative statement, it is an analytical premise: discourses have very 
real impacts on social realities. the actual outcome, however, is empiri-
cally open, given the dynamics and complexity of the social world. But 
discourses do frame (if not a priori ‘fix’) modes of thought and epistemic 
‘truths’, and they produce specific sets of acknowledged practices, inter-
ventions and other forms of regulating society. In the context of recipient 
countries, they often constitute by far the most financially, technically and 
materially dominant actors. the goal of this study is to take the develop-
ment discourse at face value, and to trace the ways in which the gover-
nance and anti-corruption interventions initiated and financed through 
foreign aid have indeed contributed to political liberation and emancipa-
tion. not bluntly through ‘stronger’ institutions or more ‘transparency’ and 
‘accountability’, but rather looking at the ways in which political articula-
tions link up to this discourse and seek to (re)frame it according to their 
interests and claims and practices.
30 foucault speaks of ‘instrument-effects’ (foucault 1977), i.e. effects which are both 
effects as well as instruments of this particular regime of power. In this reading, the ‘fail-
ure’ of a particular discursive regime (here: development) should not be analysed in terms 
of failure but in terms of discursive logics. discussing the failure of the prison, foucault 
suggests “one should reverse the question and ask oneself what is served by the failure 
of the prison; what is the use of these different phenomena that are continually being 
criticized; the maintenance of delinquency, the encouragement of recidivism, the transfor-
mation of the occasional offender into a habitual delinquent, the organization of a closed 
milieu of delinquency” (foucault 1977: 272). 
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In other words, if one takes ‘corruption’ and ‘governance’ seriously, it 
becomes necessary to analyse the processes through which social change 
is effected. this may not be through the rather mechanistic processes that 
development interventions are based on. But the paradigms, programmes 
and interventions of foreign aid of governance and anti-corruption will 
still play a prominent way in the thoughts, actions and horizons of social 
actors. ultimately, my intention is to theorise the ways in which social 
actors appropriate meanings of corruption, and the effects this operation 
has on the structuring of political order. However, this exploration will 
take me off the beaten track of conventional theorisations of corruption. 
some conceptual detours will therefore be necessary to pave the way for 
this exploration of corruption. In the next section, I will begin my explora-
tion with an overview over possible meanings of corruption, which will be 
the starting point for developing the key questions raised in this study.
3. ‘Rational’, ‘Rotten’ or ‘Routine’: What is Corruption?
so far no attempt has been undertaken here to define corruption. this 
conscious omission is due to the fact that a succinct definition of ‘corrup-
tion’ has its fallacies. consider, for example, if corruption can generally be 
viewed as “an aberrant deviation of the norm” (Heywood 1997: 417), then 
what norms are being deviated from? are we referring to the legal frame-
work or to social standards? are there degrees of ‘aberrant deviations’ 
depending on the time and place in which the act takes place? does cor-
ruption have a moral content, characterized by “the privatization of moral 
concerns and the accompanying breakdown of civic loyalty” (dobel 1978: 
959) within a given political order, or is it purely nominal, “what people 
accuse each other of when they see them acting against their interests” 
(philp 1997: 454)? and who then are the actors of corruption? Is corruption 
a trait of rational public officials, of greedy or needy monopolists over a 
public good, whose prime objective is “to maximise the value of the bribes 
[they] collect from selling this government good” (shleifer/Vishny 1993: 
601)? or is it a trait of self-serving groups, lured by the gravitational force 
of lucrative state-resources that bring forth “a stampede of favored elites 
and would-be favored elites” (Hutchcroft 1991: 415)? or is it ultimately the 
sign of a degenerate society “rotten with a culture of graft and corruption”?31 
31 see the headline of the online article by dan teng’o “Kenya Government rotten With 
culture of Graft and corruption”, 20 december 2006, in World politics review Exclusive 
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Evidently, corruption is a phenomenon that resists easy labelling.32 small 
wonder that the united nations convention against corruption (uncac) 
refrains from defining corruption, hence circumnavigating the scylla of 
cultural imperialism inferred through stipulative Western definitions and 
the charybdis of definitional relativism attempting to do justice to the 
cultural embeddedness of corruption.
the difficulty of defining corruption on the one hand, and the threat-
ening image it evokes on the other hand seems to lend itself to meta-
phorical language. speaking of corruption frequently means speaking 
in terms of decay and illness. the ‘rotten society’ noted above invokes a 
society deteriorating physically and morally. In development cooperation, 
for instance, it has become standard practice to refer to corruption as a 
‘cancer of development’, a potentially terminal and certainly perfidious 
condition affecting political order, economic growth and the capacity of 
states and societies.33
suffice to note at this point that “[c]orruption is not something that 
‘happens’ to otherwise healthy societies: no country has ever been free of 
it” (Johnston 1998a: 70). Just how true this statement is in today’s world 
is underlined by the World Map of corruption (see figure 3, below),34 
 
under http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=424 (last accessed 30 septem-
ber 2008), which refers to the ‘rotten Kenya’ that the British foreign office Minister Kim 
Howells warned of at the time. 
32 a succinct overview over the most important approaches to defining corruption is 
provided by robert Williams (1999b), who concludes slightly mockingly: “no doubt some 
analysts still hope that, somewhere in the conceptual ether, there exists a definition of 
corruption which is sufficiently capacious and nuanced to compensate for the limits of 
existing definitions, yet which is brief enough to slip into the introductory paragraph 
of official reports on corruption. to date, no all-purpose definition is available and there 
are grounds for believing that the search is futile” (Williams 1999b: 512).
33 the ‘cancer of corruption’ is reiterated in development cooperation again and again, 
following the much-noted statement of James Wolfensohn, the president of the World 
Bank at the time, in the mid-nineties. Equally evocative images abound. Johnston, for 
instance, notes a development worker describing corruption as the ‘aIds of development’ 
(see Johnston 1998a: 69). In my own work as an anti-corruption expert, I encountered 
similarly flourishing circumscriptions of corruption routinely in terms of references or in 
statements by development workers, public officials or civil society representatives. In a 
similar vein, reforms intended to prevent and sanction corruption are described in terms 
of a ‘battle’ to ‘fight’ or ‘combat’ corruption, or in terms of the ‘eradication’ of the ‘scourge’ 
of corruption.
34 since 1995, transparency International, an influential global anti-corruption organi-
sation, has undertaken an annual survey of the perceptions on corruption internationally. 
the cpI ranks countries on a scale from 0=highly corrupt to 10=not corrupt. 
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which provides a graphic overview over the extent and spread of corrup-
tion worldwide. the intended effect of the map is to shock relevant policy 
makers, activists and development agencies into action, by depicting a 
world in which corruption and poverty go hand in hand. the interna-
tional media and political attention accorded to the annual release of the 
corruption perceptions Index (cpI), on which the map is based, is sign of 
its sweeping success.
However, looking at the vast areas worldwide shaded in darker, more 
corrupt blues, one could arguably defend an inverted perspective: namely 
that corruption globally constitutes the norm, not the exception. In other 
words, on the basis of the corruption perceptions Index one could make 
a valid argument stating that in actual fact a country ‘free of corruption’ 
is a deviant society, rather than arguing that corruption constitutes some 
form of deviance. this is a distinct perspective raising a host of issues with 
regard to notions of political order or the state, which will be touched 
upon in the course of this enquiry. However, although I hope to be 
35 see under http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009 
(last accessed 25 March 2010).
(source: transparency International)35
figure 3: World Map of corruption 2009
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 undertaking several theoretical and empirical inversions of perspectives 
on corruption, this ‘inverted’ aspect is not the focal point of this enquiry. 
to pursue my objective of understanding corruption in conjunction with 
social and political change more clearly, I need to dwell for a moment 
on the definitional aspect—not so much to name ‘corruption’ more pre-
cisely, but to carve out the sociological problem that corruption denotes. 
for as widespread perceptions on the extent and indeed practices of cor-
ruption may be, as oscillating and multi-faceted as the phenomenon may 
be, as emotional and evocative denouncements of corruption may be, the 
sociological problematique of corruption needs to be pinpointed more 
precisely.
put in a nutshell, the problem of corruption emanates from its 
 boundary-crossing nature. corruption, in modern societies, always 
denotes some form of transgression of the public and private, the official 
and the unofficial, the legal and the illegal, the formal and the informal. 
such practices and properties of transgression shall be theorised in more 
detail in the following chapters. suffice at this point to peel out the core of 
corruption, as embodied by the currently most widely used and intuitively 
plausible definition of corruption.36 In the succinct formula coined by 
transparency International, corruption is “the misuse of entrusted power 
for private gain”.37 notable and new here is the openness of the defini-
tion, putting the abuse of power on centre stage, but allowing contextual 
leeway with regard to the (public or private) sphere such transgression 
takes place in. More narrowly and more classically, Michael Johnston 
circumscribes corruption as “the abuse of public roles or resources for 
private benefit” (Johnston 1998a: 89).38 Here, and for our purposes more 
36 It was actually Joseph nye who coined the gold standard of corruption definitions. 
nye defines corruption as “behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of a public 
role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or sta-
tus gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influ-
ence. this includes such behaviour as bribery (use of reward to pervert the judgement 
of a person in a position of trust); nepotism (bestowal of patronage by reason of ascrip-
tive relationship rather than merit); and misappropriation (illegal appropriation of public 
resources for private-regarding uses)” (nye 1967: 419). for a seminal overview and critical 
discussion of definitions of corruption see Johnston 1996.
37 consult their website under http://www.transparency.org/news_room/faq/ 
corruption_faq (last accessed 13 september 2008).
38 for further definitional aspects of corruption see the pioneering articles compiled 
in Heidenheimer et al. (eds.) 1993, Williams (ed.) 2000 (Vol. 1), Williams/doig (eds.) 2000 
(Vol. 2); Williams/Moran/flanary (eds.) 2001 (Vol. 3); and Williams/theobald 2001 (eds.) 
(Vol. 4); for a detailed discussion of definitional problems of corruption see Johnston 
1996. 
 corruption, politics and africa 17
useful, the classic distinction between public and private is in the lime-
light. More precisely: the relationship between the public sphere and the 
private sphere, and the norms, practices and imaginaries governing this 
relationship.
this relationship between the public and private has never been 
 unambiguous.39 and in today’s globalised world, evidently, this relation-
ship is in continual need of reconsideration, characterised as it is by pro-
cesses of glocalization40 cutting across economic, political, social, legal 
and cultural spheres. one hallmark of this process is, on a national and 
international level, the profound shift of norm-setting legitimacy and 
authority from governmental to non-state actors,41 which raises funda-
mental questions about meanings and definitions of such terms as ‘abuse’, 
‘public roles’ or indeed ‘private benefit’. the politicisation of corruption 
in national politics across continents, the intrinsic correlation between 
corruption and poverty reduction articulated continually by international 
development agencies, the powerful statements and actions by national 
and international non-governmental organisations condemning the dis-
empowering effects of corruption all point to significant shifts of the val-
ues and practices shaping these discourses, or perhaps more precisely: the 
power relations underlying the politics of such discursive operations.
these thoughts are at the outset of my exploration of corruption. I base 
my study on the premise that the “differing outlooks over the meaning of 
corruption are not just ‘noise’, or a problem to be resolved by definition, 
but rather valuable clues to continuing political development” (Johnston 
1996: 329), or rather: to continuing political struggles. It is precisely these 
struggles that I put on centre stage of my enquiry. What I am interested 
in is not what constitutes corruption, which means I will be spending very 
little time on discussing definitions of corruption. My interest is the ways 
in which ‘corruption’ is used to shape and structure social reality.
I mean by this two related sets of theoretical issues. the first set encom-
passes discourses of corruption which (re)produce meanings and under-
standings of corruption, the contours and mechanisms of which need 
39 seminally for the history of European state formation see tilly 1990, 2004.
40 these are terms that gained sociological currency in the nineties, seeking to cap-
ture processes of globalisation in terms of the disembedding and re-embedding of social 
and other relations over time and space. seminal see the edited volume coining the term 
‘global modernities’ by featherstone, lash and robertson (eds.) 1995; for the term ‘glocali-
ties’ see the contribution in the same volume by robertson 1995. see also Giddens 1990. 
41  for an in-depth discussion see peters/Koechlin/fenner Zinkernagel 2009: 1–32; and 
peters/förster/Koechlin 2009: 493–560. 
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to be understood more clearly to render their effects on the ordering 
of social and political realities in africa visible. the second, and by no 
means unrelated set,42 relates to the ways in means that particular social 
agents seek to structure and organise the public realm. these include the 
ways in which social actors appropriate meanings of corruption to articu-
late their demands and interests and needs, and the processes through 
which such articulatory operations are transformed into social realities. 
allow me to explicate these propositions in a little more detail in the 
following section.
4. Discourses of Corruption, Discourses of Africa
perhaps due to its evocative, boundary-crossing nature, a striking feature 
of corruption is the way it is enunciated in a great variety of discourses. 
this holds particularly true for discourses on development. on a very 
practical level, the statements quoted above by international governmen-
tal and non-governmental organisations indicate the weight that corrup-
tion is given with regard to national development, political stability and 
social equity. still today, the terms corruption and governance are omni-
present in development cooperation. there is hardly a national or inter-
national policy statement in africa that does not implicitly or explicitly 
refer to corruption. It seems that corruption and governance have become 
a panacea for solving development problems of all sorts. In more belliger-
ent rhetoric, the ‘fight against corruption’ is also the fight against poverty, 
the fight against inequity, the fight against inefficiency.
this clear-cut, on the surface completely smooth and unambiguous 
correlation that dominates much of contemporary development discourse 
strikes the eye. striking here are several aspects: firstly, the fact that corrup-
tion is in the spotlight of development discourse at all, especially against 
the backdrop of a void, a silence with regard to linkages between corrup-
tion and development up to the late eighties. secondly, the importance 
it is currently endowed with regarding all facets of development. Be it to 
denounce kleptocratic regimes (notably in africa), be it to design more 
42 this is in contrast to a classic foucauldian approach, where intentional acts by social 
agents disappear behind discursive inscriptions. a foucauldian approach is well-suited 
for analysing a body of thought and patterns of power relations (such as the development 
discourse), but not for identifying and analysing social agents and their influence on the 
(re)organisation of political and social order. 
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effective and efficient public institutions, be it to empower civil society, 
corruption is routinely and mostly emphatically invoked. and thirdly, on 
a material level, the swell of foreign aid allocated to governance and anti-
corruption interventions shore up this semantic force with technical and 
financial resources.43
In a nearly text-book fashion, hence, the critical scholar of develop-
ment policies in africa is faced with a discourse in a classic foucauldian 
sense, a distinct group of statements underlying particular rules of dis-
persion, sites of production, and orders of inferences. as striking as the 
regularities and patterns of this discourse are, however, equally striking 
are its disjunctions: the negative correlation between development and 
corruption is not only enunciated within the field of development, but 
also within the private sector and civil society. although the referent, cor-
ruption, is the same, the domains of its production are wildly dissimi-
lar. Most prominently, in the (multi-national) private sector rationales of 
investment and reputation frame changing articulations and practices of 
corruption; in civil society, rationales of participation and democratisa-
tion underlie the statements. and yet these different discourses feed into 
each other, producing a clearly discernible and distinctive discursive for-
mation signifying governance and ‘anti-corruption’. the developmental 
discourse on governance and corruption has materialised as a new devel-
opment paradigm,44 a paradigm that has taken on a highly significant role 
in all facets of contemporary development cooperation. for the past two 
decades it has been structuring ways of thinking and acting and plan-
ning and administering in developing countries. Indeed, the production 
of knowledge and policies on governance and corruption have become a 
whole industry.
My prime interest lies in the effects that this discursive formation has 
beyond its immediate objectives and formulated results. I am particu-
larly interested in the activities that transform society arising out of this 
way of thinking and acting. Evidently, the symbolic, rhetoric and mate-
rial resources the development discourse draws upon are endowed with 
a significant potential of transforming society (if not, as will be discussed, 
always in the articulated ways). this takes me to a further, less obvious 
discourse on corruption, namely the academic discourse of corruption in 
43 see oEcd/dac 2010 for statistical data on aid disbursement with regard to gover-
nance reforms. 
44 see pieterse 2001 for a discerning discussion of different development paradigms 
over time.
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africa. this discourse seeks to theorise and categorise the phenomenon 
of corruption in relation to political order in africa. all influential con-
temporary intellectual engagement with questions of political develop-
ment in africa invariably problematises ‘corruption’ in some form. across 
the board, scholarly enquiries into the organisation of political power in 
africa use corruption as a key explanandum for the elaboration of their 
theories. Evidently, the conceptualisation of corruption varies according 
to the theoretical premises these perspectives are grounded in. But it is 
remarkable to observe what singular importance corruption is accorded 
in the academic literature. It seems as if ‘corruption’—be it as a struc-
tural property, as a cultural matrix, as an exchange mechanism, as a social 
 practice—is the lynchpin explaining political order in africa. By inference, 
corruption also provides the key to explaining political change (or, more 
frequently, political stagnation or decay) in africa.
the elaboration of dominant theoretical positions on corruption and 
political order in africa is instrumental to this enquiry for two reasons. 
firstly, it lays bare the discursive formation configuring ‘corruption and 
political order in africa’. the overarching aim is to untangle the academic 
ways of thinking about politics and corruption in africa allowing for an 
enquiry into social and political change in africa. of particular interest 
here is the identification of identifying social agents and practices that 
effect political change in africa. More explicitly: to explore and identify 
processes of political change of a specific democratic nature.
as will be argued in the course of the following two chapters, however, 
the tools provided by the academic discourse on corruption (as well as the 
development discourse, as was seen above) are insufficient to respond to 
this question. Both discourses are trapped in their own distinct rationales 
that foreclose the seeing and understanding of spaces of social agency. 
for this reason I am compelled to sketch out what I have rather grandly 
termed a third discourse, namely a discourse on corruption and politi-
cal emancipation. In a radical reconceptualisation of dominant thinking 
about corruption and politics in africa, this discourse seeks to articulate 
ways in which one can think ‘corruption’ in a politically liberating way. 
Nota bene, this perspective does not imply a reversion to a functionalist 
or simplistic modernist way of thinking corruption, i.e. of corruption in a 
‘lubricating’ sense. the discourse elaborated here unlocks a theorisation 
of corruption in terms of political actions and emancipatory struggles.
as was discussed in the previous section with regard to definitional 
issues, the conceptualisation of corruption in terms of political contes-
tation is by no means new. However, the distinct theoretical operation 
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undertaken here is to put the question differently, namely: How can the 
articulation of particular demands that are raised through the problemati-
sation and politicisation of corruption be generalised in ways which enable 
democratic politics? In other words, how can the contingent articulations 
of social and political relations, which the very naming of and contesta-
tions surrounding ‘corruption’ refer to, be theorised in a way that allows 
a deeper sociological understanding of the conditions and processes of 
democratic politics? Hence the introduction of the term ‘empty signifier’, 
which, as will be elaborated, allows for an analysis of particular articula-
tions by social groups and the processes through which they seek, achieve 
or fail to structure political order. corruption conceptualised in this more 
overtly political sense serves as a very likely signifier of such contestations 
and articulations in africa.
Evidently, this proposition requires some careful elaboration. In fact, 
its exploration will be of key concern for the greater part of this enquiry. 
suffice to note at this point that corruption serves as a highly insightful 
medium regarding all three discourses; it serves to illuminate the practical 
effects of the development discourse; it allows a critical reformulation of 
the academic discourse; and, last but not least, it allows for the develop-
ment of a theoretical framework more conducive to understanding pro-
cesses of political change. Moreover, the enquiry into corruption lends 
itself to the enrichment of the theoretical propositions outlined in the 
body of the three discourses through empirical analysis ‘on the ground’, so 
to speak. the explanation of how such an enquiry can and will be under-
taken in concreto takes me to the organisation of the following chapters, 
to which I now turn.
5. Methodology and Organisation of the Enquiry
the structure of my enquiry has two main parts. Very simply, in the first 
part (chapters 1 and 2), the academic as well as the emancipatory dis-
course introduced in the previous section will be spelled out and sub-
stantiated more fully. the essence drawn from these two discourses, in 
ascending order of importance, provide the analytical strategy45 with 
45 on analytical strategies see akerstrom anderson 2003, who provides an excellent defi-
nition: an analytical strategy is “a way to stress the deliberate choice and its implications, 
and to highlight that this choice could be made differently with different implications in 
respect of the emerging object” (akerstrom anderson 2003: XIII; emphasis in original). 
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which the case-study on corruption and political agency in tanzania in 
the second part (chapters 3 and 4) shall be explored. using corruption 
as an analytical focal point, ultimately the objective of the enquiry is to 
develop a more nuanced and meaningful analysis of the conditions, actors 
and processes of democratic politics in africa.
Before delving into the design of the individual chapters, however, a 
note on the methodology of the first part is called for. although the fol-
lowing two chapters (chapters 1 and 2) and corresponding ways of think-
ing about corruption are all subsumed under the generic term ‘discourse’, 
the exploration of these discourses is undertaken through different lenses. 
the methodological process could be described as a gradual immersion 
into the fabric of the consecutively explored discourses, reflecting the 
gradual (and increasingly bumpy) closing in onto the theoretical and 
practical issues that are of greatest salience to this enquiry, and which 
constitute, as I will argue, a blind spot of concepts of corruption in general 
and political order in africa in particular.
the first chapter (chapter 1) hones in on the academic discourse on 
political order and corruption in africa. on a very general level, this 
chapter provides an overview over dominant theories on corruption and 
politics in africa. However, in the process of writing the literature review 
unwittingly a further analytical purpose emerged. primarily, the journey 
through the body of theoretical statements on corruption and politics in 
africa was intended as a quest for a substantiated theoretical frame of ref-
erence, for reliable orientation points to facilitate the empirical study of 
corruption and politics. But the overview did not provide any firm ground 
from which empirical referents could be identified. on the contrary, the 
literature review, as will be demonstrated, reveals a body of theories, 
categories and statements patterned in ways that obstruct the thinking 
and seeing of political agency in africa. put bluntly, academic thinking 
accords such primacy to corruption as a problem that it blankets out sites, 
practices and actors of more liberating politics. the evident patterning of 
these sometimes similar and coalesced statements, sometimes dispersed 
and divergent statements led me to the conclusion that—much like the 
development discourse—academic theories themselves constitute a rela-
tively closed discourse on corruption and politics in africa. Hence the title 
of this chapter.
the methods employed to trace the outline of this academic discourse 
on corruption are drawn less overtly from classic discourse theory; although 
they are somewhat archaeological in their approach, they have a far nar-
rower analytic purpose, seeking entry-points to substantiate a theory on 
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political agency. to my knowledge, this body of thought has not yet been 
rearticulated comprehensively to profile the relationship between corrup-
tion, political order, and social and political agency in africa.
a further interesting insight emerged in the course of my journey. 
the analytical engagement with the changing formations of the devel-
opment discourse on corruption made it increasingly evident just how 
closely development policies are informed by the academic discourse. 
this framing and mutual inscription does not only take place on a medi-
ated, ‘translated’ level. Increasingly, development agencies are employing 
leading academics to develop and design concept papers and program-
matic strategies, which in turn serve to legitimise and spread new devel-
opment policies. It is conspicuous that especially in newer policies, it is 
sometimes near impossible to distinguish between academic and devel-
opmental statements.46 Hence, I argue that they constitute an interlinked 
discursive formation with formative material and epistemic power over 
definitions of corruption.
However, whilst providing insights on the epistemic sites and modes 
of production governing ‘corruption’, it does not resolve the theoretical 
frustration that the lack of appropriate analytical tools to capture agency 
leaves us with. for this reason I turn to the political theory of Ernesto 
laclau and like-minded scholars. this discourse on political emancipation 
(chapter 2) is by necessity the sketchiest of the discourses on corruption. 
for want of relevant theoretical and methodological insights found in the 
academic (as well as developmental) discourse, I seek to develop an own 
theoretical framework to allow for the conceptualisation of political and 
social agency in africa.
Here, I develop the argument that corruption is more meaningfully 
conceptualised as an empty signifier, as a symbolic nodal point through 
which different political contestations, identities and demands can be 
articulated. theorised carefully, empty signifiers enable both the articula-
tion of dissent as well as the production of consensus in society. Hence, 
46 suffice to note here for instance the role that dfId has played in financing major 
research projects on governance and corruption, one of five priority areas listed in their 
research strategy 2008–2013, that, in their own words, was funded by £1 billion (see dfId 
2008). on a more discrete level, see the design of the strategic Governance and corrup-
tion approach (sGaca) developed by sue unsworth and the cru (2007) for the nether-
lands, which is heavily informed by the personal and institutional interconnections across 
academic sites and development agencies (including dfId); or the study on politics in 
tanzania undertaken by two renowned academics (Hyden/Mmuya 2008) and financed 
by sIda.
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they play a constitutive role for the possibility of society as such; they are a 
necessary condition for the (re)organisation of political order. oscillating 
within this tension between plural and potentially antagonistic views on 
the one hand, and the potential of socially acknowledged, universalised 
representations on the other hand, empty signifiers are always reversible. 
the question is how and to what extent particular social groups manage 
to ‘fix’ their meaning—and to what extent this (temporarily) fixed mean-
ing unfolds emancipatory potential. the theoretical elucidation of these 
operations provides the centre-piece of the analytical framework of this 
enquiry.
But this conceptualisation of corruption requires some deeper concep-
tual foundations to justify firstly, the reason why corruption and not any 
other term lends itself to being appropriated as an empty signifier. this 
question can be answered quickly, taking a short-cut through more sys-
tematic arguments developed in the following chapters. the findings of 
chapter 2 carve out the epistemic, practical and material significance of 
corruption with regard to thinking and writing about african politics, as 
well as with regard to ‘reforming’ and ‘improving’ the african state. not 
least, corruption is politicised by political parties and civil society organi-
sations seeking to change the order of things in their respective countries. 
all of these practices underscore the practical and political significance of 
corruption as an empty signifier. this takes us to a second issue, namely 
the identification of social agents who articulate corruption in potentially 
democratising ways. Historically certain sites and power relations have 
been more conducive to the emergence of democratic politics; beyond 
the state, the spheres of civil society and the economy have been piv-
otal sites of emancipatory potential. these sites will be explored in more 
detail in the course of chapter 2, paying special attention to the condi-
tions attributed to african societies. drawing from insights of all three 
discourses, I conclude this last chapter of the first part with the identi-
fication of specific social agents that are endowed with the potential to 
be actors of social change. the actors pinpointed are professional asso-
ciations, which historically have been accorded a special importance as 
mediators of social change, in a transforming as well as mitigating sense. 
not surprisingly, they are also singled out in contemporary developmen-
tal as well as academic discourse on development—but, with regard to 
africa, the latter mainly contributing to observe their absence, rather than 
their presence.
part B is devoted to the case-study of tanzania; more particularly, to the 
study of professional associations, corruption and political struggles in the 
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construction industry of tanzania. Given the qualifying statements above, 
some further comments are again warranted on methodological issues, 
beginning with the choices regarding actors, country, and sectors. these 
choices are the result of overlapping experiences, interests, and objec-
tives. the choice of social actors is explained by the conclusions drawn 
from the discourses of the first part, drawing on the academic discourse 
with regard to the relevance of african professional associations. But 
there is a further, more specific and more personal reason for pinpoint-
ing professional associations, namely an early professional encounter with 
fIdIc,47 the international umbrella organisation of consulting engineers, 
in 2002. at the time, fIdIc had recognised the business-case for prevent-
ing corruption, and had developed pioneering guidelines for a business 
integrity management system for its members (see fIdIc 2001, 2002). this 
encounter drew my attention to the vibrancy of a world hitherto off my 
radar-screen, i.e. to the importance of apex organisations as a clearing-
house of knowledge-exchange and standard setting across countries and 
continents. I was immediately struck by the fact that a tanzanian mem-
ber association was one of the driving forces behind the design of the 
integrity system. How come a member association from a small, weak and 
poor economy is so visibly engaged in creating cutting-edge standards of 
integrity and anti-corruption? the fact intrigued me deeply. and more 
generally, it spawned my interest in the question of how collective actors 
articulate their needs and interests with regard to corruption, especially 
in an environment of a weakly institutionalised state, underdeveloped 
economy and extensive corruption.
this leads me to the choice underlying the country. right from the out-
set of my engagement with theories on the ‘shadow’ state, the ‘rhizome’ 
state or the ‘quasi-state’ or other qualifying attributes that the state in 
africa is given,48 the degree of generalisation across africa irked me tre-
mendously. Even before the encounter with fIdIc I had two countries at 
the back of my mind, namely tanzania and Zimbabwe. at the time, both 
countries, including Zimbabwe, seemed at odds with the general depic-
tion of african states in terms of a blurring of the public-private boundary, 
a personalised and instrumentalised state and public norms appropri-
ated and straddled by private norms. on the contrary, certainly tanzania 
47 fIdIc stands for the International federation of consulting Engineers, celebrating 
its centenary in 2013.
48 see chapter 1, below, for a discussion of these terms and underlying theories on the 
state and politics in africa. 
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seemed to have had a history of a strong (not in the sense of authoritar-
ian, albeit in the sense of centralised political authority) and legitimate 
state, a respected leadership under Julius nyerere, and, as far as I could 
judge from afar, reasonably fair and mostly peaceful (with the exception 
of Zanzibar) transition to a multi-party democracy. at the same time, I 
was well aware of the fact that tanzania was considered to be highly cor-
rupt. so, irritated by the academic discourse on corruption and politics 
in africa in smothering sites and agents of social change, and intrigued 
by the role of professional associations as collective, norm-setting actors, 
I turned my focus on identifying specific associations and sectors for my 
research. against this both practical and academic background, tanzania 
presented itself as an ideal case to explore some key hypotheses on cor-
ruption and on political order.
for the case study, the construction sector seemed an obvious choice. 
transparency International’s Bribe payers Index 2002 identified construc-
tion as the most corrupt sector world-wide,49 thus asserting the relevance 
of corruption in the construction industry. Moreover, the construction 
industry is pivotal to national development strategies, providing the infra-
structure for the provision of public goods, a fact which is also reflected in 
substantial budget allocations for public procurement. and, from a more 
sociological perspective, the recent transformations of tanzania from a 
centrally planned to a market economy indicated that the degree of regu-
latory institutionalisation and indeed public norms in this sector were 
still in flux. Especially in this context of dislocated structures and shifting 
norms and practices, it seemed particularly interesting to explore in closer 
detail the role of professional associations in shaping, carrying, or, equally 
conceivably, subverting governance and anti-corruption reforms.
the second part of my enquiry is organised around this empirical 
exploration. this journey is undertaken in the two consecutive chapters, 
chapter 3 (case-study 2003) and chapter 4 (case-study 2010). the line of 
enquiry focuses on the question of political agency, using articulations of 
corruption as an entry point to explore such agency: In which way do pro-
fessional associations engage in the discourse of corruption? How do they 
articulate their needs and demands with regard to the legal and regula-
tory framework via statements about ‘corruption’? and how do they seek 
49 on a scale of 0=very high perceived levels of corruption and 10=no corruption, con-
struction and public Works led the ranking with a score of 1,3, well ahead of the following 
sector (arms and defence, with a score of 1,9) (see http://www.transparency.org/policy_
research/surveys_indices/bpi/bpi_2002#sectors; last accessed 2 May 2010). 
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to shift such norms as well as political and economic relations in their 
favour? does the discourse of corruption as articulated in the develop-
ment discourse enable and empower professionals, by leading to a more 
effective and responsive institutional framework? or do the prevailing 
or emerging power relations stifle and constrain professional ethics and 
democratic spaces of professional associations? or, lastly, do perhaps pro-
fessional associations in the construction industry of tanzania not have an 
interest in a truly democratising order at all, as their interests and needs 
are met within the prevailing economic and political arrangements?
for both case studies multiple forms of data-collection were employed. 
primary data was gained in two sets of field visits.50 the field research for 
the first case-study took place in february/March 2003. the field-research 
for the second case-study took place in January 2010. the main methods 
were semi-structured as well as unstructured interviews. semi-structured 
interviews were mainly used in meetings with public officials, which in 
most cases I only met once. the interviews were structured according 
to a relatively broad interview guide relating to i) organisational issues, 
ii) specific anti-corruption and governance reforms, and iii) perceptions of 
corruption in the construction sector and in society at large. However, the 
interviews were conducted without fixed wording or a fixed ordering of 
questions, allowing for adaptations of the interview process with regard to 
the diversity of institutions as well as characteristics of the respondents.
the reasons for choosing semi-structured interviews in particular with 
public officials were both practical as well as functional. firstly, a prime 
concern was to get a better understanding of the institutional mecha-
nisms, organisational features and specific facts of the agency or asso-
ciation in question, which was most effectively achieved by a relatively 
clear (if not exclusive) set of topics and questions. secondly, as the topic 
of governance and in particular corruption was still rather sensitive in 
the public sector in 2003, it was also a means to generate transparency 
as to my objective, and hence, as far as possible, provide the basis for 
more open responses from the respondents, sharing more of their percep-
tions with regard to the topics under discussion. lastly and practically, 
50 Secondary data: secondary sources of data constituted: academic studies on  tanzania; 
tanzania country reports (official and donor-funded); national governance and  corruption 
reports (official and donor-funded); national and regional corruption perceptions surveys 
(officially mandated and undertaken as well as mandated and/or undertaken by nGos); 
constitutions, manuals or brochures of the professional associations; websites of govern-
ment agencies, professional associations (where available) and anti-corruption fora.
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 semi-structured questions were a means of minimising my imposition on 
the time of my interview partners.
the intention of employing semi-structured interview technique was 
not, however, to render the interviews comparable. the small number 
of respondents, the different professional associations and the widely 
divergent type of public institution (regulatory, policy-oriented, investi-
gative, etc.) renders any attempt of such comparison subject to clear and 
articulated qualifications. a further problem of comparison is the nature 
or rather the ‘chemistry’ of such interviews. depending on the person-
ality and personal interest in the topics of the respondent in question, 
the interviews tended to take very different forms, ranging from minimal 
factual information to open-ended discussions resonating a conversation 
rather than an interview. this ‘elasticity’ was intentional in the broad 
design of the interview guide.
I initially used the same interview guide for interviews with representa-
tives of professional associations, but soon realised that a far more mean-
ingful technique for understanding their situation and their perceptions 
in more detail was to unmoor the questions and allow the interviews to 
flow in an unstructured (if not directionless) manner. although the inter-
view framework was employed for generating factual information, mostly 
it was kept in the back of my mind, creating a space in which profession-
als expressed themselves in their own terms and reflecting their own con-
cerns. contrary to most public officials (with some notable exceptions), 
the professionals had a sense of ‘mission’ in articulating corruption and 
the ways it impacts on their conduct and career. this was especially pal-
pable in 2003, less so in 2010.
the interviews51 were conducted with professionals in professional 
associations, representing architects, consultants, contractors, engineers, 
and quantity surveyors; government officials of regulatory agencies in the 
construction industry; the national anti-corruption agency; academics; 
researchers; representatives of civil society organisations; and donors. In 
both sets of fieldwork the greatest number of interviews was with repre-
sentatives of professional associations. professionals in the construction 
51 due to the politically sensitive and to all intents and purposes illegal nature of cor-
ruption I did not use any electronic recording devices. In all interviews I explicitly asked 
and was granted permission to take notes. However, to prevent any potentially negative 
repercussions on the individuals and associations I have refrained from naming my inter-
view partners. Where appropriate, the associations and authorities are named, as are the 
function, profession or position of the interview partners I quote. 
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industry included in this study are engineers, contractors, architects and 
quantity surveyors domiciled and working in dar es salaam.
two methodological caveats with regard to the choice of interviewees 
needs to be placed at this point. firstly, it must be emphasised that the 
case-studies are based on a non-representative selection of interviewees. 
the choice of interviewees was structured primarily on the basis of their 
official function, i.e. either as a representative of a relevant professional 
association or as a representative of a relevant government agency. I have 
sought to include the most important collective actors and agencies of the 
construction industry in dar es salaam. However, the actual choice was in 
many cases (but not all) mediated through a contingent snow-ball effect, 
i.e. personal recommendations acting as ‘door-openers’, not through a sys-
tematic or representative selection. to a degree, these recommendations 
(that often overlapped) also act as a proxy for who is perceived to be an 
important actor within the construction sector. secondly, the interviews 
with professionals were only conducted with professionals that have an 
official affiliation with a professional association. In all cases this meant 
not only being a member of an association, but having an official function 
within the association, such as executive secretary, chairperson, treasurer, 
or board member. the research question only focused on the discourse of 
corruption as articulated by professional associations and public agencies. 
an important disclaimer to be noted is that no interviews were conducted 
with non-affiliated professionals, which, nota bene, in most professions 
constitute the far larger part of the community.
this leads us to a double qualification with regard to the validity of the 
findings. the findings of the interviews are derived from a small, quali-
fied (the qualification being ‘active member of professional association’) 
group within the large community of professionals in the construction 
industry; they are, hence, not representative for the whole community, 
only for the formally organised representatives of the collective interests 
of the community. also, the interpretations and statements articulated 
in the interviews are largely deprived of a context immediately illumi-
nating practices of corruption. for instance, none of the interviews was 
conducted on a construction site. some were conducted in hotels, but 
most were conducted in the offices of the professionals themselves, or 
in the offices of the professional associations or government agencies. 
In terms of location, building, infrastructure, etc. the offices did provide 
some illumination on the context in which the public agency or profes-
sional association is operating. But there was no participant observation 
undertaken, i.e. I did not participate in daily routines or observe everyday 
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business and work of professionals beyond the duration of the interviews, 
which would have provided further contextualisation and richness with 
regard to their statements.
With these caveats, the last two chapters seek to outline the articu-
lations and representations on corruption by professional associations 
themselves. chapter 3 and 4, respectively, illuminate the role and space of 
professional associations in a context of rapid structural and institutional 
change. they are thus each in itself highly instructive to understanding 
the effects of governance and anti-corruption reforms from the perspec-
tive of collective actors that are, so to speak, affected (in both a practical 
as well as emotional sense) by such reforms. they provide an insight into 
the relationship between public and private interests, between formal 
norms and informal norms, and into the ways these aspects affect power 
relations between public as well as private actors of a particular sector.
But the two case-studies have an additional merit beyond analytical 
snapshots. the juxtaposition of two case-studies of the same sector, the 
same actors and the same problematique with a temporal difference of 
seven years allow for an analysis of such processes over time—in a rel-
atively short-range perspective, but during a very intense and transfor-
mative period that, hopefully, should allow for some novel insights into 
processes of the structuring of political order from a worm’s eye view. pre-
dictions tentatively made at the end of the case-study undertaken in 2003 
(chapter 3) are fleshed out, its findings reinterpreted, and novel aspects 
are illuminated in the case-study undertaken in 2010 (chapter 4), allow-
ing for a dynamic analysis of political relations, regulatory reforms and 
the trajectory of the institutionalisation of (democratic or other) norms 
and practices.
at this point I would like to conclude my introductory remarks with a 
quote on corruption by perhaps the most renowned sociologist of tanza-
nia, c.s.l. chachage. commenting on the lack of effectiveness of institu-
tional and legal reforms introduced in the decade since the transformation 
of tanzania to a multi-party market-economy, he observes the following:
despite the enactment of all the above laws and the institutions to imple-
ment them, corruption has continued to increase unabated over the years. 
Why is this case? [. . .] as far as I am concerned, I wish to state categori-
cally from the outset that there is nothing more erroneous than the view 
that policies, ideologies, laws, etc. make history. attempts to make sense of 
aspects such as corruption, embezzlement, fraud, and drug-trafficking must 
lead us beyond the examination of laws, ideologies, etc. to the examina-
tion of the way our society is organised socially, politically and economically 
(chachage 1996: 30).
 corruption, politics and africa 31
In the following enquiry, I actually intend to undertake an examination of 
‘the policies, laws, ideologies, etc.’ that govern thinking and acting about 
corruption, for I believe they have both a symbolic as well as material 
effect that needs to be understood in more practical detail. But in line with 
chachage, I place my main analytical emphasis on the theoretical and 
empirical exploration of some of the myriad of processes through which 
social actors and discourses of corruption structure the social, political 
and economical organisation of society. this takes me to the final chap-
ter, the conclusions. Here, a general overview and systematisation over 
the findings will be undertaken, substantiating, enriching and refuting key 
hypotheses across the whole enquiry. In particular, I seek to carve out 
the political spaces and processes that particular social agents make and 
shape—and are made and shaped by. But more generally, the intention is 
to sketch out a theoretical framework for researching democratic politics 
in africa: democratic politics not understood only as institutional change 
or reform programmes on a macro-level, but understood as a purposeful 
struggle for the reorganisation of the public realm by social actors.
Chapter One 
the aCademiC disCOurse: pOlitiCal Order and  
COrruptiOn in afriCa
Hence the general feeling of helplessness in the face of an infernal mechanism. 
And hence this hypothesis, which is also a risk: the development of movements 
of a ‘puritanical’ tendency, intended to bring about a reform of public mor-
als [. . .] may be among the ultimate means, in absence of an improbable self-
reformation of the political elites, to attempt to change the present course of 
affairs. Any ‘anti-corruption’ policy must face up to these realities.1
Even more insidious is in my opinion what might be called the calculated vio-
lence of neglect: that is, the deliberate failure of governments and state offi-
cials to carry out their duties in order to benefit from the ensuing disorder and 
distress.2
1. Introduction
in one of the first systematic studies of corruption in post-independence 
african countries, mcmullan comes to the conclusion that it “is part of the 
general conflict between the aims and the methods of the government and 
the society which is being governed that the subjective attitude of many 
officials in these countries should not be in harmony with their objective 
roles” (mcmullan 1961: 194), with “the colonial regime [being] the obvious 
historical source of the conflict between the government and the society” 
(mcmullan 1961: 199). although the vocabulary may sound slightly dated, 
this analysis is echoed in many of the most noted and provocative con-
tributions to political order in africa of recent years. the seminal study 
by Chabal and daloz on the political instrumentalisation of disorder in 
african states paints a picture of
a colonial civil service which sought to devise pragmatic ways of adapting 
the imperial directives to the administration of its subjects rather than a 
method of inculculating new political and governmental habits. [. . .] more-
over, the colonial experience showed how a ‘modern’ bureaucracy could be 
1  see Olivier de sardan 1999: 48.
2 see Chabal 2009: 153. 
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both arbitrary and personalized—characteristics which were infinitely more 
compatible with existing african practices than the original Western model 
(Chabal/daloz 1999: 12).3
they discuss in detail the processes in which contemporary african post-
colonial states4 have appropriated, adapted, moulded and shaped their 
histories and tradition, concluding
that, in most african countries, the state is no more than a décor, a pseudo-
Western façade masking the realities of deeply personalized political rela-
tions. there may well appear to be a relative institutionalization of the main 
state structures but such bodies are largely devoid of authority. [. . .] in Black 
africa [state] legitimacy is firmly embedded in the patrimonial practices of 
patrons and their networks (Chabal/daloz 1999: 16).5
Judging from these seminal theoretical contributions set nearly four 
decades and several development paradigms6 apart, several observations 
can be made. first of all, rather intriguingly, it seems that the essence of 
key hypotheses on the causes and consequences of corruption has not 
fundamentally changed in four decades, namely that personalised and 
particularistic (in mcmullan’s terminology: ‘subjective’) imperatives gov-
ern public institutions. this is surprising, given not just the time that has 
elapsed since then, but the fact that the geo-political and economic reali-
ties of developing countries (and indeed of industrialised countries) have 
undergone fundamental structural transformations in the wake of the end 
of the Cold War and processes of communicative, financial and economic 
globalisation.7 and in this context, the amount of targeted and conditional 
foreign aid that has been directed at african countries to foster the rule of 
law and strong public institutions also merits attention.
3 see also ekeh 1975 for a seminal contribution on colonialism and the ‘two publics’ 
in africa.
4 an evocative interpretation of post-colonial states is rendered by mbembe, who 
also emphasises their originality: “in my mind, the notion of the ‘postcolony’ refers to a 
time scape which is simultaneously in the process of being formed and of being dissolved 
through a movement that brings both the ‘being formed’ and the ‘being dissolved’ into col-
lision. the term ‘postcolony’ indicates my desire to take very seriously the intrinsic quali-
ties and power of ‘contemporaneousness’ while firmly keeping in mind the fact that the 
present itself is a concatenation of multiple temporalities. Because of the entanglement 
of these multiple temporalities, africa is evolving in multiple and overlapping directions 
simultaneously” (mbembe 2002: 4).
5 for a seminal contribution on the cultural logic and moral matrix underlying the 
legitimisation strategies of patronage relations see schatzberg 2001. 
6 see pieterse 2001 for an excellent overview and discussion of development paradigms 
of the last five decades.
7 for key analyses see rosenau 2003.
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second and more fundamentally, these quotes indicate that the explo-
ration and conceptualisation of corruption oscillates around the rela-
tionship between state and society. this is what makes the analysis of 
corruption so fruitful, that it is located in the very vertebrae of reflections 
on contemporary state-society relationships. more precisely, the analysis 
of corruption pierces the underbelly of state/society relations: its very 
naming necessarily indicates a challenge to the norm-setting primacy of 
the public sphere, and the dominance of legal and bureaucratic rationali-
ties in a classic Weberian sense. in this vein, it can be argued that struc-
tural factors, such as the configuration8 of the post-colonial state, or the 
effects of privatisation and pluralisation of the public domain, are key to 
understanding corruption; or rather, corruption is key to understanding 
the fields9 of power and agency shaped by such structural factors. simul-
taneously, the importance of social agency also shines through, inferred 
by the ‘subjective’ and the personalised ties that actors utilise and opera-
tionalise. and, not least, there seems to be a cultural dimension to cor-
ruption, particular value systems and morals that underpin and legitimise 
‘corrupt’ structures and social practices. a ‘culture of corruption’ may be 
on the surface a function of a bloated bureaucracy and greedy, self-serving 
public officials; but equally the social mechanisms and legitimising pro-
cesses of corrupt practices (and resistance) by the actors themselves, and 
their interaction with the systemic and structural factors are in need of 
illumination.
a final preliminary comment needs to be made at this point, namely the 
key importance of the state as an analytical reference point in the study of 
corruption. this is a very basic premise: only with the emergence modern 
state’s constitutive feature of a separated public (state) and private (soci-
ety) sphere ‘corruption’ in the modern sense became conceivable: namely 
as an act or behaviour which crosses the boundary between the public 
8 the term ‘configuration’ reverberates elias (1976–1982) conceptualisation of ‘figura-
tion’, denoting the process of change in which individuals and society are linked together 
through patterns of interaction—thus, not least, attempting to overcome analytical 
dichotomies between individual agency and structure. 
9 i use the term ‘field’ here in Bourdieu’s sense, i.e. as a multi-dimensional social space 
in which the actors are positioned according to the absolute volume and relative compo-
sition of their capital. rather than being a static arena, every field “is the site of a more 
or less overt struggle over the definitions over the legitimate principles of divisions of the 
field” (Bourdieu 1985: 734), in which actors struggle for dominant positions within the 
social space as well as, interwovenly, with regard to the symbolic production of meanings, 
labels, distinctions, etc. from a different perspective, see also taylor 2004 for the impor-
tance of symbolic production and the sites of such struggles in Western society.
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and the private in an illegal (or illegitimate) way. in short, corruption is a 
phenomenon of a functionally differentiated society.10 these boundaries, 
in particular the separation of public office from private property were 
only fully formalised and institutionalised in most Western countries in 
the 20th century. in this sense (if not in a moral sense), the phenome-
non and problematisation of corruption is relatively new. hence, when 
the phenomenon of corruption is explored, it is always, in a mediated or 
immediate sense, also state/society-relationships and specific patterns of 
interactions that are being analysed: through the lens of corruption it is 
the ‘modern’ state, its ideologies, its representations that are ultimately 
being analysed.
linked to this premise, there is a second facet that needs to be taken 
into consideration, namely that the study of corruption offers a highly 
revealing mirror into how political order is both organised and rendered 
intelligible by social actors: on the one hand, what structures and public 
institutions are seen to be legitimate and endowed with authority, on the 
other hand, what conceptions and images political order is derived from, 
what are the referents of political struggles and articulations. as Olivier de 
sardan categorically states, the “process of state-apparatus building dur-
ing the twentieth century, a process that is far from being achieved, is 
obviously fundamental not only for the production of corruption itself, 
but for the production of a cultural embeddedness of corruption” (Olivier 
de sardan 1999: 26). an analysis of the production, structuration and cul-
ture of state(hood) then moves to centre stage—instead of understanding 
corruption as a practice or phenomenon signifying conflict, i.e. conflict 
between the formal and the informal, the public and the private, the 
analysis needs to follow iterated and institutionalised practices that are, 
socially or legally, deemed to be ‘corrupt’.
in other words, what is of interest here are the incentives informing 
individual acts of corruption, or even the attributes of particular institu-
tions, such as the legal framework, the judiciary, the political process, etc. 
that frame corrupt behaviour. the analytic point of departure in this study 
draws on a systemic approach to corruption: an understanding that, in 
Johnston’s words, sees corruption “as a systemic problem having to do 
10 On a practical level, this can be underlined by the recent problematisation and crimi-
nalisation of so-called ‘private-to-private’ corruption, i.e. practices which do not involve 
the public sector or a public official, but are considered problematic forms of conflict of 
interests or misappropriation between representatives of the private sector, civil society 
or the general public. for a discussion see Koechlin/ledergerber 2004.
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with the sources, uses, limits, and accountability of wealth and power” 
(Johnston 2004: 22). although Johnston treats corruption classically as 
“the abuse of public roles of resources for private benefit,” he emphasises
that terms such as ‘abuse’, ‘public’, ‘private’ and even ‘benefit’ are matters of 
considerable ambiguity or dispute in many societies. [. . .] rather than end-
ing the confusion over what constitutes a corrupt act, this approach puts 
conflicts over standards and ambiguities about the public-private distinction 
at centre stage (Johnston 2004: 22–23, emphasis in original).
drawing on this understanding of corruption, the sociological question of 
corruption then becomes less one of individual or social deviance11 from 
the prevailing social, political or legal order. rather, in an empirically 
more open way the question becomes one of social struggles about norms, 
power and access to (material and symbolic) resources.12
Bringing these introductory remarks to an end, this approach draws a 
full circle to some of the first influential studies on corruption, which con-
ceptualised corruption in terms of political development, political order 
and social change. Corruption in the heyday of modernisation theory 
was inevitably linked to or emerged from reflections on the conditions of 
development. so what i propose to undertake in the following sections is 
to first, describe the discourse on corruption in terms of modernisation 
and development, using selected authors to illustrate how corruption was 
conceptualised with regard to the problem of political stability, economic 
11  surprisingly, there has been very little analysis of corruption as deviance in a socio-
logical sense, although ‘deviance’ is routinely implied when the distance between legal 
and moral orders is invoked, or the conflicts between different rationalities that corrupt 
practices denote are stressed. a closer look at emile durkheim’s classic conceptualisation 
shows that ‘deviance’ in his sense would actually provide a more multifaceted analytical 
entry-point than merely pointing to the disintegrative and dysfunctional aspects. indeed, 
deviance, with durkheim, can be conceptualised as being ‘functional’ for society: although 
in his view modern societies are characterised by rising levels of anomie (i.e. threats of 
social disintegration and unravelling of a common moral order), resulting deviance can 
also serve to make visible the boundaries of this order. ensuing public ‘labelling’ of deviant 
behaviour can serve as a space of negotiation and, (functionally) at best, forge unity on 
what is considered to be right and wrong. in other words, deviance conceptualised in this 
way does not exclude its assimilative or integrative function, on the contrary (see durk-
heim 1990, 2002). these comments aside, here corruption will not be explored in more 
detail through the lens of deviance; however, further down the (dis)integrative character-
istics of corruption will be explored more fully.
12 this approach is far closer to an understanding of state and statehood as understood, 
for instance, by migdal, who undercuts metaphors of ‘strong’ or ‘weak’ states by putting 
the struggles between different (state as well as non-state) actors on centre stage, espe-
cially with regard to the authority and legitimacy of rules about the public affairs and the 
boundaries of private life (migdal 2001: 62–71).
 the academic discourse 37
growth and social transformation in new states (section 2). Outlining the 
positions of three influential theorists of that era, namely samuel hun-
tington, James scott and Gunnar myrdal, as a frame of reference that is 
still seminal for contemporary theory on corruption, paves the way for 
an overview over the assumptions regarding the structural and cultural 
configurations of ‘corrupt’ societies. as will be demonstrated, these early 
thoughts on corruption are still highly insightful; one could even go as far 
as to say that, with the exception of some radicalised theories on state and 
statehood, large parts of contemporary literature on corruption and devel-
opment still draw from or even fall behind these early scholars. second, 
i have distinguished three groups of theories on corruption in developing 
countries that have evolved since then.13 this classification is not intended 
as a rigorous taxonomy, rather as a sketch rendering the patterning of cer-
tain statements and discursive formations of corruption in africa visible. 
they have been distinguished according to their emphasis on rules and 
regimes (section 3), values and practices (section 4), and political order 
(section 5) respectively. against this backdrop of concepts and articu-
lations on corruption, lastly, an attempt to conceptualise a preliminary 
sociology of corruption will be made (section 6), theoretically framing 
corruption in terms of inclusion, exclusion, and political struggles.
2. Corruption and Political Development: Assimilation and Integration
the rapid social change witnessed in the post-World War ii period in asia, 
africa and latin america produced pervasive corruption in most develop-
ing countries. discussing this phenomena in an influential paper named 
“What is the problem about Corruption” in 1965, a prominent scholar of 
the period remarked: “it is clear that new states are very likely to be the 
scene of a great deal of behaviour that will be called corrupt” (leys 1965: 
224)—implying in his wording already a key problematique, namely the the 
definition of and legal-normative framework regulating ‘corruption’. at the 
same time, given the challenges facing the newly independent countries, 
the conditions and types of economic, social and political development 
were on centre stage. for scholars of the era, hence, the framing question 
was not only to explain whence such a proliferation of corruption, but 
13 in the first volume of the excellent compilation of seminal articles, “explaining Cor-
ruption” by Williams (ed.) 2000, the analytic trajectory and loops in corruption theories 
over the past 30 years can easily be traced.
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also whether and how corruption is good or bad for development. against 
the backdrop of rapid social, political and economic changes in develop-
ing countries, the objectives of economic growth and social differentiation 
were on the top of the modernisation agenda. in this context, corruption 
was conceived to be either a phenomenon indicating the palpable fric-
tion between ‘modern/market’ and ‘traditional/parochial’ principles and 
values, or else a mechanism of reducing and mediating this friction.14 the 
new formal political and economic systems were under huge pressure to 
meet social demands at the same time as being at odds with local realities. 
Given the tensions created by modernisation, conceivably corruption can 
both facilitate socio-economic transformation and political integration as 
well as undermine political stability and economic progress, depending 
on the analytical angle chosen. in other words, corruption can be shown 
to be functional in the short to medium run; however, in the long run the 
divergence between the disregarded formal principles and relevant politi-
cal practices seems to lead to social, political and economic disjunction 
and alienation. again, this must not necessarily lead to disintegration and 
collapse, as the history of european countries, the usa, or the more recent 
past of developing countries have shown.15
the most prominent exponent of this line of thought is samuel hun-
tington, who carved a conceptual benchmark in his widely acclaimed 
book on political development (huntington 1969 [1968]) by examining the 
function of corruption in phases of strained and decayed political order.16 
he correlates the absence of political institutionalisation with the level of 
corruption, both of which are symptomatic for modernising countries. the 
causes of this general correlation have both cultural as well as structural 
roots. pre-empting huntington’s conclusion, he depicts corruption as an 
integrative mechanism mediating between the antagonistic forces pro-
duced and aggravated by modernisation. huntington argues elaborately 
on the basis of his enquiry into the causes of corruption, and his insights 
still provide the basis for current analyses of transforming societies and 
roots of political patronage.
14 seminally, scott carved a benchmark by distinguishing ‘market corruption’, based on 
economic market exchange, and ‘parochial corruption’, based on social exchange (scott 
1969a), a distinction which shall be discussed further down. 
15 for a detailed discussion of corruption in european states see seminally van Klaveren 
(1957); for an analysis of the ‘machine politics’ of early 20th century usa, see scott 1969b; 
for a typology of corruption and political systems see Johnston 2005.
16 for a detailed critique of huntington’s conceptualisation of corruption see alatas 
2000. 
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Firstly, he observes that the introduction of new political standards lead 
to established patterns of behaviour becoming disrupted, disregarded or 
even illegal. the conflict between ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ standards 
creates uncertainty with regard to the ‘right’ behaviour. as huntington 
points out, the “calling into question of old standards, moreover, tends 
to undermine the legitimacy of all standards” (huntington 1969: 60), thus 
opening an undefined space in which individuals and groups can act in 
ways justified by (n)either ‘old’ (n)or ‘new’ norms.17 Secondly, the distinc-
tion between public interest and private role is seminal for the whole 
concept of political and social obligation and responsibility. moderni-
sation produces such a distinction, but evidently not in an idealtypical 
way. On the one hand, corruption only becomes conceivable as a func-
tion of the (specifically modern) differentiation between the private and 
the public sphere. On the other hand, the pressures that the unyielding 
logic of impartiality, rationalisation and achievement standards exercise 
on individuals and communities may themselves stimulate greater need 
for the protection of family ties and other affective or ascriptive bonds of 
solidarity.18 Thirdly, there is a strong socio-political incentive for corrup-
tion, which acts as a redistributive mechanism between political power 
and economic wealth. it is worth citing huntington at length, for here he 
offers an original insight:
modernization also contributes to corruption by creating new sources of 
wealth and power, the relation of which to politics is as yet undefined by 
the traditional norms of the society and on which the modern norms are 
not yet accepted by the dominant groups within society. Corruption in this 
sense is a direct product of the rise of new groups with new resources and 
the efforts of these groups to make themselves effective within the politi-
cal sphere. Corruption may be the means of assimilating new groups into 
the  political system by irregular means because the system has been unable 
to adapt sufficiently fast to provide legitimate and acceptable means for this 
purpose (huntington 1969: 61; emphasis added).
17 the recent transformations of formerly socialist, centrally planned societies under-
score this point. for an early discussion of the effects of liberalisation on corruption—
precisely within this sphere of insecurity and regulatory void—see harriss-White 1996, or 
for a more in-depth contribution see Cartier-Bresson 2000.
18 this is an interesting take on Weber’s ‘iron cage’ of rationalisation. Whereas for Weber 
(1985, 2004) the relentless expansion of bureaucratic-legal domination into all spheres of 
life leads to a shrinking, a disappearance of other value and norm systems, huntington 
re-interprets the expansion by observing a higher premium accorded to such non-rational 
value and exchange systems; instead of disappearing, they become more valuable to social 
actors. 
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in other words, the (new) possibility to trade money for political power 
and social prestige, and vice-versa, works as an arbitrating and adjustment 
mechanism balancing different levels of enfranchisement within a rapidly 
changing society by assimilating (economically, politically, socially) dis-
joined groups.19 the consequences of this arbitration, however, depend 
on the trajectory of political relations20—on the potential for emancipa-
tion and rationalisation, as he expounds.
Fourthly, under the condition of economic underdevelopment and 
surging socio-political demands, modernisation of states is characterised 
by “the expansion of governmental authority and the multiplication of 
the activities subjected to governmental regulation” (huntington 1969: 61). 
the extent of interaction between citizens and the public sector is mul-
tiplied accordingly, and proportionally the opportunity for corruption.21 
Coupling the expansion of state activities with the uneven institutionali-
sation of formal roles and norms, a situation is created in which corrup-
tion becomes the prevalent behaviour of public officials.22
19  for a more recent pioneering contribution on such exchange mechanisms see reno’s 
analysis of shadow states and warlord politics (reno 1995, 1997). 
20 in a recent study on the effect of liberalisation programs on mozambique, harri-
son uses an apt term to capture these fluid processes indicated by defining corruption 
as ‘boundary politics’, in which social actors attempt to “stabilise and/or valorise perme-
able social boundaries” (harrison 1999: 538). rather than conceptualising corruption as 
the instrumentalisation of politics, harrison views corruption as the signifier of shifting 
boundaries, manifested in concrete practices on the boundaries between the national and 
the international economy, in contended societal relationships, and subsequently thriving 
in those open spaces “along the social boundaries dynamised by liberalisation” (harrison 
1999: 549). 
21  huntington also puts into this context the extreme efforts to ‘be modern’ that can 
be witnessed in some developing countries—to be more prussian than the prussians, so to 
speak: “the ideals of honesty, probity, universalism, and merit often become so overriding 
that individuals and groups come to condemn as corrupt in their own society practices 
which are accepted as normal and even legitimate in more modern societies. [. . .] the 
escalation of standards in a modernizing society and the concomitant devaluation and 
rejection of politics represent the victory of the values of modernity over the needs of 
society” (huntington 1969: 62–63).
22 in an early and important contribution to the discussion, leff highlights the positive 
effects of corruption on economic development, based on the (now mainstream) assump-
tion that the public sector does not operate perfectly. Challenging the (then mainstream) 
assumption that strong etatist policies are prerequisite for concerted developmental 
efforts, leff underlines the risk of wrong policies based on uninformed or self-interested 
criteria. he states that in “many underdeveloped countries, the bureaucracy may be the 
lagging rather than the leading sector” (leff 1964: 13). in this situation corruption acts 
as a safeguard against bad policies as well as a lubricant for economic development and 
entrepreneurial innovation. 
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huntington widens his analysis by comparing the function and the 
causes of violence and corruption in modernising societies.
Both are encouraged by modernization; both are symptomatic of the weak-
ness of political institutions; both are characteristic of what we shall sub-
sequently call praetorian societies; both are means by which individuals 
and groups link themselves to the political society and, indeed, participate 
in the system in ways which violate the mores of the system. hence the 
society which has a high capacity for corruption also has a high capacity 
for violence. [. . .] the prevalence of violence, however, does pose a greater 
threat to the functioning of the system than the prevalence of corruption. 
in the absence of agreement on public purposes, corruption substitutes 
agreement on private goals, while violence substitutes conflict over public 
or private ends. [. . .] Violence [. . .] is a symptom of more extreme alienation 
( huntington 1969: 63–64).
huntington shows great perception in exposing the political implications 
of violence and corruption as well as the nature of their relationship 
with political order.23 although he is often critiqued for his functional-
ist approach to corruption,24 highlighting the integrative and assimilative 
functions and glossing over its destabilising and disintegrative potential, 
the quote shows that he is more than aware of such dysfunctionalities, 
that he terms ‘alienation’ from public interests. however, analysing cor-
ruption in terms of specific practices of a systemic nature that link certain 
social groups to the political society, he places emphasis on the dynamics 
of social change in which corruption acts as a transformative mechanism; 
but a mechanism that only potentially, not necessarily leads to integration 
and assimilation.
huntington concludes that although corruption by definition runs 
against the ideal of modernisation, it is endowed with a specific function 
within the adapting social structure: it provides a creative and respon-
sive medium to the diverse and at times incompatible norms and social 
23 the nexus between violence and corruption is one that has become more and more 
prevalent in african countries, and it seems that the nature of their relationship as well as 
the implications for political order are far from clarified. the recognition of such ‘extreme 
forms of alienation’ demarcated by the prevalence of violence anticipates current phe-
nomena of african societies. in the wake of the protracted conflicts and social emergencies 
scarring many african countries since the nineties, violence seems to have become the 
hallmark of african politics. see, for instance, mbembe 2002 who employs the term ‘necro-
power’ to conceptualise the brute force of african elites. for excellent analyses and case-
studies of violent conflicts in africa see lemarchand 2009; the case-studies in Kaarlsholm 
(ed.) 2006; or the contributions in Chabal/engel/Gentili 2005. for a general outline of a 
sociology of violence see pioneeringly von trotha 1997.
24 for a trenchant critique see for instance alatas 1990. 
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practices within a modern political system. he clearly observes that cor-
ruption can and does weaken political development by undermining the 
government bureaucracy and public interests, but remarks at the same 
time that corrupt practices may in fact stabilise political order in the 
short—to medium term.25 he goes on to state that in the long-term, the 
organisation and structuring of political participation in the form of politi-
cal parties is “the principal institution of modern politics” (huntington 
1969: 71); but far from necessarily impeding the evolution of modern poli-
tics, huntington asserts that corruption may be the facilitator of a fledg-
ling political integration and organisation, which gradually transcend the 
particularistic interests they evolved from in a virtuous spiral of increasing 
autonomy and authority.26
this view provides a frame of reference to another prominent scholar, 
namely James scott, who in his “analysis of Corruption in developing 
nations” of 1969 makes one of the most interesting empirical analyses of 
corruption of that era. as a point of departure he dissects the discrepancy 
between social norms and legal norms observable particularly in develop-
ing countries. unlike Western societies upon which they are modelled, 
the legal framework in most developing countries has been adopted in 
an ahistorical fashion, rather than being a product of political struggles 
between social groups and classes.27 this creates a situation in which 
“[m]ost developing nations have not only taken over Western legal forms; 
they have often adopted the most restrictive and demanding forms avail-
able” (scott 1969a: 319). this rings true for developing nations a mere or 
so decade old, as they were at the time. more saliently, it is still of acute 
relevance today: most legal reforms are produced by the development 
25 in contrast to contemporary scholars such as Chabal 1999, 2009, who conceptualise 
the function of corruption in terms of instrumentalising and stabilising a permanent state 
of disorder, the function of corruption in huntington’s analysis is the opposite: namely 
to mediate between potentially conflicting norms, values and practices, to act as a kind 
of buffering zone of social, economic and political tensions arising through rapid social 
change.
26 in his enquiry dating from the same period, scott observes that one possible tra-
jectory would be the transition from a bureaucratic political system to a political party 
system, where legitimate ways of influencing governments are created; e.g. the transition 
from an illegal bribe to a politician to a legal contribution to a political campaign. the 
point from the perspective of political development is not that the overall level of corrup-
tion necessarily is lowered, but that the transition from illegitimate and illegal to legitimate 
and legal is achieved, thus institutionalising non-corrupt practices which would have been 
deemed corrupt in a more bureaucratic system (scott 1969a: 74).
27 for seminal theories on political contention and struggles and political orders see 
tilly 1990, 2004 and tilly/tarrow 2007.
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apparatus, financed by donors and written by external consultants for 
recipient governments—a problem that is illustrated by the highly sophis-
ticated constitutions and legal framework of recently democratised afri-
can countries, incorporating the highest standards of human rights and 
accountability institutions.28 this tightening and simultaneous heighten-
ing of the legal framework leads to an almost automatic expansion of cor-
ruption, albeit primarily in nominal terms: whilst there may be continuity 
in prevailing social practices and values, the (legal) framework has shifted 
and lead to the legal stigmatisation of such practices, now deemed to be 
‘corrupt’ in legal if not necessarily in social judgement.29
scott’s key interest, however, is not primarily the distance between 
legal and social norms, although this remains a key characteristic and 
prime frame of reference in contemporary studies of corruption. scott’s 
most innovative analytical contribution is the differentiated conceptu-
alisation of corruption as an a priori neutral form of political influence. 
the question is not legality or illegality, or even legitimacy or illegitimacy. 
the pivotal question is access to political decision-making: scott treats 
corruption as an alternative means of interest articulation. in his words, 
“this approach highlights the functional equivalence of a variety of acts 
of political influence, some of which violate all standards of commu-
nity ethics and some of which are totally beyond reproach” (scott 1969a: 
322).30 like huntington, he too is interested in the nexus between wealth 
and power, more explicitly looking at corruption as a means for social 
groups to access the political system. When does wealth act as a political 
resource, in which ways, by which groups? he concludes that it depends 
largely on the nature of the political system. it is in this analytical con-
text that he makes his widely quoted ideal-typical distinction between 
‘parochial’ corruption and ‘market’ corruption: the former denoting a 
situation where only ties of kinship, caste, etc. determine access to the 
28 for a discussion on problems and opportunities of the glaring discrepancy between 
the formal legal framework and socio-political and socio-economic realities with regard to 
corruption and human rights in malawi see Koechlin/sepulveda 2009.
29 although scott’s analysis allows some significant inference on the definitional power 
of certain actors and the frictions with the socio-cultural matrix of society, the emergence 
of attitudes and value structures that support the stigmatisation of (legally) corrupt prac-
tices is not discussed in his contribution. 
30 scott’s definition echoes an earlier, much noted contribution by the economist 
nathanial leff, who defines corruption crisply as “an extralegal institution used by indi-
viduals or groups to gain influence over the actions of the bureaucracy. as such the exis-
tence of corruption per se only indicates that that these groups participate in the decision 
making process to a greater extent than they would otherwise” (leff 1964: 8).
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favours of  power-holders, while the latter signifies an impersonal process 
in which influence is accorded to those who can pay most, regardless of 
their person.31
here, the type of political order is on centre stage; more precisely, the 
type of political order framing mechanisms of inclusion and  exclusion.32 
Where formal possibilities of ‘voice’33 by certain social groups are restricted, 
corruption poses an informal way to access the political system. What is 
striking in this table is the importance that scott accords to organised 
interests, or rather to the type and level of organisation of interests of 
particular interests. this is a point i will be taking up in some detail in 
31  the definitions are taken nearly verbatim from scott, but without the footnotes in 
original (scott 1969a: 330); see also table 1 ‘access to political system’ (scott 1969a: 329). 
32 scott explicitly focuses on types of corruption and access to specific types of politi-
cal systems, or more precisely, on the relationship between type of corruption and type 
of political system. this is distinct from a broader conceptualisation framing corruption 
within the institutional placement and organisational characteristics of (informal or 
‘extra-legal’) networks. for seminal contributions studies on clientelism see eisenstadt/
rominger 1984; eisenstadt/lemarchand 1981, or the contributions in Gellner/Waterbury 
(eds.) (1975).
33 see hirschman 1970 for his seminal analysis of exit, voice and loyalty as key 
political and economic actions and their relationship with political (or organisational) 
responsiveness. 
table 1: Corruption and access to the political system
Generally easy 
access to formal 
political system
Groups often securing access primarily by means of corrup-
tion because denied formal access by virtue of: 
ideological reasons parochial reasons lack of Organization
1. political elite 1.  indigenous  
commercial and 
industrial groups
1.  minority  
ethnic or  
religious groups
1.  unorganized 
peasants
2.  Cadre, branches 
of ruling party
2.  foreign business 
interests
2.  unorganized 
urban lower class
3.  Civil servants 
associations
3.  political 
opposition
4.  professional 
associations
5. trade unions
(source: scott 1969a: 329)
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the case-studies of the following chapters, where professional associations 
and corruption in tanzania will be explored more fully.
scott carves out two further issues: first, social reality always produces 
messy and fuzzy connections between parochial and market corruption, 
or rather: between parochial and market processes of articulation and 
integration.34 second, the question of the impact of corruption on politi-
cal stability depends on the relationship of the predominant forms of cor-
ruption with prevailing social structures. scott’s premise is that the closer 
the ‘fit’ is between corruption and existing social structures, the less polit-
ically disruptive such corruption is (e.g. ethnic-based corruption is less 
disruptive in a ethnically organised society than in a class-based society). 
the hypothesis is plausible in that ‘fits’ between social structures and ‘cor-
rupt’ practices narrow down the fields of social struggles and potentially 
increase the potential of connecting actors and discourses. however, with 
the benefit of hindsight, this assumption that certain social structures fit 
neatly and functionally with corruption has been rendered downright 
cynical. in the intermittent forty years, a plethora of fundamentally dis-
rupting and destructive conflicts in africa have been a product of precisely 
this close ‘fit’ between social structures and corrupt practices. instead of 
leading to a stable integration in the political system, such a ‘fit’ has lead 
to violent politics of exclusion and particularism.35
One of the first scholars to be at odds with this functional view of cor-
ruption is myrdal (1968). he carves out the destabilising force of corrupt 
practices, especially in countries undergoing fundamental socio-economic 
transformations. in his renowned study on south asia, published in the 
same year as huntington’s book, he states that “it is obvious that the extent 
of corruption has a direct bearing on the stability of South Asian govern-
ments” (myrdal 1968: 938; emphasis in original). his initial observation is 
that in developing countries in general, ‘corruption’ has become a politi-
cal resource: governments lose elections over allegations of corruption, 
34 this approach has since been elaborated and substantiated by michael Johnston in 
his book on “syndromes of Corruption” (Johnston 2005), where he frames types of corrup-
tion in relation to different types of political systems. 
35 a recent example is the violence that shook Kenya in the aftermath of the elections 
of 2007, due to precisely such close ‘fits’ between political order and ethnic structure, lead-
ing to vertical boundaries of exclusion along ethnic lines. the turbulent and often violent 
political history of highly corrupt nigeria would be another case in point. for highly inter-
esting contributions on the interrelationship between ethnicity, patronage and politics in 
african states that explores the issues that scott touches upon in more analytical depth 
see Berman et al. 2004. 
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political parties win seats on an anti-corruption ticket, and, more seri-
ously, regimes are toppled and coups are justified with the promise of 
eradicating corruption.36 although myrdal chooses a different approach 
to huntington by using the ‘folklore’, i.e. popular perception of corrup-
tion, as an analytical point of departure, he comes to similar conclu-
sions with regard to the causes of corruption in developing countries. 
however, he places more emphasis on the nexus between cultural fac-
tors and economic necessities. in particular, the ‘plural societies’ of south 
asian countries are characterised by the “fragmentation of loyalties and, 
in particular, little loyalty to the community as a whole, whether on the 
local or the national level” (myrdal 1968: 949). hence, they are historically 
predisposed to express more loyalty to less inclusive communities (such 
as family, caste, or ethnic and religious groups). modernisation and the 
concomitant emancipation from such ascriptive loyalties and dependen-
cies have the potential to fundamentally revolutionise static social struc-
tures. however, setting these social practices into the context of a fraught 
economy, i.e. inexistent, imperfect or fragmented market of goods and 
services, the socio-economic environment is such that the ensuing eco-
nomic behaviour cannot be solely guided by ‘emancipatory’ calculations.37 
as myrdal elaborates,
36 at that time, the fight against corruption was not part of the international develop-
ment discourse, but was primarily a domestic issue, highlighting the struggles over politi-
cal production and symbolic production (in Bourdieu’s sense). however, corruption as a 
powerful political resource has become even more salient since the rise of the governance 
and anti-corruption discourse—this is particularly evident in the african context, where 
the ‘third wave of democratisation’ (huntington 1991), i.e. the introduction of multi-party 
politics in the early nineties, made (the fight against) corruption a crucial argument for 
incumbents and the opposition alike. it is probably not an exaggeration to say that there 
has been no election in africa since the end of the Cold War in which allegations over cor-
ruption and concrete corruption scandals have not played a central role. for one example 
see the case-studies of 2003 and 2010 on tanzania in this volume (Chapters 3 and 4, below); 
for further examples consider the allegations over corruption of the electoral commission 
in Kenya and its violent aftermath in december 2007, or the public debates and political 
unrest in south africa over the corruption allegations of the now president Jacob Zuma, 
to name but some of the internationally most visible. more generally, see schatzberg (2001: 
24–27) for the connection between the moral matrix of political legitimacy and its condi-
tions in the late eighties and nineties under which such legitimacy is seen to give way to 
political corruption, couched in the terms of greed and overconsumption.
37 the lack of emancipation, i.e. the absence of liberation from material, political 
and social dependencies in spite of fundamental structural transformations is a central 
concern of most contemporary africanists (see mamdani 1996; mbembe 2002). focusing 
on the enduring reality of subjecthood (as opposed to citizenship) analysed so astutely 
by mamdani, Chabal terms the historically framed closing of political spaces a ‘bastard 
form of political rule’: “far from bestowing on africans political emancipation, colonial 
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‘connections’ must fill the gap. these ‘connections’ range all the way from 
the absolute dependence of attached labor in agriculture and the peasants’ 
relations with moneylenders and landlords, which are determined by cus-
tom and power, to the special considerations that lead to nepotism even 
in big business. in such a setting a bribe to a person holding a public posi-
tion is not clearly differentiated from the ‘gifts’, tributes, and other burdens 
sanctioned in traditional, pre-capitalist society or the special obligations 
attached to a favor given at any social level (myrdal 1968: 948).
this description illustrates a key feature of corruption, operating not 
within dominant legal-rational boundaries, but in permeable arenas 
framed by diverse exchange rationalities and varying degrees and types 
of coercion.38
in other words, existing social structures and cultural codes that per-
meate all spheres of society—‘traditional’ and ‘modern’; economic, social 
and political—make inclusion of citizens into the economic and politi-
cal system a function of particular connections. the stability of such a 
social order, defined and glued together by particularistic loyalties, then 
becomes a function of the resources and power of one particular social 
group. this order explains the high incidence of ‘corruption’ or, better: 
boundary-crossing connections, as well as the widespread politicisation 
of corruption. Corruption is the means to access political and economic 
resources, and is accorded a high premium, especially by those who are 
not part of the right network, those who are excluded. Of all the authors, 
myrdal emphasises the dark sides of such exclusionary socio-political rela-
tions most strongly, ranging from issues of dependence, marginalisation 
and social polarisation, to the negative impact of corruption in terms of 
loss of legitimacy and waste of resources. in myrdal’s view, the prevalence 
of corruption is a mine-field for society, for it fosters political instability as 
well as more latent processes subverting the ideals of modernisation39—
rulers thus instituted a dual form of subjecthood, which undermined their modernising 
discourse and created a bastard form of political rule” (Chabal 2009: 90). the question of 
emancipation is one i shall return to in the next chapter (Chapter 2, below). 
38 see also Cartier-Bresson 1997 on different exchange relationships of corruption and 
their implications.
39 for the latter condition, observable in many developing countries, myrdal (see 
myrdal 1968: 950) coined the expression “soft state”, a state in which ‘social discipline’ 
[sic] is lacking, public institutions are malleable and neither officials nor politicians adhere 
to their duties. this notion of a ‘cultural’ dimension of development, not in the sense of 
predetermined norms and customs, but in the meta-political sense of value-based consen-
sus on the essence of socio-political order echoes schumpeter’s insight of the normative 
preconditions of functioning liberal democratic orders (see schumpeter 1993). 
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an analysis that pre-empts the gist of many contemporary theories on 
african politics, as will be discussed further down.
the key characteristics of corruption and development of this early 
discourse are portrayed in distinct but interrelated ways. firstly, all three 
authors carefully trace the relationship between social, political and eco-
nomic order and the function that corruption takes on in terms of inclu-
sion and assimilation into such spheres. although they highlight different 
aspects, stressing political access, political integration or political desta-
bilisation, respectively, they provide a multidimensional understanding 
of corruption in relationship echo scott’s empirical postulate that “it is 
impossible to ascertain the effects of corruption on political integration, 
income distribution, or economic growth without first asking who ben-
efits in what ways from what kinds of corruption” (scott 1969a: 340).
secondly, they carve out that power, accumulation and the exercise 
of violence are not regulated primarily by the rule of law; the rule of law 
merely features as one amongst alternative systems of social reference. 
the ‘state’, i.e. public institutions function in practice along different 
lines. One common feature of these early and seminal studies on political 
change is their emphasis on the prime importance of the political office in 
developing states. the political office is the clearing-house for status and 
prestige as well as for economic and political resources. therefore, access 
to and control of the political centre is synonymous with access to and 
control of the distribution of benefits, which is key to cementing political 
support. the state neither has the primacy over nor capability to imple-
ment the rules of public affairs nor what Bourdieu terms (in a neat twist 
of Weber’s much quoted definition of the state) the monopoly of legiti-
mate symbolic violence (Bourdieu 1985: 732), i.e. the authority to define 
and impose ‘official’ viewpoints. insofar the state is weakly institutiona-
lised, the importance of ‘reciprocity’40 becomes paramount as a means of 
securing and defining predictability. the uneven internalisation of formal 
norms and political processes, and uncertainty about the sources of legiti-
macy and capacity of the political system, leads to a situation in which 
political power is exchanged with status and material wealth, so that 
short-run, concrete inducements serve to secure political cooperation 
40 in this early discussion, the notion of reciprocity was utilised in the simple sense of 
exchange obligations. Only later did scott anchor a specific understanding of reciprocity 
to the concept of the ‘moral economy’ in rural, underdeveloped states (scott 1976); and 
hyden in particular highlighted reciprocity as a focal point of african social relations and 
the essence of the ‘economy of affection’ (hyden 1980; 1995).
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and support. the underlying assumption shines through (maybe with the 
exception of myrdal) that societies will move on from this phase to the 
next, rational-legal phase depending on the “process of industrialisation as 
new economic arrangements take hold and provide new focuses of identi-
fication and loyalty” (scott 1969a: 279).41 they all sharing similar premises 
with regard to necessary processes of value-formation and social differen-
tiation. still, the analysed dynamics and features of the political order in 
developing societies depicts political institutions that are intimately—but 
unevenly and informally—embedded in society, economic opportunities 
that are framed by political offices, and social practices evolving and crys-
tallising within parochial as well as market norm systems.
3. The Political Economy of Corruption: Rules and Regimes
evidently, in this early and defining discussion on corruption there seems 
to be a level of consensus on the causes of corruption in developing 
countries, but no general conclusions about its effects. the only generally 
valid assumption regards the long-term effects on political development; 
although many early scholars of corruption42 argued that corruption can 
conceivably be functional in the short-to medium run, all studies conclude 
that in the long-run corruption undermines the objectives of ‘modernisa-
tion’ if it does not evolve beyond its prebendal roots. as the preceding 
section illustrated, the line between ‘functional’ and ‘dysfunctional’ cor-
ruption is not only blurred, but also bound up in a complex configuration. 
a variety of dynamic elements significantly shape the context of corrup-
tion, ranging from the conditions of economic development to the values 
and conventions framing social practices.
however, in the decade following these seminal conceptualisations of 
corruption, the interest in corruption as such waned. With few exceptions,43 
41 however, as the study by scott on machine politics in the usa shows, this transition 
is historically contingent, and therefore by no means linear or even predictable (scott 
1969b). 
42 apart from the arguments made by huntington (1969) or scott (1969a) discussed, see 
in particular leff 1964, nye 1967, or Banfield 1975.
43 such as the key article by Banfield, where he develops the concept of principal-agent 
relations (Banfield 1975); rose-ackermann’s seminal study on the political economy of 
corruption (rose-ackermann 1978); or the pioneering volume on political corruption in 
historical and comparative analysis, originally edited by arnold heidenheimer and Victor 
leVine in 1970, and subsequently reprinted in many co-editions with eminent authors 
such as michael Johnston (for the latest edition see heidenheimer et al. 2009).
50 chapter one
corruption came to be understood as an intrinsic structural feature of 
many third World states. reviewing the literature of the  seventies, the 
‘problem about corruption’,44 if it was addressed at all, mutated into the 
question of regime types in the third World, where corruption was one 
significant but not explicitly analysed determinant. the analysis of ‘cor-
ruption’ moved out of academic fashion, only to be replaced by an inter-
est in patronage and clientelism as key features of third World political 
systems.
most importantly, the political science of development evolving dur-
ing this time produced the distinction between two models of political 
regimes of the third World: the corporatist state of latin america45 and 
the neo-patrimonial state of sub-saharan africa.46 analogous to hunting-
ton’s notion of the praetorian character of political competition, where 
neither rules nor political institutions are firmly anchored in society, both 
concepts attempt to explain the modes of containing political disorder 
and social confrontation in terms of personal relations and the specific 
relationship with the formal structure of the state. On centre-stage are 
the mechanisms of allocation, distribution and redistribution of economic 
and political resources. although both concepts revolve around patronage 
and clientelism as structuring mechanisms of political order, the main dif-
ference between them lies in the degree of legal-rational institutionalisa-
tion of bureaucratic structures.47
until this day, the notion of the neo-patrimonial state plays a dominant, 
if increasingly contested role in explaining ‘politics’ and ‘development’ in 
africa.48 its key role in explaining personalistic and corrupt politics and 
their effects on the continent neo-patrimonialism shall serve as an entry-
point into a more pointed probe into african politics. a neo-patrimonial 
state is conventionally understood to be a state which formally adheres to 
legal-rational standards, but operates within a double frame of reference, 
44 “What is the problem about Corruption” is the title of a seminal article on corruption 
and development, written by Colin leys in 1965 (see leys 1965).
45 for early literature on corporatism in latin america see the influential volume 
on authoritarianism and corporatism in latin america by malloy (ed.) 1977, including a 
contribution by O’donnell on what he calls “Corporatism and the Question of the state” 
(O’donnell 1977).
46 for early literature on neo-patrimonialism in sub-saharan africa see, for instance, 
lemarchand/legg 1972.
47 for critical contributions questioning the distinction between the two concepts see 
classically hammergren 1977; for a more recent discussion in the light of the resurged 
interest in clientelism and neo-patrimonialism see theobald 1999.
48 With regard to development policy, see, for instance, World Bank 1989 or 1997.
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namely a private/social as well as public/official one, and thus pervades 
the public/private boundary the modern state is based on. Of course, as 
already max Weber made clear, no political system operates to the exclu-
sion of all other forms of ‘rationality’, but idealtypically there is a domi-
nant form of rationality which marginalises other existing principles of 
political relations.49 patrimonial administrations are characterised by the 
legitimate private appropriation of the spoils of office, such as taxes, cus-
toms, land, labour, etc. as part of the routine exercise of political office.50 
hence, the prefix ‘neo’ refers to a political order that is formally based on 
the legal-abstract rationality of public administration—and therefore a 
‘modern’ state—but in practice adheres to a patrimonial rationality (or 
more precisely: patrimonial realities). engel/erdmann sum up its charac-
teristics in the following words:
neopatrimonialism is a mix of two types of political domination. it is a 
conjunction of patrimonial and legal-rational bureaucratic domination. the 
exercise of power in neo-patrimonial regimes is erratic [. . .]. finally, neopat-
rimonialism corresponds with authoritarian politics and rent-seeking cul-
ture, whereas legal-rational domination relates to democracy and a market 
economy (erdmann/engel 2006: 31).
evidently, a more grounded understanding of the terms patronage and 
clientelism is called for. as Gellner/Waterbury highlight: “What makes 
a patronage society is not the sheer presence of this syndrome, but its 
prominent or dominant position, to the detriment of other principles of 
social organisation” (Gellner/Waterbury 1975: 4).51 important here is that 
patrimonial or patronage societies are not bound to a specific historical 
period; on the contrary, a variety of concrete forms exist in contempo-
rary societies.52 perhaps one of the most interesting conceptualisations of 
such relations stems from the work of eisenstadt and his fellow authors 
(1978, 1984). here, patron-client relations are framed in terms of specific 
49 for a recent theoretical innovation highlighting the material and symbolic struggles 
of and between states as well as non-state actors within societies organised along formal-
legal lines see migdal 2001.
50 see Weber 1985; also Breuer 1998 on a typology of states in their historical context.
51  seminally on patronage, principles of social organisation and also the importance of 
trust see eisenstadt/roninger 1984.
52 for one of the most noted studies see putnam and his fellow authors (1993), who 
made a seminal contribution to the concept of ‘social capital’ with a comparative analy-
sis of wealthy, prosperous and dynamic northern italy, and poor and socio-economically 
static southern italy—the former, he concludes, being structured along weak, horizontal 
ties, the latter structured along hierarchical, vertical (patron-clientelistic) lines.
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modes of generalised exchanges of trust; or more particularly, on relations 
between (and types of) distribution of power, the flow of resources and 
the structure of social relations in society, with a specific analytical inter-
est in “the different levels of continuity, or discontinuity, in the construc-
tion of the institutional order” (eisenstadt/roninger 1984: 28).53 in this 
reading, patron-client relations “indicate that the tempo and direction of 
change in some crucial aspects of social division of labour—as manifest 
above all in levels of technological and economic development—may 
differ from those that develop in the construction of trust and meaning, 
and in the regulation of power” (eisenstadt/roninger 1984: 28). their key 
interest is hence of a more fundamental sociological nature, namely the 
ways that that such interpersonal relations structure trust, provide mean-
ing and regulate power within a society, i.e. the ways in which genera-
lised exchange mechanisms relate to specific exchange mechanisms in a 
society.54
according to eisenstadt/roninger (1984: 48–49),55 patron-client rela-
tionships are endowed with some specific characteristics that distinguish 
them from other relations of dependence: a) they tend to be primarily 
particularistic and diffuse, as opposed to universalistic and formalised; 
b) they are characterised by the simultaneous exchange of different 
resources, such as identified, for instance, in the work of huntington or 
myrdal, i.e. the exchange of instrumental, economic, political resources 
(on the side of patrons) with reciprocity, loyalty and solidarity (on the side 
of clients, although evidently, for instance, ‘loyalty’ can and often is articu-
lated as a political resource); c) the latter is often tied to unconditional, 
interpersonal obligation; d) these relations are based on informal (albeit 
strongly binding) understandings, i.e. not fully legal or contractual, and 
often in outright opposition to the official laws of the country; e) they are 
organised in a vertical rather than horizontal way; and f), lastly,
patron-client relations are based on a very strong element of inequality and 
of differences in power between patrons and clients. [. . .] the most crucial 
element of this inequality is the monopolisation, by the patrons, of certain 
53 this is of course also an intended theoretical prod against the inherent bias of ‘static’ 
societies of the structural-functionalist school, which is critiqued as “negating the creative 
autonomy of groups or individuals in the very construction of such order” (eisenstadt/
roninger 1984: 24). 
54 for a detailed discussion of distinct types of patron-client systems exploring differing 
perceptions of corruption see also heidenheimer 1970: 18–28.
55 see also heidenheimer 1970 and Gellner/Waterbury 1975.
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positions which are of crucial importance for the clients—above all [. . .] of 
the access to the means of production, major markets and centres of society 
(eisenstadt/roninger 1984: 49).
this latter point is the hinge that such relations swing on: in spite of 
patron-client-relationships being reciprocal in character, the patrons are 
the gatekeepers to essential resources.
applying these findings to social reality, an important insight is that 
patron-client relations are not necessarily predominantly found in devel-
oping countries; in most if not all contemporary societies such relation-
ships exist in many differing concrete forms. eisenstadt/roninger (1984: 
49) distinguish between the place that such relations are accorded within 
the broader institutional contexts of their societies—whether they con-
stitute a) a basic aspect of the institutional matrix; b) not a basic aspect 
but a recognised dimension; or whether they are, c), an ‘addendum’ to 
the central institutional structure.56 these analytical distinctions are of 
importance, as they allow a more general and simultaneously empirically 
more open understanding of modes of generalised exchange and fea-
tures of social structures.57 although there may be some empirical over-
lap between these different forms and features, they constitute different 
 models (if not distinct types) of generalised exchange.
in the past few decades, the analysis of patron-client relationships, 
in particular the model ‘neo-patrimonial’ politics, has been extensively 
applied and developed with reference to african states.58 as Clapham 
makes explicit, the term ‘neo-patrimonial’ refers to political orders in 
56 the concept of an ‘addendum’ is derived from C. landé, who elaborates that “formal, 
explicit, institutionalized contracts do not offer an adequate explanation of the way a com-
munity works, because they do not provide for all of the needs of a community or of the 
individuals who enter into such contracts. some of these must be enlivened by the super-
imposition upon them of voluntary relations of a more selective, flexible, intermittent and 
emotional sort” (landé 1976; quoted in eisenstadt/roninger 1984: 49–50). What is meant 
with ‘addendum’, in other words, is not necessarily the higher premium on affective or cul-
turally embedded exchange relations in periods of increased instrumental rationalisation, 
such as identified by huntington 1969, but the enrichment of social relations by further 
rationalities without threatening what Gellner/Waterbury (eds.) 1975 term the dominant 
(in contemporary states usually: legal-bureaucratic) principle of social organisation. 
57 interestingly, african countries play a minor role in patron-client-theories of the era; 
for instance, eisenstadt/roninger 1984 only include one african country, namely rwanda, 
in their discussion of in total 30 case-studies.
58 the early literature draws heavily on Weber’s concept of patrimonialism (see Weber 
1985). however, as, for instance, eisenstadt/roninger 1984 demonstrate, and erdmann/
engel point out explicitly (erdmann/engel 2006: 12, footnote 7), a specifically ‘african’ sub-
type of patrimonialism (and, by extension, neopatrimonialism) would only make sense in 
a comparative conceptualisation. 
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which patrimonial rationales are intimately interwoven with legal-bureau-
cratic rationales,
a form of organisation in which relationships of a broadly patrimonial type 
pervade a political and administrative system which is formally constructed 
on legal-rational lines. Officials hold positions in bureaucratic organisa-
tions with powers which are formally defined, but exercise those powers, 
so far as they can, as a form not of public service but of private property 
(Clapham 1985: 48).59
fully aware of the plurality of simultaneous rationales discussed above, 
médard, a renowned french africanist, goes a step further by painting the 
elusive and ambivalent character of a neo-patrimonial political order:
unlike the patrimonial regime the neo-patrimonial regime hides behind a 
public facade which is complex and differentiated. it dissimulates the pri-
vate while simulating the public. this is of course true of all political regimes 
and all political speeches, as neo-patrimonialism is not the monopoly of 
underdeveloped states. however, while in the developed states the patri-
monial reality coexists with a strong institutionalization of power, in under-
developed states it undermines the state itself (médard 1982: 181).
although the ‘real’ politics may be hidden behind a public facade, neo-
patrimonial politics produce and reproduce the centralisation and inter-
dependence of socio-economic and socio-political power—political office 
as the ‘clearing house’—which enable the patrons to materially ‘feed’ 
their clients and their clients to express political loyalty. médard astutely 
observes that neo-patrimonialism reduces political resources into eco-
nomic ones, for
politics becomes a kind of business with two modes of exchange: connec-
tions and money. the state is a pie that everyone greedily wants to eat. 
Observing these practices, however, shows that Western-style reference to 
ideas of public service of general interest is not entirely a mystification, as 
some authors assume. truly, these concepts remain vague; they also hide 
specific interests, but one must acknowledge that when these values are 
not sufficiently internalized, this results in incongruous behaviour from the 
viewpoint of good administration (médard 1982: 183).60
59 for early literature on patron-client relationships and neo-patrimonialism in africa 
see also lemarchand/legg 1972, theobald 1982, Joseph 1983, and the contributions in the 
edited volume on patronage and political power in Clapham (ed.) 1982. for a recent con-
cise overview and differentiated analysis see erdmann/engel 2006. 
60 the whole idea of ‘nation-building’ begs the question of whose nation, i.e. the inter-
ests and values of which social groups shape and participate in this process. picking up the 
issue of who carries and transforms which interests, leys dryly observes the following on 
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in spite of this recognition of values informing political relations, he main-
tains that the core of neo-patrimonialism must be its (country- specific) 
politico-economic dimension: “neo-patrimonialism is conditioned by 
mechanisms of production, exchange, extraction, distribution, and, even-
tually, accumulation of resources” (médard 1982: 185). echoing scott’s cry 
for empirical analysis, médard also argues that neo-patrimonialism can 
only be understood if each of its elements (corruption, nepotism, patron-
age, etc.) are understood in their concrete relationship to the political 
regime in question. in other words, neo-patrimonial regimes, whilst char-
acterised by certain key features, are dynamic and potentially adaptive 
configurations that are subject to contingency and change.
a point which has been sidelined hitherto is that neo-patrimonial 
practices are anchored in the social underpinnings of political authority, 
for by definition patronage-ties cut across the divide between political 
authority, social legitimacy and economic wealth. By harnessing social 
institutions—such as ethnically, regionally or spiritually legitimated or, 
indeed, constructed communities61—political and economic power is 
consolidated and simultaneously elongated in its outreach. instead of a 
legal-bureaucratic framework of due process, however, the medium of this 
relationship is the exchange of political acquiescence for state resources 
is a medley of particularistic and universal, public and private, formal and 
informal practices, the patterns of which are highly contextual. so whilst 
the state, or state resources, are the honey-pot for which competing groups 
struggle and strain, personal ties and practices interweave with impartial 
rules, thus creating a specifically neo-patrimonial rationality that medi-
ates and orders the hierarchy of and integration into the political order. 
as in patrimonial societies, unequal relationships between individuals 
and groups, between patrons and clients, are the defining characteristic 
of such an order, but with the significant difference that
under neopatrimonialism, the distinction between the public and the pri-
vate, at least formally, exists and is accepted, and public reference can be 
made to this distinction (it is a different matter whether this is observed or 
not). neopatrimonial rule takes place within the framework of, and with 
the conditions in ‘new states’: “neither attitudes nor material conditions in these countries 
are focused on the support of a single concept of the national interest or of the official 
purposes of state and local officers and institutions which would promote that interest” 
(leys 1965: 224).
61 On the latter see the decisive works by anderson 1983 and hobsbawm/ranger (eds.) 
1983.
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the claim to, legal-rational bureaucracy or ‘modern’ stateness (erdmann/ 
engel 2006: 18).62
in other words, the simulations and seeming incongruousness of political 
practices in neo-patrimonial orders observed derive their very legitimacy 
from their reference to distinct, albeit interwoven rationalities—or, to 
stay closer to the (post-)Weberian terminology, to two distinct but in this 
particular case intimately interwoven types of domination.63
more recently, Bratton/van der Walle (1994, 1997) have conducted 
seminal studies on political regimes and democratic transitions in afri-
can states, exploring the implications of neo-patrimonialism for political 
change. although the context has changed dramatically—on centre stage 
is not the modernisation of authoritarian or soft states anymore, but their 
democratisation—the theoretical prerequisites of formal rationality and 
effective institutions are identical. interestingly, in spite of the significant 
change in national and international contexts, their diagnosis of african 
politics is an echo of médard:
rather, the distinctive institutional hallmark of african regimes is neo-
patrimonialism. in neopatrimonial regimes, the chief executive maintains 
authority through personal patronage, rather than through ideology or law. 
as with classic patrimonialism, the right to rule is ascribed to a person 
rather than an office. in contemporary patrimonialism, relationships of loy-
alty and dependence pervade a formal political and administrative system 
and leaders occupy bureaucratic offices less to perform public service than 
to acquire personal wealth and status. the distinction between private and 
public interests is purposely blurred. the essence of neopatrimonialism is 
the award by public officials of personal favors, both within the state (nota-
bly public sector jobs) and in society (for instance, licences, contracts and 
projects). in return for material rewards, clients mobilize political support 
and refer all decisions upwards as a mark of deference to patrons. [. . .] thus, 
personal relationships are a factor at the margin of all bureaucratic systems, 
but in Africa they constitute the foundation and superstructure of political 
institutions (Bratton/van der Walle 1992: 458–459; emphasis added).64
62 see also Gellner/Waterbury (eds.) 1975 for further analyses.
63 for a detailed contribution on the relevance of patrimonial symbols for the moral 
matrix of political legitimacy in africa see schatzberg 2001; for an elaborate discussion of 
neo-patrimonialism in post-Weberian terms see erdmann/engel 2006.
64 see also Bratton/van der Walle 1997. this insight corresponds with the typology 
developed by landé 1976 (quoted in eisenstadt/roninger 1984: footnote 40), who does not 
speak of personal relationships on the margin of bureaucratic systems, but as an ‘adden-
dum’. the insight is the same, namely that personal relationships constitute a subordinate 
politico-administrative matrix, omnipresent but not omnidominant. for contemporary 
theories on the importance of personal and informal relations for the institutionalisation 
of social interaction and reduction of social friction see Coleman 1990 or putnam et al. 
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taking this analysis a step further, Bratton/van der Walle frame the ques-
tion whether individual key actors, such as the ‘big man politics’ and the 
pattern of their political rule in african countries,65 shape the outcome of 
politics idiosyncratically, or whether there are deeper structural features 
that impact on the outcome of political transitions. Bratton/van der Walle 
come to the conclusion that transition processes are more contingent on 
the previous regime type than on other factors. according to their find-
ings, the ‘rules of the political game’ structure the dynamics of the tran-
sition, even if they do not determine the outcome itself. more saliently, 
their findings indicate that the prospects for democracy depend on prior 
traditions of political pluralism. the conclusion is stark: neo-patrimonial 
regimes, characterised as they are by the privatisation and monopolisa-
tion of political power, inherently disable processes of democratisation 
and pluralisation (Bratton/van der Walle 1994: 474–480). as they contend 
themselves, in itself this may not be such an original insight. however, 
based on the premise that new modes of political behaviour require a 
learning process by the involved actors (and, therefore, the crucial step 
from ‘democratisation’ to democracy is only achieved once this particu-
lar internalisation and institutionalisation has taken place), Bratton/van 
der Walle spell out the analytical implications by linking the make-up of 
the previous regime with the actual dynamics unfolding during times of 
political change:
Our argument suggests that organizations both within and without the 
state, and the interaction between them, provide critical arenas for this 
learning. it will be difficult, that is, to institute new rules of accountability, 
tolerance, and participation if political parties or trade unions are missing 
or underdeveloped and if judicial and legislative bodies have no tradition of 
 independence from the executive (Bratton/van der Walle 1994: 488; empha-
sis added).
Whilst recognising the practical importance of the informal organisation 
of political, social as well as economic relations, they stress the pivotal 
importance of formal institutions of political participation and opposition 
for transformation.
1993, both conceptualising in different approaches the importance of social capital for the 
accumulation of social cohesion, trust and knowledge exchange; or Granovetter 1985, who 
famously observed the ‘strength of weak ties’. 
65 see médard 1982 for a key article on the phenomenon of Big men in african states; 
see seminally Jackson/rosberg 1982a and 1982b for the meaning of personal rule in post-
colonial africa. 
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although the analysis of the political economy of corruption through 
the lens of neo-patrimonialism is empirically and analytically valuable to 
understand the concrete politico-economic institutions and their dynam-
ics in particular countries, there are two main critiques that need to be 
levelled against it. the first regards scholars of neo-patrimonialism’s nearly 
exclusive emphasis on personalistic ties permeating the state as the root 
cause of underdevelopment. although neo-patrimonial and clientelistic 
relationships are uncontestedly a predominant structural characteristic of 
african states, and the theory of neo-patrimonialism has laudably height-
ened the theoretical as well as empirical understanding of these mecha-
nisms, neo-patrimonial theories are constrained by its strict dichotomies 
of (neo-)patrimonial versus rational/legal principles and informal versus 
formal principles. neglected here are the highly creative processes of 
adaptation and assimilation that this ‘informalisation’ of rationalities and 
dominance allow.
the specifically modern social imaginaries of neo-patrimonial states 
are both more diverse as well as more constrained than in legal-bureau-
cratic states. to use a term elaborated by Charles taylor, the ‘social 
imaginaries’, i.e. the background images that inform the “implicit grasp 
of social space” (taylor 2004: 26), are key to a socially and individually 
visceral understanding of the norms underlying social practice. they are 
also key to a sense of what makes these norms realisable. however, as 
taylor demonstrates, such imaginaries are not unchanging, underlying as 
they do dynamics of appropriation and change. initially, specific moral 
orders (such as, for instance, the legal-rational or ‘modern’ state) may be 
idealised, but this idealisation itself leads to complex imaginaries that 
are associated with specific and generic social practices. taylor himself 
observes that this process is frequently dynamic, both recreating as well 
as creating a social order that is “in part traditional but often transformed 
by the contact” (taylor 2004: 19). emerging forms of social imaginary in 
times of social change, hence, are not necessarily uniform, nor need to be 
applied and appropriated uniformly; on the contrary, often new princi-
ples and norms are introduced only on certain levels “while leaving other 
niches untouched” (taylor 2004: 146).66
66 Classically, this process of uneven penetration of society by enlightened and legal-
rational values has been demonstrated by scholars such as durkheim 1960 or Weber 1985, 
2004, analysing the transformations to specifically modern states, economies and societies. 
taylor discusses it inter alia in terms of contemporary societies, e.g. with regard to issues 
of suffrage or minority rights (see taylor 2004).
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applied to the political order in africa, the social imaginaries that 
penetrate and inform the social realities of african states are evidently 
derived from both patrimonial as well as from legal-bureaucratic orders; 
a hybridity which, on the one hand, opens up spaces of creativity and 
negotiation on prevailing norms (unlike the ‘iron cage’ of legal-bureau-
cratic domination diagnosed by max Weber), but on the other hand also 
imposes particularistic constraints on the scope and type of action at 
the disposition of social actors. the constraints derive precisely from the 
seeming pluralism of frames of reference: the characteristic ambiguity of 
neo-patrimonial orders with regard to the prevailing dominant order in 
specific moments does not necessarily open up creative spaces. in prac-
tice it seems to primarily open up a wider spectrum of sanctions available 
to patrons, who can draw on both patrimonial as well on legal-bureau-
cratic norms and corresponding disciplinary measures, with a degree of 
arbitrariness that is directly correlated to the relative powerlessness of 
the clients. so whereas in Western history the specifically modern social 
imaginary lead to the primacy of categorical relations (to use a term by 
taylor) and an emancipation from ascribed or ‘traditional’ relations (albeit 
unevenly), the process in african countries is dissimilar: the ‘contact’ of 
modern social imagery with the social, cultural and economic realities has 
led to a relative disempowerment and disenfranchisement of people and 
a transformation of ‘ascribed’ identies.67
a second critique of the neo-patrimonial state is levelled against a 
different dimension of the concept, namely against the invariant frame 
of reference of such an approach: the image of a Weberian state, por-
trayed implicitly as an autonomous, unchanging and coherent body of 
space and norms. Viewed through the lens of a legal-bureaucratic state 
any leakage of other rationalities and practices into this bounded public 
sphere is considered deviant—although of course the ideal-type of a legal-
bureaucratic state is just that, an ideal-type and not social reality.68 the 
merit of neo-patrimonial theories is that they, in contrast to the more 
67 in contemporary african studies the focus on such invisible dynamics and creativ-
ity has gained renewed traction from an agency perspective, highlighting the surprisingly 
successful and resourceful survival and coping strategies of actors in sometimes extreme 
situations of marginalisation and destitution. for an influential general theoretical con-
tribution, see long 2001; for a recent contribution with an african focus see Chabal et al. 
2007; for a critique with regard to the underlying ‘overoptimism’ of such agency-centered 
theories of african societies see also Chabal 2009.
68 for an influential theorisation of the heterogeneity of contemporary states see 
migdal 2001.
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simplistic  modernisation theories, conceptualise political deviance as an 
order sui generis, but the normative judgement deriving from the mod-
ern ideal-type is not suspended. On the contrary it serves to sharpen the 
contours of the ‘deviant’ (patrimonial) order. more interesting theoretical 
approaches undercut such limiting and normative dichotomies, exploring 
‘the state’ as part of a field populated by multiple actors, practices and 
framing matrixes, in which both the images as well as the practices pro-
duced in these fields “can be overlapping or reinforcing, or contradictory 
or mutually destructive” (migdal 2001: 16),69 raising issues i shall return to 
further down.
the main conclusion emerging from neo-patrimonial theories is that 
evidently new values and rules are not consolidated automatically: 
the internalisation of values that provide a frame of orientation for 
everyday attitudes and practices, normative prescriptions on the ‘right’ 
behaviour, and correspondingly a regime of social and legal sanctions 
that regulate and control such practices underlie complex contingencies. 
looking at more iterated patterns, the impact of new rules and resources 
on configurations of power and political order is even more unpredictable. 
the key question is what social practices do these social imaginaries lead 
to, what new, adapted, appropriated, or, indeed, unchanged figurations of 
social and political order? for if, as the studies on democratisation show 
in an exemplary fashion, the formal, democratic transformation of neo-
patrimonial regimes merely leads to the consolidation or even radicalisa-
tion of neo-patrimonialism (albeit now in a formally democratic guise), 
is the quest for the identification emancipatory actors and practices not 
futile?70 how should the implored values of ‘accountability,  tolerance, and 
69 the approach of ‘state in society’ developed by midgal, who draws on Weber, shils, 
Bourdieu and (with critical qualifications) foucault in his elaboration of a more dynamic 
concept of ‘the state’. the lynchpin is his highly pertinent definition of the “state as a 
field of power marked by the use and threat of violence and shaped by (1) the image of 
a coherent, controlling organization in a territory, which is representative of the people 
bounded by that territory, and (2) the actual practices of its multiple parts” (migdal 2001: 
16, emphasis in original). the key point is the while “the image of the state implies a 
single morality, one standard way, indeed right way, of doing things, practices denote 
multiple types of performance and, possibly, some contention over what is the right way 
to act” (migdal 2001: 19; emphasis in original). although arguably the dichotomy between 
image and practice is not as pronounced as implied in migdal’s twofold definition (see, for 
instance, taylor 2004), his ‘state in society’ approach provides a sophisticated and useful 
analysis of the complexities of what conventionally is so bluntly termed ‘public-private’ 
relationships. 
70 this may also be due to the naïvety of africanists, who tend to disregard sophis-
ticated theories on political and economic change (e.g. schumpeter 1993; polanyi 1957). 
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participation’ (Bratton/van der Walle 1992: 488) evolve, how do the ‘politi-
cal parties or trade unions’ (Bratton/van der Walle 1992: 488) emerge.71 in 
other words, where do the value systems and social actors emanate from 
to carry, shape and institutionalise such a transition, if evidently the blur-
ring of the private and public boundaries are a defining feature of african 
societies?
in a seminal article published in the mid-sixties, leys discussed the 
identical problem of a “corrupted society” (leys 1965: 228) in new african 
states, and came up with a highly Weberian solution:
there are perfectly plain differences to be seen between one developing 
nation and another in terms of the public spirit and devotion to duty shown 
by their elites, and the idea of a society economically stagnating in the grips 
of a self-seeking and corrupt élite is not a pure fantasy. the line of escape 
is also fairly clear. typically, a nucleus of ‘puritans’—drawn from groups 
of such as an independent business class, professional groups, or small 
farmers—begins to exercise effective pressure to apply the official but dis-
regarded public code of ethics (leys 1965: 229).
in the meantime, leys’ cautious strand of hope with regard to ‘progres-
sive’—here: in Weberian tradition ‘puritan’—forces as well as the more 
confident predictions by other authors about the facilitative function of 
corruption have been proven wrong by the political and economic real-
ity of subsequent decades. With the benefit of hindsight and even after 
the democratic revolution in africa the conclusions reached by Bratton/
van der Walle have been overtaken by the realities of seemingly ‘unprob-
lematic’ countries such as Kenya or the Côte d’ivoire. ultimately, in both 
cases their political break-downs can also be traced back to the domi-
nating politics of neo-patrimonialism and social cleavages entrenched by 
particularistic and vertical modes of redistribution.72
hence, given the historicity and theoretically contested universal-
ity of the Western state, the most prominent weakness may well be the 
i maintain, however, with rueschemeyer and his fellow authors in their seminal study on 
the relationship between capitalism and democracy, that “it is power relations that most 
importantly determine whether democracy can emerge, stabilize and then maintain itself 
even in the face of adverse conditions” (rueschemeyer et al. 1992: 5).
71  the quotes of Bratton/van der Walle 1992 are used as a pars pro toto that crystallise 
africa’s key ‘absences’ identified in the scholarly and developmental literature—and at the 
same time constituting the key solutions identified for its development (for many others: 
hyden 2006). 
72 for a political economy of ethnicity see Berman (2004), Berman et al. (2004); for a 
highly insightful book on Kenya illustrating this point graphically see Wrong 2009.
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precedence accorded to the normative distinctions and elevations inherent 
in state definitions and imaginaries that even differentiated and sophis-
ticated neo-patrimonial approaches fall prey to. the political economy 
of corruption is hobbled to its inherent benchmark, the deeply ingrained 
culture of public administration in Western liberal-democratic states. the 
conceptual dichotomy of ‘modern’ bureaucratic-legal and ‘traditional’ pat-
rimonial order,73 on which the concept by definition rests, makes it if not 
blind then blinkered to new formations and figurations of social order 
that do not necessarily reproduce this dichotomy.
Before, however, we turn to political orders that go beyond such estab-
lished frameworks, a second line of thought about politics and boundaries 
in africa needs to be explored. this takes us to a hitherto underexplored 
dimension of corruption: the cultural embeddedness of social and politi-
cal practices observed in the introductory remarks. networks of patronage 
and clientelism are not exclusively informed by power relations, but evi-
dently have specifically cultural roots; they are nurtured and legitimised 
by specific social values, practices and norms. Cartier-Bresson terms this 
phenomenon aptly “social exchange corruption” (Cartier-Bresson 1997: 
466), where corruption is organised by social networks and becomes insti-
tutionalised through long-term relationships and community-like struc-
tures based on trust, reciprocity and solidarity.74 it is these relationships 
and their structuring principles that need to be understood more clearly 
to render a more complete picture of the political economy of corruption, 
which shall be sketched out in the following section.
4. The Moral Economy of Corruption: Values and Practices
as was shown above, the early debate on corruption and development 
already features a broader socio-cultural understanding of corruption.75 
the roots of such a conceptualisation can be found in classic politi-
cal economy that put the relationship between moral order, economic 
73 see rueschemeyer et al. 1992 for an excellent survey and analysis of the historical 
and sociological context of this development.
74 here, Cartier-Bresson 1997 leans heavily on the seminal insights of Granovetter 
1985.
75 One could argue that this was primarily due to the analytic frame of reference based 
on the dichotomy between traditional and modern societies; by definition, the undifferen-
tiated, static features of traditional societies in modernising states could only be captured 
with reference to social, cultural and religious determinants.
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practices, and the social good on centre stage.76 in the last century, the 
embeddedness of economic relations in a socio-moral matrix was famously 
profiled by Karl polanyi, who in his opus magnum “the Great transforma-
tion” (1957 [1944]) traced the ways in which capitalist economies are no 
longer embedded in a social and moral order; the ways that such econo-
mies no longer rely on social modes of regulation to control modes and 
norms of economic conduct, but on the contrary, have produced a soci-
ety which operates merely “as an adjunct to the market”, as he puts it 
(polyani 1957: 57). still, the concept of a moral economy, i.e. a socially 
embedded economy, where social norms and values are not just internal 
to economic practices (in the sense that these are historical and cultural 
products), but provide the prime frame of economic relations, plays a key 
reference point in his analysis of the commodification of society and the 
self-regulation of markets.
in development studies, the concept of a ‘moral economy’ is closely 
associated with scott’s seminal study on modes of production in rural 
south-east asia (scott 1976). scott’s theoretical innovation was to capture 
the powerful social principles of reciprocity and obligations as economi-
cally rational logics of subsistence. the ‘ethics of subsistence’ he describes 
is placed in a context of high insecurity, minimal resources, and little 
room to manoeuvre for individual peasants and peasant families (scott 
1976: 13–14); the objective and premise of his study is “that we may learn 
more about the politics of the peasants by asking not merely how poor 
they are but also how precarious their livelihood is” (scott 1976: 34).77 the 
novelty of scott’s approach was the empirical recognition and analytical 
inclusion of non-economic factors to explain economic behaviour; not by 
reducing his theory to cultural determinants, but by embedding it in a 
social context.78 not long after, hyden (1980) coined the term ‘economy of 
76 Classically see adam smith, who analyses the ways economic relations are informed 
by moral ‘sentiments’ in the sense of values (and the rationales under which these are 
overridden) in his two main publications, the “theory of moral sentiments” (1759) and the 
“Wealth of nations” (1776). see also for an earlier and influential contribution adam fergu-
son’s “essay on the history of Civil society”, first published in 1767 (see ferguson 1995). 
77 scott’s study begins by analysing the meaning of subsistence ‘ethic’ for peasant 
economies, which he explores right to its logical and significant end by applying it also 
to peasant politics and, saliently, the question of peasant rebellion; essentially and highly 
politically, scott tries to understand the dynamics of continuity and change in the agrar-
ian order.
78 this more differentiated understanding of economic theory, that conceptualises 
economic behaviour in a socio-cultural environment rose to glory under the label ‘neo-
institutional economics’ in the late eighties through renowned scholars such as elinor 
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affection’,79 exploring the particular logics of peasant production in rural 
east africa that are based on affective ties and solidarity.80 here, analo-
gous to scott’s study, the investment in social relations is more important 
to the generation of status and security than the investment in means of 
production.81
it is this blind spot comprising the socio-moral framing of certain prac-
tices that Olivier de sardan (1999) attempts to illuminate by conceptualis-
ing corruption in africa in terms of a moral economy. the emphasis is on 
‘moral’, focusing on the morality framing corrupt practices that are rarely 
found in other approaches. in his words, the
social mechanisms of corruption are scarcely explored, nor are its processes 
of legitimation seen from the actors’ point of view. this is why this article 
uses the term: moral economy, which may appear surprising when attached 
to a term as unanimously stigmatised as amoral or immoral. the intention 
here is to insist on as subtle as possible a restitution of the value systems 
Ostrom (1988) or douglass north (1990). following excerpt may illustrate this paradig-
matic shift from the neo-classical model of rational, distanced individuals to the institu-
tional approach of embedded actors: “the political realm is not a world apart from the 
economic realm, the religious realm, or the social realm. families are key producing, trad-
ing, consuming, educational, and self-governing units in any society. they sustain an inter-
generational cycle of life that is ordered in relation to conceptions and practices that have 
ethical and religious significance. societies get put together as complex configurations of 
human relationships” (Ostrom 1988: 445).
79 however, for our purposes hyden’s term is more misleading than scott’s, for the 
constraints and pressures of subsistence produce a particular moral matrix which have 
little to do with affection. the economy of affection maximises security, so that ‘affection’ 
must not be understood in a subjective sense, but in a normative sense. hence, analogous 
to the ‘moral’ of peasant economy, to a certain degree ‘affection’ is objectified to secure 
economic survival. the approach developed by scott, on the other hand, is based on a 
clear theoretical frame of reference with a hermeneutic focus on the specific individual 
and communal rationality inherent in a particular socio-economic context.
80 for a critique of hyden’s concept see hauck 2001: 201–205.
81  One of the characteristics of such affective, reciprocal economic transactions analy-
sed by hyden is the virtual inexistence of conflictual power relations that determine mar-
ket economic transactions. in the economy of affection, by definition, irrespective of the 
intended gain or distribution of benefits, social relations within the same kin or com-
munity must be harmonious, implying on the other hand that conflicts are more likely to 
emerge between different communities than within the same social group (hyden 1980). 
as myrdal (1968) amongst others already observed, particular modes of (peasant) socio-
economic organisation are linked to particular modes of social identification and conflict 
resolution, which have strong repercussions on the way that communities interact with 
other communities and, centrally, with the nation-state as a whole. hyden’s core interest 
lies here, in the role of the state as a transformative power vis-à-vis such a moral matrix 
framing economic relations, whereas scott is more interested in the conditions of social 
action by peasants. 
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and cultural codes, which permit a justification of corruption by those who 
practice it (Olivier de sardan 1999: 25).82
Olivier de sardan’s central question revolves around the generalisation, 
normalisation and banalisation of corruption in contemporary africa. 
With a set of discerning hypotheses and facilitating ‘logics of corruption’, 
he shows how social and cultural norms frame the arena in which actors 
can and do operate in contemporary africa. he lays bare the routine prac-
tice of corruption, or what he—similar to Cartier-Bresson’s notion of the 
social exchange of corruption—terms the ‘corruption complex’, i.e. the 
broad practice of illicit deeds in sweeping contradiction to the official eth-
ics of ‘public property’ or ‘public service’ (Olivier de sardan 1999: 28–30). 
although these practices are only in part legally corrupt, their illicit char-
acter is still pivotal for a meaningful understanding of the problem of cor-
ruption in contemporary, post-colonial african societies.
interestingly, Olivier de sardan takes the discrepancy between ‘formal’ 
and ‘practical’ norms as a frame of reference—in his view, “the core of 
the sociological problem of corruption is to be situated in the distance 
between juridical condemnation of certain practices and their frequency, 
their banalisation or indeed their cultural legitimacy” (Olivier de sardan 
1999: 29).83 from his perspective, the explanandum must include the 
social reality of everyday behaviour, “in order to consider what these vari-
ous practices have in common, what affinities link them together, and to 
what extent they enter the same fabric of customary social norms and 
attitudes” (Olivier de sardan 1999: 28). Based on the analysis of this socio-
moral fabric, he diagnoses a “schizophrenic situation” (Olivier de sardan 
1999: 48), where the professional and administrative legitimacy of civil 
servants is derived from a more or less completely contradictory set of 
values than their social legitimacy.
What is new about this diagnosis is the light it sheds the complex 
cultural embeddedness of corruption. Olivier de sardan distinguishes 
between general theses on the institutional framework of corruption in 
africa, such as the general discourse on corruption and patterns of its 
stigmatisation and routinisation, on the one hand, and identifying on the 
other hand its socio-cultural logics, such as solidarity and networks of 
82 however, Olivier de sardan does clearly not have an interest in the economy of cor-
ruption, i.e. the relations of production, such as scott or hyden put in the centre of their 
enquiry.
83 for a critique of this view, see the last section in this chapter. 
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the people, the predatory authority of the elites or continual negotiation. 
these logics are compounded by transcending and ‘facilitating’ multipli-
ers particular to african societies. firstly, a sense of shame: on the one 
hand, shame to fail to deliver the spoils of the office to those who socially 
feel entitled to a part; on the other hand shame to ‘betray’ the practices of 
corrupt colleagues. secondly, the ‘over-monetarisation’ of social relations, 
with money playing a permanent and central role even in (what would 
be considered in Western societies) the most private of social relations. 
Within this densely woven fabric, corruption becomes a cultural impera-
tive framed by socio-economic determinants.
the analysis Olivier de sardan offers is remarkably insightful, illumi-
nating diverse facets of the corruption complex. rather disappointingly, 
he then reaches a surprisingly simplistic conclusion, namely that the 
crux of africa lies in the “glaring discrepancy” (Olivier de sardan 1999: 
47) between the norms of the public service and legal definitions of cor-
ruption with the predominant socio-cultural logics. more direly, “it would 
seem that the effect of acquired habits and the normalisation of com-
monplace practices renders the situation more or less irreversible.” all he 
leaves the reader with is “the general feeling of helplessness in the face 
of an infernal mechanism” (Olivier de sardan 1999: 48), and an outlook 
which is dismally identical to the finding that Colin leys came to over 
30 years earlier:84 that the “development of movements of a ‘puritanical’ 
tendency, intended to bring about a reform of public morals [. . .] may be 
among the ultimate means, in the absence of an improbable self-refor-
mation of the political elites, to attempt to change the present course of 
affairs. any ‘anticorruption’ policy must face up to these realities” (Olivier 
de sardan 1999: 48).
in other words, although not only the understanding and conceptu-
alisation of corruption has come a considerable way since the height of 
84 see leys 1965, in particular his doubts with regard to the development of such a 
“nucleus of ‘puritans’ ” (leys 1965: 229) as a precondition for the development of a pub-
lic morality—given the lack of appropriate conditions in the newly independent african 
states, not least “the wealth accumulated improperly by the top élite” that is “solely moti-
vated by the hope of personal gain” (leys 1965: 229). looking at the extent of grand cor-
ruption in africa in the past decades, his analysis pre-empted the trends later captured in 
terms of kleptocracy, predation and criminalisation (see, for instance, Bayart et al. 1999; for 
an excellent documentary account of kleptocracy in the former Zaïre under mobutu sese 
seko see Wrong 2002; for a detailed account of grand corruption from a whistleblowers 
perspective in Kenya under Kibaki see Wrong 2009; or for a knowledgeable dissection of 
the role international business in grand corruption see pioneeringly moodie-stuart 1996 
and recently Baker 2005). 
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modernisation theories, but also the understanding and empirical stud-
ies of ‘development’, the analytical implications of a theory of corruption 
jumps back to square one. the paltry product of Olivier de sardan’s inno-
vative emic view is the vague notion of induced, disembedded develop-
ment of socio-moral movements to change the present course of affairs.85 
such a statement begs the question from where such puritanical move-
ments should evolve from, if, according to his analysis, social practices 
are too sedimented for change. in spite of his definitional reference to 
the legal-bureaucratic institutional framework, he too falls prey to the 
fruitless opposition between legal-bureaucratic norms on one side and 
social practices on the other side, thereby rendering the exploration of the 
(potentially creative) dynamics between social practices, ingrained values 
and official norms impossible.86
in conclusion, what the debate on the moral and political economy 
shows is that theoretical understanding as well as the implementation of 
anti-corruption policies require more differentiated empirical studies to 
shed light on the “critical arenas for learning” (Bratton/van der Walle 1994: 
488), studies that capture the processes framing the values that serve as 
orientation to social practice, norms that are endowed with social sig-
nificance (and the actual power to sanction), and institutions with the 
85 Olivier de sardan is unfortunately not alone here. as was shown in the preceding 
sections, this point is made consistently by scholars of africa from all disciplines. most 
analyses end in a highly Weberian ‘solution’, disregarding more sophisticated social-scien-
tific literature as well as studies of the east asian ‘miracles’. Consider, for instance, hyden’s 
surprisingly simplistic statement on the type of government prevailing in african states 
and the type seen to be necessary for the pursuit of the public good: “every country in the 
world that is now developed—or succeeding in getting out of poverty—has been forced 
to reduce or eliminate informal practices such as nepotism, spoils, and similar discretion-
ary uses of public authority. What remains to be done in african countries, therefore, is 
by no means unique. What is possibly exceptional is the extent to which these problems 
appear intractable. they may, therefore, call for bolder thinking [. . .]. a policy government 
is committed to providing and implementing public goals that have been duly approved 
by institutions with legitimate authority to do so. there is a clear separation between 
official and personal and the distinction between public and private matters. that means 
that employees have a self-binding commitment to an organizational mission, its objec-
tives, and the specific tasks associated with particular roles that they play. they are driven 
by work related goals, not those that may arise during the workday stemming from the 
personal problems of one’s relatives or friends. in short, there is a work discipline that 
precludes distractions. On top of that, in the best cases, there is a professional pride in 
work and achievement.” (hyden 2006: 266). 
86 not least, a more explicit reference to the economics of corruption is also lacking, 
beginning with (economic) survival strategies and ending with the globalisation of corrupt 
economic opportunities (e.g. capital-flight, money-laundering, etc.). for a discussion see 
mény 1996.
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capacity and mandate to provide public goods. ‘Getting institutions right’ 
was the implicit approach of the good governance agenda, which has not 
achieved its goal of strengthening the effectiveness and accountability 
of states; ‘getting values right’ is inherently fraught with conceptual and 
hence also empirical problems—so what remains? although Olivier de 
sardan succeeds in sketching a dense and ‘daily’ picture of the corruption 
complex, he flags at the dire consequence of his analysis. left only with 
“the general feeling of helplessness in the face of an infernal mechanism” 
(Olivier de sardan 1999: 48), he struggles to find a flicker of enlightened 
hope. Whether political realities in africa are really framed by such an 
infernal mechanism is a question i shall return to in part B. first, how-
ever, pursuing the reconstruction of pivotal theories on political order and 
corruption in africa, another angle shall be illuminated, here, instead of 
seeking the way out of such ‘infernal mechanisms’, perhaps the political 
as well as moral economy of corruption should be understood as exactly 
that: a political order sui generis, shaped by own and unique patterns link-
ing social actors to rules and resources.
5. The Order of Disorder: Power, Authority and Accumulation
as we have seen, conventional wisdom has it that political order in africa 
is characterised by a whole shopping list of patrimonial networks and per-
sonalistic, particularistic and ascriptive politics, symptom of the pervasive 
blurring between the public and the private sphere. the ‘thoroughly cor-
rupted society’ discussed by leys (1965) as a remote likelihood over forty 
years ago, seems to have become reality in many african states, leading in 
many cases to complete economic, social and political breakdowns—not 
only a failure of development in terms of social and economic indicators,87 
but also a failure of ‘modernisation’, of the institutionalisation of the 
 
87 this popular perception of africa is substantiated by development indicators. for 
instance, in the latest human development report 21 out of 23 countries classified with 
‘low human development’ are african countries (see undp 2009; the report and the 
indicators are available online under http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2009/; last 
accessed 25 march 2010). a more polemic index of failed states underlines the promi-
nence of african countries in terms of social, political and economic disintegration, 
with 11 african countries ranked in the first 20 of the failed states index 2009, including 
intuitively implausible ones such as ethiopia (rank 16) and nigeria (rank 15). the index 
is available under http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/06/22/2009_failed_states_
index_ interactive_map_and_rankings (last accessed 25 march 2010).
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modern state. rapaciousness, corruption and inefficiency seem to have 
become the hallmark of modern african politics, again after the retreat of 
the third Wave. maybe the merit of the concept of neo-patrimonialism 
is the fact that, to a certain degree, it reinserts the historical context into 
politics. it shows how the ‘modern’ state is appropriated by private inter-
ests, an interaction which is strongly couched in economic, social as well 
as symbolic (ethnic, religious, magical, etc.) terms. Of course, access to and 
(re-)distribution of public resources are the hinges this relationship swing 
on, operating not along the distinction but in the intersection and inter-
weaving of private and public spheres. the ‘incomplete’ institutionalisa-
tion of the state, in terms of its practical elevation over other structuring 
principles, is in fact the stuff of these relations of enrichment, reciprocity 
and mobility, the umbilical cord that feeds patrons and clients.
But the question remains: how can the ambivalence of the public 
sphere, the intertwining of the formal and informal, the self-enrichment 
and even vicious predation by african elites be explained? the core of 
the problem is the framing of the fields of power that characterise afri-
can societies. in spite of the african state’s apparent weakness in terms 
of capacity on the one hand, and apparent hegemony in terms of repres-
sion on the other hand, power in africa is represented by a specific, non-
Western relationship to the state, oscillating between paradoxes. in aké’s 
forceful diagnosis:
the distinguishing characteristic of the state in africa, however, is that it has 
little autonomy. this is a legacy of colonialism [. . .]. Colonial politics was not 
about good governance but about the resolution of two exclusive claims to 
rulership; it was a struggle to capture the state and press it into the service 
of the captor. [. . .] the [postcolonial] state is in effect privatised: it remains 
an enormous force but no longer a public force: no longer a reassuring pres-
ence guaranteeing the rule of law but a formidable threat to all except the 
few who control it, actually encouraging lawlessness and with little capacity 
to mediate conflicts in society. politics in africa has been shaped by this 
character of the african state. it is mainly about access to state power and 
the goals of political struggle are the capture of an all-powerful state, which 
the winner can use as he or she pleases. the spoils, and the losses, are total. 
african politics therefore puts a very high premium on power. [. . .] in this 
type of politics, violence and instability are endemic, with anarchy lurking 
just below the surface. despite the enormous power of the state, a political 
order does not emerge (aké 1996: 73; emphasis added).
as will be discussed in more detail in this section, arguably the politics 
that aké diagnoses do depict the emergence of political order, albeit not 
one based on the rule of law or democratic values. But the politics that 
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aké and many other renowned africanists88 evoke circumscribe struggles 
in african politics as particularistic, exclusionary and discrete, with politi-
cal power translating into personal and/or communal economic wealth 
and social prestige, and few if any mechanisms of integration into politi-
cal order that reach out beyond bounded groups. the radical shifts in 
deterritorialisation of economic relationships and of political authority of 
the past three decades have only exacerbated the issues. in an analysis of 
the external dimension sustaining and radicalising political orders that do 
not provide order, mbembe in his study of the postcolony (mbembe 2002) 
captures accelerating transnational factors:
millions of people have been deprived of jobs, food and shelter and are 
now reduced to struggling for daily survival. instead of curbing the corrup-
tion of local elites, the brutality of the international system has increased 
their greed and carelessness. under the pretext of privatization, looting has 
become a norm as well as a cultural practice. partial democratization under 
conditions of structural adjustment has opened the way for the privatization 
of violence.89
under these circumstances of confrontational politics, scarce resources 
and worn social cohesion, the deregulation, privatisation and democrati-
sation of african states of the past decade have led not to political and 
economic empowerment and engagement of society, but to the polarisa-
tion of the political order. instead of achieving societal transformation, the 
post-colonial state of africa has resulted in socio-economic stalling, politi-
cal uncertainty and social conflict, leading to persistently high levels of 
social, political and economic disempowerment. at the end of the millen-
nium, fuelled by the high hopes whipped up during the ‘winds of change’,90 
88 see, for instance, the excellent volumes edited by Chazan et al. (eds.) 1988, roth-
child/Chazan (eds.) 1988 or Gordon/Gordon (eds.) 1992; further selected and influential 
theories can be found, chronologically, in Bayart 1989; Chabal 1992, Bayart et al. 1999; Cha-
bal/daloz 1999; herbst 2000; mbembe 2002; hyden 2006; or Chabal 2009.
89 this quote by achille mbembe in an interview with Christian hoeller (editor springerin) 
was first published in springerin 3 (2002). the excerpt here is drawn from the online ver-
sion on h-africa under http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl?trx=vx&list=h-africa& 
month=0210&week=b&msg=mv0arOWtx0QhdYau%2Buy4iQ&user=&pw= (last accessed 
25 march 2010).
90 in an interesting observation, Clapham notes that although the ‘winds of change’ 
swept through africa as well as eastern europe and Central asia, just looking at the ter-
ritorial structure africa remained virtually untouched—a strong indication, in his opin-
ion, that even oppositional and ‘new’ african politicians are deeply reluctant to articulate 
any alternative to the post-colonial state (Clapham 1996). see also herbst 2000 on the 
importance of the political geography and the political function of ‘hard borders’ of afri-
can states.
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not the image of soft states or personal rule91 in africa shape scholarly and 
popular discourses, but the image of the ‘failed state’.92 Corruption here 
takes on a strangely hybrid guise between socio-political engagement and 
disengagement: although the political disengagement becomes apparent 
through the informalisation and illegality of corrupt practices, the system-
atic abuse of public funds, symbols or offices for personal or factionary 
interests actually serve to enhance the importance and authority of the 
public realm.
against this backdrop of, one is tempted to say, the normalisation of 
(traits of ) state failure, possibly the tables should be turned by viewing 
african states not as a failed or weak or soft states, but on the contrary as 
a successful adaptation and re-appropriation of the Western state to the 
african context. here, the ‘historicity’, the uniqueness of the post-colonial 
african state is the theoretical point of departure. in distinction to the 
scholars such as huntington or scott, who were interested mainly in pro-
cesses and structures framing political assimilation and integration, Bayart 
(1993) chooses a more archaeological and less predictive approach. What 
he observes is a ‘hybrid state’, a state in which the mix between Western 
organisation and norms of public institutions introduced by the colonial 
state and their amalgamation by local socio-political practices produces a 
distinct and different african state in its own right. What neo-patrimoni-
alism already identifies, namely that in principle mutually exclusive log-
ics, such as the formal and informal, the modern and the traditional, the 
public and the private, are intimately intertwined in african politics; what 
is novel about Bayart’s view is that far from being dysfunctional, such a 
state is portrayed as an integrative force, the climbing frame of rhizomati-
cally linked interests. the ‘reciprocal assimilation of elites’, i.e. the histori-
cally grounded collaboration between elites to secure access to national 
and international resources in a process of ‘extraversion’, is the mecha-
nism through which the hybrid state reproduces itself.93 this is not to say 
91  for the term ‘soft state’ see seminally migdal 1968; for a pivotal contribution on per-
sonal rule in africa see Jackson/rosberg 1982.
92 it is no coincidence that seminal contributions on the ‘failure’ of the african state 
emerged in the mid-nineties. Consider the contributions in Wunsch/Olowu (eds.) 1995. 
Zartmann (ed.) 1995, Joseph (ed.) 1999, and rotberg (ed.) 2003, 2004. this discourse was 
compounded in the wake of 9/11 and the geo-political discourse on terrorism and state fail-
ure. hence the title of robert rotberg’s edited volume “state failure and state Weakness in 
a time of terror” (rotberg (ed.) 2003). tellingly, the annual index on state failure was first 
published in 2005 by the fund for peace and foreign policy (see http://www.foreignpolicy 
.com/articles/2009/06/22/the_2009_failed_states_index; last accessed 25 march 2010).
93 see Bayart 2000 on the characteristics and history of african extraversion.
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that the integrative force of the state furthers its stability or effectiveness; 
on the contrary, the state is merely the trough of the ‘politics of the belly’, 
i.e. the relentless pursuit of wealth, status, prestige by the elites, that enables 
them to further their own interest and continue internal  competition.94 
‘political order’ in an african context, therefore, is not produced to serve 
or define the public interest or to mediate conflict, but to manage the 
politics of the belly, the political struggle to gain access to state power and 
therefore to personal and communal enrichment.95
more recently, Bayart, together with co-authors ellis and hibou (Bayart 
et al. 1999), argues that african politics are currently undergoing a funda-
mental change in their mode of governance, formerly characterised by 
such politics of the belly.96 dramatically described, a process of criminali-
sation, distinct from earlier forms of corruption and predation, is increas-
ingly advancing to become the main feature of african states. large-scale, 
organised economic delinquency (i.e. smuggling or fraud) as well as the 
spread of illegitimate use of violence have become intimately and rou-
tinely linked to the exercise of politics. the authors underline that this 
94 What Bayart offers us is the ‘true historicity’ (Bayart 1993: 5) of african politics, a real-
istic account of what is happening in africa without the claim or the attempt to practically 
change anything or offer advice for how such change should come about. for a critique of 
Bayart’s concept see leys 1994.
95 schatzberg has provided perhaps the most detailed analysis of the cultural legitimi-
sation underlying such metaphors, showing that “power in middle africa has much to do 
with ‘eating’ (in both literal and figurative sense) as well as with other forms of consump-
tion. the second premise of the moral matrix thus indicates that while the father-chief 
may eat’, and even eat well, there are nevertheless limits placed on how much he can and 
should consume. in a sense, this premise deals with the imprecise frontier between an 
acceptable appetite and political corruption. in a rough-and-ready calculus of legitimacy, 
the first and second premises will probably vary directly most of the time. in other works, 
the more the people have to eat (the better are the general economic conditions), the lager 
will be the permissible range of chiefly or presidential appetite. But if the people begin to 
go hungry, if economic conditions deteriorate, then appetites the citizenry might once 
have tolerated in good times will no longer be perceived as falling within the prerogative 
of the father-chief. it is also worth noting that throughout middle africa the language of 
corruption is often related to the language of food: ‘madesu ya bana’ (beans for the chil-
dren), and ‘un petit quelque chose à manger’ (a little something to eat) in Zaïre; as well as 
the ubiquitous east african equivalent, ‘chai’ (tea). similarly, in tanzania during the 1980s 
and 1990s many folds came to believe that their leaders had ‘eaten’ too much, and there 
was a consequent corollary that their legitimacy had declined apace (schatzberg 2001: 26; 
footnotes referenced in original omitted).
96 although the authors are at pains to distinguish the ‘criminalisation of the state’ 
from the politics of the belly, they emphasise that this transformation is best viewed “in 
the light of historical continuity” (Bayart et al. 1999: 30), not least because of the diversity 
and specificity of african states and societies.
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is a nascent, uneven tendency that can be pointedly observed in various 
contexts, but which is not yet a universal hallmark of african politics.
it must be said that the multiplication of conflicts, the main political logic 
of which is simple predation and which tend to be accompanied by a grow-
ing insertion in the international economy of illegality, [. . .] the spread of a 
culture of institutional neglect, systematic plunder of the national economy 
and the uncontrolled privatization of the state [. . .] all suggest that a slide 
towards criminalization throughout the sub-continent is a strong  probability 
(Bayart et al. 1999: 30).
in their view, the reframing of the political field and the emerging or, as 
it were, consolidated types of what Olivier de sardan termed ‘predatory 
authority’ and here is depicted as coercion stripped bare of social legiti-
macy has been perpetuated by the structural privatisation of the state 
and the erosion of public authority; however, the tangled, underground 
roots of the rhizome state are becoming increasingly intermeshed with 
criminal, illegal and, in certain areas of trade such as human trafficking 
and armed conflicts, even illegitimate structures. the ‘shadow state’ (reno 
1995) is changing its spots: whereas before, generally speaking, african 
politics was a function of “the management of factional intrigues for per-
sonal interest” (Bayart et al. 1999: 21), the “relationship between accumula-
tion and power is henceforth situated in a context of internationalization 
and of the growth of organized crime on a probably unprecedented scale” 
(Bayart et al. 1999: 9). intriguingly, in spite of the emphatic recognition of 
the historicity and specificity of african politics, the authors firmly anchor 
the definition of ‘criminalization’ in ‘Western’, universal standards of 
international law. echoing other influential authors, the distance between 
internationally accepted (legal) norms of political order and actual politi-
cal practices measures the degree of criminalization, consequently defin-
ing such international norms as benchmarks of legality.97 the central 
question raised in their approach is not so much the fact that the crimi-
nalisation of the african state is on the rise—a process already treated 
97 the authors “regard as criminal those political, social and economic practices which 
are the object of a ‘primary criminalization’ either by the laws and other texts of the states 
under discussion or, more particularly, in international law, or according to international 
organisations or acknowledged guardians of international morality, and especially the 
financial and economic morality which accompanies the current trend towards the glo-
balization of the economy” (Bayart et al. 1999: 15). as can be deduced from this definition, 
Bayart et al. are well aware of the cultural and normative arenas in which such notions are 
framed. however, as, for instance, migdal (2001: 19) critiques, their approach still leads to 
an unreflected elevation of one set of standards over another.
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in theories of neo-patrimonialism—but the question of radically chang-
ing terms of legitimacy. Whereas before illegal and even criminal acts 
committed within the logics of neo-patrimonial relations were politically 
legitimate (at least for the beneficiaries), the frame of political reference 
seems to be hardening. ultimately, what Bayart and his fellow authors 
propose is the re-circumscription of political ‘order’ in africa; the politics 
of the belly and the politics of extraversion are mutating from the ‘merely’ 
informal or personal sphere to a highly organised, clearly illegal and fre-
quently illegitimate dimension. in fact, this hypothesis leads the authors 
to contemplate the changing nature of political order in general:
in effect, one may wonder whether the phenomenon which we describe as 
criminalization is not best considered as a qualitative change which is trans-
forming the overall manner in which whole societies and the international 
system of diplomacy and commerce are organized, by changing the balance 
of forces between fundamental determinants of any political order: power, 
accumulation and the exercise of violence (Bayart et al. 1999: 18).
in a nutshell, profound changes on the national and international stage 
have led to mutating determinants and the body politic in africa. as a 
consequence, the understanding of political legitimacy lies wide open in 
africa—and, by implication, elsewhere. the criminalisation of the state 
implies that the moral economy of corruption, embedded as it is in socio-
culturally legitimising logics, is ruptured; that the acquiescence of the 
population is framed by violence, only partially embedded in functional 
exchange relationships, such as between patrons and clients, or cultur-
ally legitimised exchanges within vertically structured networks and 
communities (religious, ethnic, regional, etc.). Concomitantly, the politi-
cal economy of corruption is being fundamentally transformed. Where 
the stakes grow exponentially through the internationalisation of illegal 
trade and the growing opportunities of insertion into the global market 
(globalisation and deregulation of the financial and commodity markets), 
the relationship between clients and patrons is becoming disjointed, or, 
more precisely, tilted in favour of the patrons. their power is shored up 
by the availability of resources: the international networks, the finances, 
the arms to secure their influence without needing to consider their cli-
ents anymore. the line of enquiry pursued by Bayart et al. 1999 seeks to 
unravel trends emerging in state power and political order in africa from 
a perspective of historically changing patterns and opportunities of accu-
mulation. here, african political structures are firmly set in an interna-
tional (global) context of economic and political exchange, increasingly 
defined by the privatisation of former key public institutions (such as the 
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customs service or organs of public security),98 by the erosion of sover-
eignty to international financial institutions such as the World Bank or 
the imf as a result of severe indebtedness and the concomitant rise in 
influence of other, non-governmental organisations such as the Church or 
aid agencies (hibou 1999). more severely for the idea of the state, based 
as it is on autonomy, rationality and legality, african politics are framed 
by a whole host of informal political, economic and military organisations 
(see Bayart et al. 1999).
so where does this leave the idea of political order in africa? Can afri-
can politics only be conceptualised as kleptocratic, even felonious states? 
drawing on their historical understanding of political processes, Bayart 
and his fellow authors are more subtle in their analysis:
africa is resistant to every conditionality and its democratisation remains 
a great leap into the unknown, considering the degree to which popular 
sovereignty is alienated and the systematic creation of shadow networks of 
power is being precipitated by the privatisation of both the state and the 
economy. But africa is busily recreating itself, and in this process crime is 
not shorn of all ‘usefulness’ (Bayart et al. 1999: 116).
it is the specific nature of such ‘usefulness’ of illegal practices that two 
other renowned africanists, Chabal/daloz (1999) emphasise in a noted 
study of african politics. their line of enquiry is based on the trenchant 
assumption that politics in africa derives from an instrumentalisation 
of political disorder; disorder that they analyse not from the perspective 
of institutional decay, but from the ‘rational’ utilisation of such informal 
and opaque relations by adept political actors. their key hypothesis is the 
following:
in a world of disorder there is a high premium both on the vertical and per-
sonalized infra-institutional relations through which the ‘business’ of poli-
tics can be conducted and on access to the means of maximising the returns 
which the ‘domestication’ of such disorder requires. [disorder] should be 
seen as a condition which offers opportunities for those who know how to 
play that system. Whether, however, such a situation is conducive to (eco-
nomic and political) development as it is normally understood is a totally 
different question. [. . .] if, as we believe, there prevails in africa a state of 
generalised disorder, then it behoves us to explain how such disorder is 
instrumentalized politically (Chabal/daloz 1999: xix).
98 for a detailed study on the links between privatization, corruption and patronage 
of the era see tangri 1999.
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Chabal/daloz argue extensively the fact that formal, ‘modern’ political 
norms in africa have not succeeded to supersede other (ethnic, factional, 
nepotistic) modes of order and exchange within the community. how-
ever, this is not to say that african socio-political practices are traditional 
or primordial, or that politics organised along neo-patrimonial lines are 
but a stage away from ‘modern’ politics, but that africa is acting accord-
ing to its own developmental logic, a modernisation sui generis. political 
order and political representation is maintained and reproduced through 
networks of patronage, not through systems of merit; hence, corrupt prac-
tices are politically not only accepted, but imperative for political success. 
as the authors expound: “Given the durability of vertical social relations 
and the endurance of certain forms of political representation, corruption 
remains instrumentally rational” (Chabol/daloz 1999: 103). more to the 
point, they raise the question “whether such complex informal arrange-
ments, such as well-organized predatory networks, do not actually con-
spire to create and maintain a system of legitimization based on unequal 
exchange which lies at the very heart of the political order” (Chabal/daloz 
1999: 103).99 in other words, here corruption—in the sense of particular 
(patrimonial) modes of accumulation and (re)distribution—becomes the 
norm of political practice, the key logic linking political legitimacy to eco-
nomic distribution, where the analysis of corruption is radicalised through 
the prevalence of disorder and lurking violence. Corrupt practices, in this 
reading, are dangerously close to the edge, serving to reproduce a political 
order that oscillates precariously between socio-cultural legitimacy and a 
sense of just economic redistribution mechanisms on the one hand, and 
naked power and coercion that is disembedded from any moral authority 
on the other.
By provocatively emphasising the ‘own’ developmental logic of african 
politics, they refuse to provide an analytic frame of reference for political 
dynamics of change—although under the condition of the informalisa-
tion of the state and the instrumentalisation of politics, nearly all (out-
wardly non-political) practices become political. although they observe 
generalised features of african politics, these politics are not concep-
tualised in the conventional sense of ‘public power’ or the relationship 
between state and society (the ‘public’ and the ‘private’), but in the sense 
“in which political actors, within both ‘state’ and ‘civil society’, link up to 
sustain the vertical, infra-institutional and patrimonial networks” (Chabal/ 
99 see also Chabal 1992 discussing the genesis of this phenomenon more extensively.
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daloz 1999: 22).100 as Chabal/deloz demonstrate at length, political order 
in africa is not only defined by specific exchange relationships framed by 
instrumental rationalities sui generis, but is also inextricably caught up in 
them. in their view, political order in africa is framed by a complex matrix 
of dependence and survival on the one hand, and profit and power on 
the other hand, suffused by (appropriated and adapted) spiritual, cultural, 
and not least legal-administrative values—and corruption is the medium 
of such exchange relationships, on a material and immaterial level.
the great merit of Chabal/daloz is the boldness of their line of argu-
ment, shedding light on the transcending logic of political disorder in afri-
can countries. however, the authors analysis sketches a very bleak and, in 
its relentless historical, economic and cultural logic, rigid image of african 
politics locked in a steel cage of personal, particularistic and short-term 
interests, bearing a remarkable resemblance in all but their explicitly sus-
pended judgement to Olivier de sardan’s ‘infernal mechanism’. although 
they discard the loaded notion of ‘development’ to conclude that “africa is 
not degenerating, nor is it ‘blocked’, but that it is forging ahead, following 
its own path, although assuredly at great variance with existing models of 
development” (Chabal/daloz 1999: 135), their uncompromising pursuit of 
the political economy of politics in africa leads to the foreclosure of such 
alternative political spaces. the practical resilience of most african politi-
cal orders to the governance and liberalisation paradigms ruling national 
and international discourses is pinpointed precisely; but pinpointed to 
the extent of fixing african politics to a particular, unchanging pattern. 
Given their ultimately apocalyptic diagnosis of the instrumentalisation 
of political disorder, it is, therefore, not evident what new paths african 
politics are forging, unless it is the perpetual reproduction of old wine in 
new bottles—plus ça change, plus ça reste la même chose, one is tempted 
to conclude.101
interestingly, although both Bayart’s approach as well as Chabal/daloz’ 
offer a radical and insightful mode of thinking african politics, their prime 
reference of understanding african politics still remains the state—in its 
historical (dis)continuity, but also in its socio-cultural metamorphosis and 
100 evidently, the two key terms, state and civil society, are put in inverted commas for 
want of more appropriate terms that are not irrelevant and misleading when applied to 
african politics. in this reading, the state is not institutionalised or differentiated enough 
to be called a state, and civil society is too weak, fragmented and personalized to eman-
cipate itself.
101  Chabal has provided a further analysis of politics in africa in a recent volume (Cha-
bal 2009), which will be discussed further down in this chapter.
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routinised methods of extraction and accumulation. reviewing the litera-
ture on the state in africa, of which above authors are only the tip of a 
prolific iceberg, it has become routine practice to put the concept of the 
state in africa in inverted commas, highlighting the ineffectiveness of the 
african ‘state’ in its transformative capacity and widespread alienation 
from social representation.102 the semantics indicate that, involuntarily, 
disorder and criminalisation are indeed a ‘corruption’ of development—
as indeed the proliferation of corrupt practices themselves are a symptom 
of collapse, of “terminal damage at the macro-sociological level” (Chabal/
daloz 1999: 138), and, instrumentally rational, leading to the “fusion of 
criminal and political practices” (Bayart 1999: 114). Corruption, as ever, 
serves as the lead to fathom the depths of disorder, even when corrupt 
mechanisms of political reproduction are conceived in terms of political 
(dis)order sui generis. Beyond merely measuring the distance between the 
‘real’ and the ‘shadow’ state, changing patterns of corruption also indicate 
changing patterns of inclusion and exclusion, of the exercise of authority 
and accumulation of socio-cultural and economic resources.
the conceptualisation of corruption within a globalised cultural matrix 
as well as within a compelling politico-economic system magnifies the 
intrinsic logic of corruption in african political order: corruption is no lon-
ger a deviant political practice, but ambivalently represents the source of 
legitimacy and accumulation and, consequently, of power and authority, 
as well as simultaneously undermining and destabilising the very order it 
reproduces—a point sorely illustrated during the demise of ‘stable’ neo-
patrimonial states caught in a vicious circle of sapped economic resources 
and diminished political legitimacy. from a bird’s eye view, the institu-
tional regime of political orders has been shaped to accommodate clien-
telistic networks and vertical exchange relationships, which constitute the 
arteries of social as well as economic and political reproduction. from a 
worm’s eye view, the exigencies of survival coupled with the ‘normalisa-
tion’ of corruption serve to inscribe corruption in legitimatised ties of reci-
procity and solidarity. these long-term, historically grounded processes 
have been accelerated by the rapid transformations of the international 
political economy of the past two decades. the concern of development 
102 many authors have explored the nature of the african state from different theoreti-
cal reference-points; the common denominator, however, is that the state in africa is a 
‘state’ only with qualifying attributes. some of the most notable contributions have coined 
terms such as ‘quasi-state’ (Jackson 1993), ‘shadow state’ (reno 1997), or ‘parastatehood’ 
(von trotha 2000).
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discourse with the institutional configuration of, first, the markets, and, 
secondly, the political order, highlighted the institutional deficiencies lead-
ing to rent-seeking and extortionary behaviour of patrons and elites; the 
subsequent remedies, however, have failed significantly in their quest for 
effective and accountable institutions. if anything, the structural changes 
induced by liberalisation and democratisation seem to have amplified 
the struggles about domination and accumulation rather than mediated 
and confined them—observable in the intensified illegal and illegitimate 
instrumentalisations of the public domain, manifested in the totalisation 
of power structures which intermesh formal and informal networks, in 
the privatisation of national and international resource extraction and 
accumulation, and in the consolidation of structural violence and physical 
coercion (mbembe 2002). in a radicalised reading, one could argue that 
the very basis of socialisation (in Weber’s sense of ‘Vergesellschaftung’)103 
is put into question.
Where does that leave us with regard to the analysis of corruption? as 
tentatively proposed at the beginning of this chapter, the study of cor-
ruption allows for a probing study of the underbelly of state-society rela-
tions, maybe to a greater extent than envisaged. Corruption, or rather, in 
Olivier de sardan’s term, the ‘corruption complex’ is a key field providing 
insights into the topography of power and accumulation, into struggles 
about meanings and appropriations of legitimacy and authority. signifi-
cantly, these struggles are being carried out in sliding local, national and 
international spaces by a variety of social actors, where corrupt structures 
and practices not only shape patterns of (legal and illegal, legitimate and 
illegitimate) power and accumulation, but, transcending and compound-
ing the above, the term ‘corruption’ is also used as a political resource 
providing the key to domestic and international funds and credibility.
6. Conceptualising Corruption: The Question of Agency
distilling seminal contributions on political order and corruption in 
africa through a more focused sociological filter, corruption can be 
103 Weber makes the balance and convergence of interests the very essence of socialisa-
tion; only social agency endowed with these intentional or unintentional characteristics 
are defined as social relations framing socialisation (see Weber 1985: 2). Concepts such 
as ‘necropower’ developed by mbembe 2002 or, in a less radical terminology, the ‘politics 
of suffering’ elaborated by Chabal 2009 illustrate formations of power that exercise brute 
predatory or calculated coercion, tearing at the fabric of socialisation.
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conceptualised as a mechanism along which inclusion and exclusion into 
social spheres operates. Compounded by the exigencies and dynamics 
of a globalised economy, the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion are 
informed by ambiguous social imaginaries, operating within the space of 
a formal state apparatus but framed by a more or less dynamic matrix 
of hybrid values and norms. On the level of social actors, the social con-
straints and individual dependencies arising from these particular modes 
of inclusion overall result in restricted spaces of social agency: social exclu-
sion rather than inclusion, with african societies characterised by a lack of 
adaptive capacity conventionally described as vulnerability and instability 
on both a social and systemic level.104
and yet: stepping back from the bleak analysis of exclusion, the approach 
to corruption we embarked from comes back to mind, namely one which 
puts the political and symbolic struggles over meanings, standards and 
distinctions on centre state.105 in Johnston’s sense, corruption is a sys-
temic problem; but as he also observes, the very articulation of ‘corrup-
tion’ indicates semantic and political struggles over norms and standards, 
ambiguities over the meaning of corruption or rather over the propriety of 
political office and roles. precisely this understanding takes us to a strik-
ingly absent feature of the scholarly discourse on political order and cor-
ruption in africa, namely the question of agency. all theories, whether 
they be informed by a socio-cultural or a more political scientific analyti-
cal framework, either ignore, neglect, or explicitly dismiss the possibility 
104 this would provide an entry-point for a system-theoretical exploration of this lack 
of adaptive capacity of african societies, which emphasises the codes of inclusion and 
exclusion along differentiated functional logics. in this perspective, the success of modern 
societies is precisely due to the hardness (e.g. universal suffrage) and simultaneous supple-
ness (e.g. non-coercion) of such codes. seminally, see luhmann 1984; for a contribution 
on inclusion and exclusion in developing countries see luhmann 1995. however, in strictu 
sensu fully articulated functional differentiation allows for no immediate sense of ‘society’ 
as a whole, only for participation in and at best a sense of separate subspheres. 
105 this approach referenced Johnston, who conceptualises corruption “as a sys-
temic problem having to do with the sources, uses, limits, and accountability of wealth 
and power” (Johnston 2004: 22). although Johnston treats corruption classically as “the 
abuse of public roles of resources for private benefit,” he emphasises “that terms such as 
‘abuse’, ‘public’, ‘private’ and even ‘benefit’ are matters of considerable ambiguity or dispute 
in many societies. [. . .] rather than ending the confusion over what constitutes a corrupt 
act, this approach puts conflicts over standards and ambiguities about the public-private 
distinction at centre stage” (Johnston 2004: 22/23, emphasis in original)—as touched upon 
in the introduction. this approach ties in with other, more general social scientific theo-
ries conceptualising the interrelationship (rather than the dichotomy) between structures 
and agency, such as developed famously by Bourdieu 1990, 1977, or, more recently and for 
my purposes more usefully migdal 2001.
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of agency. addressing this gap, agency is understood as forms of action 
emerging from “the capability of the individual to ‘make a difference’ to a 
pre-existing state of affairs or course of events” (Giddens 1984: 14), which 
“logically involves power in the sense of transformative capacity” (Gid-
dens 1984: 15). in a more sophisticated elaboration of agency, emirbayer/
mische stress the both the temporal embeddedness as well as the poten-
tial variability and creativity of human actions:
the ways in which people understand their own relationship to the past, 
future, and present make a difference to their actions; changing conceptions 
of agentic possibility in relation to structural contexts profoundly influence 
how actors in different periods and places see their worlds as more or less 
responsive to human imagination, purpose and effort (emirbayer/mische 
1998: 973; emphasis in original).106
however, this capacity and variety of social agency to ‘make a difference’ 
(both to one’s own actions as well as potentially to one’s environment) 
is rendered invisible in studies of african politics. the bottom line of all 
enquiries treating corruption and political order in africa is the ques-
tion under which circumstances the ‘infernal mechanism’ can be trans-
formed—and yet producing either strangely flat responses,107 or deeply 
pessimistic ones with regard to agents who are endowed with transforma-
tive capacity.108 taking this proposition seriously, this raises the question 
whether these social and structural constraints imply in the last instance 
the dissolution of agency other than those already well endowed with 
social power, here: the elites, the strongmen, the thugs? the political 
dynamism that is implied (or implored?) malgré tout in their analyses ring 
hollow in the absence of the identification of actors and mediums that 
would be conducive to social change that, simply put, allows more rather 
than less freedom. On the contrary, the dynamics of the political order 
106 for a discussion with regard to agency, politics and governance see förster/Koech-
lin 2011.
107 an example discussed here is Olivier de sardan 1999; another could be hyden 2006 
with his depiction of the necessity of a idealtypical legal-bureaucratic state and concomi-
tant particular ethos of public administration. 
108 Consider, for instance, Bayart 1999, who depicts crime as the motor of africa’s ‘rec-
reation’—although it is highly contentious whether ‘regeneration’ is an appropriate term 
for what essentially describes the tightening spiral of illegitimate and downright violent 
modes of inclusion/exclusion. Or consider the “systemic contradictions” that Chabal (2009: 
83) identifies as binding african political authority to particularistic interests, leading to 
a “calculated violence of neglect” (Chabal 2009: 153) by those in power, ultimately leading 
to the corrosion and downright breakdown of the foundations of agency. see also Chabal 
1999 or mbembe 2002.
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carved out are stark: institutional reforms are appropriated, moulded 
and instrumentalised by particularistic logics; structural transformations 
of the economic and political regimes lead to the privatisation of politi-
cal and economic power; and socio-cultural practices solidify a moral 
economy of corruption, locking african politics in a spiral of unravelling 
social order, brutalised violence and criminalised economics—leaving no 
space for struggles over such norms and practices. Other than on a highly 
generic level, the scholarly discourse fails to identify the social actors and 
agency conducive to shaping a political order that mediates instead of 
produces conflict, that provides a structured space for consensus on pub-
lic purposes.109
in other words, the academic discourse on corruption is curiously dis-
missive of the intentional and unintentional activities by emancipatory 
social forces, concentrating instead on the force (in the sense of both 
power and of violence) of intentional activities to produce disorder by 
established elites or unintentional sedimentations of exclusionary struc-
tural properties. the development discourse on corruption, on the other 
hand, is bound by distinct spaces of thought and action and the interre-
lated technocratic system of relations through which it is produced and 
reproduces itself.
so the elephant sits squarely in the room: Where is the locus of agency 
for democratic spaces?110 against the backdrop of both the development as 
well as the scholarly discourse on corruption this is the key question guid-
ing the second part of my enquiry, which will be pursued with some con-
ceptual enrichment in the next chapter. first, however, i shall attempt to 
sketch an outline of the invisible but palpable elephant, which is primarily 
evident as that which is absent: the distinction between private and pub-
lic, informal and formal. the imploration of these boundaries, however, 
was ever of an idealtypical nature, and is particularly ill suited to  capture 
109 for many others consider, for instance, hyden, who, like huntington 40 years ear-
lier, observes that “africa needs to transform its movements into political parties that are 
issue-oriented and focused on constructive problem solving” (hyden 2006: 273). 
110  i quite intentionally risk the over-optimism which Chabal identifies in the quest for 
agency in african political orders: he introduces his latest book with a critical discussion 
of the notion of agency as used in african studies, pointing to the analytical risk that too 
strong a focus on agency can lead to a neglect or whitewashing of the “systemic condition 
in which development is not really on the agenda” (Chabal 2009: 15). my analytical focus, 
however, is precisely on the role of agency in fostering democratic politics. 
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 contemporary processes and framings of social and political change.111 
social transformations that shape political orders and, in a metapolitical 
sense, the creation of regimes that are based on general, inclusive, and 
public-oriented justifications, rather than particularistic and exclusionary 
logics are highly complex and contextualised both in space and time—and 
increasingly so in a world characterised by deterritorialisation, in which 
globalised economic, social, political and cultural relationships cut across 
national and local topographies. as a critical reading of both the devel-
opment discourse as well as the scholarly discourse on corruption and 
political order in africa shows, the imploration of a transformative deus ex 
machina is fraught with theoretical and empirical difficulties. hence, the 
identification of such emancipatory struggles requires an analytical shift. 
a case will be made here for linking the macro-level of analysis, such as 
expounded both in the political economic theories as well as in the more 
socio-culturally informed theories on corruption and political order, with 
a micro- and meso-level perspective, analysing the socio-cultural con-
straints and political spaces from the viewpoint of particular social actors. 
taking articulations of ‘corruption’ as a pars pro toto, how and why are 
patterns of structuration and institutionalisation of norms and practices 
shaped, which social struggles and social actors gain traction, which struc-
tural properties are iterated and solidified, and which are marginalised 
and vanish, shaping orders of inclusion and exclusion?112
to understand how political orders emerge which allow for communi-
ties of interest to negotiate their differences, and, in a more normative 
twist, develop a fundamental readiness to moderate parochial or  individual 
111 for theoretical contributions and case-studies on the blurring of the public-private 
boundaries see peters et al. 2009; for a consolidated interdisciplinary approach see peters/
Koechlin/Zinkernagel fenner 2009 and peters/förster/Koechlin 2009. 
112 What is referred to here is the structuring of social relations in Giddens’ sense, which 
involves the “patterning of social relations in time-space involving the reproduction of 
situated practices” (Giddens 1984: 17). in other words, structures are not exogenous, they 
emerge from situated practices of human agents. subsequently, Giddens defines structure 
in contrast to functionalist or system-theoretical notions: “i treat structure, in its most 
elemental meaning at least, as referring to such rules (and resources). it is misleading, 
however, to speak of ‘rules of transformations’ because all rules are inherently transforma-
tional. structure thus refers, in social analysis, to the structuring properties allowing the 
‘binding’ of time-space in social systems, the properties which make it possible for discern-
ibly similar social practices to exist across varying spans of time and space and which lend 
them ‘systemic’ form” (Giddens 1984: 17).
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interests in consideration of some common good,113 a new dimension 
needs to be incorporated into the analysis that has only been alluded to 
hitherto: namely the emergence of public spheres. put in a nutshell, the 
particularly Western trajectory has been the substitution of physical vio-
lence with the force of discursive argument in specific public spheres and 
institutions, opening up historically unprecedented spaces for agency, for 
intentional and self-reflected social action.
here the normative precedence of politics comes into play when think-
ing about modes of inclusion that go beyond mere systems and struc-
tures to include values and symbolic orders. this brings us back to leys’ 
emphasis on, in his terms, ‘public morality’ (leys 1965) in his discussion 
of corruption in african states. as philp stresses in an essay on politi-
cal corruption, “politics is partly about the contestation and projection 
of conceptions of the public interest. [. . .] public office and public inter-
est are, then, intimately connected” (philp 1997: 445). he fleshes out the 
distinctive feature of politics (as opposed to other exchange systems or 
social relations) as being “the type of general, public orientated justifica-
tion used to legitimate its claims” (philp 1997: 451). in other words, politics 
are necessarily tied to constitutions of legitimacy and representation. this 
has direct repercussions on the notion of what constitutes a public good. 
it also reframes the problem of corruption:
politics takes normative precedence because it orders otherwise irresolvable 
forms of social and interpersonal conflict [. . .]. it is impossible not to recog-
nize that political authority can be exercised cruelly, violently, or vindica-
tively, or that those who rule may do so incompetently. in each case, these 
activities will damage the capacity of the authority to secure a stable order 
of rule capable of resolving conflict. But political corruption is distinctive 
as a form of dereliction: if political authority is desirable because it orders 
fundamental conflicts between interests, the suborning of that authority 
to serve one particular set of interests covertly reinstitutes the domination 
which that authority is designed to avoid (philp 1997: 453).
What is outlined here are two sets of questions. the first set revolves 
around a political system which allows for the ordering and mediation 
of divergent and possibly antagonistic interests; a political system which 
orders difference without intolerable suppression or exclusion. the sec-
ond set revolves around the mechanisms, deliberative or other, that 
113 this is strongly based on shils concept of ‘civility’, i.e. the consideration toward ‘the 
other’ beyond one’s family or own community (see shils 1991). these are concepts that we 
shall return to further down.
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define public interests. What is collectively desirably?114 precisely the 
discourses and articulations around such ethical notions, around desir-
able public goods and the emergence of and internalisation of values that 
inform them are the hallmarks of the public sphere as understood here. 
With corruption subverting and appropriating procedures and values that 
characterise such a deliberative public sphere, african societies are, again, 
characterised by the absence of such a public sphere. and evidently it 
would be a gross naïvety to transport notions of a deliberative and proce-
durally ‘pure’ public sphere to any reality, but in this case in particular to 
african topographies characterised by exclusionary fields of power and a 
vast array of social imaginaries.
a key issue is precisely the framing of such deliberative spheres and 
processes. Chabal, for instance, based on his analysis of the hybrid con-
cepts shaping legitimacy in african politics, diagnoses the ‘systemic’ 
impossibility of the emergence of such public ethics: “therefore, the diffi-
culty lies less in the inherent corruption of political leadership in africa—
however acute that may be—than in the systemic contradictions inherent 
in the translation of the local ethics of public virtue into a more coherent, 
national and long-term vision of the public good” (Chabal 2009: 83–84). 
this is a point made already in the seminal work of peter ekeh, who cuts 
across Weberian distinctions with his conclusion that africa has not one 
but two public spheres, each one characterised by different ‘moral link-
ages’ to the private realm: the primordial public realm is a sphere char-
acterised by communal relationships and values, whereas the civic public 
realm is the political and administrative structure historically associated 
with the colonial state. the public sphere that he accords moral primacy 
to is, perhaps surprisingly, not the civic public realm, which he sees as 
historically perverted: “the civic public in africa is amoral and lacks the 
generalized moral imperatives operative in the private realm and in the 
primordial public” (ekeh 1975: 92). the moral primacy lies in the ‘private’ 
realm, or perhaps more aptly termed a non-official public—but this pri-
vate realm is informed by a cultural matrix disjoined from the norms of 
the political system it operates in. so how to achieve these seemingly 
114 seminally on deliberative mechanisms and constitutions of the public sphere, see 
habermas’ influential theory of communicative agency and the public sphere (habermas 
2009a [1962], 2009b [1982]). as Chabal puts it with regard to african societies: “to what 
main aims should socio-economic or political agency be directed? the pursuit of public 
goods is, in every society, the mark of political legitimacy” (Chabal 2009: 81). 
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intractable translations of values and norms,115 in the sense of collective 
understanding towards some common good, and of a public sphere that 
enjoys moral legitimacy?116
the discussion on post-colonial african states has demonstrated how 
differing african trajectories are, with corruption as a structuring prop-
erty, with structural and physical violence characteristically removed 
from social legitimacy, and subsequently public spheres shrinking into 
private or covert spaces. and yet: the pervasiveness of corruption and the 
corollary straddling and fusion of spheres characterising african political 
orders still do allow for the emergence of public spaces and procedures for 
transacting different interests, albeit in spaces and institutions that may 
not correlate to conventional definitions of the public sphere.117
On centre stage is the question how the systemic condition of exclusion 
can be transformed into a systemic condition enabling inclusion(s)—
or, put in more political terms: into structuring properties of the politi-
cal order enabling emancipation, of creating spaces for the negotiation 
of societal meanings, the mediation of particularistic and competing 
interests.118 this puts the scholar of african politics doubly on the spot: 
Whence the social agents articulate and resourceful enough to transform 
prevailing power relations? and of course, which ideas and values inform 
social practices and actions that are indeed conducive to an emancipatory 
political order?
this is an essentially political quest, and the objective of my analysis 
is precisely to reinsert the political back into a theory of african political 
115 Conventional dichotomies capture such translations in terms of transformations 
from local to national, from informal to formal, from private to public. Given the inher-
ently problematic content of these terms, i prefer to formulate the process in more open 
terms. 
116 there is a caveat with regard to the pairing of these seeming dichotomies: ‘local’ 
does not necessarily imply ‘informal’, or ‘national’ equal ‘formal’, etc. this is a trap that, for 
instance, Chabal 2009 seems precariously close to, who routinely implies a synonymous 
relationship between ‘traditional’ and ‘local’, even if the translation of such ‘localities’ does 
lead to a political (dis)order sui generis. 
117 for a highly insightful case-study on articulations of a public sphere and moral dis-
course in sierra leone during the 1986 elections see ferme 1999.
118 although Geertz emphasises the symbolic dimension, he infers the importance of 
ideas and their transformation into values, norms and material substance through social 
action: “ideas—religious, moral, practical, aesthetic—must, as max Weber, among oth-
ers never tired of insisting, be carried by powerful social groups to have powerful social 
effects; someone must revere them, celebrate them, defend them, impose them. they have 
to be institutionalized in order to find not just an intellectual existence in society, but, so 
to speak, a material one as well” (Geertz 1993: 314).
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order. to achieve this, a last conceptualisation of corruption is required, 
before moving on to a detailed empirical discussion of such potential 
social forces. in the next chapter, i undertake a conceptualisation link-
ing ‘corruption’ to social agency and social articulation. here, corruption 
is seen neither as social practice nor structural feature, but through the 
very lens of emancipation: as a discursive representation that creates the 
possibility of public spaces and discursive interaction.
7. Conclusions: Corruption, (Dis)Order and Agency
the second discourse i portrayed is the scholarly discourse on corruption. 
although this second discourse may not be as powerful in material terms 
as the development discourse, it produces related categories of thinking 
about corruption and hence about ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, or ‘conceivable’ 
and ‘inconceivable’ frames of political order and social organisation. as a 
body of structuring principles the scholarly discourse contributes to the 
formation of social facts, social facts which inform and are informed by 
the way we think and perceive of ‘corruption’.119 Within this discourse 
corruption is conceptualised in a more multi-faceted way, illuminating 
structures, practices, norms and cultural matrixes informing and defining 
‘corruption’. What, however, is systematically squeezed out is the possi-
bility of agency and mobilisation, the possibility of challenging dominant 
socio-political imaginaries and, in Bourdieu’s sense, of dominant positions 
within the social space. in short: the scholarly discourse dispossesses afri-
can political orders of actors, fields and practices of political struggle that 
could or do lead to a ‘viable social order’,120 a social order which is politi-
cally permeable to social negotiation and procedurally firm enough to 
protect social spaces.
the separation of the two discourses is an analytical sleight of hand 
to render the respective contours more visible. however, it is clear that 
the two discourses are interrelated and mutually inform and shape each 
other in manifold ways. they are both, to put it in escobar’s terms, part 
“of an institutional field from which discourses are produced, stabilised, 
119  see durkheim 2002 for his seminal theory on social facts; for a first seminal con-
tribution on the role of epistemology to discourse theory see foucault 1966, which also 
informs the post-development approach. see also Bourdieu 1985 for a succinct discussion 
of the relationship between objective power relations and categories of the social world. 
120 this is a term borrowed from laclau (1996: 19, endnote 2) although i do not use it 
in precisely the same sense as he does. 
88 chapter one
modified, and put into circulation”, constituting “an apparatus that orga-
nizes the production of forms of knowledge and the deployment of forms 
of power, relating one to the other” (escobar 1995: 46). most obviously, the 
scholarly discourse provides the epistemology, the legitimisation of terms 
and concepts, the categories and taxonomies, which the development dis-
course appropriates and applies in its intervention strategies. it legitimises 
and justifies the expert knowledge that development professionals ‘apply’, 
that policies and strategy papers are based on. On the other hand, devel-
opment agencies provide a substantial flow of funds to communicative 
platforms and academic research exploring governance, actively foster-
ing scientific knowledge creation and knowledge diffusion that ultimately 
validates and legitimises ‘right’ concepts and interventions.
these linkages consolidate the strategic apparatus121 fusing the sym-
bolic imaginary and epistemic communities with the material resources, 
woven together by a myriad of social and systemic threads that serve to 
render the distinctions between the two discourses a matter of focus. One 
remarkable feature of the corruption discourse in this wider sense is pre-
cisely its ability to absorb and render intelligible a multitude of differ-
ent and even antagonistic elements, even where theoretical and practical 
contestations about the ‘right’ way of seeing and doing are made audible 
and visible.122 this resilience to deconstruction is part of its adaptive 
strength—which is derived from systemic logics that actively produce 
and require legitimising factors and knowledge for new interventions, 
new research, new policy-work. although one might assume that tren-
chant critique of the discourse constitutes an impossible inscription, by 
undermining the very configurations and mechanisms of the discourse 
on corruption, such counter-representations are mostly acknowledged 
‘constructively’. this holds especially true for scholarly critique, which is 
mandated by the development industry and forms part of the image and 
121  see foucault 1966.
122 interesting examples are provided by (former) development workers who critically 
dissect the mechanisms of development cooperation that themselves are the precondi-
tion for (often: large-scale) corruption to emerge and solidify into permanent practices. 
for a detailed deconstruction of the corruption system within a programme, written up 
by the former programme manager, see Jansen 2009 who feeds his knowledge back into 
the discourse through an institution established by the very industry he is deconstructing. 
for a trenchant critique of World Bank lending practices and the window-dressing with 
regard to corruption see Berkman 2008. for classic critiques, including the systemic (at 
best unintentional) fostering of mismanagement and bad governance of foreign aid see 
Kabou 1993, hancock 1994, hanlon 1996, raffer/singer 1996, lancaster 1999, easterly 2006, 
or moyo 2008. 
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symbolic representation of reflexive, self-critical development agencies. in 
this way such critique actually paves the way to the adaptation and modi-
fication of the discourse, whose reproductive rationale is ultimately even 
strengthened—as witnessed, for instance, in the governance turn of the 
development discourse in the wake of singularly failed market-centred 
development interventions.123
so summing up, the hegemonic formations that the double discourse 
on corruption consolidates, especially in its categorisation124 of african 
political orders, has lead to an impasse in identifying and understand-
ing loci and agents of change beyond conventional, generalised spaces. 
in the scholarly discourse, potential agents and spaces of change are dis-
missed as inexistent, powerless or appropriated by dominant rationales of 
‘corruption’, extraction and disorder. the development discourse, by its 
essentially bureaucratic nature, merely identifies such agents in a highly 
technocratic way—the usual suspects in civil society or the private sector, 
that, however, disappear behind the mechanics of the project implemen-
tation cycle and programme implementation. even where development 
agencies seek more sophisticated approaches which capture the politics 
of development, such as for instance in the concept of ‘drivers of change’,125 
123 there are exceptions, of course, where such critique oversteps the boundaries of the 
discourse. see, for instance, the example of sir edward Clay, at the time British ambas-
sador to Kenya, who in a speech to the British Business association in nairobi in 2004 
accused the Kenyan government under mwai Kibaki of being on a ‘looting spree’ charac-
terised by arrogance and greed. he famously exclaimed that “their gluttony causes them 
to vomit all over our shoes” (http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/
edward-clay-kenyas-government-is-full-of-corrupt-gluttons-553304.html; last accessed 25 
march 2010). although the eu did later that year freeze £83 million because of major cor-
ruption scandals, in particular the anglo-leasing scandal (see http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/2004/jul/22/eu.kenya; last accessed 25 march 2010), Clay was later disowned by the 
British government (for a rendition see Wrong 2009). for examples of the World Bank’s 
blinkering-strategies see Berkman 2008. 
124 the discourse on corruption, intentionally or not, has a strong element of ‘sham-
ing’ of agents and structures of african political orders involved, be it rapacious elites or 
specific socio-cultural matrices. this corresponds neatly to Bourdieu’s statement on the 
power of categorisation and the entymology of the word: “in fact, this work of categoriza-
tion, i.e. of making-explicit and of classification, is performed incessantly, at every moment 
of ordinary existence, in the struggles in which agents clash over the meaning of the social 
world and their position within it, the meaning of their social identity, through all the 
forms of benediction or malediction” (Bourdieu 1985: 729). 
125 this is a concept developed by dfid in their attempt to identify actors and institu-
tions that are practically more relevant to initiating and supporting governance reforms. 
some of the drivers of Change country reports are some of the best analyses of the politi-
cal economy. however, ultimately operational rationale derives from precisely the same 
technical reduction which it seeks it overcome: its success is not measured in terms of 
revealing and addressing repressive politics or skewed accountability processes, its success 
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the practices sur place of the anti-development machine described so 
intricately by ferguson (1990) pulverise the political to fit the operational 
logic of development cooperation.
in contrast, the premise of this chapter is that tropes of change and 
political imaginaries do indeed exist in african political orders. not only 
do they exist; my key hypothesis is that the very discourse of corruption 
provides the terrain in which these struggles take place. the overarching 
interest and the main objective of the following chapters is, consequently, 
the exploration of the political and social spaces that ‘corruption’ opens 
up (or closes down), i.e. the manifold political and social articulations that 
feed off corruption as a reference. my premise is that although the dis-
course of corruption may take on a hegemonic (in the sense of dominat-
ing) shape, it actually provides the terrain for the articulation of particular 
struggles—and potentially may lead to the creation of a plurality of politi-
cal spaces and public spheres.
is measured in terms of the ‘tools’ and ‘training programmes’ which it has allowed dfid 
to produce (see dfid 2004).
Chapter two
SketChing out an emanCipatory DiSCourSe: Corruption, 
politiCal SpaCeS anD SoCial imaginarieS
Here, then, is the paradox in the search for civil society at the century’s end. 
The very fertility of the Idea—its broad, transnational appeal as a trope of 
moral imagining—stems from its polyvalence: its capacity to condense dis-
tinct doctrines and ethical strains in a fan of pliable associations that can be 
variously distilled and infinitely elaborated [. . .]. The more inchoate and poly-
morphous, the more appealing: the more appealing, the less attainable in any 
substantive, meaningful form. [. . .]. As Durkheim said long ago, the ritual of 
conjuring with resonant signs is a condition of the very possibility of imagining 
society, sui generis.1
But if there is no ground of the social, any historical intervention will be the 
work of limited historical agents. This limitation, however, is more than com-
pensated for by a new freedom that social agents win as they become the cre-
ators of their own world.2
1. Introduction
after having set the backdrop with an elaboration of the development 
discourse of corruption, on the one hand, and the scholarly discourse of 
corruption, on the other hand, the purpose of this chapter is to set up the 
main stage, namely to outline a specifically political theory of corruption. 
to tackle this rather ambitious undertaking, however, some conceptual 
and theoretical illuminations are required. in this chapter i will argue that 
the scholarly and the development discourse on corruption are intimately 
intertwined and create a particular, dominant body of knowing and act-
ing upon corruption in africa. this argument, however, will not serve to 
underpin similar arguments about the discourse of governance, i.e. that it 
has inherently repressive effects, intentionally or unintentionally, in that 
it consolidates unaccountable and unresponsive power relations on a 
domestic and international level.3 there is a strong and well-documented 
case for such an argument, but my prime research interest leads to an 
1  See Comaroff/Comaroff 1999: 6.
2 See laclau 1996: 102–103.
3 For such a narrative see, for instance, marquette 2003 or harrison 2004. 
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inversion of this angle: my enquiry is driven by the quest to explore the 
fields and processes of social transformations that the discourse of cor-
ruption opens up, rather than a quest for the spaces it closes down. this 
is, evidently, a fundamentally different approach to the development dis-
course on corruption, which seeks to identify and redress ‘dysfunctions’. 
it is also a fundamentally different approach to the scholarly discourse 
on corruption, which essentially refers, optimistically or fatalistically, to 
the importance of ruled-based, meritocratic behaviour, institutions and 
norms. my critique is that that both discourses obscure processes of 
change that do occur. the development discourse does this by its myo-
pic and technocratic rationale, breaking ‘politics’ down into standardised, 
operational procedures, indicators and projects. the academic discourse, 
albeit on a more sophisticated level, does this by its ultimate reference 
to social theories derived from specific historical western experiences. 
this leads to patterns demarcating the absence of similar processes or 
conditions visible in african societies, rather than illuminating the pres-
ence of actors, processes and conditions in africa which are conducive to 
democratising and emancipatory spaces and structures. the body of liter-
ature since Foucault has given ample demonstrations of the mechanisms 
and micro-mechanisms through which discourses shape power relations 
and social realities. But it seems that we need a very different set of lenses 
to discover changes that are effected in a different direction, changes that 
may be of a more progressive—in a political sense of liberating and eman-
cipatory nature.
But before such processes can be analysed on an empirical level in a 
way that does not replicate the blind spots of existing discourses, some 
central theoretical challenges need to be addressed. in particular, five 
conceptual steps are required, which will be undertaken in this chapter:
Firstly, a theoretical frame of reference shall be developed that enables 
us to identify within the discourse of corruption the political and social 
spaces that open up through the contact and interaction with the discourse 
(Section 2, below). For as the closing thoughts of the previous chapter indi-
cated, my hypothesis is that such transformative processes are both more 
incremental as well as more political than inscribed in the discourse(s) 
of corruption—hence their invisibility. to grasp such emancipatory pro-
cess adequately, a completely different theoretical approach is required, 
one which formulates a political theory that is linked to political practice. 
in particular, it needs to incorporate the mechanisms and regularities of 
political articulations whilst at the same time doing justice to the open-
ings and transformations of social agency and political orders; in other 
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words, not to apply a theory that does not ‘smother’ the incremental pro-
cesses of social and political transformation, but to develop a conceptual 
framework that profiles the interrelationship between social agents and 
political discourses and renders the dynamics of change effected by such 
interrelationships legible. Such a theory is found in post-marxist political 
theories. hence, in this second step, a political discourse theory will be 
outlined, drawing heavily on the political theory of ernesto laclau. his 
political theory will serve as the central theoretical frame of reference to 
identify and analyse what i am boldly (and in reference to post-marxism) 
calling emancipatory processes in the classic sense of ‘setting free’.4 this 
will enable me to carve out central concepts and their relevance to an 
analysis of corruption and political spaces in africa. rather than generali-
sations from a closed theoretical paradigm of ‘africa’ or ‘african politics’, 
which characterise more recent theories discussed in the previous chap-
ter, for my purpose a general theory on politics, or rather: the political is 
required.5 this reconceptualisation is not only tapered towards identifying 
sites of social and political agency, it puts such operations at the very cen-
tre of the theoretical inquiry. in particular, i shall argue that “corruption” 
is not so much a practice or structural feature, but rather a nodal point 
which enables different claims, interests and identities to link up and 
structure the political in new ways. Corruption is, in the terms of politi-
cal discourse theory, an ‘empty signifier’, a catalyst of social and political 
organisation. key here is not so much what corruption ‘is’, key here is the 
ways in which different actors relate to what ‘corruption’ signifies and the 
ways the seek to differentiate or link up in relation to this signifier. my key 
hypothesis is that the very discourse of corruption provides the terrain in 
which these struggles take place. the overarching interest and the main 
objective of the following chapters is, consequently, the exploration of the 
political and social spaces that ‘corruption’ opens up (or closes down), 
i.e. the manifold political and social articulations that feed off corruption 
as a reference. my premise is that although the discourse of corruption 
may take on a hegemonic (in the sense of dominating) shape, it actu-
ally provides the terrain for the articulation of particular struggles—and 
4 the Concise oxford Dictionary defines emancipation as “setting free, esp. from 
slavery or from legal disabilities”, but also as “setting free, freedom, from intellectual or 
moral fetters” (Fowler/Fowler 1951: 387–388), putting freedom and liberation at the heart 
of the term. the term emancipation will be elucidated more thoroughly in the following 
sections. 
5 For an interesting contribution exploring the differences of the political and politics 
in discourse theory, see Dyrberg 2004.
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potentially may lead to the creation of a plurality of political spaces and 
public spheres.
equipped with these more refined analytical tools, it then becomes pos-
sible to illuminate actors and practices in the context of corruption that 
shed more light on their transformational potential. however, in addition 
to developing a more nuanced conceptual framework to analyse such 
politics, two key spheres of society need to be explored in more detail. 
if the state is and remains the central reference point of the discourse of 
corruption in africa, surprisingly little is being said about the two other 
classic social spheres, namely civil society and the economy—although 
the discourse of corruption rides on the back of loaded implications about 
these two key non-state spheres and their relationship to the state, or, 
more broadly, to trajectories of development. in implicit or explicit refer-
ence to western trajectories, both these spheres carry with them promise 
of democracy and wealth, promise of nurturing and enabling the kind of 
political and economic spaces that are seen to be prerequisite for over-
coming the ‘institutional dysfunctions’ or ‘infernal mechanisms’ leading 
to corruption. Simultaneously, civil society and the private sector, like the 
strong state, are mainly present in the discourse through their identified 
absence. in an attempt to systematically explore the potential spaces for 
political mobilisation and change, hence, these two societal spheres and 
their relevance for the discourse of corruption, or more concretely: for the 
transformation of society to a more democratic society shall be explored. 
So, secondly, the loaded concept of civil society shall be scrutinised 
( Section 3, below). i shall fleetingly dwell on the normative blinkers that 
its use conventionally implies, but, against the backdrop of post-marxist 
theory, primarily seek the liberating social imaginaries that the concept 
conveys and enables.
Thirdly, then, i shall turn to the economy, a field producing and repro-
ducing key societal power relations, defining access to and control over 
both economic as well as social resources (Section 4, below). historically, 
the social classes emerging from the development of a private sector have 
been pivotal to the separation between the private and public sphere, to 
the primacy of the rule of law, and the kind of political accountability 
structures which are manifest in all shades of liberal democracy. as such 
the state of the private sector is intimately linked to the state of civil soci-
ety, both of which in turn frame the state of the state—and all of which 
are, as i shall argue, primarily conceived in the discourse on corruption via 
their deficiency, if not outright absence in africa. and yet, the discourse 
relies heavily on the idea of a structural transformation that is both cause 
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and consequence of the intentional activities of such social classes, in par-
ticular of the middle class. organised interests of the middle class have 
historically and epistemologically been of paramount importance. they 
signify a (part of) society that is not ascriptively defined, but is individu-
alised and economically autonomous, which defines its societal linkages 
via economic and political interests and a particular professional ethos 
rather than via familial or patronage ties (Section 5, below). their impor-
tance for a particular ‘modern’ trajectory and social imaginary shall be 
carved by illuminating the role of professional associations in sociological 
theories on social change—but more significantly, by discussing their role 
and presence in contemporary african societies (Section 6).
this chapter, as a whole, will set the scene for the empirical investiga-
tion of the discourse of corruption as appropriated by professional asso-
ciations in tanzania in the next chapter.
2. Reinserting Politics: A Political Theory of Corruption
my starting-point is the catch-all nature of the term corruption that has 
been critiqued so sharply with regard to the development discourse. the 
catch-all, however, also applies to the scholarly discourse, where ‘corrup-
tion’ denotes a plethora of values, practices and structures that, ultimately, 
undermine the spirit of fruitful development. i will argue that conceivably 
there is a certain political productivity in this ‘emptiness’ of the term. its 
very amorphousness allows for different actors to employ it and connect 
to each other: using ‘corruption’ and the seemingly universal meanings it 
conveys as a vehicle to articulate and negotiate different visions of values, 
norms, rationales, interests, and not least visions. how else would social 
actors from different social spheres, positions and life-worlds communi-
cate, if not on the back of a term that allows for all different meanings and 
interests to be transported and articulated? what i intend to do here is 
seek to explore on a theoretical level the articulations that are resonated 
in the very hollowness of the term corruption. ultimately, my intention 
is to identify the emancipatory and democratising discourses that its very 
malleability render possible.
Drawing on post-marxist theory, the argument developed here is that 
the term corruption is an ‘empty signifier’: a chronically underdefined 
term (such as justice, or freedom) that has no fixed signified, and hence 
can be filled with contingent meaning. this filling of meaning is far from 
arbitrary—it serves an essential systemic function. the argument is 
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elaborated extensively in the works of laclau and fellow scholars,6 who 
theorise the discursive formations of emancipatory spaces in a novel way. 
Conventionally, discourses construct meanings and subjects, and seek 
to represent universally valid truths. in ordinary language use as well as 
in post-modern usage the term discourse has been implicitly or explic-
itly linked to the concept of hegemony, a state of political and symbolic 
supremacy, of the blanketing out of difference, and hence of repression 
and domination.7 laclau has provided a highly sophisticated reformula-
tion of the concept of discourse, that, based on a gramscian understand-
ing of hegemony, loses its a priori connotation with repression inherent 
in much Foucauldian thought. on the contrary, in laclau’s approach dis-
courses and hegemonising operations become central to the constitution 
of society—in particular to democratic societies. in this thrust, laclau 
and his fellow thinkers have contributed to a radical reformulation of the 
relation between the ‘universal’ and the ‘particular’—central categories of 
post-structuralist as well as post-modernist theories. a central theoreti-
cal innovation in post-marxism is that there is no theoretical bias of the 
particular over the universal (in the sense of a ‘politics of difference’); on 
the contrary, the dual reference to both the universal and the particular 
become constitutive of social and political life.
to understand his conceptualisation of hegemony this relationship 
between universalisation and particularism needs to be laid out more 
carefully. the basic premise laclau develops is that any concept of the 
‘universal’, i.e. articulations of ‘unity’ or ‘wholeness’, is an impossibility. 
the universal is a signifier, which implicitly or explicitly negates a sys-
tem of difference. at the same time there is no universal claim which can 
wholly and truly eliminate all differences; it is a logical impossibility that 
a particular identity, constituted through difference, can fully represent 
all identities.8 in other words, universal claims are always  expressions of 
6 i shall concentrate on laclau’s political theory, although his work developed and 
develops in close collaboration and critical interaction with the work of mouffe 1993; 1996, 
Zizek 1990; 2000a; 2000b; 2000c, and Butler 2000a; 2000b; 2000c. 
7 For an overview see howarth 2000. 
8 here the intellectual engagement with post-structuralists as well as marxism is evi-
dent; the former especially with the centrality of disagreement in politics as a central fea-
ture. as norval expands: “the centrality given to disagreement in the post-structuralist 
theorization of democracy arises directly from one of its basic ontological presuppositions, 
namely, the ‘impossibility of closure’ of any identity or structure. this is important, for it 
affects the status of disagreement in the model, making it not only an empirical feature of 
political life, but something arising from a constitutive characteristic of modern society. 
[. . .] while society can relate to itself only on the condition that it forges a representation 
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particular identities, never of a ‘fullness’ which exists and speaks for itself. 
a key universalism, namely, ‘society’ or the ‘the social’ is at the centre of 
laclau’s analysis. he argues that the notion of ‘society’ is a priori empty, 
it is an ‘absent fullness’, for the existence of ‘a society’ would imply the 
cancelling out of all differences. the term ‘society’ is thus more aptly 
conceptualised as a symbol representing such an absent fullness, a closed 
universality. this symbol, however, rather than having a meaning or a 
substance to itself, is filled with particularities, which have temporarily 
managed to symbolise universalities. But this appropriation of the uni-
versal through particularities is not a priori threatening or repressive, as 
implied in other discourse theories. on the contrary, a notion of univer-
sality is indispensible for any constitution of the social and the political.9 
as laclau argues: “the universal is an empty place, a term which can be 
filled with only by the particular, but which, through its very emptiness, 
produces a series of crucial effects in the structuration/destructuration of 
society” (laclau 2000a: 58). he goes on to argue that “the impossibility of a 
universal ground does not eliminate its need: it just transforms the ground 
into an empty place which can be partially filled in a variety of ways (the 
strategies of this filling is what politics is about)” (laclau 2000a: 59). in 
other words, such terms and imaginaries that can impossibly be ‘fixed’ as 
one particular signifier are constitutive for social and political processes, 
for constituting society as such: for political struggles, contentions, and 
linkages around the ‘filling’, the definition of such signifiers are the very 
operations which enable different actors and identities to articulate and 
shape a common horizon which constitutes as an entity beyond their 
particularities.
here enters laclau’s reconceptualisation of hegemony, for such a uni-
versality or common horizon, which is a necessary precondition for the 
of its unity, these representations are secondary accretions [. . .]. the moment of the 
institution of a social order is thus always already that of a particular imaginary regime” 
(norval 2004: 152). See also lefort 1986 for further elaborations on the role of marxism in 
exposing the illusion of a society that accounts for itself. 
9 as laclau/mouffe elaborate with respect to the idea of unity: “For, even though 
impossible, this remains a horizon, which, given the absence of articulation between social 
relations, is necessary in order to prevent an implosion of the social and an absence of any 
common point of reference. this unravelling of the social fabric caused by the destruc-
tion of the symbolic framework is another form of the disappearance of the political. in 
contrast to the danger of totalitarianism, which imposes immutable articulations in an 
authoritarian manner, the problem here is the absence of those articulations which allow 
the establishment of meaning common to the different social subjects” (laclau/mouffe 
1985: 188).
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very emergence and maintenance of social relations, is constructed by 
discourses. in laclau’s terminology, universal references are constructed 
by hegemonic articulations, i.e. the articulation of particularistic identities 
that claim to embody some universal representation.10 hence his refor-
mulation of ‘discourse’ to ‘hegemonic representation’,11 which allows for a 
non-deterministic conceptualisation of hegemony: the universal can only 
be thought in specific social and political terms, capturing particularis-
tic, contextualised articulations rather than essentialist universalisms. in 
a critical reformulation of gramsci’s theory,12 these discourses thus need 
to be constructed in a way that go beyond their particularistic interest 
to become intelligible to other social agents; for if only particular social 
identities exist, then the existence or emergence of “common point of 
reference”, a “meaning common to the different social subjects” (laclau/
mouffe 1985: 188) elaborated above is not self-evident.
the mechanism through which this universalising effect of hegemonic 
representations is achieved is through the production of empty  signifiers.13 
empty signifiers allow a discourse to be filled with particularistic and 
potentially incommensurable contents whilst maintaining a universal rep-
resentation. in this sense, empty signifiers are essential for creating link-
ages, in laclau’s terminology: for enabling chains of equivalence between 
differential and particularistic identities. to understand this aspect it is 
pivotal to take note of the crucial structuring effect that empty signifiers 
have on social practices and society as such.14 a good example of the struc-
turing effects of an empty signifier is for instance the ‘nation’: the idea of 
the nation consists of a somehow unified identification of fundamentally 
different identities, e.g. of gender, ethnic, regional, political, and religious 
10 in laclau/mouffe’s early reading, social identity itself emerges out discursive con-
structions, which they term ‘discursive articulations’, i.e. practices which establish a rela-
tion among elements. one important feature of such discursive articulations is that the 
social identities themselves are modified as a result of the articulation (laclau/mouffe 
1985: 105), a point to which we shall return in our empirical analysis. in his later work, 
laclau distanced himself from the notion that social identity must always or necessarily 
be discursively constructed, by introducing a primary category of dislocation’. 
11  laclau/mouffe capture one angle of ‘hegemony’ very beautifully in following quote: 
the space of hegemony is “a space in which bursts forth the whole conception of the social 
based upon an intelligibility which reduces its distinct moments to the interiority of a 
closed paradigm” (laclau/mouffe 1985: 93).
12 See gramsci, in particular Section 2 “State and Civil Society” (gramsci 2008: 
206–275).
13 For a detailed discussion of the role of empty signifiers for politics see laclau 1996a: 
36–46.
14 For a discerning discussion of the ‘universal’ see gasché 2004: 17–34.
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groups. although these particular identities are constituted through a 
logic of difference, they are able to connect through a chain of references 
vis-à-vis an overarching universality. in other words, ‘the nation’ becomes 
an empty signifier by representing a universal identity. the chain of 
equivalence constructed by the empty signifier ‘the nation’ obscures the 
differential identities, by referring to something which is beyond particu-
larities. through the nodal points produced by the empty signifier, such 
chains of equivalence allow for the construction of a common identity—
albeit one which is logically impossible, as these differences can only be 
overcome on a purely representative level. this is what laclau (2000a: 56) 
terms the “representation of an impossibility”: the universal is an objective 
impossibility, it can only be constituted through particularistic represen-
tations.15 at the same time, the production of linkages to other identi-
ties, which cancel out the differences between the different identities, is 
a precondition for a particular discourse to constitute itself beyond the 
narrow boundaries of its own terrain. in conclusion, the very condition 
of a politics of difference (laclau’s critical appropriation of a central post-
modernist term) is precisely the appeal to universal principles.16
15 to illustrate the mechanisms through which hegemonic relations work, laclau 
invites us to consider following extreme situation of a radical disorganisation of the social 
fabric: “in such conditions—which are not far away from hobbes’ state of nature—people 
need an order, and the actual content of it becomes a secondary consideration. ‘order’ as 
such has no content, because it only exists in the various forms it is actually realized, but 
in a situation of radical disorder ‘order’ is present as that which is absent; it becomes an 
empty signifier, as the signifier of that absence. in this sense, various political forces can 
compete in their efforts to present their particular objectives as those which carry out 
the filling of that lack. to hegemonize something is exactly to carry out this filling func-
tion. (we have spoken about ‘order’, but obviously ‘unity’, ‘liberation’, ‘revolution’, etcetera 
belong to the same order of things. any term which, in a certain political context becomes 
the signifier of the lack, plays the same role). politics is possible because the constitutive 
impossibility of society can only represent itself through the production of empty signi-
fiers” (laclau 1996a: 44).
16 For detailed elaboration see laclau 1996. this theoretical reconceptualisation is a 
conscious distinction to the debates on multi-culturalism and the theories informing them. 
laclau’s central premise is that precisely the split within particularism and universalisa-
tion, i.e. the ‘unfullfilled fullness’ which universalities signify, is essential to particularisms 
if they hopes to assert itself beyond its own boundaries. So the double reference to the 
universal and the particular are the very stuff of social and political relations. although he 
clearly recognises the dangers of universalising discourses and their potentially totalitarian 
effects, he argues that “the assertion of pure particularism, independently of any content 
and of the appeal to universality transcending it, is a self-defeating enterprise” (laclau 
1996: 26). i shall return to the role of particularism and radical democracy further down 
in this section. 
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empty signifiers thus frame the nodal points at which differential 
identities transcend their differences and collapse insofar as they refer 
to a common universality. put differently, they relate to each other via 
the reference to a common universality, via an empty signifier. “there is 
no universality, as we have seen, except through an equivalence between 
particularities, and such particularities are always contingent and context-
specific” (laclau 2000c: 211). in this way, empty signifiers are constitutive 
for the construction of social order, in fact for society as such. particu-
lar identities require nodal points to relate to each other and enable this 
process of identification with the universal—here: the absent fullness of 
society. empty signifiers provide this filling function. on centre stage here 
are the modes in which social demands (particularities) are translated 
into struggles or notions that take on a wider representation beyond their 
own, narrow identity.17 as norval expounds, this process of constructing 
hegemony thus is in sharp relief from naked coercion or imposition of 
(particular) demands on subordinate groups, for it features a two-fold 
character:
on the one hand, demands are always specific, even particularistic, in that 
they arise from the experiences and conditions of particular and limited 
groups. on the other hand, for those demands to become universalized, 
to function as a horizon in which more generalized demands may become 
inscribed, they need to be marked by something transcending their particu-
larity (norval 2004: 157).
in other words, there is “both a contextual and a context-transcending 
dimension in the process of the hegemonization of a field of demands” 
(norval 2004: 157). Such a universalisation of demands, manifested as 
political struggles, are only possible through the production of empty 
signifiers.
although it clearly emerges from his conceptualisation of the ‘contex-
tual and context-transcending dimensions’ of such hegemonic represen-
tations, laclau is at pains to emphasise that the ‘emptiness’ to which he 
refers is a concrete notion. he exemplifies the steps connecting ‘empti-
ness’ with ‘universality’ by summing up his key arguments in a very illu-
minative way:
17 this double feature of hegemonic representations distinguishes the political theory 
of laclau from the particularism and subjectivism that post-modern narratives on identi-
ties and interests are critiqued for.
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[thus], universality, not being either the result of a conceptual abstraction 
or of a conceptually grounded telos, is simply a concrete historical construc-
tion and not an aprioristically determined presupposition of the social as 
such. the anti-globalization movement, for instance, attempts to construct 
equivalential chains between many locally based struggles and demands. in 
that way it breaks with the narrow particularism of the latter and univer-
salizes them by presenting them as part of a wider emancipatory struggle. 
But this construction of the universal through equivalential inscription is a 
process of identification which—as all processes of identification—is not 
purely conceptual but involves a plurality of intellectual, political, and affec-
tive dimensions (laclau 2004: 281).18
important to note here is that such hegemonising representations do not 
leave the identities or interests of the participants unchanged. they nec-
essarily involve an engagement by the social groups on all these different 
levels. as laclau himself alludes to in above quote, the very discourses—
and hence the social demands and identities represented—change as a 
result of the contingent hegemonising processes. this is a point i shall 
return to further down, and which will be particularly salient for the 
empirical case-studies.
Summing up, in laclau’s political theory hegemonic articulations, and 
by elongation the empty signifiers that act as transmittors beyond par-
ticularistic identities, have a strong emancipatory potential. they create 
the conditions of democratic politics, of the articulation of different social 
struggles. So empty signifiers, far from being meaningless, are the very 
mediums of political articulations and struggles. they fully embody the 
contradiction of the incommensurability between the universal and the 
particular, the ‘constitutive lack’ which never be fully transcended. But 
far from being a deficiency, this constitutive lack signifies the possibility 
of plural hegemonic formations: “incompletion and provisionality belong 
to the essence of democracy” (laclau 1996: 16). hence, empty signifiers 
enable a crucial democratic moment, with no one project or one political 
will being irreversible or uncontestable. Quite the opposite: all hegemonic 
representations are subject to contingent processes of identification.
Before connecting laclau’s political theory to the discourse of cor-
ruption, a word on the conceptualisation of social agents is required.19 
18 For case-studies discussing localised protest movements in the light of post-marxist 
theory see griggs/howarth 2000, 2008.
19 as the elaborations in laclau/mouffe 1985 underline, much of this theoretical thrust 
derives from their intention to reject socialist universalism, which posits a necessary uni-
versal working class as the one and sole social agent, qua its economic position.
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although agency seemingly disappears behind the central categories of the 
universal and the particular, the chains of equivalence and the hegemonic 
strategies transcending the split between universalism and particularism 
are shaped and driven by social agency. in fact, laclau’s core interest 
revolves around the question of how to empower identities and cultural 
differences in an emancipatory way, especially under the contemporary 
‘dislocatory’ effects of globalisation.20 unlike, for instance, in Foucauldian 
discourse theory, this political theory puts social agents on centre stage. 
Consistently, laclau’s and mouffe’s notion of a radical democracy is not 
only “to expand egalitarian effects into more and more areas of the social”, 
but also to recognise that “the relative autonomy of the demands of dif-
ferent groups has to be accepted and articulated into a larger common 
movement, what is called ‘a chain of equivalence’ ” (Critchley/marchart 
2004: 4). this prime consideration of plural social agents is what distin-
guishes this political theory from others, achieving a theorisation of social 
agency within a stringent framework of the social and society. again in 
contradistinction to a Foucauldian discourse theory, where the notion of 
agency is smothered by a focus on discursive iterations, laclau conceptua-
lises social agents in an mediated fashion. his prime theoretical interest 
is the relationship between the universal and the particular, or more pre-
cisely: the political projects which aim to fill the “always receding horizon” 
(laclau 1996: 34) of the universal with particular contents, which are con-
nected by such chains of equivalence. But although the theory operates 
on a high level of abstraction, the ‘contaminated’ relationship between the 
particular and the universal is articulated as concrete political struggles by 
and between specific social agents:
if democracy is possible, it is because the universal has no necessary body 
and no necessary content; different groups, instead, compete between 
themselves to temporarily give to their particularisms a function of univer-
sal representation. Society generates a whole vocabulary of empty signifiers 
whose temporary signifieds are the result of political competition (laclau 
1996: 35).
in other words, political identities and interests shape and are shaped by 
contingent, historical processes of articulation. the more contestable and 
20 the concept of ‘dislocation’ is a radical theorisation of laclau’s and mouffe’s notion 
of antagonism as the limit of the social; especially in laclau 1990 and in his exchanges with 
Butler/Zizek 2000 dislocation becomes a primary category, capturing ‘the outside’ which is 
not necessarily discursively constructed in the form of an antagonism. For a more general 
discussion of the accelerated tempo of dislocatory experiences see howarth 2000. 
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the more reversible the ‘fixing’ of the meaning of signifieds is, the more 
democratic the society. this has major consequences on social agency, 
which in a democratic society is freed up to a wide and deep understanding 
of agentic possibility in relation to structural contexts. paraphrasing emir-
bayer and mische, a democratic society brings forth and is brought forth by 
actors that see their worlds as more rather than less responsive to human 
imagination, purpose, and effort (cf. emirbayer/mische 1998: 973).
there are several key theoretical openings that this conceptualisation 
of social and political relations enables. First of all, as there are no logics 
of necessity which predetermine the composition of political identities or 
the outcome of political struggles, it allows a theoretical focus on the (de)
construction of such political identities and interests. Second, as norval 
argues, “it opens up a whole realm of theorization of social and political 
relations based on their contingent articulation” (norval 2004: 155). and 
thirdly, it is a theory which, rather than seeking to eliminate the ‘noise’ 
of political struggles, puts tension and disagreement at the very heart of 
it, but without foreclosing the terrain for processes and procedures con-
structing consensus.21
equipped with these theoretical keys i will unlock the enquiry of the 
following chapters. they are based on the central hypothesis that the dis-
course of corruption performs precisely such a filling function: ‘corrup-
tion’ provides various groups with the universal terrain to articulate their 
representations and to construct chains of equivalence. Corruption is an 
exceptionally attractive term by semantically denominating a deficiency, 
a lack of a particular kind of social order, and hence referring to ‘that 
which is absent’, to a particular, ‘good’ social order. however, the kind 
of order that is implied in the reference to corruption is widely different 
and in fact often incommensurable, although the semantics all refer to the 
same empty signifier: corruption as an obstacle to a ‘level playing field’ of 
the private sector, as a threat to ‘the stability and security of societies’, to 
‘the quality of life for all’, and not least the ‘values of democracy’—all of 
which are not necessarily compatible, or are even outright antagonistic 
notions. professional associations, government officials, anti-corruption 
activists, grass-root organisations and Ceos of large international compa-
nies share neither the same lifeworld nor political agenda. So the rather 
puzzling fascination with corruption by actors from all (antagonistic) 
21 For a highly insightful discussion of and comparison between deliberative and post-
marxist theories of democracy see norval 2004, 2007.
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wakes of society suddenly makes sense when viewed through the lens of 
an empty signifier: different groups can and do seek to fill it with par-
ticular meanings and contents which further their own objectives. the 
signifier ‘corruption’ provides them with the frame of reference to con-
nect these different identities and objectives, the chain of equivalence 
that cancels out incompatibilities between them, as well as providing the 
universal (one could also say: public) terrain for articulating particular 
interests and political struggles.
3. Civil Society: The Omni-Present Absence in Africa
Classically, the terrain of such democratic articulations and struggles has 
been analysed in the concept of civil society: the locus of empowered and 
articulate social groups actively engaging in shaping the state and creating 
a socio-political order which provides a mediating structure, not a struc-
ture of exclusion. it is to the emergence of independent, voluntary and 
organised representation of societal interests that such an ultimately fruit-
ful relationship between state and society is pinned to. hence, it comes 
as no surprise that throughout the discourse of corruption one mantra 
is chanted again and again: that the ‘principal institutions of modern 
politics’,22 the ‘reform of public morals’23 or the ‘secure and broad-based 
consensus on the rules of the political game’24 are the mediums as well 
as the products of social transformation that allow for rule-based, capable 
and legitimate collective action and representation.
the concept of civil society itself is based on the very idea of creating 
spaces for social actors to engage with the social foundations of the state. 
Conventionally defined, the realm of civil society lies between the pri-
mary units of society (individuals, families, clans, etc.) and the institutions 
of the state;25 civil society offers autonomous sources of social power, of 
22 See huntington 1969: 71.
23 See olivier de Sardan 1999: 48.
24 leftwich 1993: 614; see also hyden 1995; 1999.
25 Consider the working definition offered by Cohen/arato in their seminal book on 
civil society and political theory, who consider civil society “as a sphere of social interac-
tion between economy and state, composed above all of the intimate sphere (such as the 
family), the sphere of associations (especially voluntary associations), social movements, 
and forms of public communication. modern civil society is created through forms of self-
constitution and self-mobilization. it is institutionalized and generalized through laws, and 
especially subjective rights, which stabilize social differentiation” (Cohen/arato 1992: ix). 
remarkable here is the explicit inclusion of the family, which is usually excluded, being a 
non-voluntary form of association. important, however, is their inclusion of iterated forms 
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specifically civic values and civic action, whilst opening up new opportu-
nities of political life as a consequence of the pluralisation and differen-
tiation of institutional life. epistemologically the concept of civil society 
evolved from its specific relationship to the (western) state: the idea and 
practice of a ‘countervailing’ force to the state, where social forces form 
an inherent part of the project of the nation state by engaging with the 
state and shaping the public sphere, thereby idealtypically signifying both 
a curtailing as well as empowering complement to the state. the concept 
of civil society evokes the representation and participation of social forces 
in the political realm, transforming the latter into a locus of civic identi-
fication and representation.
For pertinent geo-political reasons, the concept of civil society was 
rejuvenated again after the end of the Cold war, and has come to play 
a pivotal role in development discourse. the powerful effects of social 
movements and civic associations in bringing about political liberalisation 
of the eastern european countries inspired hope and sharpened interest 
in their democratising role. rather mockingly, gellner describes this redis-
covery in the following terms: “the dusty term, drawn from antiquated 
political theory, belonging to long, obscure and justly forgotten debates, 
re-emerged, suddenly endowed with a new and powerful capacity to stir 
enthusiasm and inspire action” (gellner 1994: 5). in regard to africa, the 
developmental potential of civil society became hugely influential, partly 
due to the collapsing economic and structural base of the state, partly 
due to the neo-liberal emphasis by international development agencies 
on private initiative.26
many scholars have critiqued that the term civil society, as utilised 
in the current development discourse, is tenaciously and (more often 
of public communication, which is, as will be discussed further down, an essential feature 
of civil society.
26 the sense of a politically democratising and also economically vibrant force is 
summed up perfectly by gyimah-Boadi, who also alludes to the ‘tabula rasa’ with regard to 
the public sector that african societies faced after the severe economic crises of the 1970s: 
“however, some of that developmental potential of civil society was restored, by default 
or by design, following the near collapse since the late 1970s of the african state and its 
economic development structures [. . .]. the proliferation of a wide range of grassroots 
and development ngos in the 1980s and 1990s was a key manifestation of this restoration. 
this phenomenon, combined with the growing emphasis on private sector development 
as well as the emergence of private sector development groups and revamping of business 
associations, present renewed possibilities for the development of the private sector and 
economic decentralization, which can only enhance the prospects of african democratic 
development in the twenty-first century.” (gyimah-Boadi 2004: 106). 
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than not) blindly informed by the contemporary (neo)liberal ideology.27 
moreover, civil society plays a peculiarly double-edged role in develop-
ment practice: on an ideological level, it is the locus of all that is empow-
ering, equipped with the power to transform structural dysfunctions and 
check political predation; whilst on a functional level, it is looked upon 
as a service provider, a sector which can provide certain services that the 
state and the market are unable or unwilling to provide such services 
cost-efficiently, especially to marginalised groups.28 the purpose of this 
chapter is, however, not to deconstruct the discourse of civil society in 
development cooperation. the purpose of this chapter is to identify medi-
ums and actors of social transformations creating political spaces and the 
kind of normative consensus that are prerequisite for political inclusion 
of an emancipatory nature, to seek the transformationary potential of civil 
society, the political spaces that social actors shape and create. For this it 
is necessary to explore the concept of civil society in greater detail, to peel 
out the core potential as a theoretical concept as well as a social force.
First and foremost: civil society cannot be thought without the state. 
Fundamentally, “civil society cannot be constituted as a truly separate 
instance, for its functions both anticipate and extend the state’s role” 
(laclau 2000a: 49).29 in liberal theory30 that informs much of the devel-
27 See, for instance, Comaroff/Comaroff 1999; Cohen/arato 1994; gellner 1996; tester, 
1992.
28 For pioneering critiques of the era on the role of ngos and civil society in develop-
ment see edwards/hulme (eds.) 1996 a, b. however, civil society has lost none of its allure 
for development cooperation. Consider for instance the advisory group on Civil Society 
and aid effectiveness (ag-CS), who emphasise that “civil society is inherently diverse, and 
CSos fill a range of roles in social and economic development in any country, many of 
which are beyond those supported through official development assistance (oDa)” (ag-CS 
2008: xiii). the advisory group draws particular attention to civil society’s role in i) mobilis-
ing grassroots communities and poor or marginalized groups, ii) their monitoring role, iii) 
engaging in research and policy dialogue, iv) delivering services and programmes, iv) build-
ing coalitions, v) mobilising aid resources, and vi) civic education (ag-CS 2008: xiii).
29 on this point (perhaps only), there seems to be general consensus across social the-
ory. note, for instance, giddens, who reformulates the relationship between state and civil 
society in terms of a contradiction: “the primary contradiction of the capitalist (nation-)
state is to be found in the mode in which a ‘private’ sphere of ‘civil society’ is created by, 
but is separate from and in tension with, the ‘public’ sphere of the state. it is a mistake to 
suppose that everything that lies outside the scope of the state, if that is taken to mean 
institutions which precede, and are not incorporated within, the realm of state power. 
the origins of the modern state are also the origins of the sphere of civil society [. . .]. the 
capitalist state, as a ‘socializing’ centre representing the power of the community at large, 
is dependent on mechanisms of production and reproduction which it helps to bring into 
being but which are set of from and antagonistic to it” (giddens 1984: 197).
30  For an elaboration of marxist and post-marxist perspectives on civil society see 
laclau 2000a: 47–59. 
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opment discourse, civil society is generally conceptualised in three ways: 
as a social sector counterbalancing the state, as a societal sphere that nur-
tures specifically civic values, or, in its most truncated form, as a collec-
tion of non-governmental organisations. this admittedly grossly reduced 
outline does indicate, however, that civil society is ab ovo conceived in 
relationship with the state: both in opposition to the state, confining the 
state’s hegemonic (here: in the sense of dominant and appropriating) ten-
dencies, as well as complementing the state, weaving a social fabric that 
enhances and supports public institutions.31 historically, the concept of 
civil society emerged as a signifier for the separation of state and society, 
for the divide between the public (i.e. state institutions) and the private 
(i.e. the realm of citizens). the realm of civil society is defined by civic 
practices, identifying with the values of liberal capitalist order.32
gellner, interested primarily in the conditions of liberty of mod-
ern society, emphasises the buffering role of civil society against state 
dominance:
the simplest, immediate and intuitively obvious definition, which also has 
a good deal of merit, is that Civil Society is that set of diverse non-govern-
mental institutions which is strong enough to counterbalance the state and, 
while not preventing the state from fulfilling its role of keeper of the peace 
and arbitrator between major interests, can nevertheless prevent it from 
dominating and atomizing the rest of society (gellner 1994: 32).
Conventionally, such civic groups encompass different types of voluntary 
organisations, whose common denominator is the representation collec-
tive interests of both a political as well as non-political nature—innocu-
ous ones such as sports clubs or community organisations, to more overtly 
political such as trade unions and professional associations, and not least 
newer forms of issue-based organisations, such as human rights or envi-
ronmental organisations.
however, not all voluntary or non-profit social organisations are sub-
sumed under civil society, as Chazan emphasises with a specific focus on 
african societies:
not all social forces are part of civil society [. . .]. Civil society is separate from 
the state but relates to the state: parochial associations that do not evince 
an interest beyond their immediate concerns, groups that do not have a 
31 For a detailed discussion on the history and conceptual schools of the term civil 
society see Cohen/arato 1992, gellner 1994 or elliott 2003. 
32 See, for instance, putnam and his fellow authors (1993) on the importance of ‘civic 
values’.
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concept of the state beyond their own aims, and those totally controlled by 
state agencies are excluded from its domain (Chazan 1994: 256).
in other words, a particular kind of civic attitude and value structure are 
required for civil society, indicating just how intimately the idea and prac-
tice of civil society is tied to specific western conditions of socio-political 
transformations.33 the concept of ‘civil society’ is tied to the notion of 
‘civility’, which Shils (1991) circumscribes as a particular social moral (or, 
in his words: the fundamental virtue of civil society): the recognition a 
common good, of individual rights and dignity beyond one’s own com-
munity or family, and a sense of collective responsibility that restrains 
and mediates relations between members of society. this particularly civil 
‘virtue’ or moral is underpinned by specific structural transformations, as 
mamdani (1996) argues:
with an end to extra-economic coercion, force ceased to be a direct arbi-
ter in day-to-day life. Contractual relations among free and autonomous 
individuals were henceforth regulated by civil law. Bounded by law, the 
modern state recognized the rights of citizens. the rule of law meant that 
law-governed behaviour was the rule. it is in this sense that civil society was 
understood as civilized society (mamdani 1996: 14).
the key features of the structural premises of civil society cannot be carved 
out more clearly: individual rights, predictable rules and rule enforcement 
that protects citizens from the state as well as binds citizens’ interactions 
with the state—but limited to very particular, normatively defined types 
of social practices and social agents.
thus, the concept of civil society, as used in much development theory 
and policy, is based on certain (often circular) assumptions made with 
regard to both conditions as well as the effects of civil society. especially 
dominant is the assumption that the ‘nurturing’ of civil society leads to 
33 this is also emphasised by gellner, who warns that the broad definition outlined by 
himself may equally well include social orders which evoke no democratic civic sphere, 
merely an autonomous sphere or societal segment that is not oppressed by the state. he 
elaborates: “therefore, if we are to define our notion of Civil Society effectively, we must 
first of all distinguish it from something which may in itself be attractive or repulsive, or 
perhaps both, but which is radically distinct from it: the segmentary community which 
avoids central tyranny by firmly turning the individual into an integral part of the social 
sub-unit. romantics feel nostalgia for it and modern individualists may loathe it; but what 
concerns us here is that, whatever our feelings for it may be, it is very, very different from 
our notion of Civil Society, even though it satisfies that plausible initial definition of it. it 
may, indeed, be pluralistic and centralization-resistant, but it does not confer on its mem-
bers the kind of freedom we require and expect from Civil Society” (gellner 1994: 36).
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the development of a bourgeois society characterised by functional differ-
entiation, rule of law and pluralistic politics. elliott sums up the teleology 
inherent in the concept:
higher levels of education lead to greater expectations about government 
and greater capacity to participate in national politics. growth of the market 
undermines concentrated state power. the assertion of private ownership 
rights stimulates demands for political rights and freedoms. middle class 
and professional groups brought into existence by development lead the 
process of democratizing politics. the results are a shift in the balance of 
power between the state and society, a change in the nature of associational 
forms, and a redesigning of the political system along democratic lines. the 
predicted outcome is a civil society (elliott 2003: 30).
however, as the previous chapters have demonstrated, these structural 
conditions are quite simply not given in most african countries.34 on the 
contrary, african societies seem to be characterised by a blurring between 
the public and private sphere, by public institutions shaped by both for-
mal and informal practices, by dominance of personal and particularistic 
rationales rather than abstract and universal bureaucratic-legal rationale, 
by fragile rather than strong markets, by shadow states characterised by 
exclusion, dominance and coercion rather than inclusion, participation 
and freedom, with the types of ‘classic’ actors of civil society being few 
and fragile. with core preconditions of a conventional understanding 
of civil society in african political orders absent, not least the minimal 
requirement of the differentiation between state and society,35 the lack of 
empirical realities of civil society in african societies is the source of much 
scholarly deliberation. as, for instance, karlström criticises with regard 
to african political theories, “the concept of civil society surely serves no 
meaningful analytical purpose if it merely identifies an absence” (karl-
ström 1999: 106). he goes on to argue forcefully:
its purpose should be to enable us to identify those forces and institutions 
that do have some potential for producing a more productive engagement 
between state and society, and, ultimately, the sort of stable, legitimate, and 
34 white 1996 has undertaken one of the most interesting comparative studies (here: 
between Singapore and ghana), specifically analysing the structural conditions for the 
emergence of civil society. 
35 in particular the development of capitalist modes of production and a differenti-
ated state bureaucracy, structured along liberal democratic principles of accountability 
and representation.
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democratic state forms that have proven so difficult to achieve in post-colo-
nial africa (karlström 1999: 106; emphasis in original).36
here, civil society is both a social force seeking to assert and universalise 
certain values in political practice, such as freedom or equity or particular 
rights, as well as a political force seeking the redistribution or protection 
of certain resources vis-à-vis the state.37
however, it is hard to conceptualise the kind of forces and institutions 
that would shape these emancipatory and democratic spaces other than 
‘classic’ collective actors—precisely those which are notable through their 
absence in african societies. as the discourse on corruption demonstrates 
vividly, both in the development discourse as well as in the scholarly dis-
course responses to the ‘infernal mechanism’ derive, implicitly or explic-
itly, from classic conceptions of the role and composition of civil society 
in social transformation:38 the emergence of new classes, of reciprocal 
networks, of voluntary organisations, of professional associations that link 
political order to the social basis, not just in terms of institutionalised 
interactions, but also and equally importantly in terms of common ethical 
standards and values.39
africanists have grappled in different ways with this dilemma of absent 
empirical referents and the concomitant question of the analytical use-
fulness of the concept. azarya addresses the conceptual and operational 
difficulties surrounding the term ‘civil society’, with the conclusion that 
scholars are “still faced with the need to characterize the society in some 
way and ask whether a legitimate civil-public sphere of action exists in 
contemporary african societies” (azarya 1994: 96). precisely because post-
colonial african states’ authority and legitimacy has eroded, he does not 
focus on the legitimacy of civil society in relationship to the state, but 
rather on the “characteristics of civilness based on the legitimacy attrib-
uted to the public sphere” (azarya 1994: 96). azarya’s conceptual conclu-
36 For an early and seminal critique discussing fundamental flaws in the application of 
the concept of civil society to africa see Bratton 1989. his main point of critique is that 
civil society as applied to africa is an analytical concept without any empirical referents. 
37 See also gellner 1994, who posits as a necessary condition for the definition of civil 
society the conferral of a certain type of freedom upon its members.
38 mamdani (1996) makes an interesting conceptual reversion by asking not how civil 
society shapes the state or, conversely, how civil society is marginalised by the state, but 
how society is ruled through the state articulation of civil society. in more Foucauldian 
terms, therefore, his line of inquiry is how the (specifically colonial) discourse of (un)civil 
society translated into social and political reality.
39 See Boltanski/Chiapello (2000) for an excellent discussion of formative features and 
the changing spirit of capitalism.
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sion is that civil society “may still arouse our sensitivity to a measure of 
recognition and societal support for collective responsibility and action” 
(azarya 1994: 96).40 So, perhaps not surprisingly, we are again faced with 
the question of the public sphere, and issues of representation and legiti-
macy attached to it.41
in an effort to come to terms with these issues, Bratton defines civil soci-
ety (with specific reference to the relevance for african societies) as a
public political activity that occurs in the realm between the state and the 
family. although such political activity may be motivated by the quest for 
private advantage, it is not ‘private’ in the sense of being confined to the 
domestic or household arena, instead, it is decidedly ‘public’ in two senses: 
it entails collective action in which individuals join to pursue shared goals, 
and it takes place in the institutional ‘commons’ that lie beyond the bound-
aries of the household (Bratton 1994: 56).42
Bratton carves out two central features: first, that civil society is bound to 
collective action, and second, that the articulations and interactions are 
public, in the sense that they are directed at a community beyond the 
boundaries of a particularistic group. perhaps more constitutive, as tay-
lor stresses, is, thirdly, the “radically purged time consciousness: it comes 
when associations are placed firmly and wholly in homogenous, profane 
time, whether or not the higher time is negated altogether or other asso-
ciations are still admitted to exist in it. Such is the case with the pub-
lic sphere, and therein lies its new and (close to) unprecedented nature” 
(taylor 2004: 99).43 Such are the features of a specifically modern public 
40  this is a very different approach to the far more descriptive (and yet, based on her 
classic definition of civil society, normative) approach chosen by Chazan for instance: “State 
organs and social groups continually engage each other in multiple settings that are arenas 
of struggles for domination and accommodation. the constantly changing interactions that 
occur in these spaces mould and redefine the nature of state structures and social forces, 
generating an ongoing, mutually transforming, dynamic” (Chazan 1994: 256). 
41 For a seminal contribution on the “two publics in africa” see ekeh 1975. See also 
Bayart 1979 and young 1994 for discussions on the conceptual nexus between state and 
civil society.
42 By the same token, he emphasises that the public nature of civic action should not 
be confused with politics “ ‘in the public sector’—in other words, in the realm of the state. 
as government leaders have expanded the apparatus and prerogatives of the state, they 
have also appropriated and distorted the term ‘public’ to refer exclusively to the official 
activities of state functionaries. when used in extreme form, the terms ‘public’ (referring 
to family life) and ‘public’ (meaning state actions) imply that no public space remains for 
occupancy by civic actors” (Bratton 1994: 56).
43 in spite of taylor’s excellent discussion of the emergence of the public sphere, he 
leans heavily on a habermasian concept of a depoliticised public sphere, “a space of dis-
cussion that is self-consciously seen as being outside power. it is supposed to be listened 
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sphere, a public sphere that carries within the potential for democratic 
politics.
recast in post-marxist terminology, ‘public’ in this sense refers to the 
discursive chain of equivalence which provides the terrain for articula-
tions of identity and interests to become political, to be intelligible to 
other social agents, to shape and define and hegemonise the ‘shared goals’ 
and ‘collective interests’—in a more habermasian (and idealtypical delib-
erative) sense, civil society thus coined provides the spaces to articulate 
and debate shared values and interests. Civil society becomes the terrain 
(i.e. multiple social, cultural, political spaces, rather than a clearly delin-
eated space) of such articulations that seek to represent their own partic-
ular aims with those of the community as a whole—albeit with reference 
to a very specific democratic social imaginary.
So rather than conceiving civil society as a clearly delineated sphere 
(or sector) separated from but related to the state, the concept of civil 
society carries within it manifold creative and emancipatory potential. 
Firstly, civil society denotes the spaces in which struggles about the mean-
ing and the articulation of public norms and public values are carried 
out, the terrain in which (in the post-marxist sense) hegemonic negotia-
tions and deliberations are carried out. Secondly, civil society denotes the 
social actors which articulate these demands and struggles. and thirdly, 
thought together, civil society thus, potentially, becomes the very condi-
tion for linking up chains of equivalence around meanings of legitimacy, 
representation or indeed public interests.
of all africanists, Comaroff/Comaroff (1999) have been most radical 
and most creative in their critique and their reinvention of the concept 
of Civil Society—or ‘the idea’, as they term it. they take above critique a 
step further by not only questioning the utility of a distinct sphere of civil 
society for african societies, but the fundamental incommensurability of 
the concept itself: “that the autonomy of civil society from the state, the 
very autonomy on which the idea is predicated, is entirely chimerical. it, 
too, rests on a series of idealized separations, starting with that of political 
authority from private property. But this separation is, de facto, unsustain-
able” (Comaroff/Comaroff 1999: 24), they argue, due to the generalization 
of economic relationships which cut across the social and political land-
scape. here, then, the deconstruction of the discourse reveals the social 
to by power. But it is not itself an exercise of power” (taylor 2004: 89). this is a premise 
which i do not share, premising my analysis on the essentially political constitution of 
society. 
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and material conditions of modern societies (and its discourses on political 
order and civil society) and the critique of ideologically reduced concepts 
of african political orders lead to the same  conclusion—namely that, in a 
very Foucauldian sense, “power dissolves the boundaries between public 
and private, state and society. and makes any notion of a discrete civil 
society, normatively and narrowly conceived, a cheerful illusion” (Coma-
roff/Comaroff 1999: 24). But precisely this ‘cheerful illusion’ has very pow-
erful uses, for perhaps the alleged flaw of the concept, its ambiguity and 
diffusivity, is its major forte.
in the Comaroffs’ quest for creative and meaningful perspectives of the 
concept of civil society, they contend that the concept historically and 
within the social sciences serves as a ‘placeholder’, a ‘transitional term’ 
that is used to create the semblance of order. more to the point, this place-
holder creates the semblance of civic (and conceptual) order (Comaroff/
Comaroff 1999: 33). it is precisely in critical junctures, when social order 
is under stress, or when formerly meaningful social imaginaries become 
fragmented and insignificant, that the concept of civil society gains cur-
rency. a fundamental point they make is that ‘the idea’ “becomes espe-
cially ‘good to think’, and to signify with, at moments when conventional 
connections between the political and the social, state and public, are 
perceived to be unravelling” (Comaroff/Comaroff 1999: 12). as such it can 
be critiqued for its emptiness or propensity to be filled with various ideo-
logical contents—but a far more radical and promising understanding is 
precisely its validation as a placeholder, its capacity to be filled with vari-
ous meanings and imaginations. they argue that
increasing numbers of people presume the possibility of civil society. But 
it is a force less self-generating than is often supposed. and nowhere does 
it define a discrete or wholly autonomous sphere of social action. as we 
said before, its capacity to mobilize and motivate, to open up discourses of 
democracy and moral economy, to hold out the promise of property and 
political engagement lies in its very incoherence, its polysemy, its slippery 
opacity (Comaroff/Comaroff 1999: 24–25).
in this way, ‘civil society’ has all the features of an empty signifier, framing 
significant nodal points and enabling chains of equivalence connecting 
particular discourses on the ‘right’ kind of social order, on common objec-
tives and values, on specific social demands and interests to be articulated 
and to assume representation beyond particular identities. the symbol or 
the idea of civil society provides the space for public, universal represen-
tations, which conceivably can be the terrain for democratic politics and 
articulations. what Comaroff/Comaroff seek to circumscribe theoretically 
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is something they call so beautifully a ‘trope of moral imagining’: civil 
society’s “capacity to open up spaces of democratizing aspiration; [. . .] to 
mandate practical experimentation in the building of new publics, new 
modes of association, new media of expression, new sorts of moral com-
munity, new politics” (Comaroff/Comaroff 1999: 33)44—in other words, 
civil society’s capacity to create emancipatory spaces and processes.45
this rendition of civil society, very different from classically liberal con-
cepts, carves out the similarities and relationship with the discourse of 
corruption as conceptualised in post-marxist terms. the chains of equiva-
lence enabled by the empty signifier ‘civil society’ intersect many nodal 
points enabled by the empty signifier ‘corruption’. precisely their place-
holder function in times of insecurity, of blurred background structur-
ing ideas, of conflicting normative frameworks and social practices, their 
capacity to inspire social imaginaries beyond particularistic interests and 
values lend themselves to linkages. at the same time, the social agents 
and forms of public communication included in this trope shape and cre-
ate these social and moral imaginaries.
4. The State of the Economy
i now turn to the third and last sphere that has crucially produced and 
shaped social imaginaries, namely the economy. expounding the relation-
ship between the state and civil society, giddens ponders on the histori-
cal trajectory of western states and observes: “Civil society is the sector 
within which capital accumulation occurs, fuelled by the mechanisms of 
price, profit and investment in labour and commodity markets” (giddens 
1984: 197). rather starkly, his argument underlines the linkage between 
civil society and the economy—in spite of the capitalist economic sys-
tem’s disconnection from particular morals and ethics, that, seemingly, 
are the hallmark of civil society, and which in turn makes capitalism so 
very powerful.46 however, just as civil society is inherently linked to the 
44 For a further development of such moral imaginations under the condition of global 
capitalism see Comaroff/Comaroff 2000.
45 as laclau himself observes with regard to the question what kind of equivalential 
discourses would enable the emergence of new collective wills: “it is clear that the result-
ing collective will will find its anchoring point on the level of the social imaginary, and the 
core of that social imaginary is what we have called empty signifiers” (laclau 2000b: 210).
46 this is no contradiction to weber’s classic study on the protestant ethics inform-
ing a specific capitalist economy, whose hallmark, as he demonstrates so inspiringly, is 
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emergence of the modern state, as discussed above, the development of a 
market economy is inherently linked to the emergence of a civil society, 
i.e. a class of entrepreneurs and professionals characterized by economic 
autonomy. moreover, the specific economic system produces particular 
systematic linkages and identities: “the (market) economy comes to con-
stitute a sphere, that is, a way people are connected to form an inter-
connecting society, not only objectively but in their self-understanding” 
(taylor 2004: 103). it is the economy in the narrow sense as well as the 
economic sphere in taylor’s sense i shall turn to now in order to explore 
the foundations of such social imaginaries in more detail.
the imaginary of the economy is epistemologically loaded from marx-
ism to neo-liberalism, which are based on powerful if fundamentally 
opposing premises on the nature of the economy, and more specifically 
the relationship between the state, the economy and society. Concepts 
of the economy are central to the discourse of corruption in that they 
articulate specific models of economic exchange and socio-economic 
relations. they are formative on three different levels: firstly, models and 
concepts of the ‘right’ kind of economy inform the background ideals that 
are intimately intertwined with structuring ideas of state and society—
compare, for instance, the conglomerate of atomised homines oeconomici 
that constitutes ‘society’ in neo-liberalism with the radical marxist collec-
tivism and egalitarianism of a society rid of private property. Directly and 
indirectly, such imaginaries are pivotal in determining what is (socially, 
politically or legally) considered right and what is wrong, what legitimate 
and what illegitimate, what is corrupt and not corrupt. Secondly, they are 
formative for shaping and informing power structures and power relations 
within a society. the allocation and distribution of material resources, the 
regulation and organisation of property rights, and not least the modes 
of production and the economic productivity of a society are decisive 
in determining, consolidating and producing particular social positions 
and relations. in this way, they frame struggles over access and allocation 
modes of such resources, and, by inference, social mechanisms of corrup-
tion such as described both in the political and moral economy of corrup-
tion. thirdly, the discursive uses and appropriations of the economy are 
important components of the discourse on corruption, serving to explain 
structural causes and social practices of corruption in the scholarly 
 precisely its unmooring from moral and ethical foundations. For an explicit theorisation 
see influentially polanyi 1957 or Boltanski/Chiaperello 2000. 
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discourse as well as to justify and legitimise anti-corruption intervention 
strategies in the development discourse.
the structural features of the economy in africa are specific: the private 
sector in most african countries has remained weak, in spite of dramatic 
economic regime shifts since independence, and african capital played a 
modest role in the struggle for independence. in the post-independence 
period it even waned in importance, with the public sector taking over vast 
areas of the economic realm, and politics either smothering or appropriat-
ing private economic initiatives.47 partly this is a result of the centralized 
role of the colonial as well as post-independence state in the extraction, 
control and distribution of resources in many african countries discussed 
in the previous chapters. in post-independence african societies, espe-
cially in socialist regimes, this phenomenon lead to what elsenhans (1981) 
and others have termed ‘Staatsklasse’,48 a class of actors who use their 
public office to appropriate resources.49 the pursuit of economically 
unproductive behaviour and the institutional arrangements that sustain 
it, such as for instance personal rule described so intricately by Jackson/
rosberg (1982) or the types of patron-client relationships explored in the 
last chapter, are seen to be key factors in explaining the underdevelop-
ment of african economies.
in a study on statist tanzania in the eighties, Bernstein/Campbell used 
the term ‘bureaucratic bourgeoisie’ to describe the factors leading to such 
behaviour in post-independence africa:
Forms (and uses) of appropriation by the bureaucratic bourgeoisie do not 
represent accumulation in the capitalist sense (extended reproduction of 
capital and the development of productive forces) but predatory exaction of 
a pre-capitalist type (‘predation’) whereby goods and money are centralized 
47 underlining the political implication of the relative weakness of capital, holmquist 
points out that since independence “african capital has not collectively enjoyed a promi-
nent power position whether the regimes were civilian or military” (holmquist 2002: 3). 
For further perspectives on the structural features of african economies see Collier 2006; 
tangri 1999; Chazan 1994; lemarchand 1988 or macgaffey 1987.
48 See elsenhans 1981. 
49 in contemporary economic theory this is captured in the term ‘rent-seeking’, which 
denotes the same (unproductive) behaviour of seeking means to gain additional income, 
albeit unmoored from specific economic regimes. khan has probably developed the rich-
est theory of rent-seeking, which extends to actors in the public as well as the private 
sector. he elaborates the basic characteristics: “Since rents loosely represent incomes that 
are higher than would otherwise be obtained, they create incentives to create and main-
tain these rents. these activities range from bribing or even coercion at one extreme, to 
perfectly legal political activities such as lobbying or advertising at the other extreme. Col-
lectively, these activities are known as rent-seeking activities” (khan 2000: 5).
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in the control of the ruling class and redistributed to establish and expand 
groups of followers (Bernstein/Campbell 1985: 17).
this marxist analysis of the underdeveloped capitalist economy, ringing 
rather outdated in contemporary ears, makes the relationship between 
political and economic order explicit, whereby the relative weakness of 
the economy is strongly interrelated with the relative (and specific) weak-
ness of the state as measured in weberian terms. a fully developed mar-
ket needs—or shapes—a fully developed state.50
moreover, the logic that sustains productive forces is one of profit, not 
of extraction or exchange. in this sense, capitalism is both an economic 
and a political concept, relating intimately to the prevailing political 
order. as nyang’oro observes,
it is necessary to comprehend the sociopolitical constraint on capitalism in 
africa through an analysis of the historical and social factors conditioning 
political adaptation, the logic of personal rule and the consequences of this 
for economic life. in other words, our treatment of africa’s socio-economic 
base [. . .] is a necessary step to understand the state in contemporary africa. 
to put it differently, politicians and bureaucrats in africa are not inherently 
corrupt or ‘tribalist’. their behaviour is a response to a particular kind of 
a socioeconomic system in which they find themselves. that environment 
is not capitalist. we cannot expect a capitalist state to emerge in a soci-
ety whose basic nature of political economy is essentially non-capitalist 
(nyang’oro 1989: 128–129).51
this analysis, written in the historical year of 1989, illuminates the marxist 
explanation for the specific types of economic relationships that prevail 
in africa, economic relationships that have not (according to the develop-
ment discourse: yet) been transformed into capitalist relationships pen-
etrating the whole of society.
two decades later, Chabal puts a different spin on ultimately the 
same conclusion, by emphasising the non-capitalist rationale of produc-
tive forces in contemporary africa and explaining why class analysis is 
deficient:
this is not so much because classes had not consolidated in africa but rather 
that even where they had begun to materialise africans continued to largely 
behave according to ‘traditional’ social, cultural and economic logics that 
50  For classic theories on capitalism (and socialism) see weber 2004 and 1985, polanyi 
1957 and Schumpeter 1993.
51 See nyang’oro 1989. For a further astute analysis of the same period see also Sand-
brook 1985.
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class analysis supposed where being transcended. in this sense, it appeared 
that labouring within a capitalist economy did not produce classes, at least 
not classes that behaved like classes! (Chabal 2009: 78–79).52
in spite of the dramatic Structural adjustment policies of the eighties, the 
radical ideological break after the end of the Cold war, and the spread 
of governance policies of the nineties, evidently fundamental features of 
african state-society relationships have remained unchanged. in a recent 
study on african political orders, hyden also posits that neither the struc-
tural nor social conditions prerequisite for state consolidation (and the 
specifically capitalist market development) are given in africa, by stating: 
“the double pinch that african countries face is that neither the state nor 
market is already fully formed or developed. neither is in a mode of con-
solidation. Both are still undergoing formation” (hyden 2006: 216)—nota 
bene an observation three decades after his seminal study on the economy 
of affection. according to these analyses, what holds true for the state 
and for society in africa also holds true for the market: rather than being 
imbued with a distinct and ultimately dominant structuring rationale, 
the market’s specific, profit-based rationale is merely one amongst many, 
permeated and transformed and appropriated by other social, political, 
cultural and not least economic rationales.
although the non-consolidation of the market and the host of known 
characteristics of african economies—ranging from neo-patrimonial to 
informal to corrupt to criminal—are contingent upon local and national 
socio-political contexts, the international context plays an equally forma-
tive role. First of all, unlike class analysis of earlier decades, a contempo-
rary analysis of economic development within african states cannot be 
separated from their dependency on foreign aid. on the one hand, multi-
lateral and bi-lateral donors are highly influential in making and shaping 
domestic macro-economic and fiscal policies, with far-reaching effects on 
the structure and institutional framework of the economy.53 on the other 
hand, the distortion of domestic political accountability resulting from 
donor intervention leads to economic policies that are characterised by 
52 in his seminal work on markets and states in africa, Bates 1981 makes a similar 
argument, albeit in a more differentiated fashion. he observes that, firstly, the african 
bourgeoisie is quite literally spread thinly, i.e. over vast geographical and demographic 
spaces, hence limiting its transformative powers; secondly, its transformative power is 
further constrained by the prevailing social formations in former colonies, i.e. the social, 
economic, legal and political structures and traditions. 
53 For example, see haggard/kaufmann 1992; van der walle et al. 2003, harrison 2004. 
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the kind of greed and rent-seeking behaviour of african political elites 
that was extensively discussed in the last chapter. moyo, a profiled Zam-
bian economist and vocal critic of foreign aid, does not mince her words 
with regard to its effect: “Foreign aid props up corrupt governments—pro-
viding them with freely usable cash. these corrupt governments interfere 
with the rule of law, the establishment of transparent civil institutions 
and the protection of civil liberties, making both domestic and foreign 
investment in poor countries unattractive” (moyo 2008: 49). in other 
words, although a large proportion of foreign aid is directed at transform-
ing the economy and the institutional framework supporting contractual 
relationships and private sector development, in a perverse (but not ran-
dom) twist the actual effects are precisely the opposite.54
Secondly, the effects of globalization on african economies need to 
be taken into account. globalisation by definition transcends and trans-
forms national economies, and has fundamentally affected the authority 
and types of national economic policies.55 the main effects are twofold. 
on the one hand, the technological advances characterising globalisa-
tion have had a strong accelerating effect on the corrupt siphoning off 
of national funds. as a direct result of the possibilities that globalised 
and nearly untraceable financial transactions in the eighties and nineties 
opened up, grand corruption in african countries and the level of stolen 
assets exploded.56 the stealing and stripping of national assets had, evi-
dently, always been a problem in many post-independence african coun-
tries, but the scale has become unprecedented. the direct economic effect 
is the consolidation of regimes that are based on extraction and predation 
within globalised financial and trade systems, rather than being beholden 
to creating an institutional framework for production and investment.
54 For similar arguments from an economic perspective see notably easterly 2006. 
For one of many critiques see the review on Dead aid in the oxonion under http://www 
.oxonianreview.org/wp/diagnosing-dongo/ (last accessed 25 march 2010). For a discerning 
critique of easterly’s white man’s Burden see amartya Sen’s review “the man without 
a plan”, in: Foreign affairs (march/april 2006), available under http://www.foreignaffairs 
.com/articles/61525/amartya-sen/the-man-without-a-plan (last accessed 25 march 2010).
55 For a seminal contribution to the effects of technological and economic transforma-
tions on political spaces see rosenau 2003. For an interdisciplinary discussion and case-
studies on standard-setting in a globalised world see the contributions in peters/koechlin/
Förster/Zinkernagel Fenner (eds.) 2009. 
56 moody-Stuart 1997, a prominent business-man, was one of the first to outline the 
mechanisms of grand, international corruption and the role of international enterprises. 
For a recent, highly interesting contribution dissecting the mechanisms of corruption and 
asset-stripping by international business in developing countries see Baker 2005.
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on the other hand, many african economies are still characterised by 
high dependency on primary commodities and low diversification, which 
means that global economic interdependencies render them more vul-
nerable than ever to external trends.57 as hyden makes explicit with an 
intentional prod against dependency theory: “in the current global econ-
omy, african governments have little, if any, leverage and their economies 
are very extensively dependent on what happens to more developed and 
powerful economies. if african economies were ever dependent, it is now” 
(hyden 2006: 226). this dependency, however, is not merely a product of 
the global village—it is framed by a host of internal and external factors 
that characterise the specific ‘weakness’ of african economies.
So, looking at the development of the economy since independence, 
african economies—and in particular the private sector—have remained 
relatively insignificant in terms of size, volume, productivity and diversifi-
cation, although the economic and political context has changed dramati-
cally. Subsequently, the conditions for progressive social development 
are still fraught, especially when incorporating broader socio-economic 
indicators such as gDp per capita, poverty rates, literacy or basic health 
indicators. these conditions run counter to the basic socio-economic 
configurations that are specified for prosperous societies in economic 
models and concepts of civil society informing this discourse, i.e. specific 
conditions that are more likely to result in economic innovation, politi-
cal openings and empowered identities. But the kind of socio-economic 
transformation that was the basis of western development, with economic 
productivity and civic engagement generating a virtuous interrelationship 
with state institutions, is all but lacking in african countries. Quite obvi-
ously, african political orders did not emanate from the “end of extra-
economic coercion, resulting in contractual relations between free and 
autonomous citizens that produced civilised [and, i would add: wealthy] 
societies” (mamdani 1996: 14). Citizens in african are, for the most part, 
neither free nor autonomous. in particular, and highly relevantly for 
57 For the latest statistical evidence see the annual data and report published by afri-
can economic outlook (http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/). although economic 
growth in african countries had been on a record high for five consecutive years, in 2009 
it was affected dramatically by the world Financial Crisis. the effects of the international 
economic crisis underlined the structural problems of many african economies, notably 
of the ones with a high reliance on primary exports. and as the policy Brief of the oeCD 
emphasises with regard to economic development in africa: “more needs to be done to 
nurture an environment that is conducive to private-sector development, especially in 
further reducing corruption” (oeCD 2009: 1–2). 
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processes of social transformation, civil society is in actual fact not “the 
sector within which capital accumulation occurs” (giddens 1984: 197). 
accordingly, individuals (e.g. entrepreneurs) and social groups (repre-
senting collective interests) are generally not economically autonomous 
in a way that would enable the political articulation and representation 
of economically (here: capitalist) derived interests and values leading to 
the rule of law and responsive political structures.58 But as my quest is to 
identify the presence of political articulations rather than their absence, 
this statement on the lack of economically and hence also politically 
empowered collective interests in africa will be explored in more detail 
in the next section.
5. Organized Business Interests
in hyden’s rather bland analysis of the state and economy in africa, he 
outlines the classic socio-economic conditions that are necessary for a 
legal-rational political order to emerge:
Foremost among these is the emergence of a corporate class of indepen-
dently wealthy individuals who do not have to rely on public resources to 
become rich. with such a group in power, the state becomes an instrument 
that moulds development in the image of economic reasoning. a calculative 
and instrumentalist approach to policy analysis and policy making emerges 
(hyden 2006: 70).59
this analysis is in direct reference to weber’s theory of capitalist devel-
opment (weber 1985). not surprisingly, the preconditions for prosperous 
social transformation contained in the discourse of corruption echo these 
points: new economic classes that are linked to the emergence of particular 
58 the influence specific (here: religious) value-structures on the historically unlikely 
emergence of ‘the capitalist spirit’ is subject of a long and dense debate, sparked by max 
weber’s seminal study on the spirit of capitalism (weber 2004). For further seminal con-
tributions see hirschmann 1977 or Boltanski/Chiapello 2000.
59 hyden’s analysis mostly reiterates conventional knowledge on african societies, and 
reinforces neo-patrimonial thinking about characteristic political structures and practices: 
“the first is the tendency to rely on informal rather than formal institutions. in societies 
where face-to-face relations and primary forms of reciprocity prevail, there is no need 
for external rules and impersonal authorities to enforce social action. [. . .] the second 
aspect is the tendency of politics to become centrifugal; there is little respect for formal 
rules associated with a higher authority such as the state. the abstract nature of the sys-
tem underlying the ideal of a rational-legal type of bureaucracy is ignored in favor of the 
locale-specific pressures and interest associated with individual communities” (hyden 
2006: 56).
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social groups, which articulate their interests and exert organised pressure 
on the state to protect and respect individual economic, social and politi-
cal rights. to some extent, they cut across the conceptual distinctions 
between civil, political and economic society.60 on centre stage here are 
specific social groups that are economically independent from the state. 
these groups are characterised by several highly significant sociologically 
features. Firstly, their economic autonomy through income generated 
within the private sector, which renders them less vulnerable to pressures 
from the state; but at the same time the pursuit of their economic interests 
makes them important stakeholders in the institutional framework that 
the state creates for the private sector. From the nature of the economic 
regime right down to the spirit and letter of regulatory bodies, price and 
taxation policies or legal provisions, professionals and entrepreneurs have 
a strong interest in influencing the state’s interventions.
Second, bodies representing the collective interests of professionals 
have historically had a seminal role in informing and shaping social values 
underlying merit-and issue-based social order. their economic role goes 
hand in hand with a particular moral matrix, which plays a seminal role in 
defining western economic and political culture. of the classic social sci-
entists, Durkheim (1960) was perhaps the most explicit in theorising the 
role of professional associations. he puts them in context of the unleashing 
of the economic interests in the wake of the increasing division of labour. 
60 on the relationship between political, economic and civil society note Cohen/arato, 
who observe that “the actors of political and economic society are directly involved with 
political control and economic production, which they seek to control and manage. they 
cannot afford to subordinate strategic and instrumental criteria to the patterns of norma-
tive integration and open-ended communication characteristic of civil society. even the 
public sphere of political society rooted in parliaments involves important formal and 
temporal constraints of processes of communication. the political role of civil society in 
turn is not directly related to the control or conquest of power but to the generation of 
influence through the life of democratic association and unconstrained discussion in the 
cultural public sphere. Such a political role is inevitably diffuse and inefficient. thus the 
mediating role of political society between civil society and the state is indispensible but 
so is the rootedness of political society in civil society. in principle, similar considerations 
pertain to the relationship between civil and economic society, even if, historically, under 
capitalism, economic society has been more successfully insulated from the influence of 
civil society than political society has been [. . .]. nevertheless, the legalization of trade 
unions, collective bargaining, codetermination, and so on witness the influence of civil on 
economic society and allow the latter to play a mediating role between civil society and 
the market system” (Cohen/arato 1994: ix–x). interestingly, here the integrative function 
of political and economic society vis-à-vis civil society are underscored; an inversion of the 
integrative function of certain groups of civil society that Durkheim 2002 stresses, which 
will be discussed further down in this section.
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rather than a social order of a utilitarian brand emerging, an order cre-
ated through ‘invisible hands’, Durkheim sees the very same rationale of 
competition leading to disintegration and social pathologies. these risks, 
imminent to the prevailing societal order, can only be overcome by the 
economic actors themselves, who must create the normative standards 
to secure integration. more specifically, he fleshes out the role of profes-
sional associations as one of translating general norms of integration and 
cooperation into a particular professional culture (or ‘professional moral’, 
as Durkheim terms it.) the roles and morals of professionals are hence 
constructed in a reflexive turn, constituting a powerful moral author-
ity that is endowed with the capability of countering the risks of social 
anomies—here in particular socio-economic disintegration and political 
oppression—by defining and nurturing values that in turn foster social 
integration through the realisation of social rights and duties.61
in other words, according to Durkheim professional associations per-
form key integrative functions in modern societies by expressing both 
social solidarity as well as undertaking effective social regulation; tasks 
which the vast bureaucracy of the state on the one hand and the capi-
talist logics of the economy on the other cannot accomplish. Durkheim 
thus singles out the potential of intertwined functional as well as moral 
features of professional associations:
un tout autre groupe peut donc avoir la même action [integrative], pourvu 
qu’il ait la même cohésion. or, en dehors de la société confessionelle, 
 familiale, politique, il en est une autre dont il n’a pas été jusqu’à present 
question: c’est celle que forment, par leur association, tous les travailleurs 
du même ordre, tous les coopérateurs de la même fonction, c’est le groupe 
professionel ou la corporation (Durkheim 1990: 435).62
61 See seminal contributions by Durkheim 1960; 1990). For relevant secondary literature 
see hayward 1990 or Stock 2005.
62 in this sense, emile Durkheim asserts that “the professional group might well satisfy 
all the conditions with laid down. on the one hand, it will not weigh heavily on industry, it 
is sufficiently close to the interests it will have to regulate not to repress them excessively. 
Furthermore, like every group formed of individuals united by ties of interests, ideas and 
feelings, it is capable of being a moral force for its members. if it were made a formal social 
organ, whereas it is as yet only a private society; if some of the rights and duties which 
the State is increasingly incapable of exercising and carrying out were transferred to it; if 
it were put in charge of administering things, industries and arts which the State cannot 
because of its remoteness from material things; if it had the necessary power to resolve 
certain conflicts, to vary the general law of society to suit particular kinds of work, gradu-
ally, through the influence that it will exercise through the rapprochement between the 
work of all, it will acquire the moral authority which will enable it to play the role of brake 
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as Durkheim so presciently observed, professional associations, even in 
today’s era of globalisation, remain bearers and ‘multipliers’ of profes-
sional identities, who are concerned with securing public (also, but not 
only in the sense of ‘official’) recognition, defining norms and standards 
pertaining to their professional identity, and, not least, produce an ethos 
that echoes beyond their own particularistic boundaries.63
thirdly, a point particularly relevant to the development discourse, 
professional associations are perhaps the archetypical representatives of 
the educated middle class,64 heralding a socio-economic and socio-polit-
ical transformation in the sense of a liberal western society.65 in addi-
tion, they are bearers of a particular professional rationality: members of 
professional associations are commonly characterised by their expertise, 
which in turn allows them considerable work autonomy and economic 
security.66 it is no coincidence that Scott’s typology of groups and modes 
of access to the political system lists professional associations as a group 
that has “generally easy access to the political system” (Scott 1969: 329; see 
also table 3 ‘Corruption and political access’ in Chapter 1, above), together 
with other associations and the political elite. as harbingers of structural 
transformation, of specifically modern organisation and representation 
of issue-based interests and values, and not least of valuable professional 
without which economic stability would be impossible” (from “le Socialisme”, quoted in 
hayward 1990: 296–297).
63 For contemporary analyses see Donor/Schneider 2000 or lo 2005.
64 the sociological concept of middle class is as central as it is contested. here, i use 
it in a very broad sense. For a classic sociological analysis of the western middle class see 
sociologist mills 1951; for a more recent contribution see gilbert 1998.
65 taylor intricately links the specifically modern concept of secularity to the emer-
gence of common action purged of transcendental definitions of identity, such as charac-
terise, for instance, traditional laws. he argues convincingly that the “crucial distinction 
underlying this concept of secularity can thus be related to this issue: what constitutes 
the association? or otherwise put, what makes this group of people as they continue over 
time a common agent? where this is something that transcends the realm of those com-
mon actions this agency engages in, the association is nonsecular. where the constituting 
factor is nothing other than such common action [. . .] we have secularity” (taylor 2004: 
96). evidently, professional associations fall squarely and perhaps even idealtypically into 
the secular category. 
66 however, in his critical clarifications to class and class action weber warned 
against the conceptual correlation of a particular class with an association: “eine uni-
verselle erscheinung ist das herauswachsen einer Vergesellschaftung oder selbst eines 
Gemeinschafts-handelns aus der gemeinsamen klassenlage keineswegs. [. . .] Jede klasse 
kann also zwar träger irgendeines, in unzähligen Formen möglichen “klassenhandelns” 
sein, aber sie muss es nicht sein, und jedenfalls führt es zu Schiefheiten, wenn man sie 
mit gemeinschaften begrifflich gleichwertig behandelt” (weber 1985: 532–533, emphases 
in original).
 sketching out an emancipatory discourse 125
expertise, professional associations are key components of discourses 
articulating modes and interventions of social transformation—such as 
the discourse of corruption, which depicts an ‘infernal mechanism’ that 
can only be shattered by institutional reforms supported and initiated, 
inter alia, by puritanical movements, or one could also say: professional 
associations.
6. Professional Associations in Africa
a review on the literature on the role of professional associations with 
regard to democratic development in africa shows that they are indeed 
accorded great significance as agents of social, economic and not least 
political change. gros up sums the argument concisely:
nevertheless, the advent of professional associations as a political force in 
african politics is a potentially significant development; it suggests that afri-
can society may be becoming less divided by ascriptive norms such as gen-
der, age sets, and ethnicity, and more by those of professional and individual 
achievements. the multiplication of cross-cutting civil society institutions 
also may be a reflection of greater specialization and a more differentiated 
division of labor than has hitherto been the case. these were, in part, the 
social transformations that facilitated liberal democracies in the west, and 
there is no reason why they could not play a similar role in late twentieth-
century africa (gros 1998: 11).
as gleaned not least through the discussion of the scholarly discourse of 
corruption, influential authors underscore the potential of professional 
associations to push for issue-and rule-based public policies. this interest 
has been renewed by the effects of the political and economic liberaliza-
tion of the past three decades. “economic and political liberalization since 
the 1980s has created a climate which has been conducive to new delib-
erative mechanisms” as robinson (1998b: 166) expounds. he continues 
to cite examples from nigeria, ghana, kenya and Swaziland, where the 
representation of business interests (more broadly than specific profes-
sional associations) have been institutionalised for the purpose of a policy 
dialogue with the government in various bodies. however, he qualifies 
this phenomenon in view of its limited outreach:
periodic consultation restricted to government officials and a small but 
influential set of organized business interests is a very modest expression 
of enhanced political participation. in many respects this is not surprising 
as the principal objective of business associations is to lobby government 
in the hope of exacting concessions over budgetary commitments, taxation 
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policies, access to credit and foreign exchange, and other issues of concern 
to their members [. . .]. given the limited nature of societal participation in 
policy-making, it is difficult to estimate the developmental significance of 
such initiatives, even though adherents of increased participation claim that 
it will lead to improved policy outcomes (world Bank 1997). the skewed and 
exclusionary nature of policy-making that continues to prevail in much of 
africa gives reason to believe that policy outcomes will reflect the interests 
and concerns of business elites with privileged access to the policy process, 
which was previously identified as a source of blockage to effective reform 
(robinson 1998b: 167).
this critical remark echoes other contributions on professional associ-
ations, which view them as privileged, rent-seeking organisations rather 
than professional, voluntary organisations.67 Specifically, however, rob-
inson is sceptical whether the political spaces created by institutional 
reforms are sufficient to transform the exclusionary and particularistic 
nature of african politics towards a more inclusive nature of policy-
 making. “policy-making remains the preserve of technocratic elites and 
policy dialogue is generally restricted to organized interests with power 
and resources, which provides them with privileged access to those 
responsible for making decisions” (robinson 1998b: 169). this would lead 
to the hypothesis that business interests, if sufficiently well connected 
and resourced, can indeed gain substantive influence over policy making. 
Consequently, associations representing for instance small (and certainly 
informal) enterprises, which arguably constitute the greatest number of 
entrepreneurs in many african economies, and probably also extending to 
less well-connected medium-sized enterprises, are by definition excluded 
or struggling to gain such access to political decision-making arena.
a different aspect is problematised by gros. above all, he places strong 
emphasis on the fact that professional associations “have proven conse-
quential for democratization” (gros 1998: 11), citing individual examples 
of professional associations fighting successfully for greater civic freedoms 
in countries such as Cameroon or kenya. gros’ caveat with regard to the 
transformative capacity of such groups also relates to modes of inclusion 
and exclusion, but with an explicit focus on space, not on expertise or 
resources:
the one weakness with african professional and civic associations is that, 
because they tend to be small in number, urban based and interest spe-
cific, their efficacy tends to be spatially and politically limited. [. . .] unless 
67 For a discussion see Donor/Schneider 2000 or goldsmith 2002.
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 urban-based professional groups link up with their rural counterparts, 
democratization in africa could remain an urban elite affair, utterly uncon-
nected to the lives of the vast majority of africans (gros 1998: 11).68
in other words, gros identifies the lack of critical mass and capacity to 
penetrate society threatening the impact of professional associations in 
africa, rather than a dominant political economy of rent-seeking.
the concerns voiced by robinson (1998b) as well as gros (1998) are 
shored up by some of the few existing empirical case-studies on the role of 
professional associations. For instance, Brautigam and her fellow authors 
(Brautigam et al. 2002) find that so-called growth-coalitions, i.e. fruitful 
collaborations and synergies between state and business interests (which 
include professional associations) are a function of the nature of the state 
in question, rather than the nature of the organised interests in question. 
their research indicates that in the three case-studies of african societies, 
all of which underwent democratisation processes, the state’s leadership, 
ideas and capacity are the most significant factors shaping patterns and 
processes of inclusion and cooperation. however, although their case-
studies are very illuminating, their focus on business interests, rather 
than on the more specific professional organisations, is too broad to gain 
concrete further insights beyond an affirmation of the importance of the 
specific configuration of the state.
taking a completely different perspective, namely from within the 
associations, moore/hamalai find that professional associations show 
markedly different behavioural patterns than conventionally ascribed to 
them. rather than fostering professionalism and political participation, 
“they often act more in the interests of their own staff than in those of 
members. the potential for ‘unproductive’ rivalry and conflict between 
competing associations is high. the more effective associations are those 
not financially dependent primarily on membership fees” (moore/hamalai 
1993: 1895).69 Just judging from these few insights on an empirical level, 
68 an interesting link could be made here to hyden’s old analysis of the peasant econ-
omy and the state in africa, who observes that the state, exerting no control over the 
productive relations in society, is completely disjointed from society: “[a]ppropriation by 
those in control of the state are made in the form of taxation and as such they are simple 
deductions from an already produced stock of values. these are tributary rather than pro-
ductive relations and they do imply a much more limited degree of social control. in this 
respect, african countries are societies without a state. the latter sits suspended in ‘mid-
air’ over society and is not an integral mechanism of the day-to-day productive activities 
of society” (hyden 1983: 7). 
69 For further studies see moore/hamalai 1993, lucas 1997, or taylor 2007.
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statements regarding the moral authority and or even the functional effec-
tiveness of professional associations in fostering democratic, inclusive and 
productive societies are on shaky ground. there seems to be a real risk 
that the specifically democratic articulations of professional associations 
cancel each other out through competition between particular claims. or 
they peter out for lack of financial and economic resources which would 
enable more powerful linkages across society. in other words, the claims 
and interests of professional articulations may not be equipped with suf-
ficient material and symbolic resources to overcome other, more estab-
lished meanings and practices. hence, it is empirically open whether the 
democratic claims and demands of professional associations actually have 
democratising effects. Suffice to note at this point that without further 
empirical evidence the jury remains out with regard to concrete effects 
on democratic politics by professional associations.
7. The Politics of Corruption
in this chapter, i have sought to bring together different facets relevant to 
a political theory of corruption. whereas the developmental and the aca-
demic discourses of corruption are primarily concerned with articulating 
the deficiency and the dysfunction of african societies and designing and 
implementing appropriate remedies, a political approach to corruption 
understands corruption as an empty signifier, a medium for the hegemonic 
representations of particular identities, interests and values. Corruption, 
theorised in this way, is inscribed with an essentially democratic moment: 
a communicative conveyor belt that enables the articulation and connec-
tion of particular values, needs and demands to other particular values, 
needs and demands. the hegemonic discourse thus becomes “a surface of 
inscription of a plurality of demands beyond their particularities” (laclau 
2000c: 210). this universalising potential of empty signifiers allows par-
ticular discourses to be ‘fixed’ in meaning whilst at the same time evoking 
a reference to a common universality. precisely this linking up of chains 
of equivalence is the condition for the creation of public communication 
and the manifestation of particular struggles, a fundamentally political 
operation which structures social relations. as Dyrberg exclaims: “the 
idea is to grasp the political as a practical dimension in the ordering of 
the co-existence of contexts, and that this ordering of differences is an act 
of creation” (Dyrberg 2004: 242). So hegemonies, such as the discourses on 
corruption, actually create the very terrain of the political (laclau 2000a: 
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44), and politics are the structuring of these relations.70 the contextual 
and at the same time context-transcending articulations that corruption 
as an empty signifier allows is hence a necessary, if by no means sufficient 
condition for democratic politics.
this is precisely where the notion of civil society comes into play, 
which has, classically, been pivotal in denoting ‘civic’ public spheres and 
modes of communication, where shared democratic values and norms 
are deliberated. the reinterpretation of civil society as a canvas for social 
imaginaries illuminates its position in the chain of equivalence in which 
corruption acts as an empty signifier. importantly, civil society is endowed 
with the potential to be the terrain in which social actors produce and 
shape social imaginaries, articulate specific political demands and engage 
in negotiations, deliberations, conflicts and struggles. in other words, by 
making hegemonic articulations of corruption by specific social actors a 
potential vehicle of emancipation, this political theorisation of corruption 
has transcended the reduction of corruption to a symptom of institutional 
dysfunction or functional disorder. again, the potentially creative, plural-
istic moment of hegemonic representations is underscored.
But although this approach has opened up the theoretical means to 
conceptualise corruption in a potentially emancipatory way, the social 
actors that articulate their interests by seeking to fill corruption with par-
ticular meanings and demands still remain rather abstract. a recourse 
to the development and scholarly discourse on corruption also fails, as 
significant insights are either absent or refer to a diffuse macro-level. a 
key objective of this exploration, however, is to understand the micro-
processes of such hegemonic articulations, for which concrete groups and 
actors need to be identified. this line of thought brings us to the economy, 
more precisely: to the relationship between social change, civil society and 
the economy. to explore loci and actors of social change of a democratic 
nature, the terrain of civil society needs to be filled with specific economic 
features. this is important for both conceptual and practical reasons. the 
economy is both a symbol as well as a field of economic, political and 
social differentials. economic relations and related imaginaries of the 
‘right’ society are formative for social actors that historically have been 
pivotal to shaping social values, rationalities and practices that underpin 
70 See also laclau 2000a, b, and c. For an elaborate discussion of the relationship 
between the political and politics in laclau’s and mouffe’s discourse analysis see Dyrberg 
2004.
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not just democratic but also productive societies. on the other hand, the 
discussion on structural features of the african economy concluded that 
african economies—and societies—are characterised by a significant 
lack: a lack of capitalist relations that have managed to transform and 
penetrate both state and society to the extent of western societies.71 this 
ties in with much of the scholarly discourse on corruption, which identi-
fies the lack of (the historically intermeshed) legal-bureaucratic rationale 
as one key feature of african societies and political orders, leading to 
varying degrees of hybrid, oscillating or fused rationalities and exchange 
mechanisms of a negative connotation (‘poor’, ‘corrupt’, ‘criminal’, ‘neo-
patrimonial’, ‘unstable’, etc.).
the explorations of this chapter do not stop short at this insight. 
although i recognise the structural features of african societies identified 
at a macro-level, my hypothesis remains that micro-processes of social 
and political change are underexplored and under-conceptualised; hence 
the recourse to key theoretical insights of post-marxist political theory. 
Doggedly, the search for social actors with emancipatory potential is con-
tinued by zooming in on classic agents of social change. these actors need 
to meet both social as well as economic requirements endowing them 
with the capability of raising their voice—in post-marxist terms: of articu-
lating particular representations with both hegemonising as well as eman-
cipatory potential. professional associations fully meet this requirement: 
firstly, they have historically embodied important moral as well as regu-
latory functions; secondly, their members arguably occupy a privileged 
position in the social field, certainly in terms of material and symbolic 
capital, and on this basis act both as indicator as well as actors of socio-
economic transformation; and thirdly, significant for our purposes, ‘cor-
ruption’ and all that it stands for is conceivably a highly politicised topic 
that lends itself to be filled with their own, particular interests.
this takes us to the second part of the book, in which an empirical 
inquiry into professional associations in tanzania will be undertaken. the 
working hypothesis is that in spite of the structural configurations of afri-
can societies and the limited number and outreach of professional asso-
ciations, they are endowed with the wherewithal to engage in the public 
sphere. more to the point, their own professional interests and values lend 
71 of course, this also ties in with polanyi’s seminal insight that capitalism is in fact a 
historical anomaly, especially the degree to which economic relations are disembedded 
from social relations (polanyi 1957).
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themselves to be linked up with key statements of the development dis-
course, especially with regard to institutional quality and the creation and 
legal protection of economic spaces. in this context, ‘corruption’ seems an 
ideal signifier in their struggles to be recognised and heard, providing as 
it does powerful nodal points with domestic political discourses as well 
as international development discourses relating to a ‘universal’, encom-
passing order.
these issues will be fleshed out empirically in the second part of this 
study. however, what needs to be stressed here is that the choice of actors 
is deliberately conservative: professional associations are actors that do 
not herald new morals or radical social imaginaries. what makes them 
attractive for our analytic purposes is that they are actors precisely in the 
mould of the development and scholarly discourse(s) of corruption. this 
renders the premises of the discourse of corruption legible to the politi-
cal theory of corruption developed here. the question is whether, on an 
empirical micro-level, under the specific power relations analysed in afri-
can societies these struggles do indeed lead to public articulations shap-
ing more inclusive, contingent and better (in a technical and functional 
sense) rules and institutions than are currently found in most african 
states. indeed, the question is whether and how it enables democratic 
politics in the context of african societies.
Interlude: A topogrAphy of CorruptIon In tAnzAnIA
Despite the three common enemies of Tanzania’s development namely igno-
rance diseases and poverty [sic], corruption has emerged the fourth. Suggest 
the root causes of corruption and the ways to stop this social problem in not 
less than 250 words.1
Tanzanians have got so used to corruption that many have accepted it as part 
of the social scene in the country. What has changed since 2007 is that for the 
first time corruption has been brought out into the open. It has become not 
only a subject of political gossip but part of the official discourse. Corruption 
has shifted from being something people take for granted to being the subject 
of a scandal.2
Against the backdrop of the development discourse on corruption and 
governance, the first part of this study (Chapter 1 and 2) outlined two 
further discourses on corruption. the academic discourse, in conjunc-
tion with the development discourse on corruption, are discourses which 
have successfully hegemonised the meaning of corruption. they have 
constructed generally acknowledged ways of understanding, seeing, and 
practicing development and political order in African states around the 
term. the discourse on emancipatory politics sketched out in the previous 
chapter is more disparate, less coherent. It links an analytical strategy,3 
i.e. post-Marxist political theory, to a discussion of historically and con-
ceptually formative social spheres, agents and practices of emancipation. 
In fact, it redefines the concept of discourse, by removing the inherent 
suspicion of repression, and theorising it as a key mechanism of (a priori 
open) social and political operations. the analytical strategy developed in 
the last chapter is tapered in specific reference to African political orders. 
In this way, the first part of this book lays the groundwork for an empiri-
cal investigation into the ways in which corruption is constructed, more 
precisely: the ways in which specific constructions of corruption frame, 
shape, open or close spaces of localised social agency, here understood in 
an emancipatory sense.
1  exam question of the Certificate of Secondary education examination (o-levels) at 
Kisimiri School, october 2008 (courtesy of Sibylle ganz-Koechlin). 
2 See hyden/Mmuya 2008: 104.
3 Akerstrom Anderson defines an analytical strategy as “a way to stress the deliberate 
choice and its implications, and to highlight that this choice could be made differently 
with different implications in respect of the emerging object” (Akerstrom Anderson 2003: 
XIII; emphasis in original). 
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the second part of this book, for which the groundwork is being laid in 
this interlude, is dedicated to this empirical exploration, which I approach 
in three narrative steps. In this interlude I will provide an outline of the 
discursive body that development, governance and corruption indicators 
construct on an aggregate level. What I seek to do here is to sketch out 
a topography, which will form part of the landscape in which the case-
studies on corruption, social agents and the construction industry of the 
following two chapters are situated. In particular, the main statements 
made in quantitative and qualitative surveys on governance and corrup-
tion in tanzania over the past two decades are summed up. the purpose 
of this interlude is twofold: firstly, to provide a glimpse into the ways that 
development, governance and corruption are constructed and linked in 
‘scientifically’, i.e. statistically validated ways, producing rankings between 
countries regionally and world-wide, and thus emphasising numerical 
correlations between different features dimensions deemed important to 
define development (currently: governance and corruption). the second, 
and for my purposes more important intention is to describe the ways 
in which corruption is perceived and represented in tanzania itself, and 
thus to set the stage for the case studies. In the past decade, the increasing 
number of publically available reports and citizens’ surveys on corruption 
have served to profile a ‘corruption landscape’ of its own, by employing 
conventionally acknowledged methods of measuring reality and thus cre-
ating a means of articulating corruption in the public sphere. how power-
ful these articulations are in terms of inscribing processes of social change 
is another matter, and one which I shall attempt to explore from a com-
pletely different perspective, namely that of professional associations in 
the construction industry of dar es Salaam (Chapters 3 and 4).
1. Why a Topography?
As was discussed in the Introduction, ‘mapping’ corruption is a highly 
popular technique of the ‘Anti-Corruption Machine’ of foreign aid to ren-
der the scale and the type of corruption in countries or sectors visible, 
and on the basis of this knowledge to design appropriate interventions.4 
Certainly with regard to the first objective, the ‘rendering visible’, such 
a profiling is also the intention of this chapter, namely to provide some 
 
4 for an example and overview see the study undertaken transparency International 
2007 on behalf of the undp’s democratic governance group. 
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bearing points in discussing corruption in tanzania. I have chosen the 
term ‘topography’ rather than mapping; not only to distinguish it from 
the intervention-geared term of ‘mapping’, but also because the term 
‘topography’ provides perhaps a more appropriate description of the steps 
undertaken here, which is to situate the case-studies of social agents and 
corruption in tanzania. for this purpose, tracing corruption through the 
lens of indices and reports provides a (not the only, but an important) 
frame of reference of quantitative as well as qualitative statements made 
on corruption in tanzania, of the relations amongst components of cor-
ruption in tanzania, and of some of the representations of corruption by 
specific actors inside tanzania. In this way, I seek to describe the ‘surface’ 
of corruption in tanzania as captured, analysed and quantified in a variety 
of reports and indices. I hope to provide a situation (in the sense of situat-
ing) of corruption in tanzania, informed by different types of knowledge 
and statements (i.e. quantitative, qualitative, comparative, sectoral, etc.). 
this topography can be analysed with regard to the inferences to ‘develop-
ment’ or to ‘governance’ in tanzania. But for my purposes far more impor-
tant is quite literally to sketch out the landscape in which social actors 
operate in, to describe the most prominent surveys and reports that are 
in the public domain, which are available to and inscribed in discourses 
on corruption. this is a necessary operation before zooming in on to the 
case-studies that will be explored in the following chapters, not least to 
render them legible with regard to other discourses of corruption.
In the following sections of this interlude, I shall therefore undertake two 
steps. firstly, I will seek to sketch out a broad landscape, demarcating signif-
icant bearing points on development and governance in tanzania. Against 
the broader background of some developmental indicators and assessments, 
more recent ways of thinking about development in form of governance 
and corruption indices are included. these indices mostly have a global or 
at least regional scope, and thus allow a bird’s eye view of this landscape in 
tanzania. their power lies in aggregation, etching few but condensed and 
memorable statements into the discursive surface of ‘corruption’.
the second step seeks to compile perspectives that magnify more loca-
lised perspectives of corruption in tanzania, grappling with the rather 
‘messier’ landscape of such qualitative documents. In this section, I will 
proceed chronologically rather than substantively, for two reasons. firstly, 
methodological representations of corruption in tanzania are relatively 
recent, and a chronological account captures the speed and the new types 
of articulations more clearly. Secondly, a chronological account allows for 
the two case-studies that will be outlined in Chapters 3 and 4 to be situ-
ated accordingly within a temporalised landscape.
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the various facets on corruption in tanzania highlighted through these 
various perspectives by no means outline a comprehensive or even pre-
cise survey of ‘corruption’ in tanzania. But as should be clear by now, this 
is not the intention. the intention is to describe the surface of corruption, 
indicating some relevant features, positions and elevations that provide 
bearing points for other articulations of corruption by social actors in 
tanzania.
2. A Bird’s Eye View: Development, Governance and  
Corruption in Tanzania
Since independence in 1962, tanzania has managed to remain one of the 
most peaceful states of the region; unlike other states, it has survived the 
varying levels and forms of economic hardship and far-reaching structural 
reforms without severe political challenges.5 In fact, in the nineties tan-
zania was considered to be one of Africa’s so-called governance states6 by 
major development agencies, endowed with great potential to develop its 
political and macroeconomic framework.7 this is one reason why tanzania 
has been a major beneficiary of foreign aid in the past two decades. Still, the 
developmental indices in tanzania depict a consistently low social, politi-
cal and economic performance.8 Stand-alone as well as aggregate indicators 
measuring one or several dimensions of national development show that 
there is some, but slow and incremental progress.9 By the early nineties, 
tanzania was one of the leading countries in consistency and spread of lib-
eralisation policies (World Bank 1994)—all the more remarkable given the 
socialist background of the country. however, the growth rates remained 
relatively modest and lower than the population growth, at about 3% yearly 
5 unlike many other African countries, such as for instance zambia, which experienced 
serious social unrest and upheaval in protest to the Structural Adjustment programmes 
(see rakner 2003).
6 for a critical discussion of the construction of Africa’s ‘governance’ states see har-
rison 2004.
7 See in particular Adam et al. (1994) or World Bank (2000) for detailed reports and 
analyses on the levels, composition and impact of foreign aid to tanzania, which were 
affected by disillusionment (especially on behalf of bi-lateral donors) and sanctions (on 
behalf of multi-lateral donors) in the early eighties, but regained a high status amongst all 
donors in the nineties.
8 As an indication, the human development Index 2002 ranks tanzania in the category 
‘low human development’ on rank 162 (out of 177). the growth rate of tanzania between 
1975–2002 averaged 0.6%, and 0.7% between 1990–2002, with a gdp per capita of 580 ppp 
uSd in the year 2002 (which is also the year of highest value between 1975–2002).
9 these and further inferences can be drawn from table 2 ‘development and gover-
nance Indices’ of tanzania (see below).
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(World Bank 2004), with serious technological and resource gaps remain-
ing (unCtAd 2003: 67–88). In the period between 2000 and 2006, the gdp 
grew on average around 6%, which is a respectable growth rate (World 
Bank 2007; the united republic of tanzania 2008: 10).
A defining aspect of tanzania’s national economy is the proportion 
of foreign aid as part of the national budget. As table 2, below, shows, 
tanzania is a highly aid-dependent country,10 with aid levels oscillating 
around 20% of gdp in the late eighties, and since gradually dipping down 
to around 10%, with foreign aid still constituting nearly half of the govern-
ment budget.11 In spite of favourable political conditions, foreign assis-
tance and the structural reforms aimed at increasing the capacity of the 
public sector and the economy, various measures of governance indicate 
that tanzania still ranks not only amongst the poorest (certainly at the 
time of the case-study of 2003), but also amongst the most corrupt coun-
tries in the world.12 the governance challenges in terms of socio- economic 
outlook are summed up in the 2000–2008 Mid-term Millennium develop-
ment goal report on tanzania:
Although for 2007/08 many indicators are less gloomy compared to (say) the 
early to mid-1990s, the country seems unlikely to meet many of the targets 
10 tanzania clearly conforms with Brautigam’s succinct definition of aid dependency, 
namely “a situation in which a country cannot perform many of the core functions of 
government, such as operations and maintenance, or the delivery of basic public services, 
with foreign aid funding and expertise” (Brautigam 2000: 9). for concepts and analyses of 
aid dependency, see Brautigam 2000: 9–15 or Brautigam/Knack 2004. 
11  In 2006, the official development Assistance to tanzania amounted to uSd 46 per 
capita, which is just under the Sub-sahara African average of uSd 52 of the same year 
(World development report 2009: 359, table 4 ‘trade, Aid and finance’). the average 
gnI per capita of tanzania in the same year was uSd 400 (World development report 
2009: 353, table 1 ‘Key development Indicators’). even within international organisations, 
this is not seen to be a positive feature. note, for instance, an official unCtAd of 2003 
document that argues that “[a]id dependency coupled with lack of domestic capabilities 
makes development difficult to sustain. perhaps the least desirable outcome is to channel 
foreign support in an erratic and unpredictable manner through institutions that lack the 
capabilities, incentives, and structures to be effective. that seems to have been the case 
in tanzania” (unCtAd 2003: 78). Albeit less polemically than for instance Moyo (2008) 
or easterly (2006), a growing body of literature elaborates perverse and systemic effects of 
aid dependency over time, namely that “large amounts of aid may reduce local ownership, 
accountability and democratic decision-making, while fragmenting budgets and lowering 
tax effort” (Brautigam 2000: 1; see also Brautigam/Knack 2004).
12 According to transparency International’s Corruption perceptions Index, tanzania was 
on rank 73 out of 85 in 2002, and on rank 92 out of 133 in 2003. the changes in ranking indicate 
the relative position and methodological adjustments. hence, the absolute rank is less reveal-
ing than the rather intuitive confirmation of widespread corruption in tanzania (see also 
table 2 ‘development and governance Indicators for tanzania’, below). for more information 
see the Corruption perceptions Index under ‘Surveys’ at www.transparency.org.
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by 2015 if the country does not scale up human and financial resources 
input, with keen attention to effective use of resources, including foreign 
aid as well as raising domestic resource mobilization effort (the united 
republic of tanzania 2008: 10).
frequent and indeed routine statements negatively correlating poverty 
reduction and national development with corruption can be found in 
some of the most central policy document on tanzania, as will be shown 
further down. As can be drawn from the statistics of the dAC/oeCd 
(2010), the allocation of foreign aid earmarked specifically for governance 
reforms in tanzania oscillates around 4% (in 2007) of total foreign aid 
by dAC countries and multi-national organisations. not a stupendous 
amount, but substantial when one takes, firstly, the growing trend in aid 
modalities towards budget support in to account, with sectoral or pro-
grammatic allocation waning in importance; and secondly, when putting 
the absolute figures in relation with the budget of tanzania.
In this context, aid allocations tied to the measurement of institutional 
quality, i.e. governance and anti-corruption, play an important role. In the 
wake of the increasingly frequent and aid-allocation-defining quantitative 
definitions of corruption and governance, the past decade has also seen 
their numerical mapping. In table 2, below, key indicators are compiled 
to provide an insight into the most important trends with regard devel-
opment, governance and corruption in tanzania, as produced by such 
aggregate measures. Where the data was available, table 2 is split into 
the two years in which the case-studies were undertaken to allow for a 
very rough comparison between 2003 and 2009/10. the years have been 
chosen to facilitate a comparison between the two sets of research find-
ings. however, as the available data does not always correspond to the 
years in question, figures from 2005 have also been included, as they a) 
usually draw on statistics of the year 2003 (this is also a statement on 
the time-lag and relative content of such indices and statistics), and b) to 
facilitate the use of the table as an illustration of trends rather than a set 
framework. notable is perhaps also the fact that although I endeavoured 
to use the same sources for each figure for more transparent comparison, 
it proved surprisingly difficult to find the same information in reports of 
different years. the ‘messiness’ of table 2 hence also allows some infer-
ence with regard to the representation of a clear, unambiguous representa-
tion through such neat indices and figures—a neatness that immediately 
crumbles when seeking to compare even same data over time with some 
level of precision.
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13  World development report 2003 (World Bank 2003: 235), giving the figures for 2001.
14  World development report 2005 (World Bank 2005: 257), giving the figures for 2003.
15  World development report 2010 (World Bank 2010: 379), giving the figures for 2008.
16  World development report 2003 (World Bank 2003: 235), giving the figures for 2001 
(data refer to mainland tanzania only).
17  World development report 2005 (World Bank 2005: 257), giving the figures for 2003 
(data refers to mainland tanzania only).
18  World development report 2010 (World Bank 2010: 379), giving the figures for 2008 
(data refers to mainland tanzania only).
19  World development report 2003 (World Bank 2003: 235), giving the figures for 
2000–2001.
20 African economic outlook 2002/2003: 379 (“Statistical Annex”), giving the average 
over 1995–2001.
21  World development report 2005 (World Bank 2005: 257), giving the figures for 
2002–2003.
22 African economic outlook 2004/2005: 499 (“Statistical Annex”), giving the average 
over 1996–2003.
23 World development report 2010 (World Bank 2010: 379), giving the figures for 
2007–2008.
24 African economic outlook 2009: 151 (“Statistical Annex”). Available under: http://
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/1/42724007.pdf (last accessed 21 April 2010), giving the average 
over 2002–2008.
25 World development report 2003 (World Bank 2003: 241), giving the figures for 2000.
26 World development Indicators 2009: 378, figures for 2000.
27 World development report 2004 (World Bank 2004: 261), giving the figures for 2001.
28 World development report 2005 (World Bank 2005: 262), giving the figures for 2002.
29 World development report 2010 (World Bank 2010: 387), giving the figures for 2007.
30 World development Indicators 2009 (World Bank 2009: 378), giving the figures for 2007.
31  In 2007/08 approx. 44% of realised expenditure was odA (see African economic 
outlook (Aeo 2009—tanzania, section ‘fiscal policy’). this figure includes loans, grants 
and proceeds from debt relief. According to the Aeo, the government of tanzania has 
targeted a reduction of donor dependence to 34% in its 2008/09. for the country statistics 
see Aeo under “country statistics”.
table 2: development and governance Indicators for tanzania
deVelopMent IndICAtorS
Index/year Sources from Sources from latest Sources
2003 2005 2009     2010
population Approx. 34.5 million13 Approx. 35.9 
million14
— Approx. 42 
million15
gnI p/c (uSd) 27016 29017 — 44018
gdp p/c % growth













2000: 11.6% of gnI26
2001: 13,3% of gnI27
3528 6829
2007: 17.4% of 
gnI30
10.2% of gdp31 
n/a
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32 http://hdrstats.undp.org/2008/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_tzA.html (last 
accessed 21 April 2010).
33 human development report 2003 (undp 2003: 240), giving the figures for 2001.
34 human development report 2005 (undp 2005: 222), giving the figures for 2003.
35 human development report 2009 (undp 2009: 173), giving the figures for 2007.
36 See further down in this section for an elaboration on the Mo Ibrahim Index of Afri-
can governance.
37 2009 Ibrahim Index of African governance, year 2003. full dataset including figures 
from 2000 to 2007 available under http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/en/section/ 
the-ibrahim-index/scores-and-ranking (last accessed 21 April 2010).
38 2009 Ibrahim Index of African governance for tanzania, giving the figures for 2007 
(see http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/en/media/get/20091004_tanzania.pdf, last 
accessed 21 April 2010). full dataset including figures from 2000 to 2007 available under 
http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/en/section/the-ibrahim-index/scores-and-ranking 
(last accessed 21 April 2010.
39 for full rankings see “freedom in the World historical rankings” under http://www 
.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=5 (last accessed 21 April 2010).
40 tanzania Integrity Scorecard for 2006 available under http://www.globalintegrity 
.org/reports/2006/tanzania/scorecard.cfm (last accessed 21 April 2010).
41  tanzania Integrity Scorecard for 2007 available under http://report.globalintegrity 
.org/tanzania/2007/scorecard (last accessed 21 April 2010).
42 the CpI is measured on a scale of 0–10, with 10 = not corrupt, 0 = highly corrupt.
43 Corruption perception Index 2003, giving the figures for 2003.
44 Corruption perception Index 2009, giving the figures for 2009.
deVelopMent IndICAtorS
Index/year Sources from Sources from latest Sources
2003 2005 2009     2010
hdI32 low human  
development (rank  




(rank 164 out 













2003: rank 20 out of 53  
(Score: 52.42)37
rank 12 out of 53 
(Score: 59.24)38




2006: overall Score 59 (“Very Weak”)40
n/a 
2007: overall Score 60 (“Weak”)41
Corruption percep-
tions Index (CpI)42
2003: rank 92 out of 133 
(Score: 2.5)43
2009: 126 out of 
180 (Score: 2.6)44
n/a
(Source: Compiled by the author)
table 2 (cont.)
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the ratings, numbers and indices listed in table 2 not only situate develop-
ment, governance and corruption in tanzania, they are of key importance 
for defining the image of tanzania in developmental terms. for all their 
strengths and weaknesses,45 the rankings state the slow but steady prog-
ress of tanzania’s developmental and governance performance in the past 
decade. this is particularly apparent in the annual real growth rates and 
in the leap from the hdI category ‘low human development’ to ‘Medium 
human development’, representing improvements in the measured social 
and economic dimensions. But in spite of observable improvements, the 
indicators outline a profile of low social and economic development, 
weak public institutions, with concomitant weak accountability institu-
tions and high levels of corruption. drawing from these rankings, tan-
zania can be described as a ‘typical’ but hopeful African country, which, 
yes, is characterised by underdevelopment and corruption, but gradually 
making its way up the rankings.
however, one critique of such indices is that they are all on a highly 
aggregate level, severely curtailing their significance with regard to national 
and local contexts. In other words, the overall rankings of the aggregate 
and composite indicators have little explanatory power with regard to the 
quality and changes in specific sectors of a nation.46 this becomes par-
ticularly apparent when one takes the effort to break the scorings down, 
that make more differentiated statements on key governance dimensions. 
the following chart of the World governance Index (figure 4, below) dis-
aggregates the score according to year and dimension. the chart shows 
quite clearly the improvement as well as the uneven dynamics of tanza-
nia’s ‘performance’ (in the survey’s terminology) over the past decade; i.e. 
the dynamics of social and political change over time.
45 Apart from the inherent methodological problems of aggregate indices, see heller 
(2009) for an overview and critical assessment of corruption indices, see undp (2008) for 
an overview over governance indices, see Arndt/oman (2006) for a critical assessment of 
governance indices. 
46 A more nuanced approach to quantitative analysis of corruption has been pioneered 
by no-one less than daniel Kaufmann, the pioneering former head of the World Bank Insti-
tute and leading governance analyst. he was formative in establishing the recently devel-
oped Actionable governance Indicators portal, which “has been developed in response to 
the increasing demand for governance indicators that could help design specific reforms 
and monitor their impacts. the portal consolidates information on actionable governance 
indicators, provides a one-stop-shop platform to navigate these indicators and their docu-
ments and offers customized tools for data management, analysis and display” (see https://
www.agidata.org/main/AboutAgI.ashx; last accessed 27 october 2009). 
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figure 4: World governance Index (tanzania) 1998–2008
the World governance Indicator quite explicitly seeks to articulate dif-
ferences over time within countries, not merely between countries, in an 
effort to provide a more nuanced representation of governance. Accord-
ing to this representation, the quality of governance, as measured in the 
six dimensions, has all in all improved over the past seven years. notably, 
the dimension with the greatest improvement is control of corruption—a 
dimension that the case-studies in the following chapters will be dwelling 
on in a more emic approach. this also fits in with the increased attention 
that donors have been paying to the control of corruption, funding and 
implementing sweeping institutional, legal and regulatory reforms.
there is a general trend observable of global indices to incline towards 
greater disaggregation and supplementary qualitative framing. one 
important source of governance assessments is the detailed information 
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contained in the Integrity Indicators Scorecard of the global Integrity 
Index (2008). the global Integrity Index measures and ranks countries 
worldwide in a neat digit.47 however, it is flanked by the reporters’ note-
book (see further down), which provides an in-depth commentary on 
relevant political, economic and social processes, and by the Integrity 
Indicators Scorecard, which allow assessments of individual categories 
and sub-categories of the global Integrity Index.48 table 3, below, shows 
the latest scores and rankings of the Scorecard on tanzania.
As table 3 indicates, in the ranking of the global Integrity Scorecard 
the anti-corruption efforts of tanzania actually fare very badly, contrary 
to the relative progress highlighted in the World governance Indica-
tors. In this sense, the statements on governance and corruption by such 
global indices do now provide a far more diverse map of corruption and 
table 3: tanzania Integrity Index Scorecard 200749
dIMenSIon SCore rAnKIng
oversight and regulation (Cat. V) 
national ombudsman 71 Moderate
Supreme Audit Institution 68 Weak
taxes and Customs 86 Strong
State-owned enterprises 67 Weak
Anti-corruption and rule of law (Cat. VI)
Anti-Corruption law 100 Very strong
Anti-Corruption Agency 59 Very weak
rule of law 59 Very weak
law enforcement 46 Very weak
Score Anti-Corruption and rule of law 66 Weak
(Source: global Integrity)50
47 See table 2 ‘development and governance Indicators in tanzania’, above.
48 there are six categories of Integrity Indicators in all, namely (i) Civil Society, public 
Information and Media, (ii) elections, (iii) government Accountability, (iv) Administra-
tion and public Service, (v) oversight and regulation, and (vi) Anti-corruption and rule 
of law.
49 At the time of writing (March 2010) there were no more recent scorecards of tanza-
nia available. for the Scorecard and further information see http://report.globalintegrity.
org/tanzania/2007/scorecard (last accessed 25 March 2010). 
50 See under http://report.globalintegrity.org/tanzania/2007/scorecard (last accessed 
25 March 2010).
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governance-dimensions, which also allow for statements over time. Artic-
ulated in brute numbers, the ranking of countries is seemingly unambigu-
ous. dipping under the surface, it is possible to draw a multifaceted range 
of articulations and statements from these rankings, with which new dis-
courses are shored up and established ones legitimised.
the same pattern is recognisable on a regional level, embodied by the 
much-noted introduction of the Mo Ibrahim African governance Index, 
a new governance index, funded by an African entrepreneur (and, in 
addition, is coupled to a ‘leadership prize’), and designed with all the 
authority of the harvard Kennedy School of government. notable is here 
not only the African origins (which in addition); notable is the omission 
of anti-corruption as a proxy for the quality and the outcome of gover-
nance processes. the Ibrahim Index assesses governance as captured in 
the dimensions Safety and Rule of Law; Participation and Human Rights; 
Sustainable Economic Opportunity; and Human Development.51 Again, this 
index is characterised by sophisticated data and graphical breakdowns, 
allowing for comparisons over time, between regions or within categories. 
here, tanzania also demonstrates a notable improvement, inching its way 
up the scores in the past few years. table 4 depicts the relative progress of 
tanzania in the past decade.
table 4: Mo Ibrahim Index of African governance: figures for tanzania 
(2000–2007)
tAnzAnIA 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
ranking 14 17 18 20 17 15 15 12
Score 53.5 53.15 53.06 52.42 53.76 55.89 57.03 59.24
(Source: table compiled by author; data drawn from the Mo Ibrahim Index of African 
governance)52
51  the Ibrahim Index assesses governance against 84 criteria, making it the most com-
prehensive collection of qualitative and quantitative data that measures governance in 
Africa. the criteria are divided into four main categories and 13 sub-categories. the indica-
tors that make up the sub-categories are based either on official data or expert assessment 
(see the website under http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/en/section/the-ibrahim-
index; last accessed 25 March 2010). In 2009, 53 African countries were included in the 
survey.
52 All information available under http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/en/section/
the-ibrahim-index (last accessed 25 March 2010).
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Summing up the aggregate surveys on development and governance, it 
can be observed that a certain sophistication of the measurement of gover-
nance is taking place. Whereas the first governance indices were relatively 
crude and standardised, with the explicit aim to quantify ‘governance’ as 
neatly as possible, currently governance indicators are being elaborated 
or designed to allow more profiled and nuanced markers—albeit numeri-
cally reduced. Viewed through this discourse, tanzania emerges as a coun-
try characterised by a rather poor governance performance in world-wide 
comparison, ranking in the bottom quarter of both development as well 
as governance indicators. however, the assessments over time all show a 
steady improvement of tanzania’s governance performance. It is not my 
purpose to deconstruct the ‘truth’ of this performance. What I do want to 
profile, however, that judged by these surveys, the institutional and regu-
latory framework of tanzania has undergone quite significant changes 
over the past decade. Contrary to the Africa pessimism, positive (in terms 
of the measured dimensions) change has been documented in tanzania 
in the past decade.
Still, in spite of the more differentiated and longitudinal surveys avail-
able today, the scores represent either global or continental topographies 
of governance and corruption that are necessarily standardised. this leads 
to highly condensed, categorical statements, i.e. either as a naked rank 
or score, or as in bland and non-descript qualifications such as ‘weak’ or 
‘partly free’. however, there is a rich body of articulations that make dis-
persed as well discursively more formed statements on contexts of cor-
ruption in tanzania. Although these statements cannot necessarily be 
directly related to the indices, following often completely different ratio-
nales and intentions, the following section seeks to profile this contextual 
landscape in sharper relief, by assembling country-specific statements and 
articulations on governance and corruption in tanzania.
3. Qualified Views of Corruption in Tanzania
only in the past decade have more measurement tools and data on cor-
ruption been available—a new field of empirical data that can also be seen 
from the relatively recent introduction of most of the indicators above. 
the same can be said of country-specific surveys and assessments, which 
in general do not aim to rank and compare, but to provide a more quali-
tative assessment of corruption in a given country. A distinction can be 
made between surveys and reports that are mandated by the government 
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and form part of a national anti-corruption strategy, and surveys and 
reports that are mandated and/or are carried out by national or interna-
tional non-governmental organisations. In this section, the most impor-
tant elements and statements of these qualitative surveys and reports 
will be listed schematically, in a chronological order—which should also 
make the quickened frequency and types of such surveys visible. Also, 
where present, statements on corruption in the construction industry and 
public procurement will be emphasised, as this is the area in which the 
case-studies undertaken in the following two chapters are situated.
3.1. The Warioba Report (1996)
tanzania is in fact an interesting example, for as early as 1996 the gov-
ernment under president Benjamin Mkapa established a commission 
endowed with investigative powers to report on corruption in tanzania 
(the united republic of tanzania 1996a). the report, popularly known as 
the Warioba report, named after the renowned chair of the presidential 
Commission, came up with detailed and damning findings on types and 
extent of corruption in tanzania. essentially, they distinguished between 
corruption due to poverty and low incomes (the united republic of tan-
zania 1996a: 4), and corruption by persons in authority. It is worth quoting 
the passage on this type of corruption in original:
the second problem which is more serious is that even if the people know 
their rights and therefore refuse to pay for them by exposing the corrupt 
elements instead, they appear to have despaired because the leaders in 
whom they had placed trust and who they expected to be their refuge, have 
themselves become engulfed by corruption. the tanzania public has been 
reluctant to expose those who solicit and receive bribes because of a lack 
of clean and responsible leadership in the government organs concerned 
like the police, judiciary, the Anti-Corruption Bureau and the department 
of national Security. Thus the greatest task before the Government itself, the 
Parastatals and indeed the political parties, is to clean up the leadership cur-
rently in power. After that it will be necessary to take steps to develop a cadre of 
leadership which is genuinely committed to fighting the scourge of corruption 
at all levels by taking action against all who are exposed. By so doing, we shall 
have restored public confidence in the state apparatus and therefore speed the 
eradication of corruption in the country (the government of tanzania 1996a: 
15; emphases in original).
the report was at the time and has been since widely acclaimed for its 
astute and impartial assessment of corruption in tanzania. the report 
went very far, to the extent of incriminating and naming particular senior 
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public officials. however, as Chapter 3, below, will discuss in more detail, 
essentially there was political inertia after the initial stir of the publica-
tion. In any case the Warioba report is still widely cited and known, pro-
viding a very detailed description of types and extent of corrupt practices 
within public agencies.
3.2. State of Corruption in Tanzania Annual Report (2001)
With the technical and financial support of the undp, it was decided 
that the tanzanian national Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action plan 
(nACSAp) of 1999 (see section further down) should be systematically 
monitored and evaluated by a system of Annual reports. In March 2001 
the prevention of Corruption Bureau53 invited proposals from indepen-
dent institutions and in late 2002 the first State of Corruption in Tanzania 
Annual Report 2001, was published, prepared by a consortium between 
the economic and Social research foundation (eSrf)54 and an anti-
corruption organisation called front Against Corrupt elements in tanza-
nia (fACeIt).55 the data and information collected and analysed in the 
report is intended as a prime policy tool in the fight against corruption. 
hence, its tors include the following specific objectives:
•  to provide an information base for future anti-corruption policies
•  to monitor and assess the state of corruption in tanzania after adoption 
of nACSAp and sector-specific action plans in Ministries and key depart-
ments (MdAs)
•  to review and collect information on the implementation of sector spe-
cific action plans (eSrf/fACeIt 2001: 6)
not endowed with the same investigative powers as the Warioba Com-
mission, the report necessarily relies more on a multi-pronged method-
ology of desk-research, individual and focus group interviews as well as 
workshops with key professionals to capture the dynamics of corruption. 
using the recommendations of the Warioba-report and nACSAp as a 
baseline, the report compares the measures taken with the actual results 
in the prime sectors. the sectors analysed are the institutional framework 
53 for an overview over the mandate of pCB see Chapter 3 (Section 3.2) and Chapter 4 
(Section 3.4), below.
54 Acronym for economic and Social research foundation.
55 Acronym for front Against Corrupt elements in tanzania, an organisation which 
in 2003 was in fact the only vocal interest group against corruption in tanzania. this had 
changed completely in 2010, with organisations such as fordIA taking on advocacy activi-
ties in a very professional manner. 
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(Chapters II–IV), the Sector Ministries (Chapter V), the local government 
Authorities (Chapter VI), the financial Sector (Chapter VII), public pro-
curement (Chapter VIII), and lastly, the Mass media (Chapter IX). the 
focus group discussions were held with lawyers, Auditors and representa-
tives of the construction industry. Although the quality of the report and 
in particular the survey methodology is rather uneven, it documents both 
systemic and incidental cases of corruption.
In all areas, corruption remains a serious problem, with the surveyed 
citizens, respondents and focus groups reporting relatively frequent expe-
riences with corruption, as well as providing detailed information on 
prevalent corrupt practices and regulatory problems (due to both over-
regulation as well as under-regulation). the two areas in which corruption 
are reported to be most expansive is the local government Authorities56 
and public procurement, and even more so in the interface of the two. 
the report states with unusual candour that
[p]rocurement of goods and services (supplies of materials and works con-
tracts [sic] particularly in roads contracts) is one area where corruption is 
rampant. Councillors flout tender regulations in selecting contractors for 
roads works. this has often led to inflated costs, poor works quality and 
delayed completion [. . .]. these practices are perceived as grand and sys-
temic corruption in the local authorities (eSrf/fACeIt 2001: 84).
on a national level similar practices are documented across public authori-
ties, ranging from lands to Communication, where both incidental as well 
as routine practices of corrupt collusion, embezzlement, extortion or just 
plain bribery are reported. According to the Annual report on the State 
of Corruption 2001, most of these practices have not changed greatly since 
the publication of the Warioba report, in spite of governmental commit-
ments to implement its recommendations. A further problem, again 
already observed and condemned by the Warioba report, is a legalised 
form of political corruption, which is known as ‘takrima’ (Swahili for gift 
or favour). the law on ‘takrima’, introduced in 2000, allows parliamentary 
candidates during elections to give certain benefits (‘takrima’) to voters 
as an inducement to gain their votes, evidently a practice that borders 
on bribery.57
56 See also the report on Corruption in local government Authorities (2005) further 
down. 
57 this law was outlawed in a high Court ruling in 2006, after legal rights organisa-
tions had challenged its legality in a law-suit (see under http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
africa/4941672.stm; last accessed 25 March 2010). 
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In large parts, the tone of the report is very conciliatory, in spite of 
some interesting, specific and significant findings. these are mainly hid-
den in the individual chapters and the Appendices on the focus group 
discussions. the conclusions of the report are particularly weak, summing 
up some 200 pages in a mere two pages, much of which is devoted to 
describing reforms undertaken, rather than an analysis of the problems. 
It does stress, however, the importance of political will. More specifically, 
it states that the “findings of this report reveal that there is still a lot to 
be done by the government to demonstrate a clear political commitment 
in the war against corruption” (eSrf/fACeIt 2001: 160). perhaps more 
graphically, a summary statement from the Auditors Workshop that forms 
part of this report underlines this point:
It was lamented that though the president [Mr Benjamin Mkapa] has good 
intentions concerning the fight against corruption, over the years, things are 
turning out to be worse and worse. leaders do not lead the way and have 
been one of the reasons for the worsening situation. takrima was felt to be 
anathema to this fight. the meeting stressed the need to be serious and sin-
cere at all levels of leadership, otherwise things will remain the same.58
Although the report was announced as an annual publication, for the next 
six years no further annual report was commissioned, mainly due to the 
lack of funding forthcoming by donors.59 the non-materialisation of an 
annual report, however, also shows a lack of commitment on the side of 
the government in these years. only with the implementation of nACSAp 
II and funding from danida was the project ‘annual report’ and improve-
ment of official data on corruption for planning purposes tackled again. In 
September 2009, the second Annual State of Corruption and governance 
report 2009 was presented to the public (see Section 3.9, below).
3.3. National Strategy for Growth and the Reduction of Poverty (2005–2010) 
(MKUKUTA)60
Articulations on corruption, however, are not only limited to corrup-
tion-specific reports. Corruption in tanzania is routinely articulated in 
58 Summary records from the Auditors Workshop, held on 1 november in dar es 
Salaam, Annex V ‘Minutes of Constructors Workshop’ of the Annual report of the State of 
Corruption in tanzania, (eSrf/fACeIt 2001: 22). 
59 this is not least due to the disenchantment of donors on the quality of the report 
(personal communication with multi-lateral donors in february and March 2003).
60 the Strategy is far better known under its Swahili acronym MKuKutA, which stands 
for ‘Mkakati wa Kukuza uchumi na Kupunguza umaskini tanzania’.
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 conjunction with and in reference to national development, economic 
growth and in particular poverty-reduction, as the next section illustrates. 
these are particularly dominant in development policies published by the 
government. the most important of these is MKuKutA, a largely donor-
financed national framework guiding social and economic policies for 
poverty reduction. to substantiate and anchor developmental priorities 
in society, development needs were assessed in nation-wide stakeholder’s 
consultations. In this context, corruption was shown to be a concern of 
citizens. In a survey conducted by the national Bureau of Statistics, the 
respondents showed
great anxiety on issues of governance and corruption. these were stated as 
red tape, harassment by tax collectors and town/city officials, corruption, 
violent crime, un-enforceable contracts, weak courts, band norms or cus-
toms, perverse external influence on values, ‘unfulfilled promises’ made by 
their leaders or representatives, nepotism, favouritism in giving micro-credit 
service [. . .]. Some expressed doubts whether their problems or grievances 
were ever forwarded to higher authorities for action (MKuKutA 2005: 21).
Interesting here is the range of practices and issues identified as being 
relevant to governance and corruption, from distorted value-structures to 
bureaucratic discretion. It is also quite revealing with regard to the lack of 
trust citizens seem to have in formal accountability structures.
further key policy documents, all relating to MKuKutA, are much in 
the same vein as some of the operational statements encountered in the 
discourse of good governance. for instance, in one of the annual assess-
ment documents, the so-called cluster-strategies of the chapter on gover-
nance and accountability give an idea just how, firstly, linkages between 
key development terms (poverty-reduction, corruption, equity, etc.) are 
constructed, and, secondly, just what an enormous field of intervention is 
being (re-)produced by such policy documents:
the cluster has seven goals, namely:
i.  ensure that structure and systems of governance as well as the rule 
of law are democratic, participatory, representative, accountable and 
inclusive;
ii.  equitable allocation of public resources with corruption is effectively 
addressed;
iii.  effective public service framework is in place to provide foundation for 
service delivery that support poverty reduction;
iv.  rights of the poor and vulnerable groups are protected and promoted in 
the justice system;
v.  reduction of political and social exclusion and intolerance;
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vi.  Improvement of personal and material securities, reduced crime, elimi-
nate sexual abuse and domestic violence; and lastly to
vii. promote and enhance national cultural identities” (IMf 2008: 55).
3.4. Corruption in Local Authorities in Tanzania (2005)
Beyond surveys on a national level, it was recognised quite early on that 
corruption in local government authorities (lgAs) is a pertinent prob-
lem not captured by national legislation. Also, there was still very little 
empirical information available on corrupt practices in lgAs. A compre-
hensive survey mandated by the pCB and the undp and undertaken by 
an eminent professor seeks to address this lacuna, and comes to following 
conclusion:
on the whole corruption [. . .] remain[s] a daunting challenge not only for 
lgAs but for the whole country. [. . .] rigid, bureaucratic, unknown proce-
dures and unresponsive bureaucrats make people believe they would not 
get the service they deserve without ‘oiling the system’ or ‘wearing long shirt 
sleeves’, i.e. bribing the official. [. . .] Inadequate poor service delivery, poor 
working conditions and unattractive working conditions, including lack of 
working equipment create a conducive environment and temptation for 
engaging in corrupt practices. however, it is equally true that contradictory 
and incongruent policy and political statements between the politicians and 
the lgA technocrats on the one hand and these and the citizens on the 
other hand fuel perceptions on corruption. [. . .] the laid down laws, rules 
and regulations are in place and some are available at lgA offices but are 
hardly known to lgA officials and citizens which makes compliance inef-
fective. It seems that the political side of lgAs [elected representatives] is 
less involved in anti-corruption strategy than the technical side hence mak-
ing the fight against corruption less effective (ngware 2005: 111; emphases 
in original).
the main statements of the report, hence, do not necessarily affirm the 
view that corruption in tanzania is diminishing in day-to-day interac-
tions with public officials. rather, it depicts a landscape in which corrupt 
practices are systemically produced through uneven institutionalisation 
of anti-corruption and other governance reforms on the one hand, and 
entrenched attitudes towards corruption that are reinforced by disem-
powerment and poverty. however, as the quotes show, the report makes 
an explicit distinction between the technocratic level and the political 
level of anti-corruption efforts, indicating that reforms on the technocratic 
level are technically in place and probably sufficient, but the political will 
is still very uneven in making these reforms ‘live’ and effective—political 
will, as the report discusses and substantiates in some detail, that is not 
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merely a result of individual politician’s integrity, but of “a deeper culture 
of popular participation in civic affairs which is only just emerging in tan-
zania” (ngware 2005: 24).
3.5. Afrobarometer: Perceptions and Experiences of Corruption in 
Tanzania (2005)
this survey is an interesting exercise in mapping the experiences and 
perceptions of tanzanians on corruption in their country, and it comes 
up with a number of interesting findings. these are especially interest-
ing as they allow a comparison between the first survey in 2003 and this 
second survey (2006). I only want to highlight two remarkable findings 
here: firstly, the survey indicates a trend, namely that between 2003–2005 
personal experiences with corruption as well as perceptions of corruption 
among public officials have actually declined.61 the former is depicted in 
figure 5, below, which leads the authors of the survey to conclude that 
government efforts to curb corruption are showing some success.
According to the Afrobarometer, the perceived degree of corruption 
associated with public officials has also declined, although it remains on 
a high level. So,
in 2003, 80% thought that ‘some’, ‘most’, ‘all’ police were involved in cor-
rupt practices, but in 2005 this has dropped to 72%. likewise, in 2003 52% 
thought that/some/most/all ‘elected officials’ engaged in corruption, but in 
2005 a much lower 38% think Mps are corrupt, and 44% say the same for 
elected local government councilors [sic] (Afrobarometer 2006: 4).
Although this finding is based on interactions with only three public ser-
vices, it would confirm the improvement of tanzania’s ranking on the 
CpI and on the various governance indices. however, as figure 6, below, 
61 See Afrobarometer 2006: 5, figure 4; out of six common interactions with authori-
ties surveyed, three show a reduction (obtaining a permit; obtaining a household service; 
interaction with police), one remains the same (access to education), and two cannot be 
compared as they were not included in the 2003 survey (access to health care (see below) 
and voting). the prevalence of corruption in the police service as well as in the judiciary 
are shored up by the findings of the eastern Africa Bribery Index (eABI) 2009 (see section 
further down): the tanzanian police force (eABI score 62,56) and the Judiciary/Courts 
(eABI score 61,48) rank highest on the eABI score, ahead of local Authorities (rank 5) and 
health care (rank 8). for the full ranking see eastern African Bribery Index report 2009: 34 
(table 30 ‘tanzania Aggregate Index’). one interesting finding of the Afrobarometer Cor-
ruption Survey is that it seems that tanzanians are most frequently pressured into corrup-
tion by health workers (See Afrobarometer 2006: 5,6 (figure 4 and figure 5); unfortunately, 
healthcare was only included in the survey of 2005, hence not allowing a comparison to 
the situation in 2003).
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(Source: Afrobarometer 2006: 6, figure 4)
figure 5: personal experience of Corruption 2003–2005
(Source: Afrobarometer 2006: 4, figure 3)
figure 6: extent of perceived Corruption Amongst public officials
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shows, the level of perceived corruption among public officials is still on 
a relatively high level.
Secondly, addressing a commonly held myth (and one that was dis-
cussed under the ‘moral economy of corruption’ in Chapter 1, above), the 
surveys find that ordinary citizens’ understanding of what constitutes an 
act of corruption does not differ to the understanding that citizens hold 
of corruption internationally: “Clearly, tanzanians for the most part share 
international perceptions of how public officials are supposed to behave 
in executing their responsibilities. traditional cultural practices, whether 
of gift giving or other varieties, do not, in the eyes of the tanzanian pub-
lic, entitle government officials to take advantage of them” (Afrobarom-
eter 2006: 6). this is significant in that it counters statements made for 
instance by parts of the academic discourse, who seek to emphasise the 
‘local’ or ‘socio-cultural’ understanding and practice of corruption. It also 
makes a clear statement on the type of expectations that tanzanians have 
of public institutions, namely the impartial provision of public goods.
3.6. Global Integrity Report: Tanzania—Reporter’s Notebook (2007)
As noted above, part of the global Integrity report is a so-called report-
er’s notebook, where a key informant, such as a journalist, an activist or 
a researcher, describes in an anecdotal fashion symptomatic incidences 
illustrating the mechanisms of accountability and integrity in a given 
country. the reporter for tanzania in 2007 dwells at length on the large-
scale corruption scandals that have emerged especially in the wake of pri-
vatisation schemes, and links them to the destitution and lack of access to 
basic resources such as clean water, sanitation or electricity for the large 
parts of the population, which also pays extortionate rates for unreliable 
or unprovided services. And yet, according to the reporter:
the power sector drama is just the tip of the iceberg of corruption in tan-
zania. [. . .] A lack of checks and balances in the system is partly to blame. 
Abuse of power continues to thwart efforts to promote sound governance, 
while parliament has proven nearly useless in its oversight role and as a 
check on executive power. democratic governance is elusive as powerful and 
self-interested economic actors gain control over the executive branch and 
wield its powers to their own advantage. Annual auditing of public funds by 
the Controller and Auditor general, capacity building for the pCCB, aware-
ness campaigns on corruption, donor-supported governance initiatives as 
well as the formation of the sector parliamentary Committee are not effec-
tive enough. this is partly due to state capture, a process in which powerful 
elites from the private sector buy off politicians and bureaucrats to twist 
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laws, budgets, projects, policies and regulatory environments in their own 
interest. the majority of parliamentarians are little more than rubber-stamp 
legislators, who approve defective plans from the executive branch with lit-
tle due diligence or scrutiny. political patronage dilutes governance-building 
initiatives. thanks to political stability, there have been no riots to date. But 
unless a comprehensive effort is made across all branches of government to 
promote sound governance and integrity in government, tanzania’s infra-
structure and resource challenges will be here to stay.62
these strong statements paint a grim picture of the decision-making pro-
cess in tanzania, which, according to this perspective, is characterised 
by patronage, abuse of power and impunity. Juxtaposing this conclusion 
with the some of the findings of the Afrobarometer, there may be need to 
make a distinction between the decrease in petty corruption, i.e. the cor-
rupt practices citizens encounter in day-to-day interactions with public 
authorities, and increase grand corruption, which involves senior politi-
cians and public officials and large sums of money.
3.7. Pilot Review Tanzania, UNCAC (2008)
tanzania was one of the first countries to sign and ratify the united 
nations Convention Against Corruption. In the wake of unCAC, a moni-
toring process has been piloted, with tanzania acting as pilot review coun-
try. Some of the issues addressed above are included in this monitoring 
process, namely the question of implementation of the “impressive anti-
corruption laws” (unCAC 2008: 3) of tanzania. other issues reflect the 
concerns stated in the global Integrity reporters notebook, for instance 
with regard to the prosecution of grand as well as petty corruption cases 
as well as with regard to attention to a sharper separation of powers (see 
unCAC 2008: 3–4). In the executive summary, the report also underlines 
the need for stricter implementation and oversight of procurement laws, a 
finding that will be taken up in the following chapters. the report states:
Capacity in public procurement, both at implementing and oversight level, 
is a problem that needs to be addressed. Increased compliance with pro-
curement laws will reduce corruption risks in an area which constitute 70% 
of public expenditure (unCAC 2008: 4).
62 See Sebastian Sanga (tanzania: reporter’s notebook, global Integrity report, Assess-
ment 2007) under http://report.globalintegrity.org/tanzania/2007/notebook (last accessed 
5 March 2010).
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the statement underlines the fact already read in between the lines of the 
global Integrity Index, namely the there is palpable discrepancy between 
tightened institutional framework, designed with international guidance, 
and the actual practices that are predominant, here in the construction 
sector.
3.8. Eastern African Bribe Index Report (2009)
the mapping of corruption has been fine-tuned in a recent large compara-
tive survey of eastern Africa (Kenya, tanzania and uganda), which takes 
a more focused look at perceptions of and experiences with bribery. nota-
bly, the term ‘corruption’ has been narrowed down to ‘bribery’ to avoid 
problems of divergent meanings of corruption. the following excerpt of 
the eastern African Bribe Index (eABI) gives a clear assessment of types 
and extent of bribe-paying in tanzania:
the respondents reported having paid bribes for five reasons as follows;
1.  to access or speed up services;
2.  to avoid the consequences of failing to comply with a certain regulation 
or to speed up a process e.g. business licensing;
3.  during interaction with law enforcement agencies;
4.  for employment related services like recruitment, promotion or 
transfer;
5.  for business purposes like acquisition of tenders.
even though 55% of the bribery incidences in tanzania by respondents were 
for services, bribes paid for services constitute only 13% of the total value 
of bribes paid. 41% of the total value of bribes paid was for employment 
related issues. this underpins the premium attached to job seeking. While 
the survey indicates that only 4% of the bribery situations and total value 
of bribes were for business related purposes, this does not accurately reflect 
the level of integrity in public procurement but rather that the household 
survey targeted ordinary tanzanians who may not have regular business 
interactions with public institutions (transparency International Kenya 
et al. 2009: 31–32).
the results from this survey provide a far more nuanced profile of ‘cor-
ruption’ in tanzania. there does not seem to be pervasive patronage or 
clientelism, except, arguably, with regard to job seeking. With over half of 
the respondents encountering bribery demands with services, petty cor-
ruption is very frequent (‘petty’ as the value of the corrupt transaction is 
relatively low, as table 5, below, shows). for our purposes, the statement 
on integrity of public procurement above will be of particular relevance, 
as the case-studies will be looking into professional associations whose 
members depend on public procurement in the construction industry.
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table 5: Analysis of Bribery in tanzania by purpose


















(Source: transparency International Kenya et al. 2009: 32, figure 26)
In regional comparison, the survey demonstrates that tanzania fares by 
far the best out of the three countries: “the overall level of corruption as 
reflected by the proportion of east Africans from whom a bribe was solic-
ited or expected during service interaction stood at 34.6% for uganda, 
17% for Tanzania and 45% in Kenya” (eABI 2009: 10; emphasis added). 
this puts corruption into a regional perspective, although, as relevant 
statements by respondents for instance from MKuKutA or the Afroba-
rometer show, citizens in tanzania do not find this to be an acceptable 
level of corruption.
3.9. National Governance and Corruption Survey (NGCS) (2009)
In november 2009, the first baseline survey aimed at gauging good gov-
ernance and corruption situation in the country was presented (but not 
yet available to the public). Although, as mentioned under the section 
on the ‘first Annual report on Corruption’ of 2001, that was originally 
intended to be the first baseline survey of a series of annual reports, the 
quality of the first report was criticised. the ngCS is designed as the “first 
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ever composite baseline survey of governance and corruption in tanza-
nia” (pCCB 2009:xi), designed as a basis for policy reform. the survey, 
which is far more systematic and comprehensive in its methodology than 
the first Annual report on Corruption in tanzania of 2001, covers house-
holds, public officials and enterprises.
the key findings underscore some of the results of the eABI and other 
corruption surveys. Corruption is consistently ranked as a serious prob-
lem by respondents of all three sectors, with the private sector reporting 
the obligation to pay bribes more frequently than households and pub-
lic officials. Interestingly the “leading cause of corruption is attributed 
to greed. this is followed, for households and public officials by moral 
indecency and poor law enforcement; and for company executives by the 
lack of control and accountability of public officials, and moral decay” 
(pCCB 2009: xiii).63 Again this is an unambiguous statement against justi-
fying corruption in terms economic hardship or culturally hybrid values. 
like the previous surveys, it also gives some indication about the expecta-
tions that tanzanians generally have of the state and government, namely 
integrity and accountability. Interestingly, the survey makes an explicit, 
unambiguous correlation between greed, grand corruption and poverty, 
as figure 7, below, shows.
the survey finds that in the majority of cases (83%) it is government 
officials who initiate corruption, as opposed to 11.8% of citizens. the figures 
shift in the case of responses from enterprises, with 64.9% of government 
officials initiating corruption and 18.2% of business people (and 16.9% 
being tacit understanding or facilitated by brokers) (pCCB 2009: 13).
(Source: pCCB 2009: 12)
figure 7: Causal Chain of types of Corruption According to the ngCS
63 this response is quite overwhelming, with 96.2% of households, 96.6% of public 
officials, and 95.5% of company executives attributing the main cause of corruption to 
greed and selfishness (pCCB 2009: 11–12) (although one could arguably make a difference 
between greed and selfishness). 
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(Source: pCCB 2009: 19)
figure 8: “percentage distribution enterprise [sic] reporting frequency of govern-
ment procurement tenders being awarded in a clear and efficient manner”
A section of particular importance for the case-studies is on “quality and 
efficiency of public service delivery” (pCCB 2009: 18–21), as it also mea-
sures corruption in public procurement. As can be seen from figure 8 
(above) on government procurement tenders, a majority of respondents 
from enterprises dealing with public procurement reported corruption. In 
particular, they specified that
public tendering processes are beset with several malpractices, which are 
done frequently, notably:
•  bid rigging (reported as being frequent by 83.3 percent of respondents);
•  qualified bidder being disqualified at pre-qualification stage (76.7 
percent);
•  adjustment of specification in the interest of a favoured company (68.9 
percent);
•  leakage of client’s budget at tender stage (67.5 percent); and
•  modification of contract terms during implementation stage, i.e. after 
award of tender (67.6 percent)
enterprises further reported that having ‘connections’ and making of an 
‘unofficial payment’ are important factors to win a government contract, 
according to 68 percent and 63.7 percent of respondents, respectively, and 
that, on average, public procurement contracts involve unofficial payments 
amounting to 10.4 percent of the contract value. regional comparisons 
reflect significant differences in the quantum of bribes paid, which is higher 
than the national average in Mara region (25 percent of contract value), 
dar es Salaam (14 percent) and lindi region (12 percent); while in tanga, 
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ruvuma, Iringa, tabora, rukwa and Kigoma regions the bribe paid is three 
percent of the contract value or lower” (pCCB 2009: 19–20).
the survey results indicate the pervasiveness as well as the diversity of 
corrupt practices in construction and public procurement. the height of 
the corrupt ‘cut’ out of government contracts leads the report to conclude 
in its executive Summary that “[p]ublic procurement and contracting sec-
tors are prone to grand corruption” (pCCB 2009: xvi).
Summing up, the findings of the report are very comprehensive and 
methodologically sound. Similar to the first Annual report on Corruption 
of 2001, however, the conclusions of the report are rather thin, in spite 
of much data on which to substantiate these reforms. the conclusions 
stress mainly that diagnostic capacity need to be strengthened. perhaps, 
however, the stated purpose of the report being to act as a baseline does 
not lend itself to politically outspoken statements and specific policy 
recommendations.
4. An Overview over Corruption in Tanzania
the longitudinal topography of corruption in tanzania outlines a rather 
rugged landscape, perhaps not surprisingly given the diversity of sur-
vey tools. A rattle-bag of components is produced in these surveys and 
reports, some of which link up to regularised patterns, others making far 
more dispersed and marginal statements. on the one hand, corruption is 
viewed and experienced as a pertinent problem encountered routinely 
in daily interactions with public officials and public services. however, 
there are quite an amount of dispersed statements documenting a (in 
places significant) decrease of experiences and perceptions of corruption, 
for instance in the widely disseminated Afrobarometer survey (2006) or 
in the regional comparison made by the eABI. Clearly carved out is that 
the extent of bribery and corruption varies significantly between services, 
with decreases witnessed in all areas. the represented improvement over 
time underlines the positive trend of the aggregate governance and cor-
ruption indices. hence, it is perhaps surprising that these positive state-
ments are not emphasised far more, illuminating the improvements and 
achievements in the state of governance and corruption in tanzania.64
64 this is not intended as a flippant remark. evidently, looking just at the break-down 
of frequency and value of corrupt transactions provided by the eABI (see table 5 ‘Analysis 
of Bribery in tanzania’, above), shows that corruption is still extensive. 
160 interlude
for on the other hand, and far more audibly, the surveys nearly all artic-
ulate a cheerless image of tanzania, evoking old and emerging practices 
of corruption threatening the state of the nation. particularly problematic 
areas emphasised in the surveys and reports are the police, public pro-
curement and local governmental authorities. In addition, in more recent 
reports the institutionalisation of grand corruption is depicted as a seri-
ous and potentially uncontrollable problem. Although the statements in 
more descriptive reports are most colourful, such as for instance in global 
Integrity’s reporter’s notebook, equally trenchant is the latest national 
Survey on governance and Corruption (nSgC 2009), which draws a direct 
correlation between grand corruption, poverty, and petty corruption (see 
figure 7 ‘Causal Chain of Corruption’, above). Contrary to the topography 
of corruption in tanzania as viewed from a bird’s eye view, this perspec-
tive infers that grand corruption is a regularised feature of tanzania’s eco-
nomic and political order.
A further statement made across reports is that there is a more or less 
glaring discrepancy between the achievements in terms of institutional 
reform and institutionalised practices. the reasons are only dwelled on 
in the more qualitative reports, which represent the mind-sets of public 
officials as an obstructing factor, as well as problems arising out of the 
implementation, coherence and communication of such reforms. Some 
diagnose a systemic problem, in which reforms do not ‘bite’ as intended, 
but merely mould themselves around entrenched mechanisms of cor-
rupt practices. this is one reason why the importance of public sensi-
tisation and awareness raising is emphasised in many different settings. 
however, the question remains how the topography of corruption can be 
modified and reorganised to make more space for non-corrupt, rule-based 
practices.
this brings us squarely to the question of social agency. the surveys 
themselves say very little on such agency, reproducing with more or less 
analysis the findings of the questionnaires, although there may be spec-
ulative statements on the extent of (dis)empowerment of citizens in or 
between the lines.65 the reports are more explicit in this regard, most 
notably the Warioba report that condemns the blatant abuse of the rule 
65 for instance, the Afrobarometer (2006) comments a significant difference between 
those who reported to have been asked for bribes in medical clinics (26%), and those who 
say they actually paid a bribe (15%) in the following words: “the difference suggests that 
tanzanians are also feeling increasingly empowered to resist such demands” (Afrobarom-
eter 2006: 6). 
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of law infringing on citizens rights. But also, albeit couched in more devel-
opmental speak, MKuKutA, which addresses the negative correlation 
between corruption and poverty, and corruption and democratisation. 
due to the nature of most of the reports and surveys, however, they gen-
erally provide either scientifically grounded accounts of citizens’ percep-
tions of their (social, economic, political) room to manoeuvre, for instance 
as measured in relation to the frequency and value of bribes for service 
delivery or obstructions by public authorities. or then they seek to pro-
vide interventionist policy analyses, in the sense of prescriptive reforms 
and recommendations, for instance with regard to civic participation.66
What the reports and surveys inherently do not capture (and, fairly, 
do not seek to capture), are the political and economic spaces that citi-
zens do create; the spaces that are not only created in spite of high levels 
of corruption, but spaces that are created because of corruption. this is 
a theoretical and empirical lacuna which I hope to illuminate in more 
detail. to avoid a fundamental misunderstanding: corruption in this sense 
does not mean an instrumentalisation of corrupt practices, as for instance 
concepts of neo-patrimonialism or intrumentalisation of disorder signify. 
What I intend to explore in the the two following case-studies is the ways 
in which the discourse(s) of corruption are appropriated and filled with 
particular meanings of social agents, and thus serve to advance their own 
agendas of political and economic and social demands and interests. More 
specifically, based on the thoughts sketched out in Chapter 2 (above), 
I seek to understand more fully the ways in which collective interests are 
articulated, using corruption and the fight against corruption as an empty 
signifier to carry their own agenda into a wider public space and connect 
up to further discourses. potentially, as is my hypothesis, thus creating 
hegemonic representations of a specifically democratic, emancipatory 
nature.
one set of questions arising is to which extent this process actually col-
lapses or, rather, modifies their particular identities, requiring an empirical 
response. Another set of questions relates to whether and how the hege-
monic representations of corruption achieve a universalising effect that 
66 note for instance recommendation IV (out of five) of the nSgC: “the government 
needs to strengthen collaboration with all stakeholders involved in fighting corruption. the 
main organs in the civil society and private sector that are active in combating corruption 
include the media, faith-based organizations, ngos and professional associations. effec-
tive strategies of engaging these organs should be worked out. If real change is to occur, 
anti-corruption efforts must go beyond state interventions: other non-state actors must be 
actively mobilised” (nSgC 2009: 44; emphasis in original).
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realise the possibility of democratic society. In the previous two chapters, 
I have already outlined the concrete historical conditions and contours 
under which the hegemonic representations of corruption as articulated 
by the scholarly and development community has emerged. What I seek to 
do is to identify particular representations of corruption by social agents 
and explore their universalising potential—with the risk that they may 
remain pure particularities, and be absorbed by the dominant system. 
translated into empirical terms, how do social groups employ ‘corrup-
tion’ as an empty signifier? What claims and struggles are articulated in 
the discourse of corruption? And what hegemonising processes are initi-
ated to achieve a universalising effect? these are the questions I shall turn 
to in the following two chapters (Chapters 3 and 4), exploring realities of 
professional associations in the construction sector of tanzania.
Chapter three
demoCratiC spaCes in the making?  
professional assoCiations and Corruption in 2003
A member of the Institution shall at all times put the interests of the community 
and public above those of the individual.
A member of the Institution shall act so as to uphold and enhance the honour, 
dignity, integrity, standing and reputation of the profession.
A member of the Institution shall not indulge in any corrupt practices.1
1. Background: From the ‘Politics of Integrity’ ( Julius Nyerere 1962–1985) to 
the ‘Politics of Shamelessness’ (Ali Hassan Mwinyi 1985–1995)
until the 1980s, tanzania was renowned to be a country with a remark-
able sense of public ethics.2 under the charismatic founding father of 
tanzania, Julius nyerere, integrity was held to be a core virtue of soci-
ety, and consequently corruption was harshly condemned, particularly 
when practised by holders of political or public officials. nyerere held 
very strong convictions on the corrupting influence of wealth on politi-
cal office, to the extent that an explicit choice had to be made between 
economic wealth and political power.3 “i believe myself that corruption 
in a country should be treated almost in the same way as treason. if peo-
ple feel that justice can be bought, what hope are we leaving with the 
people?”4 however, the nationalisation of the economy under the flag of 
1 see the Constitution of the institution of engineers tanzania (iet 2001: 15, sections 
8.02–8.04), one of the key professional associations of engineers. 
2 the facts in this section, when not quoted otherwise, are drawn from following docu-
ments: fischer 2006, Bigsten/danielson 2001, World Bank 2000b, as well as drawing on the 
sources of the field research in January and february 2003.
3 in 1967, tanzania (already de facto a one-party-state) became a socialist state under 
the arusha declaration, which decreed the nationalisation of the private economy and 
the media. subsequently over 400 parastatals were created; supplemented by the leader-
ship Code of 1972, public officials and politicians were prohibited to own shares in private 
enterprises or undertake commercial activities of their own (for accounts from different 
perspectives see, most notably, iliffe 1979 and hyden 1980).
4 nyerere on may 17, 1962 at the 35th session of the legislature, cited in Bakari 
1996: 55.
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african socialism and self-reliance5 provided a multitude of opportunities 
for corruption. in particular the discretionary and monopolistic powers 
of the national party tanu and its successor CCm,6 the parastatal enter-
prises and the public officials within the administration lead to text-book 
rent-seeking and extortionary behaviour, exacerbated by very low salary 
levels and harsh economic conditions. these practices were endemic, 
but kept in check by the personal integrity and frugality of the president 
and his charismatic authority, so that neither he himself nor his govern-
ment were tainted by a corrupt image—unlike the conventional wisdom 
on strong african leaders and one-party-states. Whilst the ever growing 
and unwieldy public sector certainly did create opportunities for corrupt 
enrichment and extortion, the political leaders were extolled. this may 
be partly an example of how leadership can make a positive impact on 
political culture.7 however, it cannot be denied that the check on cor-
ruption was also a product of a starved economy; the opportunities for 
discretionary practices by public officials were abundant, but the means 
and the spoils were very limited.8
however, nyerere’s increasingly authoritarian rule and what turned out 
to be disastrous economic policies came to a head with macro-economic 
bankruptcy looming in the 1980s. nyerere himself laid the groundwork 
for a line of escape by negotiating controlled liberalisation strategies with 
the imf and the World Bank in the mid-eighties; he also prepared his 
exit from political centre-stage by appointing his successor. in 1983, the 
revered and respected Julius nyerere handed over the presidency to ali 
hassan mwinyi. under the second president of the republic of tanzania, 
the whole political and economic context changed dramatically. liberali-
sation strategies had already seeped into the centrally planned economy 
under nyerere, but the new government pursued the full introduction 
of the market economy. moreover, the long-called for transition from a 
5 see hauck 2001: 201–10, hyden 1980, or Jennings 2003 for detailed analyses of the 
post-arusha period of ujamaa.
6 the acronyms stand for tanganyka african national union, which was later renamed 
to Chama Cha mapinduza (i.e. revolutionary party). nyerere, the founding father and 
leader of tanu, remained party chairman of the CCm until 1990, seven years after leaving 
office.
7 on this point, see Bratton/van der Walle 1997 on leadership and political systems in 
africa; gros 1998 on the impact of nyerere’s leadership on democratisation in tanzania; 
and rotberg 2009 on corruption and leadership in general.
8 to my knowledge, there are no surveys on corruption available for this period; this 
observation is based on personal communication by interviewees and relevant informa-
tion found in the literature (e.g. gros 1998; Warioba report 1996).
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socialist country to a full multi-party democracy was also initiated with 
nyerere’s blessing, resulting in the amendment of the Constitution in 1992 
and the first transition elections in 1995. in fact, corruption may have been 
the prime factor for swaying the immense—if unofficial—influence of 
nyerere in support of multi-party democratisation, undoing his life-long 
endeavour for single party democracy. in an inquiry into the causes of 
nyerere’s change of heart, gros comes to an interesting conclusion:
the ruling party had become too corrupt for nyerere to morally justify its 
monopoly. nyerere admitted as much when he remarked in february of 
1995 that ‘tanzania stinks with corruption’.9 [. . .] as long as the party was 
not subject to competition, acts of corruption could be expected to occur 
and go unpunished. What motivation did CCm officials have to clean up 
their acts, if they did not have to worry about losing power? for nyerere, 
multipartyism became the disinfecting solution which would permit CCm 
to reconnect with the people (gros 1998: 103).
Whatever nyerere’s personal reasons were, the radical and fundamental 
transformation of the institutional framework informing the political and 
economic order in tanzania did not result in the generally aspired break-
through in standards of living. on the contrary, it created huge institu-
tional insecurity which provided many opportunities to those in power to 
interpret and shape the rules of the game according to their own private 
interest.10
in other words, it seemed as if after decades of politics of ascetism and 
economic hardship the flood-gates of wholesale, unsanctioned and even 
socially accepted enrichment had been thrown open. the privatisation 
of state-owned and parastatal enterprises regulated (in the loosest sense 
of the word) by inexperienced and untrained officials and inappropri-
ate, dysfunctional or disbanded institutions—from the legal framework 
to the financial institutions—provided an open field for the systematic 
plundering of national resources as well as the unheard of amounts of 
incoming fdi. land-grabbing, massive investment scams, exponentially 
growing kick-backs, commissions and outright bribes for the granting 
of contracts and licences, large-scale tax evasion right down to the self-
serving interpretation of the law and the corruption of judges and lawyers 
9 the guardian, 11 february 1995, cit. in gros 1998: footnote 24.
10 this is what Cartier-Bresson 2004 terms ‘new corruption’ deriving from structural 
transformations and changed opportunities, as opposed to the (neo-)patrimonial, rent-
seeking ‘old corruption’. 
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became the order of the day.11 By the end of mwinyi’s tenure, corruption 
had become a way of life, “so much that public officials are not ashamed 
to either demand or receive bribes. in fact, officials consider it right and 
the public consider it an obligation to offer bribes in order to be served” 
(the united republic of tanzania 1996b: 3), as a former foreign minister 
described “this shameless proliferation of bribery and corruption” (the 
united republic of tanzania 1996b: 3).
2. Benjamin Mkapa (1995–2005)—‘Zero-Tolerance of Corruption’
When Benjamin mkapa was elected president in tanzania’s first multi-
party elections in 1995, he found himself leading a country which within 
a mere decade had undergone a complete metamorphosis, both in terms 
of political ideology as well as institutional structure. the problems gen-
erated by the rapid structural transformations were considerable. for 
instance, the World Bank concluded in its surprisingly candid Country 
assistance evaluation of the year 2000 that
the review of economic developments in tanzania through 1995 and the 
efficacy of the Bank’s assistance efforts suggests a decidedly mixed outcome 
on many counts. the development issues facing the country by 1996 were 
many and severe, ranging from low growth and macro-instability, to perva-
sive poverty, a poor enabling environment for private enterprise, inadequate 
domestic ownership and weak donor coordination (World Bank 2000c: 8).
faced with these severe developmental challenges in a context where 
corruption had become the norm, not the exception, mkapa turned the 
fight against corruption into his ticket for government. Just before his 
election, he published his political priorities in a pamphlet with the title 
‘Building a Vision’. mkapa’s very first sentence addresses corruption,12 and 
he elaborates his view of the problem in a section wholly dedicated to 
corruption:
11 see the Warioba report 1996 for detailed evidence.
12 the first question and first sentence of mkapa’s answer on the first page of the docu-
ment is as follows:
Q: You have been elected tanzania’s third post independence president. What were 
the main issues and concerns that were raised in (a) rural areas and (b) urban areas, 
during the campaign?
a: Corruption was a big issue and i addressed it before it was even raised (mkapa 
1995: 1).
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Q [david martin]: the foreign media, indeed your local media, have said 
that corruption was the main issue of the election which was about electing 
a ‘mr Clean’. Was this true and what exactly do people mean when they talk 
about corruption in tanzania?
a [Benjamin mkapa]: Corruption featured immensely. i raised the issue at 
all my meetings. there is a widespread feeling among the population, as 
well as in the donor community, that it’s a serious disease in our society, it’s 
an impediment to justice and fairness, it has reached the point where it is a 
serious impediment to development.
how is corruption seen here? With the general population, it’s a fact that 
there is a feeling you cannot get anything done without ‘a consideration’ 
to the person who is obliged by law, or whom you have asked to carry out 
their duties. Without a ‘consideration’ you won’t get anything done. i get 
complaints that policemen can ask for anything from anybody, sometimes 
even to let you pass some place. that you can’t get medical attention with-
out passing something to the nurse or doctor, even, sometimes, the supervi-
sor. You can’t get your file in a government ministry if you are trying to get 
your land registered or whatever. there is a file opened there. suddenly it 
disappears and cannot be found again until something has passed on to the 
registry clerk. You see this is the feeling, this is the perception of corruption 
in our situation.
But on a larger scale, in terms of government contracts, tenders, licensing 
and so on, there is a feeling that favours are granted, proper criteria are put 
aside and so on. and this is a really serious disease in our society (mkapa 
1995: 5–6).13
in other words, mkapa showed vocal commitment to eradicating cor-
ruption, which began with his political campaign and, after his election, 
extended to the support of extensive governance policies. he appointed a 
presidential Commission on Corruption in 1996 to investigate the state of 
corruption in tanzania, and the findings were published in what became 
13 however, in the document mkapa elaborates no concrete steps to prevent corruption 
in future, apart from renewing the value system and increasing the remuneration package 
of the civil service (see mkapa 1995: 6), and set an example by declaring his assets after 
being sworn in (mkapa 1995: 8), a promise he kept. however, given the fact that at the time 
of writing (2009) mkapa is himself suspected to have illegally enriched himself through 
the purchase of a mining company at grossly underpriced value (see further down), the 
following statement rings either deeply cynical or prescient: “Corruption now at the politi-
cal level is perceived as the use of public office for self-enrichment. You know, i get into a 
party as a simple person, i become a minister, i retire or am sacked at the end of four years. 
and suddenly i have become the owner of a large enterprise which could not possibly have 
been earned by the remuneration which was given to me by virtue of my ministerial office. 
and the only explanation then is that you used the ministerial authority to influence mat-
ters in return for the wealth that you have accumulated” (mkapa 1995: 6).
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to be known as the Warioba report.14 the report was extremely thorough 
and forthright in its disclosures, and in its trenchant critique of the state 
of the nation. the key statement of the report was that “[c]orruption is 
rampant in all sectors of the economy, public services and politics of the 
country” (the united republic of tanzania 1996a: 476); a claim it substan-
tiated in extensive public hearings. the conclusion drawn on the extent of 
corruption was that petty corruption is pervasive in most public services 
and affects the population most directly, with systematic grand corrup-
tion identified especially in procurement, the allocation of permits and 
large public contracts, in particular construction.15 in analysing the causes 
of such widespread corruption, the Warioba report refused to succumb to 
the temptation of justifying it in general terms of a ‘poor and underdevel-
oped’ country. instead, the report bluntly addresses the issue of responsi-
bility: “it has become evident that the greatest source of corruption in the 
country is not the poor economy and low salaries; although these too have 
played some part. the greatest source is the laxity of leadership in over-
seeing the implementation of established norms” (the united republic of 
tanzania 1996a: 9).16 according to the report, hence, the problem of fight-
ing corruption in tanzania was not a question of legislation or capacity; 
the central problem, according to the Commission, was the unwillingness 
of the government to ‘walk the talk’, to follow up official policy priorities 
with implementation and enforcement.
given the growing sense of disgust with corrupt behaviour and the 
acutely felt problems that such wasted and embezzled resources meant 
for the population, the report would have provided the president volatile 
fuel for instigating blazing reforms of the political order. according to the 
general perception gleaned from the interviews as well as from the tone 
of editorials and columns in the national press, the president lacked the 
“moral courage” (as a former high ranking public official stated in an inter-
view) to capitalise on this unique chance; the named and shamed officials 
were not prosecuted (apart from one minister), and the implementation 
14 see the united republic of tanzania 1996a, b. stephen riley dryly comments this 
“remarkable set of events” by pointing out that “very few african governments investigate 
themselves, although they are very willing to investigate their political opponents” (riley 
1998: 144).
15 according to principle-agent informed economic theories and derived theories of 
rent-seeking, these sectors classically feature the greatest vulnerability to corruption as a 
result of the discretion, monopoly and size of potential profits. see klitgaard 1988, moodie-
stuart 1997, or khan 2000 for extensive analyses. 
16 see also muganda 1997 or Chachage 1996 for an appraisal of the Warioba report.
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of the very concrete recommendations got bogged down in bureaucratic 
manoeuvres. in other words, the report—with three of the most incrimi-
nating pages missing—was de facto shelved.17
still, under president mkapa, there was a comprehensive range of gov-
ernance and corruption policies designed and implemented, embedded 
in a national framework on good governance. they include a national 
anti-corruption strategy and anti-corruption plan (naCsap), the rein-
forcement of the prevention of Corruption Bureau, the establishment of 
the good governance Coordination unit, and legal reforms such as the 
public leadership Code of ethics (2001) and the law on Combating Cor-
ruption (2003, amended 2007).18 in the following section, an overview 
shall be provided over the most important of existing and newly estab-
lished governance policies in tanzania in the year 2003.
3. Regulatory Framework and Anti-Corruption Institutions
3.1. Prevention of Corruption Act (PPA)
the pCa dates back to the prevention of Corruption act, no 16 in 1971. 
this act was amended in 2002 to bring it in line with international stan-
dards. however, it was criticised for being flawed as a result of a very 
limited definition of corrupt practices and inconsistent provisions (see the 
following chapter for a more comprehensive discussion).
3.2. Prevention of Corruption Bureau (PCB)
the pCB19 dates back to 1974, when an anti-corruption squad was estab-
lished under act no 2. in 1991, the squad was restructured and renamed the 
prevention of Corruption Bureau (pCB), established under the president’s 
office. appointments are made by the president. the tasks of the pCB 
are to investigate, educate and advise the government on cases of corrup-
tion. prosecutions of public officials need the prior consent of the director 
of public prosecutions. the pCB has a head office in dar es salaam and 
43 district offices. Between 2000 and mid-2004, the pCB investigated 9507 
17 see fischer 2006 for detailed evidence.
18 for a detailed discussion on the history and design of tanzania’s anti-corruption 
policies see hussman/mmuya 2007.
19 the information in this section is based on the website of the pCB, on the Business 
anti-corruption portal, and on doig et al. 2005.
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cases (out of 10’319 received), of which 357 were prosecuted, resulting in 
48 convictions. Challenges of the pCB are lack of resources and perceived 
lack of independence from the president’s office. in spite of these chal-
lenges, it is the leading anti-corruption institution in tanzania.
3.3. Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance (CHRGG) (2001)
the Chrgg was established in 2001. it acts as an ombudsman office to 
investigate complaints of administrative justice, in particular relating to 
human rights abuse and abuse of power. it can make recommendations 
to the government. however, in practice the Chrgg has very little public 
visibility.
3.4. The Good Governance Coordination Unit (GGCU) (2001)
the ggCu20 is located in the president’s office, and formally mandated 
to monitor, coordinate, evaluate and report on the implementation of 
the naCsap across all mdas. the president also appointed a minister of 
state (minister of good governance) to supervise good governance issues. 
like the Chrgg, the ggCu is severely understaffed, and acts in strong 
cooperation with the pCB.21
3.5. The Public Service Ethics Secretariat
the public leadership Code of ethics act of 1995 requires public leaders 
to declare and register their assets in the relevant register managed and 
overseen by the public service ethics secretariat. however, the annual 
reports of asset declarations are only accessible under very restrained 
conditions. in practice, few government officials do declare their assets,22 
although in 1996 president mkapa lead by example by publicly declaring 
his assets.
20 see the official website http://www.chragg.go.tz/.
21 according to the Country procurement assessment tanzania (World Bank 2003a: 
79, para. 181), the ggCu issued a report in 2002, which includes a series of indicators for 
monitoring public procurement (developed jointly with the World Bank). however, no 
further information could be found and, as far as could be assessed, these indicators were 
not yet operational. 
22 see for instance the “government officials flout ethics law as corruption becomes 
rife and hefty” on the tanzania Corruption tracker Website (see http://www.corruption-
tracker.or.tz/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=47&itemid=29; last accessed 
2 march 2010).
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3.6. National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan (NACSAP)
Based on the ‘zero-tolerance-principle’ towards corruption, the govern-
ment of tanzania developed a comprehensive national anti-Corruption 
strategy and action plan (naCsap) in 1999, implemented from 2001–
2006. naCsap’s objective is to address and streamline key anti-corruption 
reforms in the public sector, drawing on sector strategies put together by 
government institutions. the strategy, a slim booklet of 29 pages, analyses 
and prioritises areas of action, identifies supporting processes, and finally 
draws up a detailed implementation plan. the following excerpt charts 
the comprehensive targets set by naCsap:
this strategy, therefore, outlines short term and long term national objec-
tives. it addresses prevention, enforcement, public awareness and institu-
tion building [. . .].
specifically, this strategy will lead to the achievement of the following:
•  increasing respect for the rule of law, enhancement of good governance 
and promotion of ethical leadership within its ranks and agencies.
•  strengthening the judicial system so that justice is neither sold nor 
bought.
•  having protection programmes for co-operative witnesses and whistle-
blowers.
•  transparency in government and tendering and procurement contracts.
•  an effective and friendly immigration agency, ports, customs and excise 
services.
•  a government that has zero-tolerance for corruption.
•  Building, promoting and safe-guarding a culture of self-reliance and col-
lective responsibility in the fight against corruption.
•  reinforcing the policy and sharpening the legal framework that will pre-
vent corruption.
•  strengthening the law enforcement agencies, namely, the prevention of 
Corruption Bureau, the police, the ethics secretariat and the permanent 
Commission of enquiry.
•  promoting the interface between Civil society and the government in a 
partnership to fight corruption.
•  inculcating in society the belief that transparency, integrity and account-
ability are virtues of good government and necessary bulwarks against 
corruption.23
23 the united republic of tanzania 1999: 6–7.
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these objectives reflect the recognition that the control of corruption is 
more than just a question of the right legal framework, law enforcement 
or public institutions. it recognises that especially in a under-resourced 
country, undergoing the rapid and fundamental structural changes wit-
nessed by tanzania in the past decade, anti-corruption efforts require a 
many-layered approach. operationally, therefore, the reforms are targeted 
in seven, mutually enhancing priority areas:
• rule of law and legal framework
• financial discipline and management
• procurement
• public education, awareness and sensitization of their rights
• public service reform
• whistle blowers and witness protection
• media24
the implementation of naCsap is primarily the responsibility of the 
national ministries, departments and agencies (mdas) themselves. they 
were required to report their progress through quarterly self-assessment 
reports to the president, via the ggCu.25 De facto the pCB manages the 
implementation of naCsap, although de iure the ggCu is responsible for 
the coordination and monitoring of naCsap’s implementation.
however, as mentioned above, the ggCu is severely constrained by 
its narrow mandate, limited to the collection and publication of the 
self-assessments, as well as its lack of staff and leadership. the report-
ing system suffers from further weaknesses. in particular, it is limited to 
reporting corruption cases, but not on reforms in management systems or 
procedures. also, external assessments are not included, for instance by 
citizens and ‘users’.26 apart from monitoring weaknesses, a key problem of 
naCsap was its confinement to central government institutions, exclud-
ing highly corruption-prone areas such as local government authorities. 
also, the role of civil society and the private sector in supporting the gov-
ernment in its anti-corruption efforts was underdefined. lastly, and not 
surprisingly, the implementation of naCsap suffered from a severe lack 
of human resources, both on the coordination and supervision level, as 
well as within the ministries, departments and agencies themselves.
24 the united republic of tanzania 1999: 10.
25 see www.repoa.or.tz/tgn/tgn.php for information on the quarterly self-assessment 
reports; for a synthesis of reforms see the united republic of tanzania 2006: 1–26.
26 for a detailed assessment of the implementation of naCsap see hussman/mmuya 
2007: 187–190.
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3.7. Governance Reforms under Mkapa: An Assessment
in sum, it can be seen that extensive governance reforms were undertaken 
under the auspices of naCsap, in particular legislative reforms, such as 
the public procurement act or the amendment of the prevention of Cor-
ruption act. no doubt that naCsap also served to create a greater public 
awareness and underline the political priority of anti-corruption reforms. 
however, the much-heralded fight against corruption has not lead to sig-
nificant results. one factor impeding its implementation that cannot be 
stressed enough, namely that the objectives, ambitious under any circum-
stance, were sought in a context of financially, technically and organisa-
tionally under-resourced institutions; also, the oversight and regulatory 
institutions tasked with institutionalising the reforms are completely 
new or fundamentally restructured. in other words, key institutions were 
themselves undergoing major reforms while at the same time required to 
perform sophisticated roles and functions.27
a second key factor are the multiple articulations of political will in 
the public sphere, manifested in a plethora of manifestos and policies, 
but at the same time conspicuous in its absence with regard to con-
crete measures. interestingly, within naCsap the importance of political 
will to achieve the challenging objectives is spelled out explicitly.28 the 
imploration of political will as a sort of a deus ex machina is telling, if evi-
dently neither horizontal accountability institutions nor social and political 
actors are in a position to keep the government’s performance in line with 
its promises and policies.
this takes us to the third factor. given the far-reaching social, political 
and economic implications of naCsap, it is surprising to note that the 
anti-corruption policies have been nearly entirely state and donor driven, 
with hardly any pressure coming from civil society. although it may be 
assumed that citizens bear the double brunt of corruption, by paying for 
public services and suffering from wasted public resources at the same 
time, a fatalistic or even accepting attitude towards corruption seems 
27 the overburdening of underresourced institutions and agencies was witnessed in 
various public agencies during the research for this case-study on the construction indus-
try. for an astute analysis highlighting precisely this aspect in tanzania’s public sector 
reform see therkildsen 2000.
28 “political Will refers to demonstrated intent of political actors such as is the case 
here in tanzania to attack perceived causes and effects of corruption at a systemic level. 
this corruption refers to an environment that involves the bureaucratic elite, politicians, 
businessmen and workers in embezzling public money at a large scale through various 
means” (the united republic of tanzania 1999: 9).
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to prevail. this apathy is partly a function of the virtual absence of civil 
society organisations that are not in some way tied to the state. tellingly, 
for instance, in 2003 the tanzanian chapter of transparency international 
was all but dysfunctional. the only civil society organisation explicitly 
addressing corruption was faCeit, which co-authored the annual report 
on Corruption in tanzania 2001. other organisations addressing corrup-
tion only did so through their own focal activities, such as education or 
human rights.29
the absence of strong civil society organisations is generally acknowl-
edged.30 in the case of corruption, civic apathy also seems to be a result of 
a general disenchantment and loss of confidence with the present govern-
ment’s anti-corruption policies. for although the fight against corruption 
still ranks high on the government’s rhetorical agenda, the political will to 
effectively sanction illegal, corrupt practices committed by public officials 
and effectively implement and institutionalise reforms was not evident. 
the stir and sense of a new start caused by the Warioba Commission’s 
report was not grasped, and the moment of setting examples instigat-
ing the necessary fundamental change passed without effect.31 although 
corruption and the problems it causes were openly talked about, corrupt 
29 examples of two of the most profiled ngos would be hakielimu with regard to edu-
cation (see under https://www.hakielimu.org), or the human rights Commission (hrC) 
with regard to human rights.
30 Consider this excerpt from a tanzania self-assessment report for nepad’s african 
peer review mechanism (aprm), authored by an official of the tanzanian trade union 
Council (tuCta), under the section ‘governance’: “the political and economic transition 
to a culture of decentralized multiparty democracy, after 30 years of highly centralized 
one party socialist system is in early stage [sic] [. . .]. although there exist a large number 
of union cooperatives, women and youth organizations, ethnic self-help associations and 
religious organizations, civil society organizations are not geared to an advocacy role nor 
is it structured to manage funds or implement large scale programmes. ngos are weak in 
terms of legal, financial and human resources and many are directly dependent on inter-
national support. democratization has lead to stronger human rights issues and tanzania 
has ratified most important conventions and rules of human rights, however, traditional 
and national laws combined with local customs and practices still restrict the rights of 
vulnerable groups in society [. . .] corruption is widespread phenomenon [sic] in tanzania 
hampering development in all segments of society” (kaaya, undated, but no earlier than 
2003: 3).
31 the importance of political opportunities and timing is illustrated by many cases, 
most notably in hong kong. the power of public support to instigate radical change can 
be witnessed in kenya after the January 2003 elections. against all odds, a new govern-
ment was elected, petty corruption disappeared nearly overnight, and grand corruption 
is being tackled head-on. the questions, as ever, is how long such enthusiasm and con-
certed action can last, once every-day problems have set in, political priorities shift, and 
the accused individuals and threatened actors have had time to organise themselves. 
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practices remained deeply entrenched in political and administrative 
processes. even the central institution devised to tackle corruption, the 
prevention of Corruption Bureau, can boast of no significant record of 
success. located within the president’s office and with only limited pow-
ers to prosecute, the current set-up of the pCB was evidently not condu-
cive to generating results that would bolster the public’s confidence in its 
independence and effectiveness.
Just how implicated the higher echelons of government and public 
administration was, is illustrated by following assessment of the Business 
times of tanzania:
it is no secret that senior officials who are at the receiving end of graft 
reports from the public are also invariably on the receiving end of bribes, 
either through their junior officers, or directly from bribe givers. no wonder 
no serious action is ever taken against the juniors by the seniors.
the level to which corruption has come in tanzania requires that the 
scourge must be tackled from top-down, and not the other way round. if 
heads of departments and other government institutions want it with a will 
today—and are unstintingly given the moral and actual support by those 
above them right up to the highest levels—then corruption would be effec-
tively cut in half tomorrow.32
although the president himself at the time was untarnished by accusa-
tions of corrupt behaviour, most of his colleagues in the ruling party CCm 
were tainted. these rumours erupted in a political scandal in february 
2003 when former mp dr hassy kitine raised strong allegations against 
most government leaders. the evidence suggested that there was more 
than a hint of truth to his allegations. the president himself was smooth 
in his reactions to a matter that conceivably could have given him the 
opportunity to cleanse his cabinet. his response was to withhold bold 
judgement and demand more evidence:
president mkapa, who is also the CCm national chairman, said he would 
personally like to see corruption suspects being prosecuted for the crime 
and that once their offences are proved beyond reasonable doubt they 
should be punished without leniency.
‘But how can we do so if we don’t have the evidence? ours is a coun-
try that adheres to the rule of law,’ he said, adding that all suspects should 
remain innocent unless they are proved to be guilty.33
32 “tackle graft head-on, not via fattened remunerative sops” in Business times, friday, 
7 february 2003, p. 2.
33 “mkapa wants proof on graft” in daily news, monday, 3 february 2003, p. 1.
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the continual reference to the rule of law by politicians and others in the 
public discourse on corruption was very notable. this image was reflected 
and articulated in multifaceted ways and places, in spite of a deep under-
standing by citizens of the actual practices that were institutionalised 
within the justice system,34 and despite relatively overt official practices 
running counter to the core principles of the rule of law. for example, 
the elections in october 2000 were seriously flawed in Zanzibar, and the 
subsequent riots were violently quashed by the government, resulting in 
several deaths, an un-apologetic government and international outcry.35 
according to many interviewees, a less overt practice of the ruling party 
CCm was to maintain an increasingly firm grip over all key positions in the 
public sector. this power was used to control the access to political and 
economic resources, thereby wielding the potential careers and prospects 
of individuals as a very effective tool in the fight to toe the government’s 
line. members of opposition parties were systematically barred from any 
kind of true political power, and vocal dissident voices are quashed by 
such effective means as regular harassments by the tax revenue authori-
ties, the prevention of re-appointments in public institutions, or the de 
facto exclusion from public tenders.
although the political climate in tanzania was not overtly repressive, 
the reforms aimed at democratisation did not achieve their substantive 
objective. De jure, in 2003 tanzania was not a one-party state anymore, 
but de facto it remained authoritarian, although the nature of authoritari-
anism had changed.36 Whereas in nyerere’s era it was ideologically and 
institutionally underpinned, the shifts in the political and economic land-
scape led to a situation where democratisation and liberalisation were 
implemented on the surface. however, underneath this formally libera-
lised surface, the grip of the party was as firmly entrenched as ever. politi-
cal monopolisation and public offices as means to certain wealth were a 
strong deterrent to a genuine democratisation of state and society. this 
political system was firmly embedded in a culture of ingrained dominance 
34 see the findings from the lawyers Workshop in the state of Corruption report 
in tanzania 2001 (esrf/faCeit 2001). this impression was also consistently confirmed 
in the interviews with all lawyers, engineers, constructors, architects, researchers and 
journalists.
35 see amnesty international 2000. “tanzania—a human rights Brief for election 
observers. october 2000”. ai index afr 56/13 /00; or the u.s. state department’s “Country 
report on human rights practices: tanzania 2000”, Bureau of democracy, human rights, 
and labor (23 february 2001), available under http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/
af/839.htm (last accessed 28 october 2009). 
36 for a detailed analysis confirming this assessment see skinlo 2007 (especially 
Chapter 5). 
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of the state over society, and the ideology of unity. it was evident that true 
public debates between opposing views and interests or between differing 
factions were very rare and viewed with suspicion. disputes or challenges 
between the public, the private sector and/or (more rarely) civil society 
were routinely addressed by a system of social compacts, a mechanism 
of gathering all parties together, be it in form of a roundtable, workshop, 
or the establishment of a commission. although this political culture 
explicitly and implicitly referred to the ideology of consensual, integrated 
politics of african socialism, it was more likely a rhetorical devie to pre-
vent truly competitive politics. many of these social compacts acted in 
an advisory function to the government, but were not endowed with any 
actual decision-making power. although the political and economic are-
nas had opened up, concomitantly the establishment—as crystallised by 
the members of the ruling party (CCm)—had appropriated these new and 
lucrative spaces and effectively entrenched their control.
Questioned on the impact of the pluralisation of political institutions 
in an interview,37 an advocate harshly condemned the ‘sham democratisa-
tion’ that was taking place:
multi-partyism has actually stifled democracy. the CCm is in control of key 
positions, and the mps are nominated by the party, so party discipline is 
high. the opposition is too weak. now it is actually risky to support the 
opposition. now all professionals and intelligentsia are sucked up by the 
CCm and the government. even internal criticism is stifled. everybody’s on 
the bandwagon, toeing the line.
this systematic appropriation of institutional reforms in the interest of the 
ruling elite was underlined by a culture of top-down consultation and dia-
logue with stakeholders. stemming from the socialist order and enforced 
by donor-driven demands of popular participation, the tanzanian govern-
ment nurtured political debates not as oppositional and fractional con-
flicts, but in the form of round table discussions and social compacts. this 
participatory smokescreen simultaneously defuses any critique of authori-
tarianism. elaborating her perspective on the current politics and political 
decision-making processes in tanzania, a social scientist exclaimed:
now the new politics are incorporated into the state agenda. interests can 
only be defended within the state, there are no other spaces apart from gov-
ernment. Because in reality the government stands for the private sector 
and civil society. Conflicts are solved ‘amicably’—how can that be true?
37 if not referenced otherwise, all the direct quotes in this chapter stem from interviews 
conducted in January and february 2003 in dar es salaam, tanzania. 
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in other words, a sense of democratic deliberation was invoked in name 
only, whereas these forums or social compacts actually served to white-
wash the consolidation of authoritarian decision-making processes.
the key features of the political and administrative system framing 
politics and anti-corruption reforms, i.e. rhetorics rather than deeds, 
and increasingly authoritarian ruling party, and culture of appropriation 
through ‘consultative’ rather than true deliberative processes also framed 
the agency of professional associations in the construction industry. in 
the following sections the case-study zooms into the impact of gover-
nance policies on professional associations. setting the stage, first the 
main actors, agencies and policies will be briefly introduced, before a 
qualitative analysis of professional associations and political spaces will 
be undertaken.
4. Governance Policies in the Construction Industry
this section is intended to provide an overview over the actors, the poli-
cies and the dynamics of governance policies in the construction industry 
in 2003. invariably, the reality of a sector or policy is far more messy and 
intractable than a static and reductionist snapshot, especially in a con-
text of rapidly changing regulatory framework. still, this is an attempt to 
render a more tactile and plastic sense of the institutional topography 
framing corruption and anti-corruption in the construction industry at 
the time.
4.1. Actors and Agencies
Ministry of Works (MoW ): the main state actor in the construction indus-
try was the ministry of Works, which was responsible for planning and 
procurement related to the construction and maintenance of the national 
road network and public buildings. so-called executive agencies had been 
established only very recently, with the objective to increase efficiency 
and effectiveness in the delivery of the moW’s services. these agencies, 
such as buildings (tanzania Building agency, est. 2002) or roads (tan-
roads, est. 2001) were responsible for managing the planning, construction 
and/or maintenance of certain public services. they were public entities 
affiliated to the moW, but autonomous with regard to funding and plan-
ning strategies, thereby considerably reducing the scope for discretion 
and increasing financial accountability.
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Central Tender Board (CTB): the Central tender Board, based in the 
ministry of finance, was responsible for the regulation of public procure-
ment practice and for the approval and issue of the tenders. it adminis-
tered procurement of usd 3 million or higher and reviewed procurement 
between usd 1 million and usd 3 million. regional tender boards were 
responsible for tenders of less than usd 1 million. problematic was its dual 
mandate of regulation as well as issuing public tenders, which gave rise to 
a risk of conflict of interest. however, according to the Cpar (World Bank 
2003a), the CtB was generally thought to be relatively corruption-free.
National Construction Council (NCC): the most long-standing and prob-
ably most important body of the industry is the national Construction 
Council (nCC). the nCC was established in 1981 with the task of sup-
porting the development of the local construction industry, whose “per-
formance was poor” (according to their website).38 in the eighties, given 
the socialist policies and nationalised economy of tanzania, the nCC had 
hardly any private enterprises and no organised representatives of the pri-
vate sector as counterparts. it was part of the nCC’s mission to initiate the 
founding of private associations. although it was formally located within 
the moW, it was in fact the principal interface between the private and 
the public sector as a result of its comprehensive coordinating function 
and policy work. the nCC’s main fields of activity were the following: 
planning, co-ordination and formulation of strategic interventions; tech-
nical advisory services, such as project auditing, general consulting, as 
well as the publication of arbitration rules and institutionalising dispute 
settlements; development support services, such as specific training pro-
grammes, or spearheading the establishment of a construction industry 
trust fund; productivity and quality management with the industry; infor-
mation support system ranging from business publications to statistical 
data. the range of activities reflects the importance of the nCC for the 
construction industry. their approach focused on professional, technical 
and financial capacity-building. the nCC regarded controlling corruption 
as one of the key measures to support the construction industry.39
Regulatory Boards: the liberalisation of the tanzanian economy in the 
eighties called for the establishment of regulatory institutions. But only 
in 1997 the architects and Quantitative surveyors registration Board 
38 see under http://www.ncc.or.tz/index.html (last accessed 21 october 2009).
39 listed as point 5 (out of five) of the nCC’s objectives. for a detailed profile of the 
nCC and further information see under www.twiga.com|ncc.
180 chapter three
(aQsrB), the Contractors registration Board (CrB) and the engineers 
registration Board (erB)40 were established to register, regulate and 
support professionals in the construction industry. these bodies define 
and ensure professional standards and qualifications for each profession 
through mandatory registration. furthermore, they act as counterparts for 
individual enterprises and professional associations to address challenges 
and problems in the industry. the registration boards incorporate codes 
of conduct and anti-corruption clauses in their registration process.
Professional Associations: professional associations in the construction 
industry could be divided into two categories: ‘first-generation’ associa-
tions that represent the established professions of engineers, architects, 
and quantity surveyors, and ‘second-generation’ associations that repre-
sent contractors. the very first association was the institution of engi-
neers (iet) (1972), founded on the initiative of tanzania engineers that 
had graduated in nairobi, for at that time tanzania did not yet offer an 
own engineering degree. the iet was modelled on the kenyan institution 
of engineers. only in 1975 was the first domestic course in engineering 
offered at the university of dar es salaam. a sign of the gradual opening 
towards a more liberalised economy, the mid-eighties saw a concentrated 
effort in establishing organised professional efforts. the governmental 
forerunner was the establishment of the nCC (see above), under whose 
wings several key professional associations were founded in a short period 
of time, such as the association of Consulting engineers tanzania (aCet) 
(1985), the architects association tanzania (aat) (1985) or the tanza-
nian institute of Quantitative surveyors (tiQs) (1985). apart from their 
commitment to set professional standards and improve the policy frame-
work in the construction industry, these associations had been engaged 
in regional and international apex organisations right from the beginning. 
together with the iet, they were the main formally organised represen-
tatives of professional interests of these ‘established’ professions in the 
construction industry.41
40 for further information see http://www.erb.go.tz/. 
41 the 2003 website of the nCC lists a total of eight professional associations (see http://
www.intafrica.com/ncc/services.html; last accessed 25 march 2010), of which six have been 
included in this case-study. this case-study includes one that is not listed (Cata), as it had 
only just been established in 2003. the associations not included in this case-study, but 
mentioned on the website, are the association of electrical Contractors tanzania (aeCt), 
the association of Valuers and estate agents (tiVea), and the association of Quantity sur-
veyors (tiQs). the former two were never mentioned in any of the discussions as relevant 
actors, and didn’t appear in any of the policy-making forums and, as will be seen in the 
case-study of 2009, were disbanded; the latter was not included for lack of contacts. 
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only in the late nineties and early years of the new millennium did 
the formerly unregulated and unorganised contractors begin to form as 
corporations. this was a direct result of the increased liberalisation of the 
economy and the new demands and competitive pressures exerted on 
informal professions. in 1997, the tanzanian Civil engineering Contrac-
tors association (taCeCa) was established; as the name indicates, it is 
the body incorporating only Civil engineers. six years later, in 2003, the 
Contractors association of tanzania (Cata) was founded with the explicit 
aim to represent all contractors, not merely a specialised sub-section.
4.2. Governance Policies
Construction Industry Policy (CIP): reflecting the novelty of the regula-
tion of the construction industry, it may not be surprising that until very 
recently, tanzania’s construction industry did not have an overall national 
policy-framework. this gap was closed by the Construction industry 
policy that was adopted in february 2003.42 the prime objective of the 
Cip is to support and facilitate the capacity and effectiveness of the local 
construction industry by clearly identifying priority objectives and policy 
directions.
overall, the policy sought to achieve two objectives:
1.  “implement policies that are deliberately designed to develop and sustain 
the local construction industry [. . .]
2.  [attain] “a comprehensive policy to ensure compliance with the national 
social and economic development objectives and goals” (the united 
republic of tanzania 2003: 7).
in other words, not only is the importance of construction industry as an 
integral part of social and economic development recognised, but also the 
need to actively coordinate and support the local industry:
the goal of the construction industry policy is to develop an internationally 
competitive industry that will be able to undertake most of the construction 
projects in tanzania and export its services and products and ensure value 
for money to industry clients as well as environmental responsibility in the 
implementation of construction projects (the united republic of tanzania 
2003: 3).
42 in fact, one of the very first copies of the officially printed version of the Cip, still in 
an unpolished a4-format, was handed to the author by the director of the nCC in febru-
ary 2003. 
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the key targets of the tanzanian construction industry policy constituted 
enhancing local capacity, skills and know-how; supporting financial, tech-
nical and human resources, and generally increasing the competitiveness 
of the local construction industry. for our purposes most interesting was 
the explicit prioritisation of anti-corruption efforts. “ridding the construc-
tion industry of corruption” is listed as one of the ten major challenges 
(the united republic of tanzania 2003: 7), an explicit confirmation that 
corrupt practices in construction were pervasive. the measures formulated 
to fight corruption were cross-cutting. it was hoped that by improving the 
capacity of both the local construction enterprises as well as the public 
sector, the necessary conditions should be generated for the efficient, 
transparent and effective implementation and management of construc-
tion projects, and thereby the prevention corrupt practices through more 
accountable mechanisms (the united republic of tanzania 2003: 8–11).
Public Procurement Act (PPA): procurement was identified as one of the 
seven priority areas in the naCsap, aiming for: “strict adherence to and 
transparent administration of tendering and procurement procedures” 
(naCsap 1999: 10). the most important measure to achieve this was the 
passing of the new procurement act and financial management in 2001. 
this was a major step for the construction industry, for the former state of 
weak, inexistent and even contradictory laws and regulations were fuelling 
discretion, poor quality work, legal insecurity and manifold corruption. 
under pressure from the donor community, the government of tanzania 
ploddingly initiated the draft process. the process involved professional 
associations and selected experts who were invited to voice their opinion. 
however, the actual drafting and writing of the legislation was entirely in 
the hands of the government and ministries. although civil society actors 
were routinely consulted, the interviews with participants and represen-
tatives of professional associations revealed that hardly any of their sug-
gestions were included in the final draft approved by parliament. “Why 
call me to participate? What’s the point?” was the bitter exclamation of a 
chairman of a first-generation association who had invested considerable 
(unpaid) time and effort in combing through the drafts, commenting the 
provisions and justifying amendments. this is one example of the image 
of a social compact that the government seeks to portray a decision- 
making process that involves all stakeholders in seemingly participatory 
and non-contentious way. in practice, however, the outcome was the 
glossing over adversarial opinions and interests and the pretence of dem-
ocratic participation in policy-making by non-state actors, whilst in fact 
securing the decision-making power of the government.
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the main body of the ppa was derived from international best prac-
tices. as the first legislation consolidating and regulating public pro-
curement practices on a national level, it represented an important 
contribution to sound governance in the construction industry. however, 
there were some blatant weaknesses. for instance, several key areas are 
excluded from the scope of the ppa, areas known to be most vulnerable 
to abuse and embezzlement of public funds. for instance, the act was not 
applicable to procurement involving military equipment, defence forces, 
or arms and ammunition (section 2); equally it does not apply to local 
government authorities (section 14), which are renowned for their discre-
tionary use of political power.43 not surprisingly, the state of Corruption 
in tanzania report 2002 concluded that these exclusions “give an impres-
sion that the government is not prepared to expose all corrupt practices, 
and that it may even overlook certain cases of corruption if it considers 
them politically sensitive” (esrf/faCeit 2002: 119).
the professionals’ assessment of the ppa varied significantly, depend-
ing on their professional standing. some labelled it “a disaster”, because it 
systematically discriminates instead of protects local consultants. nearly 
all pointed out that the pre-qualifications of large tenders were nearly 
impossible for local contractors to meet, even for the bigger companies, 
such as the provisions with regard to credit-lines, turn-over, equipment 
and experience. others criticise the bureaucratic attitude and slow pro-
cedures of the implementing authorities. at the same time, it was con-
tended that “they will learn”. and one respondent, a senior engineer, took 
the sedate and opaque view by commenting that “it’s good to have it in 
place, it makes people feel comfortable”.
5. Corruption and Professional Associations in the  
Tanzanian Construction Industry
5.1. Impact and Extent of Corruption
the configuration of the construction industry in tanzania can only be 
understood against its historical backdrop. as little as twenty years ago 
virtually no private sector construction industry beyond very small-scale, 
informal activities existed. only in the early eighties the support and 
43 see for instance esrf/faCeit 2003: 83–88; for a detailed case-study see fjeldstad/
semboja 2000 or fjeldstad 2002.
184 chapter three
development of a local construction industry became part of the politi-
cal agenda. the state as the main economic player was also the domi-
nant stakeholder in all larger building-projects; the public sector planned, 
funded and undertook the projects, mostly by mandating foreign consult-
ing and construction firms to undertake more complex work. until then 
no local construction companies and only a handful of tanzanian engi-
neers or architects had existed. the local construction industry, therefore, 
has to be conceived in terms of a comparatively young and nascent sec-
tor, which was still in the process of asserting itself in the national eco-
nomic and political environment.44 it is important to bear in mind that 
the recent history of a state-run economy and little more than a decade 
of privatisation shaped the institutional framework of the construction 
industry, in which the public sector plays the central role, and which is 
characterised serious national development and capacity problems.
generally it can be observed that public works and construction is one 
of the most corruption prone sectors worldwide, both in terms of spread 
and height of bribery, leading the ranks even before arms and defence.45 
the same holds true for tanzania. for instance, the Warioba Commission 
devoted about 10% of its report just to corruption in the road construc-
tion sector (Warioba report 1996). the state of Corruption report 2001 
estimates that about 25–30% of the government’s procurement budget in 
tanzania was lost due to corruption, bribery and fraud.46 the impact of 
this figure can be gleaned from the fact that the procurement of goods, 
services and works accounts for more than half of the government’s entire 
expenditure budget (annual report on the state of Corruption in tanzania 
2001: 125).47 as Judge Warioba pointed out at a Workshop on Corruption 
44 this is underlined by the fact that only in february 2003 the Construction industry 
policy was formally initiated.
45 When it comes to grand corruption, the rule of thumb postulates that the higher the 
public expenditure, the higher the corruption (moody-stuart 1997). this was confirmed 
in the first business sector survey of transparency international, the Bribe payers index 
(Bpi), where public works contracts and construction ranked first (i.e. with the highest 
corruption propensity), ahead of arms and defence industry and power. see survey results 
under Bribe payers index at www.transparency.org. 
46 this figure is quoted again and again, even on governmental websites. however, it is 
not necessarily based on sound methodologies, indicating the need for a more solid data 
base (see for instance hoap group (undated), under www.tzdpg.or.tz/uploads/media/
procurement_report_final.pdf; last accessed 25 march 2010), or the Cpar (World Bank 
2003a: 67, para. 152).
47 for instance, the Warioba report analysed 24 completed road projects between 
1990–1995 and found that cost increases reached 59% of the original contracts. although 
these increases may also have other causes, such as changed tors or unpredicted 
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prevention in the Construction industry in april 2001, the pattern of cor-
ruption in the construction industry indicated systematic and deliberate 
facilitation of corruption on the higher level, and the general acceptance 
of corrupt practices on all levels (the united republic of tanzania 2001: 
4), a view underlined by other speakers in the course of the Workshop.
all of the interviewees of this case-study, both in the private and in 
the public sector, confirmed that in spite of the institutional and legisla-
tive reforms corruption in the construction industry is still rampant. some 
of the interviewees contended that the ppa itself was not adequate to 
provide a sound framework for public procurement; others acknowledged 
that the framework, whilst not perfect, was a significant improvement to 
the previous situation; others again, whilst not happy with the present 
situation, pointed out that the institutional changes and reforms were 
still very new, and would become more effective with a time lag. every-
one, however, underscored that corruption was still an integral part of 
public procurement. given the newness of the ppa, this could also be a 
function of time within which a sound legislative framework facilitates 
the gradual institutionalisation of a culture of propriety. the interviewed 
representatives of professional associations, however, were very guarded 
in their optimism. the distrust of and dependence on public officials, the 
evidently deeply engrained abuse of public power, and the sense of impu-
nity by public officials in tendering of public procurement still was very 
dominant. this view is confirmed by the World Bank’s Country procure-
ment assessment report (Cpar) (World Bank 2003a), which identified 
“malpractices in the selection of consultants, appointment of suppliers, 
pre-qualification of contractors, tender evaluation, contract award, issuing 
variation orders, evaluation of claims, dissemination of information, certi-
fying and making payments” (World Bank 2003a: 67, para. 150). although 
the mentioned ‘malpractices’ need not automatically imply corruption, 
the information given by the interviewees indicate that corrupt practices 
do indeed feature in virtually every step of the procurement process.
one consulting engineer stated that corruption in the construction 
industry had reached “saturation point”: hardly a step in the tender could 
be undertaken without involving some corrupt practice, and hardly a 
party of the construction project is untainted by corruption. as one 
architect exclaimed exasperated, “it is impossible to resist the client’s 
complications, the systematic expansion of the initial quotes points to embezzlement and 
misappropriation.
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corruption”, meaning that the pressure from public officials on profes-
sionals to ‘deliver’ a cut from the project was as good as impossible to 
evade, given the fact that current and future income depends largely on 
being ‘cooperative’ with public sector officials. saliently, this only seemed 
to apply to parastatal or government projects; all interviewees stated that 
corruption was inexistent when dealing with private clients. however, 
given the small volume of private clients and the overall dominance of 
construction in the public sector, at the time this was a merely academic 
point from the perspective of professionals. however, it did raise an inter-
esting question when related to the ongoing process of deregulation and 
privatisation of formerly public services. the anecdotal evidence available 
seems to suggest that the abolishment of the parastatals did indeed lead 
to a substantial decrease in corruption and concomitant increase in effi-
ciency and quality.48
articulations on corruption by the professionals were imbued with a 
sense of loss of professionalism and integrity, outlined with various degrees 
of agitation. this loss was emphasised with references to its damaging 
effect on the public interest in terms of wasted or misappropriated public 
resources, with project costs systematically inflated or else the quality of 
work and inputs undercut. project designs based on maximising corrupt 
profits evidently have serious repercussions on the quality of public con-
struction: the structure of public buildings may not be adequately calcu-
lated, thus constituting a serious hazard to public security; the thickness 
of tarmac coverage on roads may only be a lower quality or only a per-
centage of the stipulated thickness; the materials utilised for public build-
ings are of poor quality; the fixtures and fittings do not adhere to required 
standards, or the quality of the cement suffers, etc. examples abound of 
failures of public service, including negligent or even deliberate endan-
gering of public safety—a problem particularly salient when it comes to 
the construction of public buildings, such as hospitals or schools, or key 
infrastructure, such as bridges. the deterioration of infrastructure such as 
roads due to technical ‘short cuts’ as a result of corruption have a more 
creeping but not less costly effect.49
48 although this observance is encouraging, the fact that parastatals were quagmires of 
inefficiency, discretion and embezzlement shows that even a slight increase in transpar-
ency and accountability would have a noticeable impact. also, the concomitant privati-
sation of key companies produced many opportunities for corrruption (for evidence see 
Chachage 1996, temu/due 2000, or fischer 2006).
49 the information in this section is based on the interviews with professionals and 
experts. it is consistent with findings from more general studies on corruption in the 
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according to some interviewees, the nineties also saw a plethora of 
“bogus contractors” [sic], whose only purpose was to access lucrative pub-
lic tenders, mostly in collusion with public officials. although this practice 
had been curtailed by the privatisation and deregulation of parastatals as 
well as the more stringent regulatory framework, the public procurement 
process was still rife with abuse and manipulation, if possibly in more 
subtle forms. as the literature on corruption in public procurement shows 
and the professionals confirmed, corrupt practices in construction are 
notoriously difficult to monitor, especially given the kind of complex and 
technical calculations involved in construction projects.50 these include 
project costs that are inflated by unnecessary or overpriced expenditures, 
or ballooning of the quantity and measurements of certain inputs. several 
informants assured me that cases of even grossly inflated project costs 
were not isolated incidents: according to most interviewed professionals, 
there is virtually no road construction in tanzania which was not system-
atically overpriced. the same applied to building projects of parastatals 
and state institutions.51 these problems were exacerbated by the fact that 
although the procurement procedures have been standardised under the 
ppa, at least on a national level, there was still no proper technical audit-
ing or monitoring of final project costs, which made the ‘adjustment’ of 
projects costs a sitting duck.52
construction industry, such as kenny 2007, Ware et al. 2007, or goldie-scot 2008. fur-
ther examples of corrupt practices were given by the professionals in abundance. for 
instance, before the public procurement act was passed, collusion between public officials 
and bogus ‘brief-case’ professionals were apparently the rule, with all the ensuing severe 
problems of quality and security of work. now it seems that the public procurement act 
has indeed weeded out sham professionals, but not the pressure to corrupt: if you as an 
architect or constructor or quantity surveyor have to bribe, you cut corners somewhere 
else (see also below). 
50 Just to illustrate the extent of these cost inflations, an architect described one cur-
rent case of a big project commissioned by a parastatal, saliently with an explicitly social 
objective, where the overall costs were swollen from the necessary usd 5–10 million to a 
sum nearer usd 60 million. looking at the scandals that have been uncovered since 2003 
(for instance the twin tower case of the Bank of tanzania involving corruptly inflated 
construction costs of usd 352 million which, according to experts, are about double the 
figure they would cost in london or tokyo; see http://www.bongotz.com/news.html; last 
accessed 20 april 2010), the figures given by the architect seem very plausible. 
51 at this point of the research, the impact of the legislative and regulatory reforms, for 
instance the newly established tanzania Building agency, could not yet be assessed, as 
they were still very new. 
52 the problems relating to inadequate or inexistent auditing of project costs diag-
nosed by the interviewees were confirmed ex post by the implementation plan of the 
Cip. under objective 8.2.8. ‘promoting the prevention of Corruption in the industry’ a 
policy direction is listed as follows: “instituting mandatory technical auditing of all major 
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there are, however, further, less explored effects of the practical effects 
of corruption on the discursive space of professionals that emerged clearly 
from the interviews. these have only indirect implications for public wel-
fare, but direct impacts on the sense of professional integrity and identity on 
the one hand and the economic conditions of professionals on the other.
5.2. ‘We survive through corruption, and we perish through corruption’: 
Perspectives of Professional Associations
although there was no consent emerging from the interviews with regard 
to the extent of the effects of the governance reforms is debated, they had 
led to some degree of improved quality of tendering and public procure-
ment. “You can’t just buy work anymore”, an engineer assured me, “you 
get more value for money”.53 at first sight, this could imply a strength-
ened governance framework for professionals working in the construc-
tion industry, and hence greater protection and predictability of their 
economic spaces. however, at second sight the situation looked far more 
sketchy.
the public sector was the biggest client of the construction industry, 
both in terms of the absolute numbers of tenders as well as of relative 
financial volume. professionals had no sustainable economic alternative 
than gaining access to and being awarded publicly financed projects. 
architects, engineers or contractors were all “hungry for jobs”, as several 
interviewees confirmed in the very same words. according to the inter-
viewees, public officials from the lowest to the highest level were keenly 
aware of the discretionary power they wielded. “the tender officers take all 
bribes [from all the parties submitting the tender, lk] and award the tender 
to the highest bidder”, an architect complained. the bribes were evidently 
demanded on every echelon of the civil service, from the small public offi-
cial, who will only hand out the tender documents against an additional 
fee, to the minister, who has a certain standard of living to maintain. the 
bribes or percentages were usually either common knowledge, or directly 
disclosed to the parties in question. in other words, in some cases the 
level of corrupt ‘commission’ seem to be predictable, and other cases the 
amount was up to the discretion of the involved public officials.
pubic-financed projects and any other projects where there shall be suspicion of malprac-
tice” (mid 2006: 56). 
53 although he also pointed out that in spite of the reforms of the ppa, there is no 
monitoring of the final project costs, which is an open invitation to inflate project costs—
not for the tender, where cost-effectiveness is stipulated as a key criterion, but after the 
tender has been awarded. 
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such endemic corrupt practices, i.e. a situation in which personal 
enrichment through public resources in or beyond the grey zone between 
legality and illegality is the norm, not the exception, is not necessarily 
problematic. a ‘corrupt’ practice is a social practice like any other, framed 
by own, particular logics. these need not necessarily constrain the articu-
latory space of professionals, on the contrary. as the literature review on 
corruption shows, such practices conceivably can and do open up spaces 
of political, economic and social agency. applied to the situation that 
the professionals in the construction industry found themselves in, one 
could argue that as long as they can materialise their professional activi-
ties through the acquisition of tenders and projects there is no apparent 
reason why they should oppose such practices. this is what one construc-
tor meant when he remarked, “corruption is a higher way of competition”. 
detached from a moral judgement, in an essentially capitalist rationale, 
corruption is just part and parcel of doing business, just like ‘ordinary’ 
costing, at which some entrepreneurs are more skilful and successful 
than others.
dwelling for a moment on this line of thought, the responses to the 
interviews indicated that undoubtedly some entrepreneurs gain from 
these corrupt networks and transactions. however, it was equally clear 
that even established professionals were struggling under the financial 
burden and the level of obstruction put forward by corrupt public offi-
cials. “the majority of companies suffer financial losses through corrup-
tion, they have nothing to gain from bribing”, an established engineer 
underlined. the main problem facing professionals was that corruption 
cuts directly into their already meagre profit margin and threatens their 
economic survival. put dramatically, it was a matter of survival. the 
dilemma was summed up in the words of an experienced and success-
ful constructor and consultant: “We survive through corruption, and we 
perish through corruption”. With every corrupt transaction professionals 
undertake they were actually undermining their own livelihood—not 
to mention their professional standards. in this way professionals in the 
construction industry were continually caught between a rock and a hard 
place, forced to weigh the financial cost of a bribe against the opportu-
nity costs of an unawarded tender. according to an architect, the bottom 
line was very simple: “uncooperative” [sic] professionals are not awarded 
tenders; “our survival is at stake, which the clients abuse”.54 although all 
professional associations and their members were pressing for the respect 
54 for a more general discussion of this dilemma see koechlin 2007.
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and acknowledgement of professional standards, the individual entrepre-
neurs felt trapped in an economic bind. the situation was rendered more 
impossible by the fact that bribes or other corrupt deals did not neces-
sarily increase the chances of being awarded the tender. looked at this 
way, corruption is indeed a higher form of competition, but with a darker 
twist: corruption does not facilitate business transaction, on the contrary. 
paradoxically, it actually increases the unpredictability of doing business 
rather than decreasing it.
there was an additional powerful economic factor squeezing the profit 
margins of the professionals, and that was the increase of competition. 
Whereas up to the late eighties and early nineties there had been only 
very few, small local companies and some big foreign companies, in the 
late nineties there was a massive increase of registered local engineers and 
constructors as well a substantial growth of foreign companies, especially 
from the east.55 the foreign companies are mostly involved in specific 
donor-funded projects from their home countries (which was standard-
practice and constitutes a serious problem in itself),56 but increasingly 
they were taking part in the official tenders of all sizes at highly competi-
tive rates. one consulting engineer estimated that just due to the influx of 
Chinese contractors the prices in construction had gone down by about 
one third. so although the situation for local contractors had improved in 
one regard, as the budget allocation to public procurement in construc-
tion had been significantly increased in the last decade, with a concomi-
tant increase in tenders and projects and hence job opportunities, the 
growth of the local competition as well as greater foreign competition 
stepped up the pressure on professionals.
55 according to estimates from the erB, foreign companies only constitute about 3% of 
all companies and undertake about 80% of the work; which leaves the remaining 97%, all 
very small to at best medium sized companies to compete for the 20% of the work. mostly, 
domestic companies work as sub-contractors to foreign companies.
56 this is evidently a big problem for the local construction industry, namely that their 
marginalisation as to know-how and experience is in fact systematically entrenched by 
implicitly or explicitly excluding them from foreign funded projects. this has partly a func-
tional explanation: most construction firms do not have the capacity or the expertise to 
do large-scale, technically demanding projects. But even here local participation, e.g. by 
breaking bids into smaller, more manageable projects, is “a very thorny issue”, as a chair-
man of a consultants’ association cryptically remarked. donors seem to routinely favour 
their home industry, and the government seems to be still caught in a bias against the local 
industry—an aspect which would merit more systematic attention. the Cip addresses the 
problem by identifying “inappropriate contract packaging of works which favour foreign 
firms in donor-funded projects” and “[u]nfavourable donor conditionalities which tend to 
marginalize local construction enterprises” (mid 2003: 7). 
 democratic spaces in the making?  191
notably, governance reforms can also have unintended consequences. 
paradoxically, in one way they rendered the professionals even more vul-
nerable. in spite of the flaws of the new procurement procedures it had 
become increasingly difficult for the professionals to randomly inflate 
project costs. to ‘deliver’ the demanded (often shameless) bribes to public 
officials, they now had to dip into their own pockets. in many cases they 
could simply not afford to do this.57 the gist of the interviews, whether 
with tiny one-man-enterprises or with representatives of established, rela-
tively large firms of twenty or more employees, was that the financial pres-
sure exerted through corrupt demands of the civil servants was strangling. 
this additional financial pressure posed particularly serious problems for 
the micro- and small enterprises; they did not get the chance of accumu-
lating any profit without it being pocketed by some official, and they were 
rendered even more vulnerable by the fact that their industry was charac-
terised by the lack of supportive institutional mechanisms, such as finan-
cial credit facilities or other collaterals to draw upon, by unfavourable tax 
regimes, unfavourable working environment with regard to salaries, safety 
or health, and erratic work-opportunities.58
it comes as no surprise, then, that professional associations were key 
to problematizing corruption in the construction industry in public, by 
linking the problem of corruption to the problems of infrastructure devel-
opment, public welfare and official government policies. in particular, it 
seems that one workshop constituted a crystallisation point, the Work-
shop on Corruption prevention, organised under the auspices of the min-
istry of Works in march 2001. the workshop brought together all the main 
stakeholders of the construction industry.59 professional associations evi-
dently played a catalytic role in making this workshop happen. several 
interviewees confirmed that was the first time the problem of corruption 
57 the case of one contractor was reported where the official had demanded a bribe 
of usd 40,000 for the award of a particular project, although the bid of the entrepreneur 
in question had been the most competitive. although the contractor was prepared to pay 
to get the award, he could only afford to offer usd 10,000. the result was that he was 
disqualified and the project was awarded to someone with greater financial liquidity than 
him. even if he had been in a position to inflate the project costs to regain the costs of 
corruption, the lack of financial liquidity prevented him being awarded the contract in 
the first place.
58 these problems were emphasised by the interviewees from both the private and the 
public sector, and they are explicitly acknowledged in the Cip (see Cip 2003: 6, section 3.3. 
‘performance Constraints’). 
59 see the united republic of tanzania 2001 for details on issues addressed and 
participants.
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in the construction industry had been openly addressed by all stakehold-
ers, and underlined the way in which professional associations had articu-
lated corruption in the public sphere and sought to inscribe their own 
interests and demands in the official discourse.
5.3. ‘They are blind and deaf ’: Perspectives on Public Officials
the unanimous opinion of all respondents was that corruption in the con-
struction industry is driven by the public sector. a representative of the 
engineers registration Board observed that “the problem is low prestige 
and low salaries of public officials. Both affects their integrity and their 
motivation. the combination of low living standards and a high status 
of wealthy people creates an environment that is conducive to demand-
ing bribes”. indeed, the wage levels in the public sector were significantly 
lower than in the private sector.60 for a graduated engineer without much 
experience the ratio was estimated to be about 1: 4, with the discrepancy 
growing at every level.61 looking at the costs of living, civil servants were 
under real pressure to seek for additional income, legally or otherwise. 
most professionals displayed an astute sense of the economic restraints 
facing small public officials—which is not to say that they didn’t suffer 
from the harassment and trouble caused by petty corruption. still, there 
was palpable empathy for the pressure to be corrupt in the lower cadre, 
as a product of economic constraints. as an engineer replied, “the basic 
issue is subsistence”, i.e. the subsistence of the public officials, some of 
whose wage-levels barely met everyday needs. the understanding of this 
was echoed in many different statements.
this discerning attitude may also have stemmed from the fact that most 
engineers and contractors were themselves former civil servants, not sur-
prising given that the formalised private sector was a relatively new phe-
nomenon in tanzania. in many cases, the interviewed professionals had 
been in the same departments or positions as the ones harassing them. 
60 for the construction industry in tanzania, see for instance the Cpar (World Bank 
2003a: 67, para. 151).
61 the figures quoted by different sources were the following: a graduated engineer 
without much experience would earn a monthly salary of about usd 100 in the ministry 
of Works and about usd 400 in the private sector; an engineer with about 10–15 years 
experience the equivalent would be usd 150 in the ministry and anything above usd 600 
in the private sector. these figures are at best indicative; the road fund funds the salaries 
in the ministry of Works, so engineers in the public sector probably earn more than their 
colleagues. this is also the reason why most public officials endorse in other commercial 
(not necessarily corrupt) activities during their work-time.
 democratic spaces in the making?  193
however, the extent of their understanding was strictly qualified to seri-
ous economic distress, which only accounts for some corrupt practices. 
the professionals seriously criticised the rigorous, unbending, and often 
unprofessional (in the sense of unskilled and disinterested) attitude of the 
public officials. a graphic depiction of this was given by two representa-
tives from a contractor’s association, who described how they would plead 
with their former colleagues from the public sector, who were obstructing 
their business to elicit a bribe, to be less technocratic and more respon-
sive to the interests and needs of the professionals, reminding them that 
one day they too might want to run their own business and would then 
be faced with the same difficulties;62 “but they are blind and deaf, they 
think they will remain in office indefinitely”, the contractors concluded 
exasperated. the problem was official discretion, but it was coupled with 
a particular official attitude, an attitude showing scant regard for the dif-
ferent rationale governing the private sector, and disregarding the role 
of the administration as the warden of public interests. the normalised 
practices of the public officials seems to be informed by a mixture of self-
serving and unprofessional attitude.
the general view taken of mid-to high-level public officials and the 
ministers by the representatives of professional associations was far more 
uniform in its condemnation. “greed!” was the unfailing and often bit-
ter answer to the reasons fuelling high-level corruption. their salaries, 
additional perks (such as cars, housing, staff, etc.) and privileged position 
were perceived to be more than sufficient; their corruptness as merely self-
serving enrichment. in the opinion of the professionals, public officials 
were feathering their already soft nests at the expense of ordinary citizens 
and professionals struggling to make ends meet. in addition, public office 
in itself had become a socially legitimate avenue to gain wealth, irrespec-
tive of income levels. Corruption was now “a way of life”, a “societal ill”, 
because it was generally accepted attitude that public officials use their 
position to enrich themselves.63 Wealth in itself has become such a social 
goal that the means of acquiring it are irrelevant. “riches are respected 
no matter what. if you have a nice position and leave it poor you were 
stupid not to make use of it!” exclaimed a frustrated senior engineer. his 
62 as far as could be ascertained, the fact that the officials in question were acting 
illegally was not part of their argument—a telling omission.
63 the sentiments of the former foreign minister quoted above were confirmed (often 
verbatim) many times in the course of the interviews, by interviewees of all ages and 
backgrounds.
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colleague put it more strongly: “if you are poor, you are stupid. if you are 
not corruptible, you are stupid!” hence, the fact that personal, short-term 
motivations drive public officials to corruption overshadowed the prob-
lem of inadequate remuneration; the remedy of the latter would be rather 
straightforward, the remedy of the former rather more intricate.64
the interviewed public officials themselves obviously did not dwell 
on their own corruptibility. they underlined other factors that the pro-
fessionals also prioritised, namely the inadequate technical training and 
professional exposure of entrepreneurs, still cumbersome procedures, 
the time-lag in implementing the rapidly changing rules, and of course 
the reforms that have been achieved in a relatively short time. some did 
lament the insufficient support from the government in protecting and 
developing the local construction industry, and the slow and juddering 
pace of designing and implementing a construction industry policy. When 
asked directly about corruption, the answers were either a reference to the 
existing anti-corruption clauses, for instance of the registration boards, 
or a very opaque response about the difficulties and challenges of public 
procurement.
5.4. Professional Identities, Social Agents and Political Struggles
of course, professionals themselves were not immune to the prevailing 
primacy of profit-grabbing, be they engineers, architects or contractors. 
the interviewees themselves acknowledged this: “to grow you have to 
put everything back into your business, but this is not recognised here, 
there is a fast buck attitude”. Cases of collusion and corrupt practices by 
entrepreneurs were mentioned throughout the interviews. But the inter-
viewees from the private sector were all members or representatives of 
professional associations; they distinguished themselves within the com-
munity precisely through their engagement to improve and protect pro-
fessional conduct, distinguished by integrity and quality. the overarching 
ideal articulated was that membership in a professional associations sig-
nifies the hallmark of professional quality, in the eyes of the professional 
community, in the eyes of the general public, and perhaps most impor-
tantly, in the eyes of the public sector and the government. generally, the 
64 in a critical analysis of the relationship between public officials pay and corruption 
in tanzania, mutahabe comes to the conclusion that “the link between pay and corruption 
is tenuous” (mutahabe 2005: 1), confirming the doubts with regard to the degree of pay 
being a significant factor shaping the extent of corruption.
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majority of the professionals interviewed were deeply unhappy about the 
way corruption affected the standards of their work and their reputation 
as a sector.
professionals in the established professions, such as consulting engineers 
or architects had an acute and internalised sense of professional conduct, 
reflected in their self-perception, in their reasoning against corruption, 
and, on a more formalised level, in the constitutions of their associations.65 
the associations themselves were all established with the prime reason 
of increasing the quality of professional standards and lobbying to cre-
ate a facilitative regulatory framework guaranteeing and supporting these 
standards.66 routinely, all constitutions feature tailored Codes of Conduct. 
for instance, the Code of professional and ethical Conduct forms an inte-
gral part of the constitution of aCet, and is derived from international 
best practices.67 it includes provisions on professional integrity with regard 
to safe-guarding the public interest, in particular with regard to safety, 
health, property and welfare of the public (art. i 1 and i 2); with regard 
to professional expertise and honesty (art i 3 and i 4); an anti-bribery 
clause with regard to clients (art i 5)68 as well as suppliers (art iii 4);69 and 
a provision regulating conflict of interests (art ii 4). the codes of pro-
fessional conduct are in substance very similar to the rather slicker ones 
65 for instance, aCet is an active member of the apex organisation fidiC. With lead-
ing participation of aCet, fidiC developed a cutting-edge code and manual of Business 
integrity management systems in 2002. 
66 for a seminal historical contribution analysing the economic interests that drive the 
development of associations with their exclusionary professional standards and qualifica-
tions see Weber 1985: 203–209 in the chapter on “gemeinschaftsformen und ökonomische 
interessen”. 
67 in fact, art i 7 of aCet’s constitution explicitly refers to the standards of professional 
conduct laid down by fidiC (association of Consulting engineers tanzania (aCet). Code 
of professional and ethical Conduct. in: aCet (1985). Constitution (fourth edition 2008). 
p. 35).
68 “no member shall offer, give, solicit or receive, either directly or indirectly, any polit-
ical contribution in an amount intended to influence the award of a contract by public 
authority, or which may be reasonably construed by the public of having the effect or 
intent to influence the contract. he shall not offer any gift or other valuable consideration 
nor pay a commission or percentage in order to secure work” (association of Consult-
ing engineers tanzania (aCet). Code of professional and ethical Conduct, article i 5. in: 
aCet (1985). Constitution (fourth edition 2008). p. 35).
69 “no member shall solicit or accept gratuities, directly or indirectly from contractors, 
manufacturers or suppliers, his agents or other parties dealing with his clients or employ-
ers in connection with work for which he is responsible” (association of Consulting engi-
neers tanzania (aCet). Code of professional and ethical Conduct, article iii 4. in: aCet 
(1985). Constitution (fourth edition 2008). p. 37).
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stipulated in the Constitution of the institute of engineers (iet)70 relating 
to: Conduct of members; Conduct of corporate members; duty to uphold 
professional reputation; duty not to indulge in corrupt practices;71 duty to 
serve the interest of the client; malicious damage to professional reputa-
tion; Continuing professional development; penalty for breach of conduct. 
remarkable in both cases is the emphasis on professional reputation and 
the respect for professional conduct.
all associations have the authority to discipline or, in severe cases, 
exclude members in cases of professional misconduct.72 however, at the 
time of the interviews, the associations were diffident in actually endors-
ing these measures. there was a tangible preference of all representatives 
to address cases of misconduct more informally, through peer pressure, 
rather than enact a formal disciplinary procedure. the reasons given were 
persuasive: the associations had relatively few members, drawn from a pro-
fessional community that was very small and characterised by face-to-face 
interactions, not by impersonal procedures. although formal disciplinary 
had been employed in cases of severe misconduct, in the first instance 
personal, direct interaction (albeit in the formal roles of Council member 
or chairman, and member of the association) fitted more closely to estab-
lished practices and features of the community. in cases of corruption, a 
second layer seemed to be added: as corruption was an endemic element 
of virtually all transactions within the construction industry, professional 
associations were realistically not in a position to discipline their mem-
bers. such sanctions would have backfired on the associations themselves, 
as they risked either ridicule or disengagement. as associations they are 
committed to protect the interests of their members, and the interviews 
revealed a strong sense that the structural pressure to corrupt could not 
be resisted by disciplining individual members. in addition, in the view of 
the associations and professionals there were no credible accountability 
70 see section 8 ‘professional Conduct’, subsections 8.01–8.08. in: the institution of 
engineers tanzania (1975, revised 2007). the Constitution. pp. 15–16.
71 “a member of the institution shall not indulge in any corrupt practices”, in: the insti-
tution of engineers tanzania (1975, revised 2007). the Constitution, section 8.04., p. 15.
72 see for instance the Constitution of the iet: “any alleged breach of sub-sections 8.01 
to 8.07 which may be brought before the Council, properly vouched for and supported by 
sufficient evidence, shall be dealt with by the Council either by expulsion of the offender 
from the institution under the procedure in sub-section 7.03 as far as it applies, or in such 
a manner as the Council may think fit” (see section 8.08 in: the institution of engineers 
tanzania (1975, revised 2007). the Constitution. p. 16; or the disciplinary proceedings 
stipulated in the Constitution of aCet (aCet (1985). Constitution (fourth edition 2008). 
disciplinary procedure. pp. 39–41).
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institutions that would reinforce such community-internal sanctions. 
“there is no trust”, sighed an exasperated engineer: existing institutions, 
such as the public procurement appeals Commission, the registration 
Boards, the pCB, or even the judiciary were not trusted sufficiently to act 
as safeguards of integrity. not one of the interviewees, from the public 
or private sector, could give a straightforward, unambiguous response to 
examples of complaints processes that had been taken to one of the pub-
lic accountability agencies. the one case of corruption mentioned that 
was taken up by the CrB with involved a foreign company, who subse-
quently withdrew their tender.
still, what emerged from the interviews is that professional standards 
had definitely ‘hardened’ and improved in the past decade, due to (a) the 
self-regulatory initiatives and the advocacy efforts of the professional asso-
ciations, (b) the institutional and regulatory reforms such as the establish-
ment of registration boards, and (c) better availability of trainings and 
continual education. professional associations played an important role 
in providing such trainings on behalf of or in cooperation with the public 
sector (and sometimes donors), drawing on their own expertise as well as 
the expertise provided through their affiliation with international asso-
ciations. more tangibly, with the establishment of the registration boards 
professional standards were now formally acknowledged,—a hard-earned 
victory by professional associations.
at this point, a distinction needs to be drawn between professional 
identities of first generation associations on the one hand and professional 
identities of second generation associations on the other. as elaborated 
above, ‘established’ professions conveyed the impression of being comfort-
able and secure in their professional identity, drawing on and referring to 
established domestic, regional and international networks and standards. 
the situation with regard to contractors, however, was rather different. 
local contractors only had a very recent history of professional identity, as 
was also reflected in the recent establishment of the only two contractors 
associations. it was a young profession, tainted by a low social status 
and with a reputation for badly executed work and unskilled and profit- 
grabbing contractors. Both contractors associations were established 
with the explicit intention to fight against such non-professionalism, i.e. 
to change the ‘bad attitudes’ and malpractices within the profession; to 
define and institutionalise professional standards; to improve their nega-
tive image in the public, and, lastly, to support a better industrial frame-
work and working conditions of contractors.
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Both in public and in the course of the interviews, the contractors were 
far more outspoken than the first-generation associations, articulating 
their interests in a significantly more confrontational way. for instance, 
when the Contractors association of tanzania (Cata) was formed in 2003, 
their chairperson, engineer Consulata ngimbwa, explained in a newspa-
per interview that one of their key motivations is to enhance the public 
and government recognition of the profession. she goes on to underline 
the importance of the regulatory framework:
half of the government budget goes to construction. But the public per-
ceives local contractors as incompetent and dishonest. the few projects 
awarded to them have been unduly delayed, or executed shoddily and in 
some extreme cases, abandoned. the problem here is not incompetence 
but the environment under which they get these works, the rules are 
not good.73
the quote is very revealing, connecting the contractor’s negative image 
with the structural problems of the country—with a terse reference to the 
paucity of work available to local contractors—and thus linking up the 
(official) rules framing contractors’ work with their reputation. this state-
ment can be interpreted as a very direct demand for a better legislative 
and regulatory framework. however, it also includes a thinly veiled refer-
ence to the common knowledge of public officials’ corrupt behaviour.
all in all, both first and second generation professional associations in 
the construction industry of tanzania were central to the development 
of a regulatory framework and professional standard-setting, and to the 
public articulation of the importance of professionalism with regard to 
public welfare and cost-effective use of public resources. equally, they 
were seminal in pushing for governance reforms that improve the eco-
nomic basis of their profession, including more predictable and coher-
ent norms that protect professional qualifications and conduct. Bringing 
in professional expertise and international networks and exposure, they 
engaged in dialogue and coalitions with relevant actors of the public sec-
tor, seeking to influence and improve (if with uneven success) the design 
and implementation of governance reforms, and strengthening their own 
professional position. in 2003, the governance reforms were gradually 
being consolidated and merging into a recognisable, comprehensive regu-
latory body, with the key pillars being the registration boards, the Cip and 
the ppa.
73 see “Contractors’ body to press for law review”, daily news, 24 february 2003, p. 5.
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however, a perhaps perverse effect of the success of governance 
reforms—the establishment of a registration board—was already dis-
cernible, if only from the perspective of an established first-generation 
association, namely aCet. a long-standing, internationally renowned and 
distinguished member made the rather shocking comment that “the engi-
neers registration Board destroyed aCet”. What he meant was that up to 
about the year 2000, membership in aCet, which is conditional on specific 
professional qualifications and standards, constituted a hallmark of excel-
lence. around the year 2000, the erB took over the statutory registration 
of companies. the statutory requirements of the erB obviously override 
the criteria stipulated by aCet, so membership in aCet constituted no 
real professional distinction anymore. in other words, official regulation, 
although welcome from a perspective of general and formalised rules, 
encroached on self-regulatory achievements. it also constituted greater 
state control over professionals—the power to register as well deregister 
them—that in the absence of the rule of law and independent and effec-
tive horizontal accountability bodies had ambivalent effects.74 further-
more, although this was not mentioned here, against the backdrop of the 
increasingly authoritarian tendencies and penchant for ‘social compacts’ 
within the administration, it is conceivable that the registration boards 
actually facilitated the governmental appropriation of autonomous repre-
sentations and counterveiling interests.75
the sudden irrelevance of a central function and constituting element 
of aCet was compounded by the development within the professional 
community itself. aCet represents the interests of consulting engineers. 
however, according to this respondent, the increasing technical focus of 
the engineers—itself also a feature of the increasing professionalization 
of the industry—lead to a situation in which most members of mid-level 
management of the companies lost interest in business development or 
74 for an interdisciplinary analysis and case-studies on shifting boundaries of norma-
tive authority between public and non-state actors see the volume edited by peters/koech-
lin/förster/Zinkernagel fenner (eds.) 2009.
75 according to the provisions of the erB, the minister of Works appoints the Board. 
the provisions specifically require that the two of its nine board member are not in the 
service of government; these two board members have to be nominated by aCet (one) 
and iet (one) (!) (see http://www.erb.go.tz/composition.htm; last accessed 25 march 2010). 
the statutory inclusion of professional associations in regulatory bodies can be an indica-
tion of their official recognition, but it can also be seen as a form of cooptation (for a dis-
cussion on risks and strengths of such multi-stakeholder fora see koechlin/Calland 2009; 
for a critical view on governmental co-option strategies of civil society organisations by 
african governments see Bratton 1989).
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industry politics. although this could not be verified, it might also be an 
indication of short-termism of professionals. in any case, it manifested 
itself in a loss of membership. the decreasing membership lead to a 
decrease in representativeness and voice of the associations. the prob-
lem of insufficient membership was mentioned by all representatives of 
all associations. Be it that the professionals “don’t recognise the benefits 
of collective action” (diagnosed by an architect) or that the professional 
associations “do not identify the burning issues” (diagnosed by a consult-
ing engineer with regard to the established first-generation associations), 
the conclusion was clear: “they [i.e. professional associations] are weak”, 
as several informants across the professions observed. and in a full vicious 
circle, the decreasing membership threatened both the financial basis of 
the professional associations, which are dependent on voluntary work 
and membership fees, as well as weakened the voice of the professional 
associations vis-à-vis the public sector.
6. Hegemonies and Fixations of Corruption:  
Some Preliminary Conclusions
summing up, the engagement of first as well as second generation profes-
sional associations was primarily aimed at creating a level playing field 
and defining professional standards. But although the associations were 
actively engaged in policy discourses, the collective and individual actors 
were seriously struggling with more basic issues, in particular structural 
problems, such as the dependence on the public sector and the crush-
ing competition of foreign competitors and inaccessibility of resources 
(funds, equipment, collaterals, technology, experience). hence, corrup-
tion was routinely and often vocally recognised to be a serious problem, 
but under the difficult economic and political circumstances which ren-
dered the implementation and internalisation of professional standards 
near impossible, it was always set in the wider governance context of 
inadequate public institutions and industry policies. professional associa-
tions observed that the prevention of corruption was in their own core 
interest, as they had a driving economic, political and professional need 
to increase the predictability and security of their situation. in addition, 
they had an ideological interest in articulating standards of professional-
ism and relating them to their particular profession, formalising distinc-
tions between themselves from other groups within the same profession 
(e.g. civil contractors v electrical contractors) or within the same sector 
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(e.g. architects v engineers). these distinctions were pivotal to the con-
struction of differential identities for official recognition and public 
acknowledgement. in this way, they appropriated and sought to shape 
the language of governance and anti-corruption reforms, articulating their 
own particular interests (such as salary scales, credit facilities, protection 
from foreign competition, etc.), and constructing linkages to their particu-
lar discourse to wider discourses, such as the rule of law, state effective-
ness, public service and national development.
it can be concluded that ‘corruption’ thus works in a double bind:
on the one hand, corruption was indeed an empty signifier in the most 
political sense, framing the most significant nodal points through which 
linkages across the public-private divide and more generally across dif-
ferential identities took place. ‘Corruption’, as could be observed, was 
filled with particular demands and claims, but as an overarching refer-
ence point provided the terrain of political struggles around contentious 
identities, interests, and representations. as perhaps was to be expected, 
the fissures and antagonisms of these differential articulations were far 
more subtle than just between public/private, or integrity/greed, or pro-
fessional competence/incompetence. they ran between and across the 
spheres, they ran within professional communities, and they ran across 
social imaginaries.76 they were not arbitrary, however. Corruption con-
stituted a powerful signifier, publicly relating immediate needs, interests 
and constraints of professionals to a wider horizon. thus, nascently and 
unevenly, professional associations successfully filled ‘corruption’ to sig-
nify not only professional standards, qualifications and expertise, but also 
to link it to discourses of governance and development. in this sense, 
professional associations opened up emancipatory spaces that enabled 
greater and more diverse forms of articulation.
on the other hand, corruption was also a medium undermining the dis-
cursive resources available to professional associations. Quotes in the sense 
of ‘Corruption is a higher form of competition’, or ‘if you are poor, if you 
are not corruptible, you are stupid’, point to a rather different significance 
of corruption. this discourse was less manifest in its articulations in the 
public sphere, but all the more dominant in economic transactions. from 
76 to illustrate this point with an example, justifications for the importance of profes-
sional conduct and integrity was given by the respondents in reference to the require-
ments of the market economy (competitiveness) as well is in reference to the socialist 
values formulated under Julius nyerere.
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the reflections of the professional associations’ realities, the dominance of 
this discourse was felt astutely. this discourse forged chains of equivalence 
around non-legal, rhizome nodal points, such as the general acceptance of 
enrichment through bureaucratic means (which does not equal the pro-
fessionals’ understanding of entrepreneurial and legally acquired profit), 
of personal contacts, of the (ab)use of power differentials—understood 
and known by everyone, but not articulated in the public realm.
But the perhaps most unexpected finding is that the governance reforms, 
for all intents and purposes strengthening the corruption discourse of 
the professional associations, were antagonistic in their effects. in line 
with the intended and formalised objectives, they reaffirmed demands 
for greater predictability, for rule-based processes, for safeguarding pro-
fessional quality—largely echoing the articulations of the professionals 
grouped around and within ‘corruption’. But at the same time the ‘official’ 
discourse on corruption deflated the professionals’ discourse on corrup-
tion by hegemonising their representations and appropriating the nodal 
points—registration, accreditation, definition of norms and standards. 
this happened largely on a symbolic level; the practical effects—such as 
the transformation of ‘official’ identities, or the internalisation of formal 
norms—remained incremental. however, assessing the very diverse fixa-
tions of corruption in the construction industry of tanzania, one compo-
nent cannot be stressed enough: the demands, values and indeed interests 
were very young. they were in flux, within a rapidly changing frame of 
reference—economically, politically, socially—and the observed pro-
cesses and actors emergent, fragile and unstable.
however, as a preliminary conclusion, the power relations were still 
characterised by significant differentials between (and in fact: within) the 
public sector and professional associations. professional associations man-
aged to successfully employ corruption as an empty signifier, connecting 
it up to wider corruption discourses of development agencies as well to 
governmental discourses. generalising across the differences of successful 
professional articulations, the identities of the professional associations 
was strengthened through these successful partial fixations, separating, 
at least on a formal level, the ‘professional’ from the ‘unprofessional’. the 
price is paradoxically a partial loss of identity, a collapse of a sense of pur-
pose, which was hegemonised by governmental regulatory bodies.
Corruption as an empty signifier is thus a brittle bearer of professional 
articulations and interests. from the snap shot of this case-study, the future 
flow and patterning of the discourses cannot be predicted with more cer-
tainty than at the beginning of the study, albeit the struggles can be made 
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out in more detail. the findings do outline two main currents: in time, the 
hegemonic representations of professional associations around meanings 
of corruption may well link up to a critical mass of nodal points, feeding 
into swelling discourses on democracy, on economic development, and 
be transformed into public and secure spaces of economic, political and 
social agency. By the same token, professional identities, far from being 
profiled and differentiated and ‘universalised’, may well be hegemonised 
and smothered by other discourses on corruption, closing down the prac-
tical and symbolic spaces of professional associations to a narrow strip of 
technicalities.
Chapter four
Closures of DemoCratiC spaCes?  
professional assoCiations anD Corruption in 2010
Ridding a country of any kind of corruption, including corruption in procure-
ment, is a long journey and ‘A journey of a thousand miles begins with a single 
step’ [Confucius]. Tanzania has not yet reached the end of this long journey, 
and this applies to many countries, but we have made not a single, but many 
steps into the journey and we wish the stakeholders to recognise and appreci-
ate these efforts.1
1. Introduction
the intention of this chapter is to explore the patterning of discourses of 
corruption by professional associations over time. in one way, the conclu-
sions of the case-study in 2003 are rather weak, deprived of grounds for 
a strong or predictive statement. perhaps the ambiguous terrain mapped 
out in 2003 is also a function of the relative novelty of discourses and 
representations of corruption in the construction sector at the time, with 
nodal points still being sought and forged. in another way, the case-study 
is very revealing, crystallising the political struggles that seek to frame 
and fixate a certain order of things, universalise particular differences, 
and connect them up to other particular representations. the case-study 
also illustrated some of the modifications and transformations that pro-
fessional identities have undergone in the course of hegemonising repre-
sentations—both in terms of constructing professional identities as well 
as in terms of collapsing professional identities.
now, seven years later, a second snap shot is taken, mirroring as far 
as possible the analysis of 2003, with the objective of capturing the prac-
tices and orders of discourses on corruption. in other words, the objective 
is not to ‘validate’ hypotheses carved out of the findings of the case-study of 
2003. the objective is to provide a denser representation of the dynamics 
1 this is a statement by the Ceo of the public procurement regulatory authority in the 
ppra’s quarterly journal (see ppra 2009: 4).
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of social change, i.e. to understand practices, struggles and the trajectories 
of discursive representations of corruption over time.
a word on the extent to which the case-studies discussed in the previous 
and this chapter are mirrored. the qualitative methodological approach of 
both case-studies does not pave the way for an exact comparison that, in 
any case, might prevent the recognition of discursive dynamics. this sec-
ond case-study is undertaken with a lens focused on the politics of corrup-
tion, rather than on manifestations of corruption, which was the original 
focus of the case-study of 2003. the structure of the study remains grosso 
modo the same, sketching out firstly the macro-context of politics and cor-
ruption reforms, secondly, the meso-level of (changes in) the institutional 
framework and key actors of the construction industry, and thirdly, the 
representations of corruption by professional associations of the construc-
tion industry. in a last step, the observed dynamics will be synthesised, 
analysing the hegemonic power of emancipatory discourses of corruption, 
and seeking to understand the specific processes of ordering differentials 
over time more clearly.
2. Jakaya Kikwete—‘A dedicated spirit of government’?2
at the end of the era mkapa, tanzania had a wide public awareness of 
corruption and a diverse set of governance and anti-corruption institu-
tions. under president Kikwete the fight against corruption did not receive 
quite the same prominence as it did under president mkapa. at the begin-
ning of his presidency in 2005, president Kikwete3 did send a strong signal 
by (re-)appointing two respected persons as heads of key anti-corruption 
institutions, namely of the prevention of Corruption Bureau (pCB) and the 
auditor General. also, the prevention of Corruption Bureau was endowed 
with greater autonomy in 2007, granting it further investigative powers 
and upgrading to the prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau 
(pCCB). further reforms include the amended anti-corruption bill, which 
was also passed in 2007, and the enhanced national anti-corruption strat-
egy (2006–2010) launched in the same year (see sections below).
2 this alludes to a response by one of the interviewed contractors (see below). 
3 president Jakaya Kikwete was elected in 2005, and at the time of writing his first term 
in office is coming to an end. legislative as well as presidential elections are scheduled for 
31 october 2010. for more information see the website of the international foundation 
on electoral systems (ifes) under http://www.electionguide.org/country.php?iD=211 (last 
accessed 8 may 2010). 
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at the same time, however, tanzania had been shaken by a series of 
major corruption scandals that seemed to indicate that corruption was 
not receding. on the contrary, revelations of a system of grand corruption 
involving senior public officials, domestic private sector representatives 
and foreign companies in a context of relative impunity seemed to chase 
each other.4 although these cases date back to the era mkapa, the jury 
is still out with regard to president Kikwete’s dedication and seriousness 
about acting against corruption. under his watch some massive corrup-
tion scandals have been exposed, involving key government institutions 
such as the Bank of tanzania5 and the sacking of the Central Bank Gover-
nor, or the resignation of his prime minister and two further ministers due 
to their complicity in a huge corruption deal that has become known as 
the richmond scandal.6 unlike under Benjamin mkapa, these cases have 
been dealt with through due process and debated in the public realm. But 
as an observer remarked in 2007, discussing tanzania’s grand corruption 
schemes: “hopes that the new government would be able to curb cor-
ruption are evaporating as disputed projects continue to gain approval 
4 for instance, the alleged corruption scandal involving usD 40 million in a govern-
ment deal with British aerospace for a radar system; the usD 47 million for the purchase 
of the presidential jet; the major corruption allegations with regard to the building of the 
usD 350 million Bank of tanzania twin towers, which, according to experts, were double 
the costs of similar constructions in tokyo or london; or the corruption scams under vari-
ous privatisation schemes, most prominently the iptl power supply contract involving 
the national power company tanesco and several foreign companies (see, for instance, 
the article on “Governance and Corruption in tanzania: 1995–2005” detailing corruption 
cases under http://www.bongotz.com/news.html, last accessed 20 april 2010; or the article 
on tanzania Corruption tracker “how corruption ‘eats’ tanzanian taxpayers’ hard earned 
revenue”, under http://www.corruptiontracker.or.tz/, last accessed 20 april 2010; or huss-
man/mmuya 2007).
5 the grand corruption cases of the era mkapa include the Bank of tanzania’s external 
payment arrears account (epa) scandal; at the time of writing (2009), at least 13 indi-
viduals are in court over the 2005 scandal where the government paid usD 105.5 million 
to companies using flawed or nonexistent records from the central bank’s external pay-
ment arrears account. also, the former president is himself implicated in a privatisation 
deal of a coal mine allegedly made corruptly and fraudulently (see, for instance, tanzania 
affairs, “Corruption-Crusade Continues”, 28 september 2008, under http://www.tzaffairs.
org/2008/09/corruption-crusade-continues/; last accessed 13 october 2009). 
6 they resigned after clear implications of their involvement in the richmond scandal, 
a contract with a mirage company for emergency power supply that swallowed over usD 
170 million from public funds. see, for instance, “tanzania pm to resign over graft”, BBC 
World news, 7 february 2008 under http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7232141.stm (last 
accessed 14 september 2009); or tanzania affairs, “Corruption-Crusade Continues”, 28 
september 2008, under http://www.tzaffairs.org/2008/09/corruption-crusade-continues/ 
(last accessed 13 october 2009).
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from the executive.”7 so in spite of the exemplary investigation into some 
cases, the extent of corruption in the public sector does not seem to have 
receded significantly. in fact, both the World Bank8 and norway9 have 
recently sent some powerful signals, by threatening to reduce funds to 
tanzania, justified on different accounts by corruption and lack of trans-
parency and accountability.
perhaps against this backdrop, ‘zero tolerance of corruption’ as a priority 
policy has not been wiped off the agenda. With the general elections com-
ing up in 2010, at the time of writing president Kikwete has reactivated the 
national anti-corruption campaign. he began his campaign for a second 
term with a spectacular criticism of his own government officials. accord-
ing to a leading national newspaper, speaking at the inauguration of the 
pCCB house in Dar es salaam on september 10, 2009, the president
said that 30 per cent of the Government Budget was embezzled through big 
investment and contractual projects and in public procurement by civil ser-
vants. of the sh9 trillion 2009/2010 Budget, the theft of 30 per cent by gov-
ernment officials would amount to a whopping sh3 trillion. this is almost 
equal to the 34 per cent that donors are expected to provide for develop-
ment project.10
this may well be the beginning of a newly, invigorated anti-corruption 
stance of the government. on the other hand, there are indications that 
the ruling party, CCm, is only willing to have corruption cases addressed 
in which leading party members are not implicated. nearly simultane-
ously with the president’s outspoken critique of corrupt public officials, 
the national executive Committee (neC), the governing body of the 
CCm, established a three-person-team, lead by former president ali 
hassan mwinyi, to restore party unity and enforce party discipline at 
the august neC-CCm convention—a unveiled paraphrase for curtailing 
7 see sebastian sanga (tanzania: reporter’s notebook, Global integrity report, assess-
ment 2007) under http://report.globalintegrity.org/tanzania/2007/notebook (last accessed 
5 march 2010).
8 the latest Country performance rating of the World Bank shows poor performance 
of tanzania on key lending criteria. according to newspaper articles, tanzania stands to 
lose about usD 312 million Dollars in soft loans in from 2010–2013 (see the Citizen, friday 
11 september, or the sunday Citizen, sunday 13 september 2009). 
9 norway has been threatening to withhold funds due to entrenched corruption in nat-
ural resource management programmes funded by norway. for a synopsis see http://com-
mons.globalintegrity.org/2009/04/headlines-in-tanzania-millions-go.html (last accessed 
14 september 2009); for the full report see Jansen 2009.
10 see the sunday Citizen, sunday 12 september 2009, under http://www.thecitizen.
co.tz/newo.php?id=13771 (last accessed 13 september 2009).
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critical voices within the party. the following account of the party con-
vention makes the general atmosphere within the party very clear:
it is understood that during the highly-charged Dodoma meeting, more 
than 40 neC members launched direct attacks on sitta [the speaker of the 
national assembly] and other ‘rebel’ mps for speaking out against high-level 
corruption in government.
they accused the speaker of ‘embarrassing’ the government by allow-
ing mps during the recent parliamentary budget session to openly criticize 
senior public leaders, both past and present, and there were several calls 
for sitta’s immediate expulsion from the party and replacement as house 
speaker.
an official CCm statement issued after the meeting said merely that all 
ruling party cadres—particularly mps—had been banned forth with from 
speaking out on widespread corruption and abuse of office allegations 
against ex-president mkapa. nothing else was said.”11
in other words, the signs of increasing party monopoly and especially 
of top-down control of party discipline that was already observed under 
mkapa seems to be in the process of being formally consolidated.12 the 
question where that leaves the political exposure of corruption and 
unethical behaviour of senior officials is open. obviously, the internal 
debates within the CCm are being shut down, perhaps because leading 
members voice their opposing views. in marked contrast to 2003, how-
ever, the opposition party, Chadema, has gained considerable traction. it 
has grown in size and media presence, and its leaders, prominent mem-
bers of the public, do not seem to be afraid (anymore) of addressing con-
tentious issues and challenging government accountability. although the 
proof will be in the 2010 elections, Chadema seems to provide a viable 
alternative for disaffected CCm mps and voters.
it seems that in the past seven years two trends can be observed in tan-
zania: on the one hand, large-scale corruption cases that occurred in the 
early to mid-2000s have been exposed; their occurrence can be explained 
simply through the increase in available funds (fDi and foreign aid), the 
institutional voids and loopholes during the rapid reform process, and not 
11 the CCm-neC session was recounted in this Day, one of the most outspoken and 
courageous english newspapers in tanzania, on friday, 18. september, in its frontline story 
“msekwa gives his version of events” (pp. 1–2) (mr msekwa is the CCm vice-chairman). the 
excerpt is taken from page 2.
12 the enforced party discipline makes the unspoken rules evident. also, this increased 
tendency towards authoritarianism has been noted in several academic contributions. see, 
for instance, skinlo 2007 or hyden/mmuya 2008.
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least through the consolidation of political and economic power of the 
CCm, which was the ruling party during Julius nyerere’s socialist era, and 
has been in power since the first multi-party elections in 1986. on the 
other hand, the fact that these cases have found their way into the public 
realm and the justice sector is also significant. the same period has seen 
a remarkable change in the legal and institutional framework designed 
to prevent and sanction corruption. the reforms will be discussed below; 
suffice to note at this point that although their performance and imple-
mentation is uneven, the opening of political spaces and the hardening of 
legal practices, as evidenced in the prosecution of high-level corruption 
cases, may point towards a process in which time plays a greater role than 
it is usually accorded. Just how this process is to be assessed is open. two 
quotes from two very knowledgeable tanzanians, both prominent corrup-
tion experts in their own right, illustrate the discrepancy. When i asked 
them (separately) about the meaning of these grand corruption cases, the 
opinion of one was that it pointed towards an increased criminalisation 
of the state, to a tightening of the political elite and a handful of (mostly 
indian) financial ‘advisors’ that were still protected in a tightly-knit web 
of impunity. the other person’s opinion was more sanguine: “it was a win-
dow which is being shut now”.
i shall now outline the institutional reforms aimed at shutting this win-
dow, undertaken in the period between 2003 and early 2010. this section 
provides an overview over national governance reforms, with the section 
following it zooming in on reforms in the construction sector. Both outline 
the institutional and policy framework of the realities of the professional 
associations that will be explored in the last sections of this chapter.
3. Governance and Anti-Corruption Reforms in the  
Regulatory Framework
3.1. National Strategy for Growth and the Reduction of Poverty 2005–2010 
(MKUKUTA)13
the mKuKuta is the national framework guiding social and economic 
policies for poverty reduction. ‘Governance and accountability’ constitutes 
13 mKuKuta stands for ‘mkakati wa Kukuza uchumi na Kupunguza umaskini tanza-
nia’, the commonly used swahili acronym of the national strategy for Growth and poverty 
reduction. 
210 chapter four
one of three clusters of poverty reduction, indeed, according to the mKu-
Kuta, it “provides the bedrock [. . .] for broad-based growth and improve-
ment of quality life and social well-being to take place [. . .]. human rights, 
a functioning and fair justice system and the war against corruption are 
key elements of this cluster” (mKuKuta 2005: 31). the box below details 
its strategic objectives:
Box 1. mKuKuta Cluster iii—Goals and targets for Governance and 
accountability
•  structures and systems of governance as well as the rule of law are demo-
cratic, participatory, representative, accountable and inclusive.
•  ensure representative, inclusive (poor and vulnerable groups) and account-
able governance institutions at all levels.
•  equitable allocation of public resources with corruption effectively 
addressed.
•  public resources are allocated, accessible and used in an equitable, account-
able and transparent manner.
•  institute effective regulations and mechanisms regarding petty and grand 
corruption.
•  effective public service framework in place to provide foundation for ser-
vice delivery improvements and poverty reduction.
•  administrative systems of public institutions are managed transparently 
and in the best interests of the people they serve.
(source: mKuKuta 2005: 50)
tanzania’s poverty reduction objectives are supported by international 
donors through budget support and country assistance programmes.14 
recently, a supplemental credit of usD 171 million has been pledged by 
the World Bank, specifically to help implement the mKuKuta. according 
14 an edition of ‘Development and Cooperation’ dedicated to tanzania in 2009 circum-
scribes the role of foreign aid and poverty reduction in the following way: “from 2005 to 
2010, the government of tanzania is implementing a strategy called mKuKuta to com-
bat poverty and boost growth. the strategy includes crucial institutional reforms such as 
political devolution and anti-corruption measures. [r]oughly a third of state activities and 
expenditures are financed with funding from donors at present”. the article goes on to 
describe the budget-support provided to tanzania, which is only one of many forms of 
foreign aid: “in the current financial year (2008/09), 14 donors are contributing a total of 
$ 750 million to tanzania’s national budget. this amount makes up 12% of the budget and 
a full third of all donor spending. the uK and the World Bank are the main budget-support 
donors, each contributing around 25%. Germany’s share is below two per cent” (spitzer/
fleuth-leferink 2009, available online under http://www.inwent.org/ez/articles/092482/
index.en.shtml; last accessed 25 march 2010).
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to an online article on the tanzaniainvest website, in this context the 
World Bank country director emphasised again the “added urgency to 
tanzania’s efforts to improve the business environment and strengthen 
governance, in particular the fight against corruption”.15 the mKuKuta 
is also explicitly referred to as a frame of reference in the new national 
anti-corruption strategy (naCsap ii) (see below), along with other major 
reform programmes of the justice system and public administration.
3.2. The Enhanced National Anti-Corruption Strategy 2006–2011 (NACSAP II)
in the mKuKuta, the enforcement of naCsap is mentioned as one spe-
cific priority (mKuKuta 2005: 51). naCsap ii (2006–2010) is the second 
phase of naCsap i. it represents a continued official recognition of the 
importance anti-corruption efforts and a reaffirmation of the goverment’s 
zero-tolerance of corruption:
Corruption in public life undermines good governance and economic 
growth, distorts national development, and retards the general welfare of 
the citizens, particularly the poor and vulnerable in society. Considering 
these ill effects, the Government of tanzania will maintain a zero tolerance 
for all acts of corruption, petty or grand, in the use of state resources, create 
public awareness, and engage all stakeholders in preventing and combating 
the vice (pCCB 2008: 1).
at the same time, it seeks to address and overcome some of the weak-
nesses experienced in the implementation of naCsap i: “Considering that 
preventing and combating corruption is necessarily a long and tedious 
undertaking that requires patience, regular reviews, and innovations, the 
Government has decided to introduce a more robust and comprehensive 
naCsap ii” (pCCB 2008: 6). the new strategy emphasises the importance 
of ‘partnership’, aiming to strengthen strategic collaborations between 
governmental authorities, and broaden societal engagement against cor-
ruption by reaching out to the private sector and civil society.
15 see “World Bank funds tanzania’s mKuKuta strategy” of monday 11 January 2010; 
under http://www.tanzaniainvest.com/tanzania-economy/news/35-news/374-world-bank - 
funds-tanzania-mkukuta-national-growth-strategy (last accessed 25 march 2010).
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Box 2. Goals of naCsap ii
1.  Combat corruption in a more scientific way and by addressing its root 
causes;
2.  strengthen anti-corruption mechanisms at all the mDas;
3.  introduce systems of integrity, accountability and transparency in local 
Government administrations (lGas);
4.  mainstream and empower the private sector into anticorruption;
5.  mainstream and empower Csos and other non-state actors into the anti-
corruption process;
6. raise public awareness of anticorruption;
7.  Build synergy between naCsap and legislative and Judicial integrity 
programs;
8.  enhance the capacity of pCCB, GGCu and Director of public prosecution 
to deal with corruption, manage and implement naCsap.
(source: pCCB 2008: 8–17)
particularly relevant for the construction industry are the education of 
mDa staff on the ppa and the monitoring of its application and compli-
ance (under Goal 2); the introduction of Council integrity Committees on 
a local Governance level, and capacity-building of Council tender Boards 
(under Goal 3); and the identification of potential business and corpo-
rate association, consult with and build their capacity for anticorruption 
initiatives, as well as create public-private partnerships including central 
government and lGas (under Goal 4).
the implementation of naCsap ii is envisaged along two main mech-
anisms. firstly, on the level of ministries, Departments and agencies 
(mDa) it details that all anti-corruption efforts need to be an integral part 
of the relevant strategic plans and the expenditure frameworks for a more 
coherent and budgeted implementation. secondly, the establishment of 
national and sectoral consultation mechanisms is planned, involving, on 
various levels, representatives from the Government, civil society, the pri-
vate sector as well as development partners. perhaps most emphasised 
throughout the document is the need for coalition-building, dialogue 
and consultation processes, with the establishment of a national anti-
corruption forum as its pinnacle.
3.3. Prevention of Corruption and Combating of Corruption Act (PCCA)
in 2007, the prevention and Combating of Corruption act (no. 11) 
(pCCa) was enacted. the new act incorporates relevant provisions of the 
united nations Convention against Corruption and the african union 
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Convention against Corruption. as a major improvement, the range of 
corruption offences has been broadened significantly, and under section 
5 of the pCCa gives the pCCB (see below) a broader mandate and greater 
operational independence. in addition, the coordination between anti-
corruption agencies has been strengthened.
3.4. Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB)
in 2007, in the wake of the revision of the legislative framework, the pre-
vention of Corruption Bureau (pCB) was renamed prevention and Com-
bating of Corruption Bureau (pCCB), established as an independent public 
body and endowed with a broader mandate. Based on the amendment of 
the pCa, the pCCB’s scope of operation now includes more than twenty 
offences, and the officers of the pCCB have been given special powers, 
including certain powers of investigation (but not prosecutorial powers, 
which is under the mandate of the Dpp).16 according to their website,17 
the high level goals derived from their mandate are the following:
• enlisting and fostering public support in fighting corruption.
•  examining systems and procedures of government and public bodies to 
identify corrupt practices or potential.
•  providing impartial and independent advice to organisations and indi-
viduals (public and private) on preventing corruption, or reducing its 
likelihood.
•  advising on implementation of revised systems and procedures in gov-
ernment and public bodies where corruption or its potential, has been 
identified.
•  investigating individual, organisation (public or private) or companies 
suspected of being involved in corruption.
•  prosecuting where appropriate, individual organisations or companies for 
offences under the prevention of corruption act and others.
• Creating an enabling environment i which objectives are achieved [sic]
the pCCB is organised in four departments covering prevention, public 
awareness, investigation and prosecution of offenders. at the time of writ-
ing, the pCCB is established in 21 regional offices, covering all of mainland 
tanzania (interestingly, Zanzibar is exempt from its mandate). it has also 
16 for an overview over the history, mandate and strategic priorities of the pCCB see 
pCCB (2007).
17 http://www.pccb.go.tz/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=19&itemid 
=22 (last accessed 22 february 2010).
214 chapter four
established a hotline, available under the telephone number 113, where 
offenses relating to corruption can be reported.
3.5. Public Ethics Secretariat
in 2005, the list of public leaders required to declare their assets was 
expanded. also, the legal framework and organisational capacities of the 
ethics secretariat has been strengthened and expanded.
3.6. Good Governance Coordination Unit (GCCU)
recognising the weaknesses of the GGCu, the government decided to 
increase the capacity of the GGCu in order to improve the coordination of 
naCsap ii. the so-called integrity Committees, established in all mDa’s 
as focal points of anti-corruption efforts, will prepare the quarterly reports 
that are submitted to the GGCu as a key component of monitoring the 
implementation of naCsap ii.
4. Governance Reforms in the Construction Industry
4.1. Public Procurement Act (PPA)
the enactment of the public procurement act no. 3 in 2001 was repealed 
and replaced by the public procurement act no. 21 of 2004, addressing 
many of the flaws of its predecessor. Key reforms include the applica-
tion of the act by local government bodies; the devolution of tendering 
responsibility to ministries, Departments and agencies; and the creation 
of two new agencies, the public procurement regulatory authority and 
the public procurement appeals authority (see below). section 72 con-
tains an anti-bribery clause which defines a corrupt practice as “offering, 
giving, receiving, or soliciting of anything of value to influence the action 
of a public official in the procurement practice or contract execution” 
(ppa 2004, section 72).
4.2. Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (PPRA)
established in 2004 under the revised public procurement act, the man-
date of the ppra is to support a transparent, accountable and value-for-
money culture of public procurement. it replaces the regulatory function 
of the former Central tender Board. Contractors must register to be 
eligible for participation in public procurement, and a list of registered 
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contractors is distributed to all tender Boards. they also act as an infor-
mation gateway, with tender notices and procurement legislation and 
policies found on their website. the ppra in endowed with provisions to 
blacklist companies.
underlying their priority of supporting a transparent and due procure-
ment process, across the top of the ppra’s home page runs a banner say-
ing: “our motto is promoting value for money procurement to the public. 
Corrupt free procurement [sic] delivers value for money procurement to 
the public. let’s join hands to build a corrupt free public procurement 
regime. together it can be done.”18
the emphasis on increasing sound public management of public pro-
curement through an improvement of accountability and transparency is 
being prioritised by the ppra. for this purpose, it has identified all rel-
evant stakeholders and their role in the public procurement process, in 
which professional associations feature quite prominently (see appendix 
5 ‘ppra stakeholder mapping’, below). in 2009, an anti-Corruption strat-
egy in public procurement (aCspp) was developed as a contribution to 
naCsap ii, specifying challenges and interventions at the levels of a) pre-
vention, b) detection, c) investigation, and d), enforcement. as part of this 
strategy, the ppra developed a ‘red flag checklist’ covering all phases of 
the procurement process, which it intends to apply to all financial audits 
as from f/Y 2009/10. here, the ppra is intensifying its collaboration with 
the pCCB in detecting and investigating corruption in public procure-
ment.19 in the interviews, the integrity and competence of the director of 
the ppra was emphasised. however, as the following sections will show, 
the ppra does not seem to be accorded much weight in terms of institu-
tionalising rule-based practices.
18 see www.ppra.go.tz (accessed on 22 september 2009). see also the supplement of the 
tanzania procurement Journal whose editorial is dedicated to the topic of ethics and fair 
dealing in public procurement. the editorial column emphasises the importance for and 
indeed legal obligation of public officials as well as business people to adhere to highest 
ethical standards, but states: “unfortunately, in this country certain practices exist and 
have been taken as a norm in public procurement.” the column concludes with the plea: 
“let us not view it [i.e. public procurement] as something which can enrich us quickly but 
as something which is necessary to bring development to the people through the provi-
sion of quality goods and services, in a timely manner and at prices which offer value for 
money to the public” (tanzania procurement Journal (Vol. ii, no. 12, supplement no. 2, 
14 July 2009; delivered free weekly with the Daily news; p. 1). 
19 see the october–December 2009 edition of the tanzania procurement Journal, 
edited by the ppra, dedicated to anti-corruption strategy in public procurement.
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4.3. Public Procurement Appeals Authority (PPAA)
the public procurement appeals authority was also established under 
the revised ppa in 200420 with the aim of providing an independent 
mechanism through which bidders can submit complaints arising from 
the public procurement process out of court. on their website, they justify 
their establishment prominently with the prevention of wasted and mis-
appropriated public funds—on their website “about public procurement 
appeals authority”, the first of only three paragraphs is the following:
more than 70% of the Government Budget is expended in procurement 
related activities every year. the Controller and auditor General’s report 
that 30% of the losses report each year in the Government are losses identi-
fied with public procurement [sic]21
in other words, here too anti-corruption is prioritised as a prime objec-
tive of an improved procurement system. in practice, again, it does not 
seem to carry much weight, according to the impression gained in the 
interviews.
4.4. Implementation Action Programme for the Construction Industry 
Policy
in 2006, the ministry of infrastructure Development launched the Cip’s 
implementation action programme (iap). the iap is led by a steering 
Committee chaired by the permanent secretary of the ministry of infra-
structure Development, with the nCC acting as secretariat. the 14 mem-
bers are ex officio representatives of, amongst others, the prime minister’s 
office (regional administration and local Government), the tanzania 
national roads authority, all registration boards of the construction 
industry (i.e. erB, CrB, and aQsrB), as well as the aCet, taCeCa, and 
aat (miD 2006: 7).22
the iap identifies twelve objectives of the Cip that require additional 
legal backing. in fact, the iap reads like a wish-list of professionals and 
experts, addressing the need for promoting technological development, or 
the introduction of credit bonds, training funds and further financial tools 
20 see part Vii of the ppa.
21 see under http://www.ppaa.go.tz/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=17
&itemid=29 (last accessed 22 october 2009).
22 see miD 2006. 
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to strengthen and protect the domestic construction industry. relevant 
provisions for preventing corruption and strengthening professional stan-
dards are incorporated throughout the action programme. one explicit 
objective is ‘promoting the prevention of Corruption in the industry’.23 
for instance, the iap underscores the seemingly obvious enforcement 
of the amended public procurement act to “[e]nsure transparency and 
accountability in procurement, design and contract administration” (miD 
2006: 18, repeated on miD 2006: 22). another example concerns the reg-
istration boards as well as professional associations, who are tasked to 
“[e]stablish and enforce ethical codes of conduct for the registered profes-
sionals” (miD 2006: 35). in addition, very much in the spirit of the pro-
fessional associations, the Cip foresees a “[r]eview [of] enabling acts for 
regulatory Bodies to delegate some of regulatory functions to the associa-
tions” (miD 2006: 42), with the policy objective to “[e]volve self-regulatory 
mechanism [sic] for their members as a way of ensuring delivery of qual-
ity service, competitive performance and prevention of corruption” (miD 
2006: 42). in other words, the official discourse on the implementation of 
the construction industry sees a defined role for professional associations 
in a wide range of areas, from ethics, training and capacity-building to 
awareness-raising.
however, according to all interviewees with professional associations 
as well as authorities, the Cip has not even begun to be implemented. it 
is the epitome of a paper tiger. the main problem diagnosed was a lack 
of anyone in the driver seat; some interviewees emphasised the absence 
of political will—in the emphatic words of a representative of a contrac-
tor’s association, “what we are missing here is a dedicated spirit of the 
government”.24 others pointed out the organisational reforms in the moW 
absorbing all space for strategic thinking, and others again to the relative 
weakness of the nCC, who has a real sense of ownership with regard to 
the Cip, but “has not got enough muscle” in relation to other government 
authorities, such as the regulatory bodies. in other words, in spite of pro-
viding a serious process and detailed operational framework allocating 
clear responsibilities to all major stakeholders, including professional 
23 see miD 2006: 56, no. 8.2.8. in the annex of the iap. 
24 if not referenced, all the direct quotes in this chapter stem from interviews con-
ducted in January 2010 with representatives of the construction sector in Dar es salaam, 
tanzania. 
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associations, the Cip never took off—and will, certainly in this version, 
never take off.
4.5. Extent of Corruption in 2010
across the board, and without an exception, all the interviewees, whether 
from the public or private sector, confirmed that the level and exigencies 
of corruption in the construction sector had not abated. on the contrary, 
people were under the impression that it had increased.25 all the intervie-
wees asked about the level of corruption in comparison to 2003 responded 
without hesitation that it was more pervasive and involved higher amounts 
of money.26 mainly this seems to be due to the influx of more and bigger 
finances. as a well-established consulting engineer remarked: “Corruption 
is not going down, it is rising. i mean, in 2003 a project of usD 20 million 
was an exception, now it’s absolutely normal”. surprising, still, given the 
far more advanced regulatory and legislative framework, i.e. the greater 
independence and stronger mandate of the pCCB, the reforms of the ppa, 
the greater degree of institutionalisation of the regulation boards, and the 
establishment and operationalisation of the ppra and the ppaa. in fact, 
when asked outright about the governance reforms in the construction 
industry, no interviewee said that the situation had improved since 2003. 
at best, some observed the situation had remained the same, in spite of 
the ‘frills’ of new institutions and amended laws. Verbatim, a civil engineer 
observed: “Corruption is not going down. these guys are not presenting 
25 this perception of an increase of corruption in the construction sector contradicts 
the score of for instance the Cpi that identifies a slight decrease of (albeit: overall) corrup-
tion in tanzania in the same period (see Chapter 5, above). this perception is confirmed 
by the findings of the ppra’s survey of tanzania’s procurement system, which is based on 
survey methodology developed by the oeCD, and which compares specific dimensions the 
procurement system with oeCD baselines from earlier surveys (ppra 2007: 75–80). 
26 the interviewees were referring to corrupt practices framing the project cycle of 
ordinary tenders issued by the public sector. however, two interviewees also pointed out 
that 2010 is an election year, and hence the tussle about and the ‘politicisation’ of tenders 
and their allocation as part of political campaigns was already palpable, with the concomi-
tant increase in corruption. one well-connected engineer made an interesting point about 
the struggles within the system: “many people do not know this, but there is corruption 
within the political system. ministers are lobbying mps to rubberstamp their projects. par-
liamentary committees have become very powerful for this reason”. tying this observation 
into the analysis on politics and political order in africa discussed in Chapter 1, above, 
this kind of corruption is neither neo-patrimonial nor ‘disorderly’, but very much like the 
political corruption found in american or european politics (for examples and analyses 
see, for instance, transparency international 2004).
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the right ways to fight corruption. the tools are there. if government is 
serious, then things should happen”.
there was a definite sense of powerlessness pervading the comments 
on the extent of corruption. in distinction to 2003, where articulations 
of corruption were shaped by outrage and at the same time a sense of 
agency and promise, the interviewees now shrugged their shoulders—not 
without indignation, but coupled with resignation: “Corruption is a prob-
lem, but what can you do about it?” asked a consulting engineer, nota 
bene of an association which had been at the forefront of defining best 
business practices in 2003. this is a sentiment echoed by many others in 
a state of more or less agitation. after describing the infinite and often 
highly perfidious ways that tenders were manipulated by public officials, 
a successful and engaged quantity surveyor summed up the situation in 
the following way: “the enemy is very smart, i don’t know whether it is 
possible to do anything”. as a result his strategy was to try and stay clear 
from public tenders, and stick to projects in the private sector. “i would 
prefer to have a handful of small or middle-sized private projects than 
one or two big public projects. they are a waste of time and money”. this 
strategy was enthused by most other interviewees, who confirmed that 
corruption in the private sector was minimal, and, another distinction to 
public sector projects, the efficiency of the project management itself was 
far greater: “they want value for money”. only: not many professionals 
are in a position to make acquisitions and secure projects in the private 
sector, either for lack of capacity and experience, and/or because major 
investment projects are only available in Dar es salaam and one or two 
other cities. in the regions and rural areas, public investments still con-
stitute the overwhelming majority of projects, from roads, waterworks, 
irrigations schemes, infrastructure, power supply, etc. in other words, this 
strategy of ‘exiting’ the public sector, a real alternative in comparison to 
2003, when there were hardly any private projects available to local com-
panies, is limited to the select few. and for the public sector there still 
seems to be one truth: “everyone is corrupt, even every service in rural 
areas”, according to a contractor.
so, just comparing corruption in the construction industry between 2003 
and 2010, the one major space easing the pressure to (be) corrupt noted 
by the majority of respondents is not the firmer normative framework, 
the greater legal coherence, the institutional filling of regulatory voids, 
or even the professionalization of the industry—no, it is the increase of 
private investment in construction. a conclusion reflecting rather poorly 
on the implementation and internalisation of governance reforms.
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i shall discuss how this situation frames the room to manoeuvre of pro-
fessional associations.
5. Professional Associations and Corruption in the Construction Industry
in spite of the openness of the findings of the case-study of 2003, i had 
formed at the back of my head the hypothesis that given the structural 
reforms, the improved legal framework of public procurement and more 
coherent regulation of professionals, professional associations would 
become more asserted, stronger and more assured in their professional 
standing within the construction industry and policy making processes. 
in other words, in an admittedly highly optimistic Weberian reading, i 
assumed that articulations of corruption referring to particular normative 
frameworks, professional ethics as well as professional industrial policies 
would, firstly, lead to a profiling and ‘hardening’ of their professional iden-
tity, and secondly, to an at least partial hegemonisation of governance 
discourses by the associations, manifested in more resources and a stron-
ger voice. this, in my opinion rather neat hypothesis begun to crumble 
with the very first interviews—and, a bit like all the kings men and all 
the kings horses attempting to put humpty Dumpty together again, i 
have not been able to reassemble it since. Yes, the discursive terrain that 
presented itself in 2003 was, in 2010, transformed through the remark-
ably extensive regulatory reforms described above. Yet it seems that this 
formally restructured construction industry (one could also say: the dis-
locations in the discursive landscape) has not expanded the hegemonic 
power of professional associations, although their representations of cor-
ruption were, as the case-study of 2003 indicated, doubtlessly formative to 
the ways these reforms were articulated and formalised. however, instead 
of this process leading to an increase in the democratic space of profes-
sional associations, quite the contrary seems to have happened. firstly, 
corruption seems to have all but disappeared as an empty signifier—not, 
as was indicated above and will be shown through the eyes of profession-
als, because of a lack of nodal points that ‘corruption’ could connect to, 
but because the hegemonic representations of official regulatory institu-
tions (especially the regulation boards) has proved to be more dominant, 
‘smothering’ and appropriating the emancipatory corruption discourse of 
professional associations. this holds not only true for the corruption dis-
course; it seems that in general the articulatory and practical spaces of 
professional associations has been filled with official articulations, thus 
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closing down on differential, democratic spaces. this argument will be 
substantiated below in the sections talking through the different dimen-
sions affecting the identity, resources and boundaries of the professional 
associations.
Professional Associations: in 2009, three professional associations had 
disappeared from the nCC’s list of professional members,27 and two more 
had been added, including Cata.28 Given the small number of profes-
sional associations and the size of the private sector in construction, this 
is quite a remarkable fluctuation. interestingly, in 2009 the contractors 
working in the informal sector formed a professional association (tan-
zanian association of informal Constructors (taiCo)), with the support 
of the national Construction Council and the unDp.29 according to two 
interviewees, in 2008 the establishment of an apex organisation for all 
professional associations was induced. however, its establishment has not 
progressed since.
Membership: all the associations are still struggling with a lack of inter-
est and lack of members. this has two main repercussions: the first is a 
financial problem, as the associations are largely membership-financed. 
the second, linked to the first, is the problem of lack of membership. the 
associations all struggle with relatively weak membership numbers and 
the concomitant lack of representativeness—an issue unchanged since 
2003. “You need a strong voice, the voice comes from the members. You 
cannot speak with a strong voice if you have less than 50% of professionals 
as members”, said the executive secretary of a formerly influential engi-
neers’ association. as an example, according to the executive secretary, 
aCet had an estimated average of less than four new members in the 
27 these were the tanzanian association of Contractors (taCa) (which according to 
informants was never operational), the association of electrical Contractors tanzania 
(aeCt), and the association of Valuers and estate agents (tiVea), none of which were 
included in the study of 2003.
28 the other association is the tanzanian institution of arbitrators (tiarb), which was 
also not included in the case-study of 2003.
29 the informal sector was not included in this case-study, and this point shall not be 
elaborated any further. however, from the interview with the responsible desk officer and 
from the documentation provided by her, there are some interesting observations that can 
be made. the prime objective of taiCo is to improve the exploitative work-conditions and 
wages of the informal workers. this incongruous hybrid type of association between the 
formal and informal seems to be an indication of a) the increasing importance of formal 
recognition to have access to more and better paid jobs, b) the increasing importance of 
speaking with a collective voice to influence the sectoral framework, and c) the increasing 
confidence about and engagement to demand basic rights. tellingly, taiCo’s constitution 
does not include any provisions on professional codes of conduct (see taiCo 2009). 
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past years, and in 2008 no new member at all. in 2009, however, accord-
ing to the executive secretary the ‘value added’ provided by the directory 
they had recently published (see under ‘activities’ below) attracted seven 
firms and 12 individual members, which constitutes a remarkable success. 
still, the issue is both a problem of numbers and of weight. on the one 
hand, the associations are struggling with attracting sufficient members 
in absolute terms; but equally weakening is the fact that the associations 
are not necessarily attracting the important players, i.e. the bigger firms 
or the experienced and established professionals. the latter seems a par-
ticular problem for ‘established’ professions, i.e. the engineers and the 
architects.
all the associations included in this study had a membership of under 
50%, although exact numbers were hard to get, also because the distinc-
tion was made between ‘active’ members—i.e. members who paid their 
membership fees—and other members. examples are aCet, which has 
about 90 members out of an estimated 200 registered consulting engi-
neers; taCeCa, which has an estimated membership of approx. 300 out 
of a total of more than 1000 registered civil contractors; Cata with an esti-
mated membership of approx. 500 (of which about 350 ‘active’ members) 
out of a total of about 4000 contractors; the aat has approx. 80 members 
(out of approx. 250 registered architects). the tiQs seems to have the 
best ratio, namely 80 individual members out of a small community of 
about 150 registered quantity surveyors. however, of the 80 members only 
about 40 are actually registered quantity surveyors, the other members 
are only graduate members. the problem of lack of members as well as 
lack of commitment by the members in paying their fees was emphasised 
throughout the interviews, particularly in the small associations.
the reasons for this scant interest given were mainly lack of a sense 
of community within the professions themselves, even within the more 
established professions. “they do not see the need for us”, was diagnosed 
self-critically, or, with a more cutting assessment of the absence of cohe-
siveness of the professional community: “they are not interested in the 
future of the profession”—be it because many professionals are content 
with the existing situation and opportunities, be it because they are not 
sufficiently aware of the work of the associations, or be it because they 
quite literally do not subscribe to the objectives of the association. many 
are members (in fact, the erB stipulates membership in a professional 
association as a condition for registration, be that a national, regional or 
international association), but do not pay membership fees or take part 
in the annual meetings or other events. other reasons given were not just 
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lack of interest, but also lack of time: “people are willing, but they are too 
tied up with their own business”, was observed by interviewees of several 
professions, i.e. everyone is so busy that they cannot or do not want to 
make time for additional (especially voluntary) engagements.
an additional point not raised in the interviews of 2003 was now 
addressed quite emphatically. the registration boards are mainly financed 
by the professionals themselves, their fees being statutory for registration. 
the sentiments within the professional community with regard to the 
associations seems to be that “they pay fees to CrB, why should they pay 
us too?”. this is especially pertinent as the registration boards have taken 
on many functions that the professional associations formerly filled, most 
notably professional standard setting. there was a distinct sense conveyed 
by most of the associations themselves that, indeed, they were not offer-
ing any ‘value added’ to the community, because they are too small, too 
poor, and too weak to influence official policies. But in particular, it was 
emphasised that they were weak in terms of status as well as resources 
vis-à-vis the ever stronger registration boards.
Staffing: the associations vary in terms of staff available to them. in 
comparison to 2003, there is a small professionalization to be witnessed, 
with more associations endowed with permanent staff. however, the 
staff numbers are still very small; for instance, aCet has a staff of four 
(with a paid executive secretary only since 2005); iet has a similar set-up. 
taCeCa’s staff is down from four full-time positions in 2009 (including 
an advocacy position) to two in 2010 (the executive secretary and the 
office manager), although they have been successful in attracting fund-
ing. But most of the associations were completely reliant on voluntary 
work, which constitutes a major problem. human resources to convene 
and inform members, plan and execute the variety of activities is a very 
scarce resource. the question: “When to find time?” was raised several 
times in the course of the interviews, not to mention the question how 
to find money. the impression was that the smaller associations, such as 
the tiQs or aat, are completely reliant on less than a handful of persons 
(in both cases without any permanent staff ), and the others are all also 
struggling with constraints.
Activities: most of the associations were involved not so much in out-
right advocacy, but were concentrating mainly on technical activities, such 
as improving specific provisions of contracts, procurement stipulations or 
training. to secure their purpose and status, most the associations were in 
one way or the other cooperating with the relevant regulatory boards on 
training. health (such as hiV/aiDs, or health and safety on construction 
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sites) seems to be one area of advocacy and engagement, which is also 
supported by donor agencies and international organisations.30 two of 
the associations were primarily concerned with compiling and publishing 
a directory of all professionals in the community.31 as such a directory 
had not previously existed, or urgently required an update, these activities 
were seen to be of immediate use to the members and beyond. all asso-
ciations were involved in activities to protect their profession and specific 
quality standards, for instance through specific contractual stipulations or 
financial arrangements. also, new ways of cooperating with the authori-
ties were being sought, for instance, through mous on areas of activities 
and responsibilities.
Where possible, the associations were seeking to participate in intergov-
ernmental fora that in most cases go beyond the construction industry. one 
important vessel is the tanzanian national Business Council, where “our 
voice is heard in the highest level”, as representatives of two of the asso-
ciations underlined. General opinion was that influence had to be sought 
as close to the ‘realms of power’ as possible, going beyond the immedi-
ate regulatory and institutional framework by connecting to ‘higher’ dis-
courses on public-private cooperation and dialogue.
notable was that ‘corruption’ had all but disappeared from the agenda 
of the associations. Whereas in 2003 nearly all associations had some proj-
ect, activity or forum articulated around corruption in a wide sense (i.e. 
professional ethics, improvement of legal framework, more effective and 
transparent implementation etc.), in 2010 no discourse on corruption con-
necting up to other discourses (in this sense: public discourse) could be 
discerned. of all associations, taCeCa was the only association that has 
a project in the pipeline, but a project that has been lying dormant for the 
past few years due to lack of funding.32 according to the leading represen-
30 see the activities by taCeCa, who are engaged in the prevention of hiV/aids in 
road projects, or the iet, who in collaboration with the erB and osha are aiming to 
include health and safety in the criteria’s of the tender boards. 
31  the two associations are taCo and aCet, so this seems to be a particular concern of 
the consulting industry, to enhance visibility and access to information on companies. 
32 one proposal on ‘taCeCa programme monitoring anti-corruption initiatives in the 
construction sector’ had been prepared by the itt (uK) for taCeCa in november 2007, 
but found no further funding (unfortunately no copy of this proposal could be obtained). 
Before that, in 2006, taCeCa outlined another governance project on ‘Design of a system 
for monitoring the implementation of policies and legislation focusing on local Civil 
engineering Contracting subsector’ (see picture), which, amongst other objectives, includes 
the identification of mechanisms to “assess issues hindering the growth and improvement 
of local civil engineering contracting sub-sector” (taCeCa 2006: 6) which, the draft report 
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tatives of taCeCa, the reason given by the funding organisation was that 
corruption was now an issue taken up by other, specialised civil society 
organisations, and hence there was no need for a professional association 
to address the topic.
the general impression gained from the interviews was that discursive 
articulations of corruption have significantly decreased both in general 
representations within the public media as well as in the more circum-
spect field of construction industry policies. in spite of the problems that 
still pervade the construction industry, the constraints on (legally) profit-
able, quality work and on the professional integrity of professionals in the 
construction industry, the professional associations are not addressing the 
issue in a programmatic fashion. taCeCa is the only association that has 
attempted to kick-start it in a more systematic manner, but has failed due 
to lack of funding. this does not mean, however, that the topic has lost 
its salience for the associations, or that it is not addressed in more infor-
mal ways. a leading member of the tiQs exclaimed “in all these forums 
and meetings [with government], corruption is always a topic, but the 
minister or the Deputy minister does not listen”. this sentiment was 
echoed nearly verbatim by other interviewees from professional associa-
tions, embittered that “we shout, but they do not want to hear us”. there 
seems to be a particular ‘deafness’ of the public sector to the voices of 
the professional associations, in general, as will be commented further 
down, but in particular with regard to issues of corruption. this lack of 
impact may be compounded by the problem of social compacts that was 
already diagnosed in the case-study of 2003; as a civil contractor pointed 
out, describing encounters with the government: “You talk, you agree, but 
then nothing is implemented the way that you think it should be”—the 
associations’ voice “goes in one ear, out the other”, as his colleagues put 
it in a different interview.
concludes, “include poor technical and management skills, lack of investment capital and 
finance, poor management organization, lack of access to work opportunities, globaliza-
tion, marginalization and corruption” (taCeCa 2006: 53). the terms of reference were 
laid out by the funding organisation, Business environment strengthening for tanzania 
(Best), supported by the World Bank, the government of Denmark through DaniDa, of 
sweden through siDa, of the united Kingdom through DfiD, and the embassy of the 
Kingdom of the netherlands.
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6. ‘Our voice is not heard’: Perspectives on Public Officials
the discourse on the public sector as articulated by professionals in the 
private sector has mutated slightly. the problem of wage asymmetry is 
not accorded the same weight as it did in 2003, although there is still a 
discrepancy of about 1:3,33 according to an eminent board member of the 
erB. as he accorded, this discrepancy still has a potentially corrupting 
effect, but it was not a feature problematised further in other interviews. 
What was striking in comparison to 2003 is that the public sector was 
characterised in similar terms by the professionals, and yet with some 
very significant differences. the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ was 
still being drawn in terms of both attitude and greed: “Government offi-
cials are not professionals, they cannot see. it is a problem of mind-set, 
not that they are benefiting a lot. if they were pushed out of the pub-
lic sector into the private sector they would realize”, as a civil contractor 
observed, emphasising on the lack of exposure and professional experi-
ence of senior officials. this assessment of obstructive senior officials was 
resonated by a consulting engineer: “the wages are not a problem, just 
greed. it’s not the ordinary person in the office, but the senior persons, 
those persons with the power to blacklist a contractor, to blacklist a con-
sultant, those with a good salary, with extras perks. they want to buy 
a new car, they want to build a new house in one year. so they resort 
to malpractices”. as an established and recognised contractor lamented, 
echoing others: “Why should they not work for money?”, referring both to 
the greed and discretion encountered in public officials, as well as to the 
difficult economic situation of contractors, whose profit margins are still 
and perhaps increasingly squeezed by competition and corruption. the 
comments also, of course, point to a particular entrepreneurial ethics, a 
pride in earning one’s own money through productive and professional 
work (as opposed to the ‘unproductive’ bureaucrat).
the great difference between 2003 and 2010 is not, then, a change in 
mind-set and official ethics, or more effective normative sanctions, as 
might have been expected from transformed regulatory landscape. no: the 
difference lies in the articulations around the space that regulatory insti-
tutions are taking up. not in the sense of creating and protecting spaces 
33 the example given was for a young graduate engineer, who would earn approx. 
usD 400 a month in the public sector, compared to approx. usD 1200–1500 in the private 
sector. 
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for professional practices, but in the sense of encroaching on the spaces of 
professional associations in terms of standard setting, outreach, training 
and definition of best practices. all associations of the construction inter-
viewed were agitated about the fact that especially the registration boards 
were taking on more and more functions that hitherto had been exer-
cised by the professional associations—and which, as was strongly felt, 
the associations were far better placed to exercise. since they have been 
established, the registration boards “are slowly showing their muscle”, as 
was stated with regard to their expansion of activities. indeed, both the 
erB as well as the CrB’s mandate has widened, and they are increasingly 
active in accreditation, training as well as outreach, for instance, through 
their aGms or through local consultative meetings. the need for the 
registration boards was not disputed, on the contrary, but the need for 
complementary spheres of activity was underlined. statements such as 
the following were regular features of the interviews: “the CrB should not 
act as police, they should support us”. “Why are they conducting training? 
these are things that we are far better placed to do.” “We are striving for 
CrB [sic] not to jeopardize the work that should be done by the associa-
tions”. the legitimisation of their ‘better placement’ was drawn from three 
reasons: firstly, through the associations autonomy and independence 
(a distinction made by statements such as: “the erB cannot do anything 
against the government’s will”); secondly, responsiveness to the needs of 
the profession (examples abound, from health and safety requirements 
to specialised contractual arrangements); and thirdly, through their more 
relevant degree of expertise, not least through continual interaction with 
regional and international apex organisations, with which all associations 
were involved in.
problematic remains the scant recognition that is accorded to the asso-
ciations, in spite of their formalised interaction and consultation process 
with regard to various institutional and legal reforms (which begun with 
the establishment of the registration boards and has continued over the 
ppa and its amendments, the Cip and its iap, as well as to various spe-
cialised technical specifications), as well as the frequent physical prox-
imity and interpersonal exchanges.34 the complaint and agitation with 
34 the interpersonal exchanges are quasi-guaranteed because of the small size of the 
expert community in the construction sector. the representation on the boards as well as 
other official meetings and committees are routine meeting-places for public and private 
representatives. in addition, some associations are actually located or have an office space 
in the same building as the registration boards, such as, for instance, the iet. 
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regard to the ‘deafness’ of public officials and institutions when it comes 
to addressing corruption is resonated on a larger scale: professional asso-
ciations, to a greater or lesser extent, are not mute, but their voices are 
muted. their efforts at hegemonising representations, be it on corruption 
or others, are characterised by palpable power asymmetries, by highly 
uneven endowments with symbolic and material resources.
a case in point is the official, statutory guaranteed representation 
of the professional associations on the registration boards. most inter-
viewees from the associations acknowledged that communication had 
become easier as a result of the official representation and the forma-
lised encounters and spaces of communication. the interpretation on the 
effects of these formalised encounters, however, differed from association 
to association, depending on their relationship with the registration board 
in question. one problem that loomed large was that, whilst the associa-
tions have the statutory right to nominate candidates for the boards, it is 
at the discretion of the ministry to appoint the final members. evidently, 
the associations strongly resented the fact that they were disenfranchised 
in terms of ‘real’ representation.
at the same time the cooperation between the registration boards and 
the associations seems to have drawn closer and become more formalised. 
in their quest to secure own spaces and counteract the traction of mar-
ginalisation, the associations seek to formalise their cooperation with the 
registration boards. as mentioned above, the iet is in the process of draw-
ing up a memorandum of understanding between themselves, the erB 
and the occupational health and safety authority (osha). one objective 
of the iet is the official recognition of health and safety standards by the 
ppra as a criterion for awarding tenders.35
the division of labour between the associations and the registration is 
irksome to all associations. on the one hand the associations feel margin-
alised and expropriated by the expansion of regulatory activities. on the 
other hand, there is a sense of abuse of their expertise and voice, which 
is called upon only when it suits the registration boards. this, interest-
ingly, also holds true in one case where the registration board evidently 
calls on the association to criticise certain government policies, which the 
registration board, as a government agency, could not do itself. “But these 
are not necessarily our opinions or our stakes”, was complained. this is 
a particularly interesting case of inverted hegemonisation, showing again 
35 unfortunately no copy of the mou could be obtained.
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the shifting boundaries between and within both government as well as 
associational discourses.
What was remarked in 2003 still holds true in 2010, namely the impor-
tance of individuals. the professional community engaged in policy work 
is still very small, and personal relations are important. in many cases 
the integrity or capability of a particular executive of a public agency was 
acknowledged, also underlining the fact that this rendered communica-
tion and professional recognition much easier. an influential factor seems 
to be the professional qualification of the public official in question, i.e. 
whether he (mostly he, not she) is from the same professional community 
or not. this is especially felt within the non-engineering community, due 
to the dominance and establishment of the engineering profession in the 
tanzanian construction industry and policy framework. remarkable is that 
at least two important institutions of the construction industry, the nCC 
and the ppra, are directed by persons who are generally acknowledged 
to be competent and genuinely engaged in promoting professionalism. 
however, without contesting the integrity or the skills of these individu-
als, the institutions themselves were not seen to be very effective, placed 
as they are within a disabling environment.
as indicated above, however, the discursive landscape has changed. 
those associations with sufficient human resources are increasingly 
articulate in fora that go beyond the construction industry, in commit-
tees or high-level meetings that create overarching formalised nodal points 
between the public and the private sector. interestingly, better inter-sectoral 
communication is also one of the prime priorities of the naCsap ii, which 
seeks to create a variety of local to national stakeholder platforms. in the 
construction industry, it is perceived that, as was outlined in the previous 
sections, the Cabinet and in particular the relevant ministries (miD and 
moW) are not very strategic or proactive in designing, structuring and 
implementing industry policies. hence, the need to be ‘heard’ in other 
spheres seems to lend itself to discourses of professional interests. one of 
the most important cross-sectoral vehicles seems to be the national Busi-
ness Council (nBC), which is chaired by the president, and has twenty 
members of the public sector (government and senior public officials) and 
twenty members from business. the latter include representatives of the 
professional associations, such as taCo or taCeCa. as a civil contractor 
remarked, “there, our voice is heard in the highest place”.
to conclude, two features are notable. the first is that professional 
associations are at pains to take their representations out of the construc-
tion industry, and be heard in the wider and weightier forum of selected 
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business interests. the second is the emphasis on non-adversarial politics. 
as the same civil contractor, who represents an association in the nBC, 
emphasised: “When talking to government we say we are not hostile, we 
are trying to build a friendly environment.” professional associations are 
endeavouring to engage in dialogue, not confrontation, with the state—
and this increasingly beyond the narrow confines of the construction 
industry, in which, in addition, due to its still relatively small size persons 
and personalities know each other only too well.
7. Hegemonies and Fixations of Corruption:  
Conclusions in Space and Time
looking back, at the end of the case-study in 2003 there was no clear-
cut conclusion on the stability and closure of professional identities. the 
articulations of professional identities and purposive representations of 
collective interests coupled with political claims were, at that time, still 
relatively fresh. Very clearly, at the time they were restructuring and being 
restructured by the evolving regulatory framework and the emergence of 
new official actors. this restructuring process was inscribed deeply by the 
donor discourse on governance and corruption, which provided the mate-
rial and epistemic frame of reference for relevant governmental policies 
in the construction industry and, more generally, with regard to specific 
anti-corruption measures. the conclusions were very much in terms of a 
snapshot: on the one hand, professional identities were becoming firmer 
and more universalised through processes of articulation that employed 
corruption as an empty signifier. Corruption, in this understanding, served 
to unify differential demands, i.e. the distinct demands of the different 
professional associations themselves (distinctions that are sharply drawn), 
as well as differential demands inscribed across the public-private divide. 
thus the meaning of corruption is emptied out and refilled with particular 
meanings that all refer to a common universality, enabling and creating 
a set of relational differences: a chain of equivalences that allows these 
distinct and different identities to relate to each other.36 Corruption as 
an empty signifier renders demands of the anti-Corruption machine (as 
embodied in relevant donor discourses), demands articulated in national 
development policies, demands emanating from public institutions as 
36 for elaborations see laclau (2000, 2004), Gasché (2004), or norval (2004).
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well as the demands from the professional associations mutually legible. 
in the process, the different hegemonic representations undergo modi-
fications, constructing and experiencing new differences (e.g. between 
different professional associations, or between professional associations 
and regulatory bodies) as well as new equivalences (between particular 
professional associations and regulatory bodies, or between professional 
associations and national business interests).
in 2003, the jury was out with regard to fixations of the hegemonic 
representations and delineation of identities of professional associations 
in the construction industry. Both a successful hegemonisation process 
was thinkable, with the hegemonic representations of professional asso-
ciations forging chains of equivalence with the social imaginary emerging 
in the process of democratisation, pluralisation and liberalisation. ‘suc-
cessful’, here, would mean that the particular meaning of corruption as 
articulated by the professional associations, demanding political and eco-
nomic spaces that create professional recognition, professional integrity 
and rule-based, legal profit-making opportunities, would acquire a univer-
salising effect. this did not seem unlikely, especially as the governmental 
discourse on development, the donor discourse on governance and anti-
corruption, as well as more concretely the legal and institutional frame-
work were all operating with similar statements. at the time, the elements 
of articulating corruption in this emancipatory sense were readily avail-
able (a contingent process which is by no means predetermined), and lent 
themselves to being filled with distinct and different representations.
at the same time, the dominant practices of corruption were framed 
by a different set of logics—profit-seeking and profit-making ‘no matter 
what’, largely unconstrained by legal sanctions or ethical norms. this 
counter-discourse squeezed the spaces of professional associations con-
siderably. on the one hand, it made their demands of social transfor-
mation more urgent, more pressing, as reflected both in the observed 
belligerence or frustration of responses, as well as in the frequency that 
‘corruption’ was problematised and employed as pars pro toto for disinter-
ested, self-serving public institutions and political marginalisation. on the 
other hand, the dominant practice of corruption characterising the con-
struction industry—a hegemonic representation sui generis, as indicated 
in the conclusions to Chapter 3—deprived the professional associations 
of the material and, to an extent, the symbolic (in terms of credibility and 
legitimacy) resources to articulate their demands. the increasing numbers 
and diversity of articulations by professional organisations, the regula-
tory changes, and increased interactions of professional associations with 
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public agencies, with ‘corruption’ acting as an empty signifier, could be 
interpreted as an emancipatory process, leading to more diverse political 
and economic spaces for professional associations. the demands, state-
ments and practices of professional associations had obviously made their 
mark, resulting in concrete regulatory and institutional reforms—albeit 
not to the extent hoped or demanded. in addition, the heterogeneity and 
variety of linkages and coalitions between and across the public/private-
divide made a more open, more emancipatory process thinkable. But on 
the other hand, the dominant practice of corruption and the discursive 
closures witnessed at the level of national politics in terms of authoritar-
ian trends were structuring the political spaces hierarchically, endowed 
with and exerting far more power than the small and weak professional 
associations could ever hope for.
in the years between the two case-studies, the structuring of the 
political spaces and the delineation of professional identities underwent 
dynamics that were not predicted in 2003. the first and foremost conclu-
sion is that corruption as an empty signifier has waned. ‘Corruption’ is still 
a dominant discourse of national development and growth, but it has lost 
its power to forge chains of equivalence for emancipatory micro-struggles. 
the democratic spaces and standard setting power of professional asso-
ciations has decreased significantly. although professional associations 
are seeking to reach out beyond the confines of the construction industry 
to high-level meetings, the nodal points are not forged by the signifier 
corruption. Corruption is still being articulated by professional associa-
tions, but not in a programmatic form—partly, of course, due to lack of 
donor support, who have ‘externalised’ the topic of corruption to special-
ised civil society organisations; partly due to governmental practices that 
foster impunity. in 2010, corruption is articulated in far more informal, 
more indirect ways by professional associations, thus losing much of its 
hegemonic power. this loss of power and resonance is reflected in the 
relative loss of recognition and visibility of professional associations in 
this period. evidently, i do not mean to say with this that ‘corruption’ is 
the only empty signifier that is capable of articulating the professional 
demands and interests for a rule-based, democratic social order, or con-
structing the nodal points strong enough to inscribe their discourse in the 
discourses of other (in particular: public agents) social agents. But in 2003 
‘corruption’ seemed to be endowed with the right ingredients against the 
right horizon to do so. But the empty signifier ‘corruption’ has shrunk and 
become dissipated, not evocative enough to synthesise collective action 
or social imaginaries anymore.
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interestingly, the actor articulating corruption most forcefully and 
coherently is a regulatory authority, namely the ppra. the ppra is clearly 
seeking to construct corruption as an empty signifier, seeking to represent 
the ‘unity’ of regulatory institutions and professionals within the construc-
tion sector as well as that of sectoral and national reforms as unified in 
the fight against corruption and for more efficiency and professionalism. 
the discourse of corruption is employed to delineate the regulatory body’s 
identity, seeking to bolster its own visibility and authority. however, as 
far as could be ascertained, professional associations have not sought to 
link up to these articulations (as indeed the ppra has not reached out 
to them), nor do these articulations show much traction with other gov-
ernmental agencies. the lack of hegemonic radiation has to do with the 
social actor seeking to fill it with one particular meaning; in this case, 
the ppra who, in spite of the importance of its mandate, itself does not 
occupy a very powerful position within the governmental administration 
as well as within the construction industry.
But this lack of hegemonic radiation also demonstrates that corrup-
tion as an empty signifier has lost its allure, its gravitational force—it is 
not powerful enough anymore to link up discourses, to collapse frontiers 
between different identities. the different social agents in the public as 
well as private sector are concerned with the construction of other empty 
signifiers. in this, certain actors are far more successful than others. over-
all, it seems as if the hegemonising representation of the regulatory bodies 
has appropriated much of the differential identities of the professional 
associations. By taking over terms, values and practices such as ‘profes-
sionalism’, ‘quality’, or ‘training’, the regulatory bodies have also taken 
over the spaces formerly created and occupied by the professional asso-
ciations. instead of securing spaces, in a paradox twist the successful dis-
courses of professional associations have served to disempower them. in 
effect, the process of establishing a comprehensive regulatory framework 
to safeguard professional quality and practice has led to a squeezing out 
of professional associations’ spaces. the de iure functional differentiation 
this process is embedded in, in principle welcomed and sought, has not 
resulted in de facto functional differentiation, which would allow and 
indeed necessitate a diversity of logics. instead it has resulted in building 
and reinforcing the power and the outreach of the state.
important at this point is to note that although the state’s power has 
definitely been extended by this regulatory process—and evidently in 
very real senses—this power is not as monolithic as depicted in many 
neo-patrimonial accounts, or as single-logic-driven as more radical 
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accounts of instrumentalisation and criminalisation would have it, nor 
indeed as deterministic as accounts of socio-cultural frameworks outline 
(see Chapter 1, above). the power of the state is transformed and con-
solidated through idealtypical rule-based institutional change, effecting 
and enunciating certain democratic moments. however, the effects of 
this transformation are far more diffuse than anticipated. it does not fall 
neatly into the category ‘stronger institutional framework’, as evidently 
the institutional framework, whilst largely endowed with authority, does 
not enforce its rules. it does not fit neatly into the category ‘increased 
authoritarianism’, as there is a marked heterogeneity in terms of integrity 
and ‘culture’ of public agencies to be observed. and it does not fall neatly 
into the category ‘democratisation’, as the power asymmetry between 
the public and the private sector (at least the part of the private sector 
observed) is pronounced.
it is precisely this uneven spread of power within the social order 
(beyond the public/private divide) that needs to be understood in a more 
discerning fashion. professional associations are endowed with very few 
resources.37 they do not have the symbolic or the material resources to 
‘make themselves heard’, to make officials and public institutions listen 
and act. Corruption as an empty signifier has lost the power to capture the 
imagination and, not least, the funds to resonate in public. i shall return to 
the question of inequality in power relations and the effects on the struc-
turing of political spaces in the concluding chapter. suffice to say at this 
point that the statements made by professional associations (and indeed 
other actors within the construction industry) on corruption are too dis-
persed and too irregular to coalesce to a discursive formation, to a regu-
lar and dominant representation that radiates into practices, articulations 
and statements of other social actors. there is a definite sense that the 
window of opportunity, the historical horizon against which such emanci-
patory statements could be made legible and audible, has closed. Whereas 
in 2003 there was a distinct (if brittle) sense of professional identities 
and interests being profiled and represented in official discourses, these 
have now been hegemonised by official discourse. instead of achieving 
a hegemonic representation themselves, the articulatory process (which 
had hegemonic moments) has lead to official discourses totalising these 
claims. the nodal points constructed by the professional associations have 
37 or, put in Bourdieu’s terms, they occupy very weak positions in the social terrain 
(Bourdieu 1985). 
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shrunk to highly formalised practices: to memorandum of understand-
ings, to the formal division of labour between them and the registration 
boards—but framed by a clear and known power asymmetry.
thus, the political spaces characterising the construction industry in 
tanzania are structured by an intriguing mix of stronger democratic poli-
tics on a national level, weaker democratic identities on a sectoral level, 
stronger regulatory institutions and representations, and, certainly within 
the construction industry, a shrunk public (in the sense of shared) space 
in which meanings and claims can be heard. But although the case-studies 
have illuminated some of the processes through which democratic dis-
courses are inscribed, articulated or, indeed, are disarticulated, they say 
very little about the conditions under which such democratic social change 
becomes possible in a non-deterministic, non-linear way. obviously, the 
case-studies were only focusing on a very narrow strip of social order over 
time and in space. however, the question merits our attention on a more 
fundamental level. as aletta norval argues in reference to equality (as an 
intrinsic element of democratic politics), constitutive is
a change of perspective, of aspect, forced upon the existing social order, 
which institutes a new space where meanings may be shared. to repeat: 
there is not first a shared space in which all reasons and demands may be 
heard equally and into which new demands can be inscribed, but rather 
this shared space of reasons needs to be instituted, often through practices 
other than verbal argumentation. thus the verification of the presupposi-
tion of equality always takes place through the rupturing of a given order 
by disagreements (mésentente) that challenge existing orders and institute 
new spaces of meaning, which may become sites of emancipation, or alter-
natively may become ossified over time (norval 2007: 78).38
to rephrase it blandly: how are new spaces instituted—and what consti-
tutes emancipatory sites rather than sites of ossification? i shall turn to 
precisely this process of changed aspects forced upon the social order, this 
disruptive process of challenges and disagreements, as well as the ques-
tion under which conditions new spaces of democratic meaning can be 
instituted in the following, concluding chapter.
38 evidently, norval develops her argument in explicit contradistinction to deliberative, 
liberal as well as critical theoretical scholars. she draws heavily on Jacques rancière, who 
notes that “proving one is correct has never compelled others to recognize they are wrong”. 
as a result, the “affirmation of the right to be correct is dependent on the violence of its 
inscription” (norval 2007: 77, quoting rancière 1995: 49). the kind of ‘violence’ of such 
inscriptions generating contemporary democratic politics is, perhaps, still underexplored.
ConClusions 
Corruption, politiCs and politiCal order
soundlessly collateral and incompatible: World is suddener than we 
fancy it.1
the diverse articulations of corruption explored in this book should make 
one thing visible: ‘corruption’ is a political concept. it is political in the 
ways that it is produced by the development discourse, shaping social 
realities through powerful imageries and material interventions. it is polit-
ical in the various ways that the academic discourse identifies the struc-
turing properties denoted by corruption, reiterating the blurred boundary 
between the public and private in africa. and lastly, it is political concep-
tualised as an empty signifier through which particular groups manage 
to inscribe particular demands and interests in a universal horizon. it is 
this last conceptualisation that i seek to develop in more detail in this 
concluding chapter, drawing on substantive insights from the chapters 
on the academic and developmental discourse on corruption, as well as 
fleshing out some of the more pertinent findings from the case-studies on 
professional associations in tanzania. in doing this, i hope to relate these 
insights to some questions of general theoretical interest.
the case-studies illuminate political micro-struggles, looking at a small 
and narrowly circumscribed field of social agents and the ways they 
articulate their demands using corruption as a signifier portraying ‘public’ 
1 excerpt from the poem “snow” by louis Macneice (see also the heading to Chapter 1, 
above). the full poem reads as follows:
the room was suddenly rich and the great bay-window was
spawning snow and pink roses against it
soundlessly collateral and incompatible:
World is suddener than we fancy it.
World is crazier and more of it than we think,
incorrigibly plural. i peel and portion
a tangerine and spit the pips and feel
the drunkenness of things being various.
and the fire flames with a bubbling sound for world
is more spiteful and gay than one supposes—
on the tongue on the eyes on the ears in the palms of one’s hands—
there is more than glass between the snow and the huge roses.
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aims: rule of law, democracy, or economic growth. in the first section, 
i will seek discuss the findings in the light of the academic and develop-
ment discourse on corruption. in the second section, i will dwell more 
extensively on the proposition of corruption as an empty signifier. this 
second section will be devoted to theorising this proposition in the light 
of more general mechanisms of the creation of political order, taking a 
particular interest in the political processes that underlie such creative 
processes. the question to dwell on, lastly, is the conditions under which 
democratic—non-instrumental, non-criminal, non-infernal—structures 
and identities are possible.
1. Corruption, Development and Political Order
in the introduction to this book, the first and foremost entry-point 
sketched out in the introduction was the sheer material and rhetorical 
presence of the development discourse on governance and corruption. 
Within a very short period of time, the ‘fight against corruption’ and 
the struggle for greater transparency and accountability became leading 
principles of development policies. as Marx seminally stated, ideas have 
material effects2—and in the case of foreign aid this is even more appar-
ent, as the ‘ideas’ embodied in policies guide aid flows. in other words, a 
substantial percentage of aid started to flow into donor-designed gover-
nance and anti-corruption reforms, ranging from legal sector reform to 
the redesign of public institutions. the material effect of foreign aid is 
particularly pertinent in countries such as tanzania where it constitutes 
a substantial part of tanzania’s real expenditure. But such interventions 
that are embodied in new public policies, new laws or new institutions 
also have effects beyond their immediately intended objective: as part 
of a wider discourse, they are highly political as a social imaginary, as 
a horizon against which particular demands can be thought, articulated 
and inscribed. it is hence not surprising that professional associations 
only begun to articulate corruption as an issue in the wake of liberalisa-
tion, democratisation and governance reforms of tanzania. the question 
is what effects does this symbolically and materially powerful discourse 
have on the realities of social actors?
2 see in particular the elaborations of Marx on the labour process in Volume 1 of “das 
Kapital” (see Marx 2005). 
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Breaking the material component down to the level of professional asso-
ciations in the construction sector, donors did not feature prominently in 
the design and financing of anti-corruption programmes of the associa-
tions. the few anti-corruption programmes that were financed (or pro-
posed) by donors had an important immediate effect in terms of income 
and status, but they are few and far between. looking at the patterns of 
anti-corruption funding for civil society, donors seem to be supporting an 
increasing ‘specialisation’ of actors who are, in their eyes, endowed with 
the legitimacy to articulate corruption. professional associations, whilst 
in the early days of liberalisation and regulatory reform received donor 
support in their efforts to establish and protect professional standards, 
are now being delegitimized in terms of addressing corruption. Based on 
the observations over a period of seven years with regard to the profes-
sional associations, this ‘function’ is now given to specialised nGos in the 
area of civil rights and corruption and withdrawn from organisations and 
associations that incorporate it in their specialised, particular interests 
and agenda.
the financial power of foreign aid is certainly one reason why the 
meta-discourses on governance and anti-corruption fed by the develop-
ment community are of far greater importance to professional associa-
tions. these are the discourses that inform and frame national policies, 
which professional associations can refer to and construct overarching 
equivalential relations. this meta-discourse shapes and re-affirms par-
ticular political articulations on corruption, such as for instance the con-
tinually reaffirmed government zero-tolerance-of-corruption-principle. 
perhaps more relevantly, this discourse frames and creates specific gov-
ernance and anti-corruption reforms, such as the new act on preventing 
and Combating Corruption, the public procurement act, or the regula-
tory bodies. the establishment of these institutions demarcate shifts in 
the discursive formations, offering new spaces and structural locations for 
professional associations—although with very mixed outcomes in terms 
of emancipation.
as the case-study showed clearly, somewhat paradoxically the regu-
latory expansion by public institutions has de facto and de iure delegiti-
mised and disenfranchised professional associations’ activities. in other 
words, the new norms and procedures established and hardened in the 
wake of governance processes have not led to a substantive decrease in 
corruption, nor indeed to substantively greater or more secure spaces 
for professional associations. the case-studies reveal that the develop-
ment discourse on governance and anti-corruption is not as dominant 
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as assumed: the social imaginary serving to inform values and practices 
of social actors is not one predominantly of market-economy, rule of law 
and democracy. But neither is it one of neo-patrimonialism, or of a moral 
economy, as the academic discourse would suggest. the social imaginar-
ies that actors in tanzania draw on are also composed of references to 
democracy, economic growth, and the rule of law; but they are interfused 
with social imaginaries of remnant socialist bureaucratic dominance, and 
are often reset in socially acknowledged rent- and profit-seeking terms, 
unbridled and compounded by a large degree of legal impunity.
2. Reassessing the Academic Discourse on Corruption in Africa
in other words, the findings from the case-studies allow some critical 
re-articulations of the academic discourse on corruption, and by infer-
ence on political order and social change in africa. Modes of inclusion 
and exclusion into political order, as well as statements on corruption 
discussed are typologised below in table 6, with the first three theories 
referring to conventional conceptualisations of the relationship between 
political order and corruption (see Chapter 1), and the last column syn-
thesising the insights of political discourse theory.
Firstly, one of the key themes of the academic discourse on corruption 
is the more or less explicit conceptualisation of corruption as an exchange-
mechanism between social position, economic wealth and political status. 
economic wealth here is conceptualised as a means to access the politi-
cal system, as a medium that allows the inclusion of otherwise excluded 
groups. Whether such practices qualify as corruption depends on their 
position within the matrix of social legitimacy and legality at a given point 
and place in time. related to this statement is a second mechanism out-
lined, namely corruption as a transformationary ‘conveyor belt’ mediat-
ing different, often incompatible rationales and logics (usually theorised 
in dichotomous terms, i.e. traditional/modern, local/national, informal/
formal, social/legal, etc.). ‘Corruption’ again acts a medium of inclusion/
exclusion—the stability or conversely instability of a political order that 
relies on such mediating and redistributive mechanisms depends very 
much on the configuration of society, the organisation of the political sys-
tem and the available means for redistribution. and thirdly, an assump-
tion made explicitly by scott and routinely present in other scholarly 
perspectives, is that professional associations as ‘modern’ social groups are 
granted unproblematic access to the political system. in conjunction with 
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their classic features (non-ascriptively organised, economically autono-
mous, etc.) they are hence potentially powerful civic actors contributing 
to the control and greater responsiveness of the state. although they are 
endowed with this possibility, in the literature they are characterised by 
their relative insignificance or downright absence under the given struc-
tural and cultural conditions prevailing in most african countries.
do the case-studies substantiate such statements? dwelling for a 
moment just on the mechanism of accessing the political sphere by means 
of economic resources, the evidence is less conclusive. in the case of pro-
fessional associations, no such exchange mechanism could be observed. 
For starters, professional associations are economically too marginalised 
to have the economic means to gain access to the political system through 
economic resources. But more pertinently: at no point did the professional 
associations indicate that such a mechanism would be necessary or use-
ful. access to the political system for their collective interests was defined 
and articulated primarily via rule-based, formal mechanisms and the rule-
based influence on the formation of such mechanisms—a phenomenon 
that will be discussed further down.
a completely different story, however, is the individual perspective. 
Here, not access to the political system, but access to the administration 
and the power of the administration and individual officials over the allo-
cation of public tenders was of key importance. in this context, illegal 
exchange practices (i.e. corruption) routinely pave the way or indeed are 
standard practice for professionals to gain access to public project. How-
ever, in contrast to depictions in the scholarly discourse, at stake is not the 
reinterpretation, reinvention or even mediation between local and general 
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norms, between formal and informal values. Far simpler, far more banal: 
corruption is a means of economic survival and economic enrichment. of 
course, for scholars of economic history this comes as no surprise. as Karl 
polyani famously described the powerful rationale and social imaginary 
evoked by capitalism:
nineteenth century civilization alone was economic in a different and dis-
tinct sense, for it chose to base itself in a motive rarely acknowledged in the 
history of human societies, and certainly never before raised to the level 
of justification of action and behavior in everyday life, namely, gain. [. . .] 
Within a generation, the whole human world was subjected to its undiluted 
influence (polanyi 1957: 30; emphasis added).
although african societies, and in our case specifically: tanzania, has been 
exposed to this ‘motive’ since its emergence, the recent transformations 
from a centrally planned to a market economy have completely restruc-
tured economic and political relations. Moreover, the social imaginary of 
profit and enrichment have risen to politically legitimised and socially 
accepted heights. especially in the case-study of 2003, the stir and power 
of this still very new experience of profit-making was extremely tangible. 
in this light, exclamations such as “if you are poor you are stupid”—i.e. 
if you have the opportunity to enrich yourself and you don’t do, you only 
have yourself to blame—make utter social sense.
But for the purposes of the analysis here, this insight is most fruitful 
when we look at it in a different light. evidently, corruption can mean-
ingfully be conceptualised as “a systemic problem having to do with the 
sources, uses, limits, and accountability of wealth and power” (Johnston 
2005: 22). However, what i am most interested in are the political effects 
this ‘systemic problem’ has. the problem of corruption that individuals 
are faced with is highly interdependent with the problem of marginalised 
political space of collective interests. Corruption has become routinised 
to the extent of being a structural property of the political economy of 
tanzania. the fact that economic practices of individual professionals are 
framed (in an enabling as well as constraining sense) by such structural 
properties has strong repercussions on the framing of the spaces and artic-
ulations available to professional associations. as emerged very clearly 
from the case-studies, it means that only few professionals do indeed 
gain the kind of independent, autonomous wealth and status classically 
ascribed to the middle class. professionals are still highly dependent on 
the public sector for access to economic opportunities, just due to the 
fact that the majority of projects in the construction industry are funded 
by or through public sector, in spite of the relative increase in private 
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investment witnessed in the past years. this dependency is not offset by 
the growth in registered professionals or indeed the professionalization of 
the construction industry. neither the relative growth of the middle class, 
the growing coherence of the regulatory framework, the public debate on 
political imaginaries, nor the above-mentioned liberalisation of the econ-
omy have led to any significant changes—even over a short but dynamic 
period of seven years. this had, however, nothing to do with an exchange 
mechanism, it had something to do with opportunities of enrichment and 
profit, which, according to the perceptions recounted in the case-studies, 
have sedimented into a general culture of corruption. as indicated in the 
conclusions to both case-studies of 2003 as well as 2010, above, this ‘cul-
ture of corruption’ could conceivably be framed in terms of a hegemonic 
representation of corruption sui generis—a discourse which is manifest in 
ubiquitous practices rather than public articulations; a discourse which, 
perhaps, also features the dissolution of antagonistic boundaries between 
‘us’ and ‘them’, between ‘professionals’ and ‘non-professionals’, with sub-
sequent ripple effects on the organisation of the political and economic 
realm. this is certainly a point which merits further theoretical and 
empirical attention.
returning to the core focus of this enquiry, the scrutiny on mechanisms 
of access to the political system also sheds critical light on the assumption 
that such access is ‘unproblematic’ for professional associations. What 
could be observed in the case of associations of the construction industry 
is they are ‘not seen’ and ‘not heard’ by the public sector. in other words, 
they do not feel taken seriously, they do not enjoy respect and recogni-
tion by the public sector. this is partly for historical reasons, against the 
backdrop of a socialist, centrally planned economy and the only gradual 
change in mindset of public officials. But it also has to do with the lack of 
importance and visibility of the associations, who buckle under the double 
load of, as individual professionals, economic survival and, as associations, 
under the low degree of support within the professional community. More 
to the point, the findings of the case-studies indicate that the professional 
associations have lost rather than gained recognition in the past decade.
turning to a further assertion made by the academic discourse on cor-
ruption: can one, then, analyse the political order in tanzania in terms of 
a moral economy of corruption? Well, no. Yes, there is indeed a ‘corrup-
tion complex’ to be observed, but one defined by values and practices of 
profit. at no point was there such thing as a corruption complex bounded 
by a particular moral matrix, based on traditional values of reciproc-
ity and compounded by hybrid ‘logics’ such as monetarisation of social 
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relations or pluralisation of normative frameworks to be observed. the 
collective values that the professional associations nurture, articulate and 
seek to institutionalise for are intrinsically public values, very much in a 
durkheimian sense. these collective values are imbued with a distinct 
sense of community, marked by professionalism and specific expertise, 
and always with reference to the public—i.e. values that on the one hand 
draw and define boundaries around the professional community, and 
on the other hand always refer to society beyond these specific bound-
aries. the particularisms nurtured here, hence, are not vertical, they are 
horizontal—a fundamental difference to theories of moral economy of 
corruption as well as notions of neo-patrimonialism.
this insight requires that some dominant scholarly claims about the 
relationship between the public and the private sphere need to be refuted. 
as discussed in Chapter 1, above, one of the most pervasive ‘truths’ on 
african political orders is the straddling of the public-private divide, 
i.e. the blurring of and (more or less instrumental) playing with and on 
boundaries between public interest and private interest, between formal 
norms and informal norms, between the legal and the legitimate (in the 
full range of possibilities and combinations). What could be observed in 
the case of professional associations in the construction industry of tan-
zania is the opposite phenomenon, a thought i would like to dwell on for 
a moment.
the findings from both case-studies, underscored by some qualitative 
statements from the topography of corruption in tanzania, show that 
identities are forged according to the particular sector, not according to 
the particular network actors are privy to. in the case of professional asso-
ciations seeking to delineate their identity and make it more profiled and 
articulate vis-à-vis the public sector, this implies both practical (e.g. in 
terms of expertise and productivity) as well as cultural (e.g. in terms of 
rationale and values) distinctions from social actors in the public  sector, 
not a fusion with them. equally, whilst the more progressive actors in 
the public sector may support and cooperate with professional associa-
tions, they define themselves clearly within the hierarchical logics and 
boundaries of the administration and government. as mentioned above, 
this does not go to say that professionals (here: individuals, not: profes-
sional associations) do not ‘cross the line’ and collude in corrupt practices, 
or subscribe to ideals of enrichment ‘no matter what’. But it means that 
structuring principles of collective interests and social agents are derived 
from completely different rationales to the ones postulated in dominant 
theories of african political order.
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even though it may arguably be a marginal phenomenon, this distinc-
tion is of fundamental practical and theoretical importance. Whereas 
the ‘straddling’ and boundary-crossing occurs systematically in terms of 
access to economic resources by individual actors (professionals), it does 
not occur in terms of identity-formation and articulation and hence of 
access to political resources of these collective social actors (professional 
associations).
still, it must be conceded that there are strong indications that cor-
ruption in tanzania acts both as a practice as well as a medium of exclu-
sion/inclusion to political as well as economic resources. particularistic 
exclusion from, and conversely particularistic inclusion into flows of such 
resources are routine, thus validating certain assertions made by theories of 
neo-patrimonialism and more broadly by the political economy of corrup-
tion. What needs to be strongly refuted, however, is the necessary fusion 
of such processes and instrumental use of norms across the spheres. this 
is neither generalised nor conclusive—although it would be tempting 
to conclude that the horizontal, public structuring principles and values 
observed in the case of professional associations are truly a marginal phe-
nomenon, acting and operating in a double bind of internal and external 
constraints. in this vein, one could argue (in good company) that collec-
tive action and professional interests and identities can be brushed aside 
as irrelevant, subject to the more general and dominant logics of corrup-
tion. But this is to misunderstand the fundamental theoretical implica-
tions of the distinction between collective and individual identities has. a 
key finding is that collective identities are articulated only by social actors in 
ways that are necessarily relevant to the public sphere. it is an articulation 
that goes beyond the particularistic (and of course far beyond the indi-
vidual) identities of the social actors in question. the fact that ‘modern’, 
professional identities, demands and frames of reference are employed 
and appropriated by social actors to articulate their demands is a sig-
nificant political act. significant in that it signifies a particular ‘modern’ 
kind of public space and social order, specific kinds of values and prac-
tices framed by rules, skills and merits. arguably, these elements are too 
disparate and unconsolidated to demonstrate the institutionalisation of 
democratic rules. But a ‘grand narrative’ of social change is not of interest 
here. What needs to be understood better is the actual processes under 
which such values and rules can and do emerge, carried and sustained 
by which social actors. albeit from a worm’s eye view, the findings of the 
case-studies show precisely such processes, in which social actors seek to 
shape the rules and practices of social order in a specifically democratic 
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way; i.e. not referring to localised or informal values, and not bound by 
a moral economy. to put it with taylor, there are social actors whose 
“constituting factor is nothing other than [. . .] common action” (taylor 
2004: 96): a hallmark of secularity, and, i would add, a hallmark of specifi-
cally democratic social action.
the findings offer insights into specific sites of this struggle, and they 
offer insights into the factors shaping the struggle over time. in fact, the 
sites themselves offer significant insights. the sites of ‘real’ encounters, 
encounters in which, according to the respondents, rules shaping agency 
in the construction sector are made, are predominantly the public sphere: 
official meetings, committees, workshops and conferences, which provide 
the formal time and space for encounters between public officials and 
professional associations. Moreover, the workspaces are often in close 
proximity, housed within the same building, allowing for regular informal 
encounters in an official and public space. But as could be observed in the 
case-study in 2010, the sites have been extended beyond a purely sectoral 
space. although of course the construction industry is the central frame of 
reference structuring these encounters, professional associations are tak-
ing their interests and demands beyond the construction industry, seeking 
and finding representation in other fora that have been established with 
the explicit objective to provide a time and space for encounters between 
the public and private sector. this explains, for instance, the repeatedly 
emphasised importance of the national Business Council, established and 
run under the auspices of the president.3 it goes far beyond the scope of 
these case-studies to make a statement on the effects of these encounters 
on a national level. suffice to observe here that the sites of interaction 
are neither particularised nor informalised, nor do they feature any indi-
cation of a ‘straddling’ of the public and private. they are organised pre-
dominantly along official lines, in terms of spaces as well as procedures, 
formally structuring the encounters between representatives of the two 
sectors on a sectoral as well as national level.
dwelling for a moment on the sites of articulations and concomitant 
identity-formation, an aspect which was not highlighted in the case-studies 
is the importance of regional and international apex organisations, espe-
cially by first-generation associations. in other words, the importance of 
3 Here a intended and positive effect (in terms of emancipatory politics) of the develop-
ment discourse can be observed, in that donors strongly advised for and fund such sites on 
a very senior, national level—with a degree of influence that, for instance, small profes-
sional associations could never hope for. 
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cooperation and interaction within the professional community across 
borders was repeatedly underlined as an important resource for strength-
ening their professional identities, associational visibility and specific 
expertise. statements by professional associations regularly emphasised 
the importance of the presence (or, indeed, absence due to lack of funds) 
of such encounters. again, this underlines the importance of horizontal 
references, communities that define and reproduce themselves via their 
profession across national and regional borders. this orientation within 
a particular identity does not, however, imply a closure of their articula-
tions. although it does affirm the differential identity of the profession, it 
also constructs an equivalential relationship, by enabling openings and 
linkages with professional discourses on public interests and on best prac-
tices in a regional or international context. issues such as for instance 
the regulatory framework or the extent of standard setting authority by 
professional associations indicate how significant these delineations are 
with regard to the interaction with state representations.
in sum, the case-studies show that, at least through the lens of profes-
sional associations in the construction industry, the distinction between 
the private sector and the public sector is deeply ingrained. not least due 
to the reforms in the public sector and the increasing regulation of the 
construction industry, over the past few years one can observe a more 
clearly organised and recognised distinction between the public and pri-
vate sector. such distinctions include the institutionalisation of formal 
sites of encounters or the formalised power of official authority. But spite 
of these conclusions, and in line with well-established theories on africa, 
one might be tempted to argue that this strict distinction merely serves as 
a façade to conceal ‘real’ encounters, as a performance to please Western 
or oppositional sensibilities. But the arguments elaborated here are not 
just stated from what is ‘visible’, what can be seen, what is being per-
formed, articulated and acted on the surface. the arguments developed 
here are grounded in the perspectives and perceptions of the respondents: 
the professional associations themselves solely and continually referred to 
the legitimacy and recognition of such formal meetings. the fact that these 
meetings, round tables, committees, etc. do not always show the expected 
or intended effect, or that they do also serve as façades for other, ‘real’ 
interests, does not weaken the argument. the actors themselves, whether 
from the public or from the private sector, perceive these sites to be the 
‘real’ sites, the legitimate and acknowledged sites for contestation, debate, 
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dialogue and consensus. this is a powerful finding, for it squarely refutes 
dominant theories on public-private relationships in africa.
if anything, the awkwardness of the empirical findings relate to the 
flakey, small and constantly challenged spaces of professional associa-
tions. this holds true even over time, during which the normative frame-
work of the construction industry has changed dramatically in direction 
of good governance models. this is what i termed ‘Humpty dumpty’ in 
the case-study of 2010—the quest for and validation of unambiguous 
directions of social change remains elusive. What the empirical findings 
indicate, however spuriously, is the complexity of such identity forma-
tion, articulation and creation of political rules. Contrary to the linear 
trajectory outlined by the discourse on good governance and corruption, 
such processes are shaped by far deeper contextual and contingent fac-
tors to allow a predictive approach. this is no novel or original insight, as 
a host of empirical studies will reveal. pertinently, the empirical findings 
here also run counter to the academic discourse on corruption, in that 
they demonstrate that indeed there is social agency and political spaces 
precisely in the sense of Western (if such a generalisation is permitted) 
market-based democracy in african states. in other words, most explana-
tory frameworks of african societies miss the point, in that they dismiss or 
are blind to the political effects of social agency. as emirbayer and Mische 
(1998) demonstrate so convincingly, the ways in which social actors relate 
to their worlds is not cast in iron; social agency is informed in varying and 
variable degrees by human imagination, habits and judgement. it is pre-
cisely this ability to respond to ones’ context which underlies the dynam-
ics of social interaction and change. although stark conceptualisations of 
‘african’ moral or political economies may construct impressive models of 
social orders, they are not conducive for understanding practices and pro-
cesses of change. on a theoretical and empirical level, it is precisely these 
sites, actors and processes of contestation that need to be understood 
better. in terms of a further research agenda, such micro-struggles need 
to be better embedded in an exploration of wider political changes, to 
gain a more general understanding of the ripple-effects and processes of 
sedimentation or, indeed, disruption on a national level. However, what 
remains to be pinpointed more clearly within the scope of this study is 
to what degree and under which conditions such articulations can assert 
themselves. this is a question that i will turn to more extensively in the 
next section.
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3. The Politics of Corruption as an Empty Signifier
the relation between politics and corruption is one that plays a central 
role in the academic discourse on corruption, and is key statement of the 
development discourse. However, where the development discourse oper-
ationalises statements on ‘politics’ in a highly bureaucratic fashion, the 
academic discourse on corruption throws a dark shadow on african poli-
tics. in both discourses political agency is accorded no real space, albeit 
for very different reasons—in the first case because social actors disap-
pear in the technocratic operationalisation of development interventions, 
in the second discourse because the structural conditions characterising 
african states leave no space for plural social and political agency.
the tentative outline of a third discourse on corruption, what i have 
termed an emancipatory discourse, allows for the thinking of such spaces 
and actors and processes. the question posed at the outset of this dis-
course was: can corruption be conceptualised as an empty signifier—a 
nodal point that does not close down political spaces, but actually opens 
them up? in other words, in very Gramscian terms, can corruption act 
as a medium to transcend narrow interests of a particular social group 
and represent something more universal, something connecting up differ-
ent social groups in society and create a sense of a greater community or 
unity? distinguishing it from the analytical strategies of other discourse 
theories, in this third discourse, corruption is very explicitly not concep-
tualised in terms of a specific political or moral economy of corruption 
defining political order and access to social resources. Corruption is con-
ceptualised as an ‘empty signifier’, as a ‘vehicle’ that allows a whole host 
of different meanings to be attached to it. the ‘emptier’ corruption as a 
signifier is, the more meanings and representations it can be filled with. 
Quite literally it means different things to different people. and in this 
sense it is a very powerful medium of social articulation, as empty signifi-
ers allow for different identities, interests and representations to be linked 
up together. empty signifiers can thus be understood as nodal points of 
society through which differential identitites can be transcended and 
inscribed in a more universal ‘social’ identity. the less ‘fixed’ their mean-
ing is, the more ‘open’ they are, the more conducive they are to being 
inscribed with different meanings and identities. empty signifiers thus 
structure society by providing unifying points of articulation between and 
across particular identities, performing an eminently political operation.
However, this begs the question why ‘corruption’ was constituted as 
an empty signifier, and not any other potential symbol of such unity? 
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evidently, there are other potential empty signifiers floating in the public 
realm, some of the more obvious ones being development, democratisa-
tion, or poverty-reduction. although this point was not elaborated in this 
study, these can and do act as empty signifiers. My focus is on corruption, 
however, because it is such an immensely evocative term, even in its very 
semantics denoting an absence, the unfulfilled (moral, political, economic, 
etc.) reality of society. these semantics have provided a fertile surface for 
inscriptions of discourses that relate to these powerful social imaginaries 
and related empty signifiers. in particular, as i have shown, the develop-
ment discourse has constructed powerful articulations on corruption that 
are ubiquitous in the public realm and serve to structure specific interven-
tions and national policies. this makes it a particularly accessible signifier, 
broad enough to be legible and give material shape to a wide range of dis-
courses and yet invoking all things good about inclusion to ‘development’: 
about economic growth, social equity, and political culture.
this explains the relationship between the empty signifier and politics, 
in which empty signifiers produce a trope of political articulations and 
moral imaginings for such diverse groups and interests. But it also points 
to a second central question, namely: why do some social groups articu-
late and mobilise more successfully than others in a particular strip of 
time and space? is it possible to make any predictive statements on the 
hegemonising operations of particular social actors, on the extent they 
manage to create a sense of universal meaning through their own, differ-
ential representations? as a reminder, the explorations of concrete social 
actors in tanzania, namely professional associations in an urban context, 
were chosen explicitly on the basis of such a predictive hypothesis, i.e. 
their historically and discursively constructed potential for fostering social 
change of a particular democratic kind. in other words, precisely because 
dominant discourses identify these as being the ‘right’ social agents to 
articulate, internalise and mediate value-structures and practices which 
would foster a rule-based political culture and a merit-based economy. 
in addition, my hypothesis was that the discourse of development would 
provide both the material and symbolic social imaginary dislocating 
entrenched structural positions, hence opening up new spaces and oppor-
tunities for such social actors.
the findings of the two case-studies leave a more fragmented, fissured 
impression. to analyse these findings, however, some more fundamental 
thoughts are in need of elaboration.
as was explored in the previous chapters, the social production of empty 
signifiers is a constitutive act of social relations: through the emptying out 
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of the particular meaning of signifiers, i.e. through the loosening of the rela-
tionship between the signifier (the name) and the signified (the meaning), 
social actors are able to create a ‘universality’ of their own particular aims 
and connect to broader, wider aims. thus, the conceptualisation of corrup-
tion as an empty signifier allows for highly differentiated interpretation of 
the processes through which social actors link up to other discourses, the 
processes through which they magnify and, importantly, modify their own 
demands and interests, at the same time drawing boundaries around their 
own identities and opening the boundaries up for other articulations.
But this has not yet answered the constitutive question raised above. 
Why do some social actors express such demands and not others, if poten-
tially all differential identities can be transcended through such hegemonic 
operations? laclau gives a very clear answer, namely that the unevenness 
of power is constitutive:
not any position in society, not any struggle is equally capable of transform-
ing its own contents in a nodal point that becomes an empty signifier. now, 
is this not to return to a rather traditional conceptualisation of the historical 
effectivity [sic] of social forces, one which asserts that the unevenness of 
structural locations determines which one of them is going to be the source 
of totalizing effects? no, it is not, because those uneven structural locations, 
some of which represent points of high concentration of power, are them-
selves the result of processes in which logics of equivalence and logics of 
difference overdetermine each other. [. . .] if this is correct, it is impossible 
to determine at the level of the mere analysis of the form difference/equiva-
lence which particular difference is going to become the locus of equival-
ential effects—this requires the study of a particular conjuncture, precisely 
because the presence of equivalential effects is always necessary, but the 
relation equivalence/difference is not intrinsically linked to any particular 
differential content (laclau 1996: 42; emphasis in original).
on a formal level, laclau here refers to the organisation of the political 
terrain through difference/equivalence: shaped both by chains of equiva-
lence, i.e. the ‘collapsing’ of identities through the production of nodal 
points, as well as by differential frontiers that outline particular identi-
ties and struggles. But there is no predetermined social agent or particu-
lar identity or content that is a priori more successful at performing this 
hegemonic operation. What is determinant are the ‘particular conjunc-
tures’ that laclau observes.
exploring the case of professional associations in tanzania more care-
fully, the ‘study of this particular conjuncture’ shows that these identities 
and interests are indeed articulated and moulded around corruption as 
an empty signifier. Key is the function of the international development 
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discourse on corruption. Here, the findings on its depoliticisation effects 
need to be amended. although the mechanics of the development dis-
course do have an intrinsically depoliticising effect, the overdetermina-
tion of ‘corruption’ has had a political effect: the discursive construction 
of corruption as articulated in the international development discourse 
and its subsequent inscriptions in national political discourses has been 
one of the prime conditions for differential identities to be articulated and 
appropriated through corruption by professional associations.
in other words, professional associations performed a hegemonic oper-
ation, by articulating their own differential identities through the nodal 
points constructed around ‘corruption’. this is a process that could be 
clearly observed in 2003: the anti-corruption discourse of foreign aid led 
to a restructuring of the discursive terrain by endowing certain structural 
locations with distinct symbolic and material power. this in turn opened 
up the political space for professional associations to represent their 
interests in terms of differential identities (professionals/unprofessionals, 
professionals/officials, etc.) as well as in terms of equivalential interests 
(development, growth, ‘better rules’). Given the very recent establishment 
of ‘professionals’ as a distinct identity, this was a crucial operation. interest-
ingly, this primary operation of establishing professional associations—and 
hence a drawing a boundary around a distinct ‘professional’ community—
was not derived from references to outright antagonisms. there are sur-
prisingly few statements that refer to the public sector or to public officials 
or politicians as ‘the enemy’.4 although ‘typical’ attitudes and behaviours 
of the public sector were critiqued or lamented, in general consensual 
operations with the public sector around nodal points such as ‘regulation’ 
or ‘professionalisation’ were emphasised. this holds especially true in the 
case of first-generation associations. only around the year 2000 were more 
explicit differences constructed with reference to corruption, materialised 
in the Workshop on Corruption in the Construction industry in 2001 (the 
united republic of tanzania 2001). that particular conjuncture allowed 
professional associations to articulate specific demands, needs and griev-
ances in reference to corruption. With the dominant articulations of the 
national political discourse on anti-corruption and economic growth, 
framed and informed by the international development discourse on gov-
ernance and corruption, professional associations could latch on to this 
4 see below (section 3) for a further elaboration of the theoretical significance with 
regard to democratic politics. 
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signifier and fill it with their own, particular interests and demands that 
went far beyond ‘corruption’ as such: greater institutional support, better 
quality-control, clear and formally recognised distinction between profes-
sionals and non-professionals, better financial protection for profession-
als, to mention but a few of the (over)determinations.
these attempts to define this discourse did show signs of success: the 
interests and demands of the professional associations were heard in the 
public sphere and resonated beyond the very narrow identity of the asso-
ciations themselves. in particular, their efforts to articulate and imple-
ment institutional and regulatory improvements served to construct a 
distinct sense of community on several levels: they managed to delineate 
‘the construction industry’ as an entity which was worthy of a sector pol-
icy; they achieved the definition of ‘professionals’ as a separate category, 
embodied by distinct professional associations of ‘engineers’ or ‘contrac-
tors’; and the professions themselves were distinguished by subcategories, 
such as ‘consulting engineers’ or ‘civil contractors’. these identifications 
and delineations were achieved not least by the invocation and inscrip-
tion of (anti-)corruption as a signifier of institutional and legal reform.
What could be observed in 2010, however, is that the power of cor-
ruption as an empty signifier had waned considerably. although ‘cor-
ruption’ is still a dominant signifier in the public realm, it has all but 
disappeared from the public articulations of professional associations. in 
many ways, this is surprising, given the priority that governance reforms 
are given within the international and national development discourse, 
and also given the acute pressures on political and economic spaces of 
professionals.
this phenomenon points to a particular conjuncture in laclau’s sense 
elaborated above. in the late nineties, there was a window of opportu-
nity shifting certain power relations and opening up articulatory spaces, 
enabling new articulations of identities of and relations between the pub-
lic and private sector. However, as was tangible from the start, the identi-
fication with collective interests as embodied in professional associations 
by the community is truly weak. the values and practices of the profes-
sional association are by no means a gauge of the values and practices of 
the whole professional community. invisible to this case-study were for 
instance those professionals who are not part of a professional commu-
nity, those who have ‘no sense of community’, those who ‘don’t think of 
the future’, but who ‘think only of themselves, here and now’. they were 
palpably present, however, in the articulations and statements of the pro-
fessional community, who were not only pushing back against the public 
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sector (which itself, as was demonstrated, is far more heterogeneous than 
generalised concepts of ‘the state’ allow for), but also rubbing up against 
those ‘colleagues’ who subscribed to other ethics and values. this is not 
to say that representatives of professional associations do not engage in 
corrupt practices—some do and must. But they engage in corruption as 
individuals, not as representatives of professional associations. in their 
identity as representatives of collective interests of a specific professional 
community they are fighting for an order in which they are not obliged to 
be corrupt—put more generally, for an order in which they enjoy a larger 
degree of political recognition, legal security and economic freedom.
in other words, there is a threshold, a critical mass of representative-
ness that particular interests need to reach that their articulations achieve 
hegemonising effects. this has not only a symbolic dimension, but a 
deeply material one too: it is not just a question of representation, it is 
equally a question of resources. lacking other sources of income, such as 
donor-financed projects or own activities, the resonance of their articula-
tions is very weak. obviously, professional associations failed to construct 
new forms of political identification that are evocative enough to mobilise 
their own community, let alone other communities beyond particular pro-
fessions. it could be argued that this lies in the signifier ‘corruption’ itself. 
evidently, the signifier is not emptied out sufficiently to provide a power-
ful canvas of communal aims, to provide a trope of political and other 
imaginations. it seems that it is still filled with particular meanings that 
prevent it becoming (or rather: remaining) a societal symbol of democratic 
spaces. such significations of corruption encountered were, for instance, 
the meaning of enrichment (in a positive connotation), the meaning of 
doing business, or even the meaning of powerlessness and resignation. 
under these circumstances, the fragile, poor, small and often personalised 
professional associations are themselves not powerful enough to define 
the discourse of corruption, its practices and representations. What in 
effect happened is that powerful state and economic actors appropriated 
the meaning of corruption by stamping it on the institutional reforms. 
the particularistic demands of the professional associations with regard 
to substantive change and reform were all but dissolved in the process.
However, the fact that the authorities have managed to hegemonise 
representations of corruption far more successfully than the associations 
is remarkable in itself. What is notable here is not that professional asso-
ciations are not powerful enough to assume this role, given their minute 
size and number. What is remarkable that state authorities are powerful 
enough. evidently, the authorities represent ‘structural locations of high 
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concentrations of power’. as laclau (2000b: 207–221) elaborates more gen-
erally, the ability of a group to assume a function of universal representa-
tion presupposes that it is in a better position than other groups to assume 
this role; in other words, that power is unevenly distributed between 
various social actors and social sectors. Given key statements on weak 
states and dysfunctional public institutions by the academic discourse, 
the finding that authorities are located in a more powerful position is not 
at all self-evident. in addition, the process of hegemonisation itself mer-
its attention: the process through which the authorities undertake these 
hegemonic representations is strictly within the formal, public sphere and 
along formal and formalised procedures. again, this finding challenges 
dominant statements on blurred boundaries and hybrid norms. it is not 
a question of patrimonial control or of instrumentalised disorder. on the 
contrary, official state functions such as the regulation of the construc-
tion sector are extended in a completely legal and bureaucratic fashion. 
Whether this absorbation of particular, differential identities of social 
agents by the public sector may lead to the increasingly antagonistic 
articulation of demands, is at yet open. statements such as “they will not 
be kept down forever, they will rise” indicate that the frontiers drawn by 
subordinate social agents may indeed become more confrontational, with 
political and economic frustrations becoming increasingly aggravated.
although this point would merit greater attention, i need to leave it 
standing and turn back to the related question of democratic politics. 
in the following and concluding section, i shall discuss in what way the 
contextual dynamics of this operations enable or constrains democratic 
spaces.
4. Corruption, Identity and Democratic Politics
in this exploration of corruption as an empty signifier, one of my main 
objectives was to tease out an empirically substantiated account of the 
conditions and processes of social agency and democratic politics in afri-
can political orders. in closing, there are some remarks i would like to 
make relating to the possibility of democratic politics in africa. a key find-
ing of the case-studies was that the identities of professional associations 
have, on the one hand, undergone dramatic changes, being accorded for-
mal accreditation and acknowledgement. the findings indicate, as a clas-
sically modernist feature, a ‘hardening’ and strengthening of civic actors 
in african societies. on the other hand, in spite of these institutional 
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changes professional associations are as weak or perhaps even weaker 
that they were a decade ago, certainly in terms of internal cohesion and 
boundaries of their collective professional identities. one of the reasons 
for this unpredicted weakening has been, rather counter-intuitively, the 
successful formal appropriation by public authorities of key spaces that 
had formerly been occupied by professional associations. partly this 
occupation was by default, as the regulatory framework appropriate for 
a market-economy had only begun to be designed in the nineties. in this 
context, professional associations fulfilled a standard setting role, which 
gave them a privileged position vis-à-vis state authorities. However, this 
privileged position was very fragile, dependent on persons (leadership) 
on the side of the associations as well as on the side of the authorities. 
this position, so to speak by default, was also subject to dislocations as a 
result of the regulatory, legal and institutional governance reforms. these 
reforms systematically privilege the state authorities, in letter and in spirit 
implementing governance principles strengthening the rule of law, regula-
tory capacity and generally institutional effectiveness. However, instead of 
creating and securing political and economic spaces of professional asso-
ciations, as assumptions inherent in anti-corruption reforms and also the 
hypothesis at the outset of my first case-study would suggest, they have 
led to the disempowerment and marginalisation of professional identities. 
in fact, it seems as if the formalisation has led to a loss of professional 
identity, rather than to an assertion of professional identity. subsequently 
and interlinked, it has led to a dispersal and fragmentation of hegemonic 
representations by professional associations, who have not been able to 
successfully fill the institutional reforms with their own meanings, values 
and practices.
this is relevant in responding to the question under which conditions 
democratic politics can emerge, my exploration focusing on the processes 
and dynamics shaping and shaped by social agency. in particular, i have 
sought to outline the hegemonic operations enabled by the empty sig-
nifier corruption, which are endowed with the potential of articulating 
emancipatory politics. i would like to flesh out some thoughts about the 
discursive formations, subject positions and identities that account for 
social agency and organise the political space. For as stuart Hall reminds 
us, identities are “those points of temporary attachment to the subject 
positions which discursive practices construct for us. they are the result 
of a successful articulation or ‘chaining’ of the subject into the flow of 
discourse” (Hall 2001: 6). in other words, determinant for subject positions 
256 conclusions
are specific discursive practices. in dominant academic discourses on cor-
ruption, the subject, i.e. democratic social agents, are ‘chained’ to articu-
lations of a vertically organised political order of limited differentiation. 
the micro-study on professional associations in tanzania shows that this 
‘chaining’ is far more complicated. although the subject positions of the 
professional associations have not experienced significant liberation, the 
discursive formations have fissured and coalesced in relatively dynamic 
and unpredictable patterns. precisely the political effects of these pro-
cesses of incremental micro-struggles set in multiple discursive forma-
tions are of key analytic interest.
political theory allows for a more tapered conceptualisation of the 
political dimension of discursive formations: “discourses and identities 
produced through them are inherently political entities that involve the 
construction of antagonisms and the exercise of power. Moreover, because 
social systems have a fundamentally political character, they are always 
vulnerable to those forces that are excluded in the process of political for-
mation” (Howarth/stavrakakis 2000: 9). this is a central point neglected 
in the academic discourse on corruption: although evidently, as the case-
study of the construction industry also showed, politics and administra-
tion are authoritarian, they are not uncontested. even under such difficult 
circumstances characterised by the deeply uneven distribution of political 
and economic power, political order is not ‘given’. it is always contami-
nated with the possibility of other, plural, different articulations. Contesta-
tions and different articulations are never completely eliminated. in other 
words, hegemonies are inherently precarious and reversible. precisely this 
‘irreversible reversibility’ is constitutive for democratic politics, irrespec-
tive of the degree of political openness or closure.
and in spite of the observed collapse (or rather: crumbling) of profes-
sional identities, the insights gained from the case-studies still point to 
favourable conditions for the emergence of democratic politics. as was 
observed in Chapter 2, above, disagreement and antagonism is at the heart 
of a post-Marxist notion of democratic politics, in contrast to deliberative 
theories of democracy. and yet, as was noted above, professional associa-
tions, whilst seeking to distinguish and differentiate themselves from the 
public sector or from ‘unprofessionals’, the language and figures of speech 
are generally, with very few exceptions, conciliatory. in the interviews of 
both case-studies, there are only infrequent allusions to the ‘other’ as an 
‘enemy’. opening up a further theoretical line of inquiry, one could argue 
with Chantal Mouffe that it would be more meaningful to speak of ‘adver-
saries’ than of the ‘enemy’, pointing to the existence of conditions which, 
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in her analysis, make the emergence of democratic politics more likely. 
Consider following proposition:
i propose to distinguish between two forms of antagonism, antagonism 
proper—which takes place between enemies, that is, persons who have 
no common symbolic space—and what i call ‘agonism’, which is a differ-
ent mode of manifestation of antagonism because it involves a relation 
not between enemies but between ‘adversaries’, ‘adversaries’ being defined 
in a paradoxical way as ‘friendly enemies’, that is persons who are friends 
because they share a common symbolic space but also enemies because 
they want to organize this common symbolic space in a different way 
(Mouffe 2000: 13).5
this is insofar significant as the common symbolic space may be con-
tested, but still constitutes a common space within which relations, con-
testations and manifestations are possible. in a different and perhaps 
more familiar terminology, one could also speak of the existence of a 
public sphere. Moreover, the ‘common symbolic space’ observed through 
the representations of both representatives of professional associations as 
well as public officials is a public sphere shaped very much by universal, 
even emancipatory ideas and imaginaries—even if there are other, non-
democratic hegemonic representations that are co-present. But this obser-
vation merely underlines the validity of the plural and fragmented nature 
of contemporary societies. perhaps even more so for african societies, 
which, as the case of ‘stable’ tanzania shows, are in enormous normative 
flux. the social imaginaries at the disposal of citizens and social agents 
are, also, of a potentially democratic nature, evoking new public spheres 
and concrete liberations. as laclau puts it, they enable the “increasing 
freeing of human beings through a more assertive image of their capaci-
ties” (laclau 1996: 123). this assertive image and spaces within which it is 
contested and defined are certainly present, even if they do not translate 
into linear and mechanical ‘democratisation’.
in african societies, identities may be more fixed than elsewhere. But 
this greater degree of fixation is not necessarily and certainly not a gen-
eralised ‘infernal mechanism’. political identities are not unchanging, they 
ripple and are rippled, shape and are shaped by continual struggles. some 
hegemonic articulations are certainly seeking to fix autocratic, patrimo-
nial or downright criminal hegemonies, but others are evidently seeking 
5 For a critical discussion of Mouffe’s proposition with regard to the possibility of dem-
ocratic politics see norval 2007: 154–160. 
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to fix democratic, emancipatory identities—which at present are more 
fragile, more precarious. But even if these are only moments of fixation, 
they are creating social change and reorganising the political space. some 
social imaginaries are shored up, whilst others are dismantled or fade 
away. What an emancipatory discourse needs to look at more closely are 
the specific, localised conjectures that enable democratic articulations.
it also needs to take time into account as a decisive factor in the 
emergence and stabilisation of democratic politics. this is not to argue 
for a simplistic model of democratic development, on the contrary: my 
understanding of politics is deeply rooted in social agency as a temporally 
embedded process of social engagement. political order thus emerges and 
is structured through changing configurations of social actors and forms of 
engagement. taking the pivotal importance of social agency into account, 
the political, social and economic traumas that have jarred african coun-
tries in the past few decades cannot be overemphasised. not only have the 
norms, values and practices under which power is exercised undergone 
a series of fundamental changes, so have the social horizons and imagi-
naries of the actors coping and engaging with these historical situations. 
the capacity of social actors to respond to and shape the world they live 
in is a dynamic process of social engagement. as i hope to have demon-
strated with this study on discursive formations, political identities and 
social agency in tanzania, for a more grounded understanding of such 
processes there is a strong case to be made for the analysis of unspec-
tacular politics.
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